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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the possibility of constructing a consistent ethical system 
that offers clear notions of equality and incorporates an animal ethic. The first part is 
more meta-ethical in nature, reflecting on notions such as moral intuitions, 
universalism, consistency and coherence. It demonstrates that moral illusions might 
exist and offers a method to discover such moral illusions.  
The second part turns to normative ethics, dealing with principles of welfare, justice 
and basic rights. It tackles problems ranging from population ethics to non-ideal theory.  
Finally, the third part moves to applied (animal) ethics, In analogy to optical illusions, 
I demonstrate that speciesism is not only a kind of prejudicial discrimination but also a 
moral illusion: an obstinate intuitive judgment that is inconsistent with a coherent 
system. The third part also tackles the predation problem and the sentience problem in 
animal ethics. 
The end result of this work is a pluralist principlist ethical system that can be 
captured in a metaphor of five moral fingers working together as the moral hand. This 
moral hand is a constructed, coherent ethical system of five universalized ethical 
principles based on strong moral intuitions. The thumb represents the principle of 
universalism, which is a basic ingredient of coherentism, and generates an anti-
discrimination rule. The index finger symbolizes a consequentialist welfare ethic, based 
on the coherence of impartiality and empathy. The middle finger is the mere means 
principle of a deontological rights ethic: humans (and animals) have a right not to be 
used as merely means to someone else’s ends. This principle captures a lot of moral 
intuitions that pop up in famous dilemmas. A fourth principle, the ring finger, refers to 
the value of biodiversity and adopts some elements of carnism, the opposite of 
veganism as ideology. This fourth principle solves the predation problem and is 
coherent with some other moral intuitions. Finally, the little finger represents the 
principle of tolerated partiality which can be used in some final moral dilemmas. With 
these five fingers of ethics, we can grasp the moral problem of consuming animal 
products, and answer the question whether veganism is a moral duty. 
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Introduction 
The discussion about the moral status of non-human animals (hereafter: animals), and 
the use of animals for food, clothing, entertainment or research, has a long history that 
goes back to Ancient Greece (Pythagoras, Plutarch). From time to time the problem 
resurges throughout the centuries (Leonardo Da Vinci; Jeremy Bentham; Oswald, 1791; 
Ritson, 1802; Salt, 1892). The real breakthrough of an academic animal ethics came in 
1971, when Richard Ryder introduced the term "speciesism": a discrimination on the 
basis of someone’s species, by analogy with racism and sexism (Godlovitch & Harris, 
1971; Ryder, 1975). The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by the application of 
different rational1 theories in normative ethics (mainly utilitarianism and deontological 
ethics) to animals (Singer, 1975; Clark, 1977; Regan, 1983). In the 1990s, criticism arose 
from the postmodernist and feminist point of view, against the “cool”, rational 
approach. (Plumwood, 1993; Adams, 1995, 1995b). A new plea for vegetarianism relied 
on an ethics of care (Adams & Donovan, 1996) or a virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 2000).  
Around the turn of the century the debate took a new twist towards (social) 
psychology and experimental philosophy. Many animal rights ethicists consider the 
argumentation for animal rights and veganism as solid and completed, but they note 
that there is more psychology than ethics behind our use of animals (Serpell, 1996; Allen 
et al. 2000; Joy 2002, 2009; Herzog 2010). The question should be asked why so few 
people are convinced by logical consistency and rational arguments.  
In this dissertation, I will return to the older, rational tradition in animal ethics, the 
approach of the seventies and eighties. After 40 years of refining the theories of animal 
ethics, I want to try to present an ambitious, most consistent and coherent ethical 
 
                                                     
1
 I define ‘rationality’ in its broadest sense as ‘effectivity in means, consistency in ends’. In this context, a 
rational ethical theory is (very roughly) characterized by an appeal to critical thinking, logic, consistency and 
reason, using a language of principles, rules or rights. It is distinguished from a more emotional approach to 
ethics. However, some experimental philosophers (e.g. Greene, 2008) claim that some rationalist ethical 
principles (e.g. deontological rights) might be the result of underlying intuitive emotional reactions.   
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system of animal equality. Consistency is the objective. My motivation for returning to 
this rationalist tradition with its focus on consistency is sixfold. 
First, this consistent ethical system of animal equality demonstrates that vegan 
animal rights people are safe in relying on and following its moral code of veganism. 
These people can trust the ethical system and don’t need to worry that their system 
contains moral inconsistencies as severe as the inconsistencies encountered in the 
other, speciesist ethics.  
Second, I want to express that critical thinking, consistency and rationality are and 
should be important elements in our moral lives. Consistency and coherence are strong 
constraints on ethical systems. These constraints help us to distrust unreliable moral 
intuitions (moral illusions) and to avoid a hyperrelativistic “anything goes” attitude. 
Throwing away all inconsistent ethical systems already limits the options to the 
surviving consistent ethical systems. This makes it easier and more reliable to select the 
ethical system that best fits our shared and strongest moral intuitions. If ethics would 
be merely a matter of taste, it should be a matter of consistent taste.  
Third, related to the previous point: I believe that a consistent system that best fits 
our shared strongest moral intuitions has a higher likelihood of compliance. 
Consistency limits arbitrariness, and a less arbitrary conception of justice might be 
more politically stable: I believe (and hope) that individuals who grow up in institutions 
governed by less arbitrary, more consistent conceptions of justice tend to be more 
motivated to respect its rules (this is an empirical claim, however, that requires 
empirical evidence). 
Fourth, we can try to convince someone to become vegan by appeal to emotion, 
intuition, empathy or serving a delicious healthy vegan meal. These are all valuable 
“psychological marketing tricks” in the animal rights movement, and when it comes to 
encouraging common people to become vegan, these strategies are likely to be more 
efficient than an appeal to rational consistency. But it is my conviction that becoming 
vegan for an additional right reason, as a moral duty based on rational, consistent 
arguments, has some extra intrinsic value.  
Fifth, I want to demonstrate that some new things can and should be said in a 
rational animal rights ethic. In the past 40 years, philosophers underestimated the 
importance of some problems (such as the predation problem and the sentience 
problem). I will tackle these problems. And I want to present a clear overview of all basic 
principles needed in an animal rights ethic, using the metaphor of five fingers of a 
moral hand. 
Sixth, my hope is that people, especially academics and other people interested in 
ethics and philosophy, would critically consider the arguments in this dissertation and 
apply them to issues like veganism and the production and consumption of animal 
products. I will try to demonstrate that the speciesist ethics that a lot of people have, is 
not internally consistent, and that a feasible consistent theory that respects deep 
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(phenomenally strong) moral intuitions is possible. Making the ethics consistent results 
in an ethical system, one of its implications is veganism. For those people who believe in 
rationality and consistency, these arguments might be an additional motivating factor 
to become vegan. After critical reflection I believe that veganism is not only a fair, 
healthy, ecologically sustainable and animal friendly way of living, but it is also a way of 
living that is most consistent with the deepest moral values of a lot of people.  
 
In order to argue for animal equality, this dissertation contains three parts. The first 
part refers to the “ethical consistency” in the title, here understood in the broad sense. 
So I start with meta-ethics, a reflection on the meaning and validity of ethics. In the first 
part, we will not yet find principles of how we should behave. We first have to set up the 
rules of the game. If I want to convince a meat eater with rational arguments, we first 
have to agree on the validity of the rules of the game.   
The starting point is our moral intuitions. These intuitions are spontaneous, 
unreflected gut feelings that something is right, wrong, good or bad. The resulting 
persistent judgments cannot be justified with further rational arguments. Intuitions are 
“things that strike us as true without us knowing entirely why they do” (Cohnitz and 
Häggqvist, 2009, p.3). They arise on their own and are not the result of inferential 
reasoning.  
Moral intuitions have different strengths, where the strength is determined by our 
willingness (not) to give up the intuition. Hence, the strongest intuitions are the ones 
that are accompanied with the strongest emotions and the strongest desire to respect 
them. Therefore, strong moral intuitions are intrinsically motivating, which gives us a 
first reason to start with those moral intuitions. A second important reason is that meat 
eaters start with intuitions as well, when they want to justify their meat consumption. 
So meat eaters and animal ethicists can agree on this part of the rules of the game. I 
believe that all ethical systems are in the end based on moral intuitions. I hope (and 
weakly believe) that the strongest moral intuitions that I use in this dissertation to 
argue for veganism, are shared by meat eaters. In other words: if animal rights activists 
and meat eaters put all their moral intuitions on the table, selecting the strongest of 
them to construct a consistent ethical system, we might see that a lot of those intuitions 
are shared by all parties. This however is an empirical claim that requires further 
evidence. 
After moral intuitions, a second important element is the method that will be used to 
move towards consistency:  universalization. This is the area of reflective ethics. 
Reflecting on particular situations, some moral intuitions are ignited. We have to 
translate those moral intuitions into particular ethical rules, applicable to those 
particular situations. Next, these particular rules should be universalized to all morally 
similar situations. We arrive at universalized ethical rules.  
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The importance of this method of universalization is also shared by meat eaters, as 
we can see in discussions about animal rights and meat consumption. Not only animal 
rights ethicists, but also a lot of meat eaters give arguments based on universalization. 
So the good news in convincing meat eaters is that we share the same rules of the game: 
moral intuitions and universalization. We both value consistency.  
Apart from a (hopefully) rather strong consensus on the importance of 
universalization, this method has another important advantage: it puts strong 
constraints on the consistency of ethical systems. So the next step is to check whether 
our universalized ethical rules are consistent in the sense that they form an internally 
consistent system lacking contradictions. When it comes to the theory of animal 
equality, we will see that it is not only consistent, but coherent: different intuitions, 
principles and arguments mutually support each other. They form a web of principles, 
like a crossword puzzle. As different letters combine into words, different intuitions can 
be unified in principles. The meat eater will have difficulties trying to show 
inconsistencies in this coherent structure. 
The crossword puzzle analogy helps to clarify the notion of coherence. Coherence, or 
consistency in the broad sense, has two aspects: non-arbitrariness and internal 
consistency. Non-arbitrariness in the crossword puzzle means that the letters in 
neighbouring white boxes should not be random, but should form existing words. 
Internal consistency means that each white box should not contain more than one 
letter.  
The two rules of the game (one letter per white box and white boxes generate words) 
place strong restrictions on the possible solutions of a crossword puzzle. Without those 
two rules, a crossword puzzle will have many equivalent solutions. With the rules, there 
will only be a few solutions (most of the puzzles have only one, but some might have 
two or even three parallel solutions). Similarly, non-arbitrariness and internal 
consistency place strong restrictions on possible ethical systems. As arbitrary and 
inconsistent systems are thrown away, we are left with only a few possible systems that 
best match our moral intuitions. As a consequence of these two restrictions, there will 
be more mutual agreement between the ethical systems that different people have. A 
consensus will be easier to achieve and there will be less space left for moral relativism. 
To illustrate the two rules of internal consistency and non-arbitrariness, we can look 
at two interesting analogies between atheism and egalitarianism. First, the atheist does 
not belief in a god that is 1) almighty, 2) all good and 3) allows the evil in the world, 
because a representation of a god that has those three properties is internally 
inconsistent. Similarly, an egalitarian animal rights activist does not belief in an ethical 
system where 1) humans have basic rights, 2) animals can be killed and eaten by 
humans and 3) speciesist discrimination is not allowed, because an ethical system that 
contains those three elements is internally inconsistent. As a second analogy, we can 
say that a theist is in fact an inconsistent atheist: a person who believes in God does not 
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belief in Zeus, Apollo, Thor, Krishna or any other possible god. S/he is a 99,999…% 
atheist. This kind of inconsistency refers to the arbitrariness: it is arbitrary to pick out 
and believe in one of those many possible gods if the amount of evidence for the 
existence of all those gods is equal (in fact nihil). Similarly, a speciesist meat eater is an 
inconsistent egalitarian: it is arbitrary to discriminate on the basis of species instead of 
e.g. race, sex, population, genus, family, order, class or any other possible (biological) 
category. Picking out the category of species is arbitrary, because the moral relevance of 
all of those many possible categories is equal (in fact nihil).  
We can apply a kind of golden rule of reciprocity to counter arbitrariness and 
inconsistency. If you may believe in God without evidence, then I may belief in Brahma 
without evidence. If you may say that we should have blind faith in Allah, then I may say 
that we should have blind faith in Jupiter. If you may be a speciesist without 
justification, then I may be a racist without justification. This kind of golden rule of 
reciprocity is nothing but an application of the method of universalization. As we will 
see, this universalization puts strong constraints on our beliefs and our ethical systems.  
Yet, like theists, speciesists will not easily be convinced by the arguments. The reason 
is that there are cognitive and moral illusions, in analogy with optical illusions (Purves 
& Lotto, 2002). We cannot trust all our intuitions. Universalization is a method to find 
out whether an intuition is an illusion. I will argue as clear as possible how to determine 
moral illusions. My final goal, in part three of the dissertation, is to show that 
speciesism based on a moral illusion: it is a stubborn intuition that makes our ethical 
theory inconsistent.  
The principle (or method) of universalism generates a formal principle of equality in 
terms of impartiality and antidiscrimination. It says that we should treat equals equally 
in all equal situations. This is a formal principle, because it does not state how we should 
treat an individual. To give this principle some material content, we have to move to 
normative ethics. Instead of meta-ethics, normative ethics deal with questions of what 
is right and good, what should be done and what is valuable. 
The second part of this dissertation uses normative ethics to present three material 
principles of equality. Hence, this part refers to the final word in the subtitle of this 
dissertation. I will derive three material principles of equality, based on different 
normative systems (consequentialist ethics, ethics of care and deontological ethics). 
Together with the formal principle of equality (the impartiality and antidiscrimination 
principle), these three different material principles of equality can be used to construct 
a nuanced theory of animal equality. As we will see, these principles of equality are not 
incompatible with some of our moral intuitions that can be translated into two notions 
of inequality. 
The first material principle of “prioritarian equality” is a consequentialist principle 
of justice, focusing on just distributions of lifetime well-being. It states that we have to 
give a strong priority to increasing the lifetime well-being of the worst-off sentient 
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beings. It can be justified with two different, mutually supporting arguments. One 
argument is based on a rational thought experiment of impartiality (the veil of 
ignorance, Rawls, 1971), extended with a high but not maximum risk aversion (need for 
safety). A second argument is based on a feeling of empathy, extended with a low but 
not zero need for efficiency. 
The second principle of “tolerated choice equality” says that we are allowed to be 
partial towards those sentient beings with whom we have a personal or special 
relationship2 or for whom we feel a lot of empathy. This partiality is only allowed as 
long as we could respect similar levels of partiality that all other sentient beings might 
have. The concern for personal relationships or special feelings of empathy is 
characteristic of an ethic of care that distances itself from an ethic that is too impartial. 
I will combine the tolerated choice equality with a well-known principle of equality of 
opportunity.  
The third principle of “basic right equality” brings us to deontological ethics based 
on duties and rights. The basic right is related to a mere means principle, as it is the 
right not to be used as merely a means to someone else’s ends. Equality means that all 
sentient beings have an equal claim to this right. Instead of empathy, this right stems 
from the feeling of respect. The basic right is coherent with a lot of shared moral 
intuitions encountered in a lot of different moral dilemmas. An extended version of the 
mere means principle allows for other deontological intuitions (e.g. the difference 
between doing and allowing). And more: the extended mere means principle opens 
space for the tolerated partiality principle that generated the tolerated choice equality. 
It says that we should tolerate some levels of impartiality. This property nicely 
demonstrates the coherent interweaving of the different principles. 
The three material principles of equality allow us to get a very precise and nuanced 
picture of discrimination.  
The third part of the dissertation is devoted to applied ethics, referring to the 
“animals” in the subtitle of this dissertation. So we will discuss some issues in animal 
ethics. First, I demonstrate that speciesism is a moral illusion which results in immoral 
discrimination. In order to do this, I will present five arguments why the species 
boundary (the criterion “human”) is not morally relevant, and five other arguments 
why sentience is morally relevant. These ten arguments cohere with each other and are 
based on strong moral intuitions and scientific knowledge. One intuition that speciesists 
have – the prejudicial difference in moral status between humans and non-humans – is 
not strong enough to overthrow the ten arguments. And if we add some psychological 
 
                                                     
2
 This principle is not restricted to a mutually conscious relationship: you might have a personal relationship 
with an individual that is not consciously aware of being in a special relationship. E.g. the relation with a baby. 
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insights in the mechanism of discrimination, we get an even stronger case against 
speciesism.  
If we mention sentience3, our next problem is how to know whether a living being is 
sentient. This sentience problem consists of two parts: first there is the scientific 
question of the required criteria to test whether someone is sentient. I will briefly 
present the current scientific consensus on this issue, which roughly says that at least 
all vertebrate animals with a functioning central nervous system are sentient. The 
second problem is an ethical one: we now have to do tests to see whether a living being 
(a fish, an insect,…) is sentient, and those tests might cause pain, fear or distress when 
the individual is indeed sentient. Are we justified in performing such tests? Are we not 
using those animals as merely means? I will argue that such tests are not immoral. 
In the animal rights discussions over the past 40 years, a highly underestimated 
problem is the predation problem. As with the sentience problem, I will discuss the 
predation problem in two parts. First, there is the prey problem: suppose a lion is 
attacking a zebra. Most people, including animal rights activists, say we do not have a 
duty to protect the zebra if we could. But if the lion is attacking a human, things change. 
Isn’t this speciesist, and how to reconcile this intuition with an antispeciesist ethics? 
The principle of tolerated choice equality will solve the issue.  
The second issue of the predation problem is the difference problem. What is the 
difference between a lioness killing a zebra in order to feed it to her two whelps, and a 
surgeon killing an innocent person in order to use his organs to save two patients in the 
hospital? In both cases, a sentient being is killed against his will and parts of his body 
(muscle tissue or organ tissue) are given to other sentient beings in order for them to 
live. Yet, there appears to be a consensus amongst most animal rights activists, that 
predation is allowed but organ transplantation is not. So what is the difference between 
predation and transplantation? How can we reconcile our theory of animal equality 
with this intuition that there is a difference? In order to solve the issue, I will introduce 
a new principle, which is in fact based on elements of a carnist ideology. Carnism (Joy, 
2002; 2009) is a sub-ideology of speciesism, the opposite of the ideology of veganism. 
Modern day meat eaters often unconsciously adopt this ideology, justifying their meat 
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 Note: I use the words “sentient being”, “affective being” and “person” interchangeably. Although feelings 
and sensations can be neutral, a sentient being has affective (positive and negative) reactions such as liking, 
disliking, pleasure and displeasure. A person is broadly defined as a being who has personal experiences and 
preferences. This requires the presence of a perceptual consciousness and the capacity to have positive and 
negative feelings. When the context makes it clear, “persons” will sometimes refer to “moral agents”, a subset 
of the sentient beings.  
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consumption by claiming that this behaviour is natural, normal and necessary4. By 
clarifying those three notions, I will argue that violations of the basic right are only 
allowed when all three criteria are satisfied. So predation is allowed because it is 
normal, natural and necessary, whereas transplantations are neither normal nor 
natural. Borrowing aspects from the carnist ideology gives us the advantage that our 
theory becomes coherent with the intuitions that a lot of meat eaters share.  
To make the case for this 3-N-principle even stronger, I relate the 3-N-principle to 
the intrinsic value of biodiversity. To justify this value, I explore an interesting analogy 
between two properties: well-being of sentient beings and biodiversity of ecosystems. 
The intrinsic value of biodiversity introduces an element of environmental ethics, an 
important branch of applied ethics. 
The 3-N-principle (based on the value of biodiversity) can be combined with another 
principle that can solve the difference problem in the predation problem: the principle 
of behavioural fairness. Together, we arrive at a fifth principle of equality (a fourth 
material principle): everyone has an equal right to a behaviour that is both natural, 
normal and necessary (i.e. a behaviour that strongly contributes to biodiversity). Briefly 
put: if a zebra is allowed to eat for survival, then so is a lion.  
The epilogue of this dissertation presents the metaphor of the moral hand: five basic 
ethical principles correspond with the five fingers of the moral hand. These five 
principles are universalism (the thumb), prioritarian justice and the value of well-being 
in consequentialist ethics (forefinger), the mere means principle and the basic right in 
deontological ethics (middle finger), naturalness and the value of biodiversity in 
environmental ethics (ring finger), and tolerated choice partiality and the value of 
personal relationships in ethics of care (the little finger). These five fingers generate five 
principles of equality (one formal, four material), respectively: impartiality, prioritarian 
equality of well-being, basic right equality, naturalistic behavioural fairness and 
tolerated choice equality. Although these five principles of the moral hand might 
conflict with each other in particular situations, they can be considered as moral forces 
that need to be balanced against each other. Just as a physical system with multiple 
forces (gravity, electromagnetism,…) is not inconsistent, the moral hand is not 
necessarily an inconsistent ethical system. However, some elements of a speciesist or 
carnist ethical system are internally inconsistent in the sense that the theory says that 
something is both allowed and impermissible, without the possibility of balancing 
different principles.  
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 Consumption of animal products is not necessary, however, as dietitians claim that a well-planned vegan diet 
is healthy for everyone, including pregnant women and athletes (ADA, 2009). 
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In the appendix, I present a review and systematization of the trolley problem, a very 
famous thought experiment in moral philosophy. A runaway trolley is about to kill five 
innocent people. Are we allowed to sacrifice another innocent person in order to save 
the five people? 
After the bibliography I present a schematic argument for veganism, clearly 
indicating all the basic assumptions and logical steps. 
 
Before we dive into the details, I want to give a summary of this dissertation: a 
structured line of reasoning to arrive at a complete ethical system of animal equality, 
consisting of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fit our 
strongest moral intuitions, without too many arbitrary elements.  
Summary: towards a coherent theory of animal equality5 
In this introduction my goal is to construct a coherent ethical system that is capable of 
dealing with all relevant issues in principle-based animal ethics. The basic line of 
reasoning of this construction goes as follows: I start with a factual property of the 
world, which ignites a moral intuition or emotion, i.e. a quick, spontaneous moral 
response or judgment that has no further rational justification. Then, in a process of 
reflection, this intuition is translated into a universalized ethical rule, where 
“universalized” means: “relevant to all morally similar situations”. Sometimes different 
moral intuitions will mutually support each other, resulting in a set of coherent 
universalized ethical principles. But sometimes we encounter a new fact or situation 
that again ignites another moral intuition or emotion, which might be in contradiction 
with our constructed set of universalized ethical principles. To solve this conflict or 
moral dilemma, we can either change the ethical principles, or introduce a new ethical 
principle that trumps the previous ethical principles in that particular situation. This 
new ethical principle needs to be universalized as well to all relevantly similar 
situations.  
This process continues: we again test the constructed coherent set of universalized 
principles in new situations, and if we encounter a moral dilemma, we look for further 
refinements. Eventually, all situations and all facts that ignite moral intuitions should be 
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 This section is based on Bruers (2014), Towards a Coherent Theory of Animal Equality, accepted for 
publication in Between the Species. 
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covered, and we move to a consistent ethical system of hierarchical universalized 
principles, where some principles trump others. In other words, we reach a theory in 
‘reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls, 1971), which means that our strongest moral intuitions 
and ethical principles are coherent (mutually supporting each other). 
This approach can be compared with solving a crossword puzzle. The descriptions of 
the words are the analogues of relevant input data (objective facts in the world as well 
as moral intuitions that we have). The white boxes refer to the different possible 
situations and viewpoints, the individual letters represent the intuitive moral 
judgments from particular viewpoints in particular situations. The words correspond 
with the universalized ethical principles (applied to all similar situations), and these 
words mutually support each other and form a coherent solution to the puzzle.6 So let’s 
derive a coherent ethic of animal equality, starting from the most basic, indisputable 
objective facts and moral intuitions. 
The construction of a coherent system 
Fact 1: All sentient beings have a well-being and they value their own well-being (and 
everything that contributes to well-being). Sentient beings are beings that have and can 
subjectively feel interests. They have the experience of having preferences (wanting 
something). Things subjectively matter to them, meaning first of all that the individual 
has a mechanism (i.e. a complex functioning nervous system) that enables the 
individual to have representations of their bodies and environments. These 
representations can have intentionality, resulting in qualitative experiences 
(phenomenological sensations or qualia). For example: through my fingers I can feel 
these pages. I know the difference between this feeling and an absence of feeling, for 
example when my fingers are anaesthetized. However, just before I paid attention to 
this feeling of touch, I was not aware of it. There was an unconscious neural activity (but 
no anaesthesia). Only after I focused on my fingertips, it became a conscious experience 
or ‘quale’ of touch. Now, qualia are often neutral. I don’t feel an urge to avoid touching 
paper. But other qualia have valence. They are affective in nature and are evaluated as 
being positive or negative. A needle in my finger generates a quale that I wish to avoid. 
This quale is called pain and it generates an urge in me. Once a quale becomes an 
affective mental state (i.e. a positive or negative feeling or emotion such as pain, 
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 To be clear, constructing an ethical system (based on input data such as moral intuitions generated through 
thought experiments) is analogous to solving a crossword puzzle (based on input data such as descriptions of 
the words and knowledge of the pattern of the white boxes and the lengths of the words). Hence, constructing 
an ethical system should not be confused with constructing a crossword puzzle. 
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distress, joy,…), well-being comes into play. These feelings are related to interests, 
desires or needs: they are nothing but subjective experiences of (un)satisfied interests. 
Fear, pain and frustration indicate that the needs for respectively safety, bodily 
integrity and freedom are not satisfied.  
Moral intuition 1: Impartiality is morally important. We can consider a two-step 
process to increase impartiality, from rational egoism to extended contractualism. A 
rational egoist would strive for a contractarian ethic (cfr. Thomas Hobbes), where all 
rational beings (i.e. beings with whom one can negotiate) of equal power will become 
part of the moral community, because those rational egoists gain mutual advantages 
through the social contract. However, in a first step to extend impartiality, Rawls (1971) 
used the method of the veil of ignorance to delete the second condition of equality of 
power. He arrives at a contractualist ethic that also includes rational people in 
dependent or weaker positions (minorities, future generations,…). The veil of ignorance 
is a thought experiment, whereby you imagine that you will be born as a rational agent, 
but you don’t know who you will be. You can determine the moral and political laws, 
based on your knowledge of the natural laws. I would suggest a second step to extend 
impartiality, whereby we delete the condition of rationality. Imagine that you might be 
any object or entity in the world, but you don’t know who or what you might be. For 
complete impartiality, you have to imagine you could be a planet, an electron, a pig in 
the year 3000 or anything you can think of. How would you like that entity to be 
treated? If you were non-sentient, this question would not matter to you, because 
nothing done to you will influence your well-being. You would not have a well-being, 
experiences or preferences. The kind of treatment becomes important only for those 
beings whose well-being can be influenced by moral agents. Non-sentient entities 
should not be taken into account in this moral evaluation. So the least arbitrary and 
most impartial thing to do is to delete both conditions (of rationality and equality of 
power), which is what Rowlands (1998) argued, from which it follows that well-being 
still remains important. 
Universal ethical principle 1: All moral agents should strive towards impartiality in 
all situations, and should take everyone’s well-being into consideration in an impartial 
way. Moral agents are people who are able to understand the notion of impartiality. 
Fact 2: Empathy is meaningful for all and only for sentient beings (feeling empathy 
for non-sentient beings such as teddy bears would be a kind of projection of emotions). 
Empathy is the capacity to experience or sample the emotions of others. This emotional 
response occurs when the perspective (frame of reference) of the other is taken. 
Moral intuition 2: Compassion (empathy plus the desire to alleviate the suffering of 
the other) is a moral virtue. 
Universal ethical principle 2: All moral agents should develop compassion in all 
situations (hence also towards all sentient beings). Moral agents are people who are able 
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to develop compassion, are able to understand the virtue of compassion, and are able to 
help others. Those moral agents should try to improve the well-being of others. 
The above two universal ethical principles are coherent with each other, and give a 
rational and emotional basis of the moral importance of sentience. They are based on 
contractualism, consequentialism and virtue ethics. The coherence gets even stronger 
when we consider the following two moral intuitions. A) Mental capacities (self-
consciousness, rationality,…) are morally important. They are very special, complex and 
vulnerable, hence worth protecting. B)  Babies and mentally disabled humans have 
rights because they have something morally important. They have a higher moral status 
than human egg cells, skin cells, dead human bodies, plants or stones. Together with the 
fact that sentience is the only mental capacity that mentally disabled persons have in 
common with other humans who have strong rights, A and B generate two extra 
reasons why sentience is important. Furthermore, the link between rights and sentience 
is also not farfetched: rights protect interests; feelings detect interests.  
This gives us a strong coherent case for the moral relevance of sentience. It is a 
scientific question (i.e. a matter of fact) what entity has a well-being and how its well-
being can be influenced. We can briefly compare this moral relevance of sentience with 
the moral irrelevance of a criterion such as the species Homo sapiens. First, the species 
is one of the many biological classifications, thus it is arbitrary to pick a specific species 
and not a specific population, genus, family, order, class,… Second, the definition of a 
species is very complicated. One of the definitions refers to a set of individuals who 
could get fertile offspring. But reference to fertility and offspring is very artificial and 
farfetched when it comes to determining who has rights. Third, science will never be 
able to determine whether a human-chimpanzee hybrid, a human-animal chimera, an 
ancestor (Australopithecus, Homo habilis,…) or a genetically modified humanoid should 
still be called Homo sapiens. The boundaries are fuzzy. Fourth, all species are temporally 
related to all other species in a similar way, as populations can be spatially related in a 
ring species (a ring species consists of a spatial spreading of populations, where A can 
get fertile offspring with B, B with C, but C not with A). Fifth, if the moral status of a 
species is determined by genes or bodily appearance, then it is also very arbitrary to 
pick out those genes or bodily characteristics and not others (such as skin colour). We 
are not responsible for our genes, so it would be a violation of the desert principle if we 
based moral status on genes. In summary, the species boundary is too arbitrary, 
artificial and abstract to be morally relevant.  
So far, our ethic is not yet unambiguous and clear. We observe that there are 
different sentient beings and multiple ways to influence their well-being (for example: 
increasing everyone’s well-being a little bit versus increasing the well-being of one 
individual a lot). So what is a just distribution of well-being? First of all, we value 
parsimony and simplicity. One simple solution would be to add the levels of well-being 
of all sentient beings for a specific time interval, and then take the sum over all times. 
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Then we could try to maximize this sum. This is sum-utilitarianism. But there are also 
other simple options, such as trying to maximize the well-being of the worst-off 
sentient being (the one with the lowest level of well-being). This is maximin-
utilitarianism. However, according to many people, both sum-utilitarianism and 
maximin-utilitarianism have some counterintuitive implications. With sum-
utilitarianism, it is morally good to sacrifice one individual in order to increase the well-
being of others, or to kill one individual and replace him with another sentient being, or 
to keep on breeding sentient beings in order to increase the sum of well-being. The 
latter is known as the ‘repugnant conclusion’ (Parfit, 1984): an overpopulated world 
with a trillion individuals with a well-being slightly above zero, might be better than a 
world with only a thousand individuals who have a satisfyingly high level of well-being. 
Our moral intuitions go against these conclusions. These conclusions can be avoided by 
introducing a level of risk aversion. 
Fact 3: There are many sentient beings, and some beings can be worse-off than 
others. This fact implies that from behind the impartial veil of ignorance, how to 
maximize your well-being becomes a game of chance. Mathematically, sum-
utilitarianism implies that the expectation value of your well-being will be maximized. 
But you have to be aware that there is a risk that you might be born as one of the worst-
off individuals. For example: two individuals might have well-being levels equal to 10 
and 100, so the expectation value will be equal to 55 (the average). In sum-
utilitarianism, this situation would be equal to the situation where those two beings 
both have a well-being of 55. The problem is that in the first situation, you might end up 
as the person with level 10. When much is at stake, most moral agents have a risk 
aversion (need for safety – to play it safe), and in this game of chance, this means that 
they would not opt for sum-utilitarianism, but to some kind of prioritarianism: giving 
priority to increases of well-being of the worst-off positions. Therefore they prefer the 
second situation (with equality of well-being). If you have maximum risk aversion (a 
maximum need for safety), you would take the maximin-utilitarian strategy 
(maximizing the minimum/lowest well-being), giving all priority to the worst-off 
position, because you are so worried at becoming this worst-off individual. If you have 
zero risk aversion, you are a sum-utilitarist. A high but not maximum level of risk 
aversion would result in a prioritarianism that is in between maximin-utilitarianism and 
sum-utilitarianism. We could call this ‘quasi-maximin prioritarianism’. 
Moral intuition 3: A (high) level of risk aversion is good (especially when much of 
your well-being is at stake; then most people are risk averse). 
Universal ethical principle 3: Quasi-maximin prioritarianism should be applied in all 
situations. Mathematically, this principle can be expressed as the maximization of a 
power average of values of life of all sentient beings. The power in the power averaging 
corresponds with the level of risk aversion behind the veil of ignorance. The value of life 
(lifetime well-being) refers to the total preferred well-being of an individual over 
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his/her complete lifespan (that spans from the first till the last subjective feeling of the 
individual). This preferred well-being is the value that one would ascribe to living the 
complete life of that individual, when looking from the most impartial point of view, e.g. 
from behind a veil of ignorance. The value of life contains everything that would matter 
to you, everything that would be valuable to you, all the preferences that you would 
have, if you would live the life of that sentient being. 
Quasi-maximin prioritarianism has some elegant features. It avoids the 
abovementioned objections against sum-utilitarianism, and also a lot of objections 
against animal ethics. First, consider the idea of painlessly killing someone (for example 
in his sleep). From behind the veil of ignorance, you cannot prefer such killing, even if 
you are not aware that you will be killed. This means that a sentient being should now 
be defined as a being that has already developed the capacity to feel and has not yet 
permanently lost this capacity. Indeed, value of life starts from the first feeling and ends 
at the last feeling.  
Next, take the problem of replaceability. Is it allowed to kill a sentient being 
(painlessly), and then let another sentient being be born? This happens when we breed 
and slaughter cows. If we kill a sentient being, his value of life will be e.g. 5, whereas it 
would have been 10 otherwise (when he lives a full life). So in a first option, one 
individual will have a life with total well-being equal to 5 (an early death), and a second 
one will also have a short life with total well-being 5. In a second option, we will have 
only one being, with level 10 (a full life). From behind the veil of ignorance, in the first 
option you will get a low value of life equal to 5. In the second option, you are sure you 
will have level 10. A sum-utilitarist would say that the both options are equal, because 
the total value of life equals 10 in both situations. But I would prefer the second 
situation, and that’s also what our prioritarian theory says, because this theory uses a 
(power) average. Therefore, sentient beings are not replaceable. Also the repugnant 
conclusion (the idea to keep on breeding sentient beings until their values of life are 
about to drop below zero), can be avoided, by simply noting that behind the veil of 
ignorance you would not prefer an overpopulated world where everyone has a very low 
value of life. So quasi-maximin prioritarianism avoids the often heard argument that 
breeding livestock animals is good, because they owe their lives to the breeders, and it is 
better to live a life on a farm than not to be born at all (this might not be the case for 
animals living on a ‘factory farm’). According to our prioritarianism, the choice is not 
between an existing life on a farm versus a non-existing life, because as said above: in 
each choice, we only consider the sentient beings that exist in that world-history. 
Another famous problem in animal ethics is the lifeboat dilemma (e.g. Regan, 1983). 
Suppose there are different sentient beings in a lifeboat, but we cannot save everyone. 
Those beings can have different expected life expectancies, but they can also differ in 
complexity (richness) of emotions, the amounts of needs, the levels of satisfaction when 
needs are satisfied,…. This means that the potential values of life can differ amongst the 
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different sentient beings in the lifeboat. The potential values of life between a (mentally 
normal) human, a dog or a frog can differ. This influences our choices whom to rescue. 
As Regan argued, it might be required to sacrifice the dogs first, because they 
experience a less rich life than the humans. However, Regan said that the life of one 
human would trump the lives of a million and more dogs. According to our 
prioritarianism (the veil of ignorance with a high but not maximum level of risk 
aversion), there would be a number of dogs, above which the loss of that amount of dogs 
would be worse than the loss of one human life.  
The quasi-maximin principle is coherent with a lot of our moral intuitions. And there 
is a second way to arrive at this principle.  
Fact 4: There might be situations where we can decrease someone’s well-being with a 
huge amount (e.g. drive him/her into extreme poverty) in order to increase the worst-
off position with a negligible small amount.    
Moral intuition 4: Efficiency is important to some degree. Empathy might have a 
tendency to give absolute priority to improving the worst-off individual, which results 
in a maximin strategy. But if we value efficiency, we would not sacrifice too much well-
being. 
Universal ethical principle 4: This equals quasi-maximin prioritarianism (principle 3). 
We should maximize the value of life of all sentient beings, giving a strong priority to 
increase the lowest values of well-being. In other words: we should maximize the value 
of life of the worst-off individuals, unless this is at the expense of much more well-being 
of others. 
In summary: a rational approach of impartiality (the veil of ignorance) with a high 
but not maximum risk aversion (need for safety) coheres with an emotional approach of 
compassion with a low but non-zero need for efficiency. The two approaches represent 
two different points of view: the rational approach looks at a situation from the outside, 
from an impartial point of view behind a veil of ignorance. The emotional approach is 
more down to earth: it looks at a situation from the inside, from the subjective 
experience of compassion with others. These are two approaches resulting in the same 
quasi-maximin prioritarian principle. 
This principle has two disadvantages. As a first problem, the values of life are very 
difficult to measure and compare. All we have is our empathy, our scientific knowledge 
and our imagination. We have to try placing ourselves in the position of others, by using 
empathy, or by imagining that we could be the other individual, with all his or her 
needs and feelings. So the ‘emotional’ method of empathy and the ‘rational’ method of 
the veil of ignorance are actually two rules of thumb to make educated guesses about 
the order of the values of life of different individuals. Empathy and imagination are 
virtues to be developed and already allow us to move quite far.  
A second disadvantage is that the level of priority given to the worst-off (in other 
words: the level of risk aversion or the need for efficiency), is in some sense arbitrary. 
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The level is somewhere between 0 (sum-utilitarism with zero risk aversion) and infinity 
(maximin-utilitarism with maximum risk aversion). However, I believe our coherent 
picture is strong enough to withstand this objection. The arbitrariness is less bad than 
overriding a coherent set of strong moral intuitions. The good thing is that no-one has a 
strong preference to a sharp level of priority. No-one says the value should be 748. It’s 
more like a fuzzy range that we prefer. So we can and should be a bit tolerant to the 
levels of priority that other moral agents would prefer, and this means we can be 
flexible and could come to a democratic or mutual consensus between all moral agents. 
But once we have set a level of priority, we should apply it consistently in all relevantly 
similar cases. 
The quasi-maximin prioritarianism is the basic framework of a coherent ethical 
system of animal equality. All sentient beings are in some sense equal from an impartial 
perspective such as behind a veil of ignorance. It is a consequentialist ethic, because it 
only looks at outcomes of values of life. Giving a level of priority for the worst-off 
positions, some people (true consequentialists) might prefer to stop the construction of 
a coherent ethical system here. However, there are some more intuitions that do not fit 
in the prioritarian ethic. We first discuss an intuition related to an ethic of care and next 
an intuition related to an ethic of rights. 
Fact 5: There is a possible situation where I have to choose between a sentient being I 
hold dear and one or more other unknown sentient beings. E.g. in a burning house 
dilemma, where I have to choose between saving my child or other individuals from the 
flames.  
Moral intuition 5: I am allowed to help the person I hold dear. 
Universal ethical principle 5: It is allowed to be partial in all situations of aid where 
someone is involved whom you hold dear (with whom you have a personal relationship 
or strong feelings of empathy), as long as we tolerate similar levels of partiality of 
everyone else. This principle of tolerated partiality trumps the above prioritarian 
principle to some degree, but not too much. 
Burning house dilemmas such as “Your child or the dog?” (Francione, 2000) are often 
used to criticize animal equality. But here I introduce a new principle of tolerated 
partiality, which hides a new kind of equality: tolerated choice equality. In the burning 
house, I would save my child instead of someone else, which points at an emotional 
inequality in favour of my child. But I can still consider all individuals in the house as 
being equal in some other subtle sense, if for example I tolerate your choice to save 
someone else instead of my child. A white racist would say that it is immoral to save 
black children from the house instead of white children. A speciesist would say that it is 
immoral to save someone belonging to another species. But if someone has an 
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emotional connection with a dog, the principle of tolerated choice equality says we 
should tolerate his choice to save the dog. Saving a dog instead of a human 7, saving a 
mentally disabled orphan instead of a mentally normal child, or saving your lover 
instead of two unknown persons, might be violations of the quasi-maximin prioritarian 
principle. But I think we are allowed to violate this quasi-maximin principle to some 
degree. Also here we could try to reach a democratic or mutual consensus between all 
moral agents, about the degree of violation that is allowed. We should apply this degree 
of partiality consistently in all situations. 
Fact 6: The organ transplantation problem. There is a possible situation, where five 
patients in a hospital would die unless we sacrifice an innocent person against his will 
and use five of his organs for transplantations. This would be allowed according to 
prioritarianism, because the (power average) lifetime well-being would be higher if the 
innocent person is sacrificed.  
Moral intuition 6: I (and most people) feel emotional distress and restraint to sacrifice 
this one person against his will. We should not sacrifice someone, even if 
prioritarianism is violated and even if someone I hold dear is one of the patients in the 
hospital. So this intuition trumps both prioritarianism and tolerated partiality. 
There are a lot of other moral dilemmas where we can use someone without his/her 
consent as merely means to save others. Torturing someone in order to gain 
information about a bomb, throwing someone (a sentient being such as a mentally 
disabled human) in front of a runaway trolley in order to block the trolley that is about 
to kill other people, using someone as a shield against bullets, using someone as a slave, 
using someone in medical experiments, using someone as a scapegoat to stop a riot, 
terror bombing civilians in order to demoralize the enemy, raping someone, killing and 
eating someone (cannibalism), trafficking,… All these situations generate moral 
intuitions that are very coherent if we translate them into the following deontological 
principle (an interpretation of a Kantian ethics). 
Universal ethical principle 6: All sentient beings have a basic right not to be used as 
merely a means to someone else’s ends. A victim is used as merely a means, when two 
conditions are met. 1) A moral agent causes the victim a ‘disrespectful harm’ against its 
will: the victim has to do or undergo something that s/he does not want. Examples of 
disrespectful harm are a treatment as property or commodity (see Francione, 2000) or a 
violation of bodily integrity. 2) The presence of the body of the victim is required in 
order to reach the ends. For example without the body of an animal, we could not 
produce an animal product (meat, eggs,...) for consumption. The latter is an important 
criterion because there are moral dilemmas whereby you are allowed to cause harm to 
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 I tolerate that you give more food and medical assistance to your pet than to a hungry child far away. 
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someone in order to save others (for example redirecting a threat towards one person in 
order to save a group of people). In those dilemmas, the presence of the victim was not 
required in order to save the others. 
This principle is coherent with the notion of respect, which is next to empathy an 
important moral virtue, and it is coherent with the notion of intrinsic value (the 
opposite of instrumental value) as well. 
The ethical principle of the basic right trumps both the principle of priority and the 
principle of tolerated partiality. But the basic right is not absolute: if the principle of 
priority is strongly violated (if thousands of sentient beings will die), then a basic right 
might be violated (this corresponds with a need for efficiency). As with the above 
principles, this level of violation can be determined on the basis of a democratic or 
mutual consensus among moral agents. And here we have flexibility as well: there are 
different levels of harm, there is a morally relevant gradation in someone’s ends (from 
the vital needs of many sentient beings to the luxury ends of one individual), and there 
is a gradation in the level of sentience and mental capacities. These gradations could be 
coupled. For example: a being with higher levels of morally relevant mental capacities 
has a stronger claim to this basic right. 
Let’s briefly apply this principle to the ‘least harm’ objection against veganism (Davis, 
2003). Suppose that a meat eater can kill and eat one cow, whereas a vegan needs a crop 
field to get the same amount of nutrients. Suppose using that crop field accidently kills 
five mice. The meat eater causes least harm, but s/he violates the basic right of the cow, 
which is worse. The mice are not used as merely means, so therefore veganism remains 
the morally better choice. (For further criticism on the least harm argument of Davis, 
see Matheny, 2003, and Lamey, 2007). 
We now arrive at an ethical system with three principles of equality. The first is 
based on impartiality (interchangeability of sentient beings) and results in a form of 
prioritarianism. According to this theory, if we have to choose between two situations 
that have equal total well-being, we should choose the one with the most equal 
distribution of well-being. The second is a tolerated partiality, whereby we tolerate the 
choices of others to save those they prefer. From this tolerated partiality, the 
individuals in a burning house inherit a ‘tolerated choice equality’. This principle 
weakly trumps the first principle. The third principle is a basic right equality, and this 
trumps the two former principles to a strong but not absolute degree. All beings with 
similar levels of the relevant mental capacities have an equal claim to the basic right not 
to be used as merely a means to someone else’s ends. The three principles are related to, 
respectively, a consequentialist ethic of well-being and justice, a feminist ethic of care 
and a deontological ethic of rights.  
These three principles imply veganism. Consider a dairy cow in the livestock industry 
and a human who likes to eat cheese. Start with the veil of ignorance. In one situation, 
dairy cows are not bred, so we can only be a human being, who has a value of life equal 
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to 10. In the second situation, this human enjoys the cheese (his value of life increases to 
11), but the cow has a miserable life (suffering in the livestock industry, early death,…). 
So her value of life equals 3. According to quasi-maximin prioritarianism, the first 
situation is preferred. If you’d choose the second situation, from behind the veil of 
ignorance, you have probability ½ to end up in the worst-off position. (According to 
sum-utilitarianism, the second situation is better). Tolerated partiality is also violated: if 
we prefer the enjoyment of cheese above the use of the cow, we should also tolerate the 
other option: breeding women and using their breast milk to make cheese for cows 
(suppose the cow likes human cheese). This we would not tolerate. The third principle is 
also violated, because the cow in the livestock industry is used as merely a means (her 
bodily integrity is violated and she is treated as property). 
With these three principles, we arrive at a coherent system that best fits our 
strongest moral intuitions. Some intuitions based on speciesist judgments are not 
compatible with this system of animal equality. These intuitions are too weak and 
cannot be incorporated without introducing highly arbitrary and artificial 
constructions, so we have to dismiss these speciesist intuitions as being moral illusions. 
Although our theory implies veganism, it still allows for some partiality (the tolerated 
partiality meets our intuitive preference for some individuals). However, there is one 
serious problem remaining. 
Fact 7: Obligate predators need meat in order to survive. If obligate predators cannot 
use other sentient beings as merely means, they will all become extinct. If principles 4, 5 
and 6 are universalized to predator animals, this would imply that they have to become 
extinct.  
Moral intuition 7: Obligate predators are allowed to hunt and hence violate the basic 
rights and well-being of prey. It would be a tragedy if they became extinct.  
It is not easy to formulate a clear principle that is coherent with this intuition as well 
as with the intuitions that we encountered before. If we suppose that biodiversity has a 
moral value, then we have the following option. 
Universal ethical principle 7: If a sufficiently large group of sentient beings became, 
by an evolutionary process, dependent on the use of other sentient beings for their 
survival, they are allowed to use other sentient beings for that purpose (until feasible 
alternatives, that don't violate basic rights, are found8).  
If we suppose that biodiversity has moral (intrinsic) value, and if we define 
biodiversity as the diversity of everything that is the direct product of evolutionary 
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 Such alternatives could be the production of artificial (cultured) meat to feed the predators, genetically or 
psychologically reprogramming predators to change their behavior, the use of wildlife contraception to 
control prey populations,…  
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processes, then this seventh principle becomes coherent with the value of biodiversity. 
So the existence of predator animals contributes to biodiversity and we should not 
destroy that biodiversity. 
This principle is also coherent with a ‘triple-N-principle’, which refers to the three 
values ‘natural, normal and necessary’ of a carnist ideology (Joy, 2009). This connection 
works if we define natural as: behaviour that is a direct consequence of a process of 
evolution (genetic mutation and natural selection). So it refers to an ‘evolutionary 
process’. Normal means that the behaviour happens a lot, so it refers to a ‘sufficiently 
large group’. And necessary means that those beings would die if they no longer exhibit 
that behaviour. This refers to ‘dependency for survival’. 
Putting the three criteria together, natural+normal+necessary means that a lot of 
biodiversity would be lost when the behaviour stopped. And a lot of biodiversity has a 
lot of moral value; sufficiently enough to trump the basic right and well-being of prey 
animals. Predation is normal, natural and necessary, so it is allowed (as long as there are 
no feasible alternatives), even if it violates the basic right. For humans, eating animal 
products is not necessary (according to the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics (ADA, 
2009)), so we are not allowed to violate the basic rights of animals. Organ 
transplantation (by sacrificing a sentient being against his will) is not allowed either, 
because it is a violation of the basic right and it is not normal and natural (although it is 
necessary for the patients).  
Note that this value-of-biodiversity principle is completely unrelated to the value-of-
sentience principles discussed before, although we could compare biodiversity as an 
intrinsically valuable property of ecosystems with well-being as an intrinsically valuable 
property of sentient beings. Both ecosystems and sentient beings are unique and 
irreplaceable entities that have a tendency to increase their corresponding valuable 
properties (biodiversity and well-being). In itself, the biodiversity principle seems 
arbitrary, but it is coherent with a lot of moral intuitions that a lot of people share. For 
example: moving around and killing insects (by accident) is considered allowed, even if 
scientists are able to demonstrate that insects are sentient. But the 3-N-principle says 
that moving around is natural, normal and necessary behaviour of animals. The same 
goes for procreation, even if the animal species does not sufficiently contribute to the 
(power) average well-being of a prioritarian theory. Procreation is natural, normal and 
necessary, and a lot of biodiversity will get lost if some species were not allowed to 
procreate. 
The 3-N-principle, based on the value of biodiversity, generates a fourth principle of 
equality: naturalistic behavioural fairness: all natural beings (who contribute equally to 
biodiversity) have an equal right to a behavior that is both natural, normal and 
necessary (i.e. a behavior that contributes to biodiversity). Natural beings are those 
beings that originated by natural evolution. 
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Finally, we also have situations where predators attack us or beings that we hold 
dear. Our intuition says we are allowed to defend ourselves and others, and we have a 
stronger duty to protect some individuals with whom we have special relationships. All 
sentient beings have the right to defend themselves or others, they have the right to be 
partial in such decisions, as long as they respect similar levels of partiality of others (see 
principle 5) and as long as biodiversity is not threatened. If we wish, we could also add 
that we have a duty to protect all beings who have (or will develop) moral agency or 
rationality. Those rational beings not only feel their interests, but they also know and 
understand their interests. This rationality applies to most human beings, except e.g. 
seriously mentally disabled human orphans. This satisfies people’s intuitions that we 
have a duty to protect humans from predators. (But if we say that we have a duty to 
protect mentally disabled humans whereas we do not have a duty to protect non-human 
animals, because all humans have a higher moral status than non-humans, then we 
become too partial. This kind of speciesism, like racism or sexism, is a kind of partiality 
and arbitrariness that we cannot tolerate.) 
This completes the process. We now have a theory of animal equality, with clear and 
coherent universalized ethical principles that best fit our strongest moral intuitions, 
and without too many arbitrary elements. In the epilogue of this dissertation, I will 
relate the above seven universal ethical principles to five principles of the moral hand. 
Universal ethical principles 1 to 4 are unified in a forefinger principle of justice and the 
value of lifetime well-being. Universal ethical principle 5 corresponds with the little 
finger principle of tolerated partiality. Universal ethical principle 6 corresponds with a 
middle-finger mere means principle and the basic right to bodily autonomy. Universal 
ethical principle 7 corresponds with the ring finger principle of naturalness and the 
value of biodiversity. Finally, the method of translating particular moral intuitions into 
universalized ethical principles corresponds with a formal thumb principle of rule 
universalism.  
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Chapter 1 The basic elements 
In this section I present the basic elements in a construction of a coherent ethical 
system. Those elements consist of the input data (moral intuitions), the method (the 
principle of universalization) and the goal: an ethical system which is internally 
consistent (contains no contradictions), clear (contains exact, unambiguous 
formulations), parsimonious (does not contain unnecessary or arbitrary elements) and 
comprehensive (compatible with as much as possible of the strongest moral intuitions, 
applicable to all situations). I will defend this approach by referring to several analogies 
borrowed from the empirical sciences, mathematics, geometry, grammar, taste 
evaluation and crossword puzzles. There is however one serious issue in this approach: 
the existence of illusions. These are the pitfalls: we cannot trust all our input data (our 
moral intuitions). 
1.1 The input data: moral intuitions  
Intuitions can be roughly described as immediate, automatic, fast, non-inferred, a priori, 
spontaneous judgments (or beliefs) that lack further justification; the typical gut 
feelings, or responses of a system in ‘automatic mode’. It can be compared with e.g. 
perception or aesthetic judgments. In morality, I consider the lack of further 
justification, or the fact that we cannot give rational arguments to justify intuitions, as 
the relevant property of moral intuitions. Morality is based on moral intuitions about 
what is right and what is good. These intuitions are judgments with a motivational, 
prescriptive and often emotional content. We have a desire to comply with our moral 
intuitions. The stronger a moral intuition, the less willing we are to act against it (or 
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tolerate someone acting against it).1 Morality is ‘emotionally driven’, based on emotions 
such as empathy and indignation. The motivational component means that you yourself 
feel the urge to do something or refrain from doing something, and the prescriptive 
component means that you want others to do similar things. Morality is non-cognitive: 
it does not contain statements with a truth value. It rather expresses emotions, 
attitudes and prescriptions.  
The counterpart of intuitions is reflective thinking. This is the area of ethics, to be 
distinguished from morality.2 Ethics moves beyond the unreflective intuitions of 
morality: it is characterized by a search for principles as basic building blocks (axioms) 
of an ethical system. These ethical principles are reflective and clear expressions of 
underlying moral intuitions. 
Although moral intuitions often appear in a blink of an eye, it is not self-evident to 
articulate all your moral intuitions. In order to interrogate your morality, we can use 
special devices or thought experiments. These are moral dilemmas developed to test or 
discover new intuitions. One example of a moral dilemma is a trolley dilemma (see also 
appendix for a review of the trolley problem): suppose five people are on a track, 
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 Some moral intuitions are more emotional in nature (e.g. the feeling of disgust about unharmful, safe, 
consenting incest between siblings). Others are more ‘perceptual’ or ‘rational’ in nature (e.g. the spontaneous 
judgment that saving more lives is better than saving less). Some intuitions are inborn (e.g. “Don’t kill your 
children”), others are learned or acquired (e.g. some racist intuitions about black people by a white 
supremacist). Some intuitions arise in concrete situations (e.g. “Don’t push the fat man in front of the 
trolley”), others might be more abstract or formal (e.g. “Treat equals equally”). In this dissertation, I consider 
those distinctions as less relevant, because the goal is a ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls, 1971) where our moral 
intuitions are brought into a coherent system of ethical principles. In the movement towards reflective 
equilibrium, some intuitions need to be revised or disposed. In that sense, it doesn’t matter whether the 
intuition is more emotional or rational. What matters is the perceived strength of the intuitions and our 
willingness to revise or trump the intuitions: which moral intuitions are more revisable or surpassable than 
others, which intuitions are stronger to resist modification, which intuitions are stronger to surpass others? I 
do not think that there is a clear correlation between e.g. revisability and the degree of emotionality (versus 
rationality) of intuitions. Some intuitions that tend to be more emotional in nature might be stronger than 
other more rational intuitions. And some intuitions on the rational side of the spectrum might easily override 
some emotional intuitions. Neither do I see a clear correlation between strength of an intuition and the degree 
of innateness. Therefore, I am not much concerned about the degree of emotionality or innateness of moral 
intuitions. I am rather concerned about our willingness to revise intuitions and the extent to which intuitions 
can be brought into a coherent ethical system. I agree with Rawls, who recognizes emotionality (e.g. when we 
are upset or frightened) as an error-disposed condition of moral intuitions (Rawls, 1971, p41; Brophy, 2009, 
p13), but some kinds of emotionality (e.g. empathy) might also increase the credibility of intuitions (Brophy, 
2009, p115). 
2
 Some animals such as chimpanzees, dolphins and dogs have a (proto)morality (Schermer, 2004, p.16; Bekoff 
& Pierce, 2009): they can feel empathy, they can cooperate, they demonstrate altruistic behavior or they have 
intuitions of fairness. It requires more complex rational thinking to move from unreflective (intuitive) 
morality to reflective ethics.  
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unaware of the oncoming trolley. They will all die if you do nothing, because you see 
that the trolley driver is unconscious. You are standing on a bridge, and next to you, 
exactly above the rails, is a really heavy man. You can save the lives of the five people if 
you push the man from the bridge, because he is heavy enough to block the trolley. 
Most people (men and women, from different cultural backgrounds) intuit that it is 
impermissible to push the heavy man.   
In this dissertation we will encounter other moral dilemmas. Such dilemmas often 
appear to be farfetched or unrealistic, but remember that in order to discover basic laws 
of physics, scientists agree that performing special experiments (e.g. using particle 
accelerators) in a thoroughly controlled manner (e.g. in a vacuum) is the best strategy 
to interrogate nature. Even if those experimental set-ups appear to be everything but 
similar to the world we experience, they are very instructive to search for physical laws. 
The idea behind those ‘exotic’ experimental set-ups is to exclude disturbing factors 
from the experiment. I believe the same goes for ethics: exotic thought experiments like 
the trolley dilemma can be fine tuned to interrogate our intuitions, eliminating 
disturbing elements.  
Now that we have encountered a moral intuition, it appears that, for a lot of people, 
it is difficult to translate or express that moral intuition into ethical principles. Why do 
we let five people die if we could save them? One principle might be: don’t kill. But 
that’s too vague. A more accurate formulation could be: do not act if action results in 
the death of a person who would not have died otherwise.  
Once we have such hypothetical ethical principles, we have to test whether the 
resulting ethical system is consistent and whether the principles are both internally 
consistent, as well as consistent with other moral intuitions. Consider another trolley 
problem: again five people are on a main track. If you do nothing, they will die. But this 
time you could turn a switch so that the trolley will take a side track. Unfortunately on 
the side track one person will be killed. The structure is similar: doing nothing means 
five people die, acting means five people are saved and another person dies. Most 
people intuit that we are permitted to act. This seems to be in contradiction with our 
hypothetical ethical principle, so either we dismiss one of the intuitions, or we refine 
the ethical principle. In later sections we will discuss in more detail this reflective 
process of looking for a consistent system. 
I believe that moral intuitions are a very important element in ethics and a valid 
starting point of deriving an ethical system of animal equality. Some ethicists (e.g. some 
utilitarians such as Singer, 2005) might claim that their ethical systems are completely 
detached from any moral intuitions. However, all systems start with axioms that can be 
considered as intuitions. Consider sum-utilitarianism. For those utilitarians it seems 
self-evident that we should look at consequences and that we should maximize a 
property. But why are only consequences important, why should we focus at the 
maximization of something, and what should we maximize? For those utilitarians it 
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seems self-evident that we should maximize that thing that people want to maximize, 
such as well-being. But how do we aggregate well-being? For those utilitarians it seems 
self-evident that we should take an aggregation that reflects impartiality. But what 
impartial aggregation should we take? For those utilitarians it seems self-evident that 
we should take a simple aggregation formula. But why should we value simplicity and 
what simple formula should we take? For those utilitarians it seems self-evident that we 
should take the sum of well-being. But why should we maximize the sum of utilities 
instead of e.g. the product, which is equally simple from a mathematical point of view? 
In summary, even utilitarians are faced with several self-evident beliefs that they are 
not able to justify any further. 
Also virtue ethics and deontologists are based on the intuitions that virtues 
(beneficence, compassion, honesty,…) or some other properties (intentions,…) are 
important. All ethicists use intuitions.3 And in the context of animal rights, meat eaters 
have and live by moral intuitions as well. They have the intuition that personal liberty 
and choice of food are important, that (some) animals have lower moral status that 
allows humans to eat them… All moral agents have moral intuitions and they are not 
easily tempted to do something against their moral intuitions. So, respecting moral 
intuitions is important. When I derive an ethical system and I want to convince meat 
eaters to become vegans, I should propose a system that is highly compatible with the 
strongest moral intuitions that both I and those meat eaters share. The strength of a 
moral intuition is inversely related to the willingness to override the intuition. Hence, 
the strongest moral intuitions are the most motivating, because they generate the 
strongest desires to respect them.  
We cannot escape the idea that moral intuitions are the only input that we have in 
ethics, and that moral agents have difficulties in overriding their strongest moral 
intuitions. So we should cherish those strong moral intuitions. Ethics without moral 
intuitions is like science without experimental facts. In all aspects, from science to daily 
life, we need some relevant input. Let’s consider the following six examples that can be 
used as analogies of ethics. 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Perhaps one could make distinction between ‘cool’ (more cognitive) intuitions and ‘hot’ (more emotional) 
intuitions. For example Greene (2008) criticized a lot of deontological judgments, claiming that they are based 
on unreliable, ‘hot’ or alarmlike emotional responses (such as disgust). If such distinction is possible, we can 
construct an ethical system based on only the ‘cool’ intuitions. But for me it seems difficult to clearly make 
this distinction (perhaps neuroscience can help in making this distinction?). And it is not clear why all ‘cool’ 
and none of the ‘hot’ intuitions are reliable. Therefore, I will make another distinction, between those 
intuitions that fit in a (strong) coherent framework and those that don’t.    
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1) Physics and other empirical sciences. In the field of scientific research as a 
cognitive activity, we have observations as input data. These observations are very 
specific, for example: at time T at place P under conditions C, I saw object O falling. In 
general, the information about the external world is received through sensory data, 
perceptions by one of our five senses. 
2) Mathematics and algebra. Here we start with a priori knowledge. Three is a 
number and four is one higher. You have to accept this intuition, otherwise we can’t 
move on in mathematics. 
3) Geometry. This line segment is similar to that. There is some property (e.g. length) 
about lines that make them similar. That is an intuition in geometry. 
4) Grammar. According to Chomsky (1986), people from different countries have an 
inborn faculty of language in their brains, which means that they have intuitive 
judgments about the grammatical correctness of a sentence. “The gnorfl is sprinkle” is a 
good grammatical sentence, I just know it, even if the content is meaningless. The 
grammatical intuitions are interesting to better understand how morality functions. 
John Rawls (1971) and others (Hauser et al. 2008) proposed an analogy between our 
language faculty and our moral faculty. The language faculty generates intuitive 
grammatical judgments about the grammatical correctness of sentences, just like the 
moral faculty generates intuitive moral judgments about the moral goodness of 
situations. We intuitively see that an act is morally right and a sentence is 
grammatically correct. And as with morality, people often have difficulties in expressing 
why a sentence is grammatically right or wrong; they just know it. It takes some effort 
to look for the principle that expresses the specific intuition. As with grammar 
(Chomsky, 1986), some moral intuitions and lines of reasoning are universal 
(independent from culture) and likely inborn. Thus we can speak of a universal moral 
grammar (Mikhail, 2000; 2007; O’Neill & Petrinovich, 1998).  
5) Crossword puzzles. The input data are the descriptions and number of white boxes 
for the words.  
6) Taste evaluations and aesthetic judgments. The input data are taste preferences of 
specific products. It appears that people from different cultures like some product made 
from cane sugar. 
 
In all those areas we have input data, be it evaluations, judgments, observations, 
given information,… Moral intuitions can be compared with those input data. The above 
six analogies give us a nuanced picture about the role of intuitions in our morality. I 
explore further these same six analogies below, in the discussion of the method. 
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1.2 The method: rule universalism 
The method to be used in order to set up an ethical system is universalization. First the 
moral intuition is expressed as a particular ethical rule, valid for that particular 
situation. Universalization then consists in extending this particular rule to all other 
similar situations. In brief: “Equal moral judgments for all morally similar situations.” A 
situation is morally similar to another if it is similar with respect to all morally relevant 
characteristics of those situations. This is a formal method: it does not have material 
content, i.e. it does not state what characteristics are morally relevant.  
The idea of universalization is mostly elaborated by ethicists Immanuel Kant (1785) 
and R.M. Hare (1991). The most general expression of the principle of universalism 
reads: “You must (may) follow the rule that everyone who is capable, rational and 
informed must (may) follow in all morally similar ways in all morally similar situations 
towards all morally equal individuals.” The four parts in italics in this expression point 
at four kinds of universalism: the moral agents (the actors who are capable of doing 
something), the moral patients (the receivers of a benefit or harm, as morally equal 
individuals), the acts (the similar ways of doing something) and the situations. The 
moral agent A does (or refrains from doing) an action C to moral patient P in situation S.  
The principles of impartiality and anti-discrimination are clearly universalizations 
with respect to patients. Discrimination is a different treatment of individuals 
(patients), based on morally irrelevant criteria.  
The idea that moral imperatives must be equally binding on everyone is an example 
of universalization with respect to the agent. Kant’s famous categorical imperative 
(Kant, 1785, p.30), can just as well be understood as a universalization with respect to 
agents and/or patients. In its ‘universal law’ formulation, the categorical imperative 
goes as follows: “act according to that maxim (moral rule or guiding principle4) whereby 
you can will that it should become a universal law.” One should ask the question: “What 
if everyone (or many people) acted (or thought it is allowed to act) in this way?” There 
might be two contradictions: a contradiction in conception, which means that the 
universalized rule results in a logical or physical impossibility, and a contradiction in 
 
                                                     
4
 A note on terminology: most of the time, a ‘principle’ refers to a ‘basic principle’. This dissertation argues 
that there are five basic principles. The first basic principle is called ‘rule universalism’. This principle refers 
to the universalization of moral ‘rules’ or ‘guiding principles’. Those moral rules are typically less basic, less 
abstract or more specific than the basic principles. Moral rules are derivatives of basic principles. For example 
the moral rule “Do not steal” is derived from the basic principle to maximize aggregated well-being. The 
moral rule “Do not rape” is derived from the basic mere means principle.  
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the will, which result a universalized rule is possible, but not wanted by a rational moral 
agent. 
An example of a contradiction in conception, resulting from universalizing a rule 
with respect to the agent, is the ecological footprint. If everyone (all humans) would 
consume as much as an average human in a developed country, we will exceed the 
carrying capacity of the planet. We would need resources of more than one planet, 
because the ecological footprint in the developed world is higher than the available 
biocapacity of 1,8 global hectares per human (GFN, 2010). There is no other planet like 
Earth, so this behavior is simply not universalizable. Therefore, it is unfair (and 
unsustainable) for those people in developed countries to have such a high ecological 
footprint.  
A contradiction in the will might occur after a universalization with respect to both 
agent and patient. For example if I am allowed to harm you, then everyone is allowed to 
harm everyone else. So you are then also allowed to harm me. I cannot will this, because 
I value my well-being, so I encounter a contradiction. My rule that I am allowed to harm 
you cannot be universalized, so it is an immoral rule. This universalization therefore 
generates the golden rule: (do not) treat others as you would (not) like to be treated.5   
Universalization with respect to the act becomes much more subtle. Note that the 
above expression (“You must follow the rule…”) refers to rules instead of particular 
acts6. Hence we can call it rule universalism. A formulation in terms of rules instead of 
acts has some advantages. First, it allows for conditional rules (e.g. “Do X if Y unless Z”)7. 
If I say that I am allowed to lie down on my sofa and watch a movie tonight, this act 
cannot be universalized with respect to agents, because it is impossible for 7 billion 
people to fit on my sofa tonight. We might save the idea behind the categorical 
imperative if we universalized a rule instead of an act, because the rule can contain 
some conditionals. I can follow a rule which says that I am allowed to sit in a place I 
prefer and watch a movie at a time I prefer, if I own the place (e.g. my sofa) or if there is 
some place left (e.g. in a movie theater). Universalizing this means: everyone is allowed 
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 The following example is a critique to an oversimplified application of the golden rule. Suppose that I don’t 
mind if you lied to me. One might interpret the golden rule as claiming that in that case it is allowed for me to 
lie to you. However, this application of the golden rule is itself a violation of the golden rule. We can derive a 
‘platina rule’ from the golden rule: do not take your own preferences when you decide how to treat others, 
because you would not like others to take their own preferences when they decide how to treat you. In other 
words: I am not allowed to lie to you if you do not want be lied to, because I would not like you to lie to me 
when I do not want to be lied to.  
6
 We encounter a similar difference between rules and acts in the discussion between rule consequentialism 
and act consequentialism (Hooker, 2011). 
7
 And it allows for game theoretic situations where the choice what to do depends on what others do or should 
do (see section 7.2). 
Ethical Consistency and Animal Equality 
32 
to lie down in a place they prefer and watch a movie they prefer, if some of those 
conditions are met. A focus on rules instead of acts allows a specification of the 
conditions that can be universalized in such a way that we can want this 
universalization of the conditional rule. 
A second advantage is that the focus on rules allows for public expressions, such that 
all moral agents are able to understand and follow the rules. Rules are useful tools in 
giving justifications of acts. As a consequence, a focus on rules gives meaning to the idea 
of giving the good example as well as the idea of giving the right justification. 
Universalization also applies to metarules (rules about rules). For example, I can 
propose the universalized rule: “Everyone should always tell the truth, unless your 
name is Stijn Bruers.” But now Marie can use a universalization on the level of 
metarules and respond that if I am allowed to use my name in a rule, then she is allowed 
to do the same: “Everyone should always tell the truth, unless your name is Marie.” I do 
not want this, and as a consequence, we can derive a metarule: “Rules should not refer 
to names.” Similarly, rules should not refer to nouns or specific times and places. This 
universalization on the level of metarules gives important clues on what counts as 
morally (dis)similar situations. A situation where Stijn lies is similar to a situation where 
Marie lies. 
The universalization criterion matches two conditions: non-arbitrariness and 
consistency. An ethical system based on rules that are not universalized may easily be 
consistent, but the lack of universalization results in arbitrariness. Universalizing the 
rules avoids the arbitrariness, but now the system might contain mutually inconsistent 
rules. Both non-arbitrariness and consistency should be respected. A rule should be 
non-arbitrary (i.e. universalized) and consistent with other non-arbitrary rules of the 
system. The two conditions of non-arbitrariness and consistency generate coherence 
(see Chapter 2). 
Universalization in ethics is related to the property of supervenience of moral 
statements. Supervenience is a kind of dependency relation: moral judgments 
supervene on natural properties in the sense that if two situations, acts or events are 
similar in their natural properties8, then they should imply the same moral judgment 
(or moral value). Or stated in reverse: if you have different moral judgments about two 
different situations, then you should be able to point at a morally relevant, objective 
difference between those two situations.  Compare this with the supervenience of 
mental states on physical brain states: psychological properties supervene on physical 
properties in the sense that all persons who have the same physical properties (the 
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 With “similar natural properties” I mean similarity only in their relevant aspects. 
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same brain states) must also be psychologically indistinguishable (having the same 
mental states).9 Note the universality of this statement.  
Note that in non-cognitivist meta-ethics such as expressivism, supervenience is 
considered as a consistency condition: expressivists claim that moral judgments are 
based on our subjective attitudes toward objective, natural properties (e.g. behaviors or 
situations). Supervenience means that our attitudes should be consistent and non-
arbitrary. 
The process of universalization is omnipresent in ethical discussions and 
argumentations, because universalization allows for the use of analogies, and analogies 
are often used in argumentations. People frequently refer to another specific situation 
which is similar to the discussed situation, and then appeal on intuitions in that other 
situation. The question is: when is an analogy valid?  
It is clear that the validity of the use of an analogy needs to be justified as well. But 
first, of course, we need to justify the use of the method of universalization. To do this, I 
will refer again to the six analogies of ethics mentioned in the previous section. In all 
those examples, universalization is important. Next, I will demonstrate that a lot of 
people, including meat eaters, use this method in ethical discussions. I will present a list 
of arguments given by meat eaters, in order to demonstrate that meat eaters also accept 
this method of universalization. Hence, after accepting the importance of moral 
intuitions, we come to see that animal rights ethicists and meat eaters both share the 
same rules of the game. This should bring a compelling rational argument for veganism 
and animal equality one step closer.   
So let’s first take another look at the six analogies. 
 
1) Physics and other empirical sciences. We had a specific observation that at time T 
at place P under conditions C, I saw object O falling. I now make a hypothesis which goes 
under the name of induction: all similar objects fall under similar conditions at all times 
in all places. So when I see another object falling when I release it, it is conforming to 
this principle of gravity. If it is not falling, then something relevant must be different: 
the place (e.g. in a space ship), the conditions (there is a strong force such as a magnetic 
field counteracting gravity) or the object (it has a propeller and wings, or it is a balloon 
with helium). When the object does not fall, it simply means that other principles 
should be included and those principles need to be universalized as well (e.g. every time 
an object is released in the presence of a strong magnetic field that acts as a force…).  
 
                                                     
9
 A difference between psychological supervenience and moral supervenience is that the letter has no 
physically or logically necessary relationship. In this sense, supervening moral judgments are not facts of the 
world, whereas psychological states are facts of the world. 
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2) Mathematics and algebra. From the intuition that the number 3 has a successor, we 
universalize this to the mathematical axiom that every number has a successor. This is a 
basic axiom in the algebraic system of natural numbers. Mathematicians do not allow an 
exception to this rule. But there can be other universalized rules with exceptions, and of 
course those exceptions need also to be universalized.  
3) Geometry. All lines of equal length are similar. All right angles are congruent. (The 
latter principle is one of the basic Euclidean axioms.) 
4) Grammar. All sentences with the structure “Subject + verb + predicate” are 
grammatically correct.  “The gnorfl is sprinkle” was just one example of such a 
structure. But there is an exception: the structure is not correct when the sentence is a 
question. And this exception rule needs also to be universalized: the structure “Verb + 
subject + predicate?” is always correct in case of a question.  
5) Crossword puzzles. If the input data is “fruit” and “five letters”, and we can fill in 
the letters “APP”, then we are forced to complete this word to “APPLE”. So filling in a 
word gives information about the content of all relevant white boxes, i.e. all boxes that 
are similar. Similarity means that they are next to each other in a row or column. This is 
also a kind of universalization. An individual letter represents a particular ethical rule, 
applicable to a particular situation. A word is analogous to the universalized principle, 
applicable to all similar situations.  
6) Taste evaluations and esthetic judgments. This pear tastes good to me, so now I 
have to accept that all products with the same chemical structure taste as good. But 
there is an exception: e.g. when it is hot, it no longer tastes good. So we again 
universalize this to the principle that all products with a similar chemical structure and 
the same temperature taste as good.  
 
In summary: universalization is perhaps the most important tool in moral arguments, 
because it is the basis of consistency. Universalization happens not only in ethics, but in 
all other cognitive activities, as long as similar conditions apply (this is also a 
universalized statement). If animal rights ethicists want to convince meat eaters that we 
should become vegans, and if these ethicists want to use rational arguments, meat 
eaters should accept the same rules of the game. Meat eaters already accepted moral 
intuitions as starting points, so let us see whether they can also accept the method of 
universalization. Looking at discussions with meat eaters, it becomes clear that those 
ingredients are indeed important for them as well. Both meat eaters and animal rights 
activists use all four forms of universalization in their arguments. Here is a list of 
arguments by meat eaters. They indicate that meat eaters value universality and 
consistency as well. 
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1.2.1 Universalizations made by meat eaters 
1.2.1.1 Universalization with respect to the situation or the act 
“But aren’t you wearing leather shoes?”  If killing animals for food is not allowed, then 
killing them for clothing is not allowed either. Or if you are allowed to wear leather 
shoes, then you are also allowed to eat meat. This is a correct argument, and it is the 
reason why ethical vegans won’t buy leather shoes. 
“You are a vegan, so you are also against breast feeding?” If you are against the use of 
animal products, you should be against breast milk as well, because humans are animals 
as well. This is an invalid argument, because we can easily point at morally relevant 
differences: breast milk is necessary for the baby, and the mother gives it voluntarily. 
The ethical rule “Do not use animal products” has exceptions, such as necessity and 
voluntariness. These exceptions should be universalized as well. 
 “So we shouldn’t walk around because that will kill insects?” Killing cows for food is 
like killing ants by walking around. This is an invalid argument, because of two reasons: 
insects likely lack or have a very small emotional life, and killing by accident when 
walking around is different from intentionally killing someone in order to use him. 
“You are against animal experiments, so you never use drugs tested on animals?” 
This is an invalid argument, because of two reasons: 1) animal rights activists are only 
concerned about animal experiments done in the present and future, and 2) meat eaters 
are likely to use products whose development or discovery involved rights violations in 
the past that they abhor. For example they might use technology based on mechanisms 
or materials that were discovered with the help of slaves some hundred years ago. Note 
that I hereby replied with an analogy, referring to technological inventions and slavery. 
We can argue that the analogy is valid, as the relevant properties are similar: rights 
violations of animals and slaves, the use of animals and slaves in the process of 
developing something that we now use. So I replied with a universalization. 
“Animal rights activists want to promote freedom of animals, but they restrict our 
freedom by imposing veganism against our will. That is inconsistent.” This is an invalid 
argument because of two reasons: 1) there is a morally relevant difference between 
killing someone in order to enjoy the taste of eating him, and restricting someone’s 
freedom to violate rights. 2) Meat eaters themselves promote freedom of e.g. women by 
restricting the freedom of rapists and imposing their ethics upon them. Again I make an 
analogy, which is customary in a process of universalization. I universalized with 
respect to the patient, from animals to women, and with respect to the act, from 
slaughter to rape. The analogy is valid, because raping women and killing animals are 
both examples of violations of bodily integrity just for pleasure, and these are morally 
relevant facts. 
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“Animal rights activists use the earth as well, kill life, rob land from wildlife, eat food 
that otherwise animals could have had… The production of vegan food also kills 
animals.” This argument is invalid because there is a morally relevant difference 
between killing by accident and intentionally killing someone. Meat eaters also eat food 
that otherwise other humans could have eaten. And animal rights activists consistently 
claim that we do have a duty to protect wildlife animals as much as possible, and help 
them if we can. 
“Rights are a human invention, so talking about animal rights is still anthropocentric. 
Therefore it is inconsistent with the idea that anthropocentrism is bad.” This argument 
is invalid, because this is a confusion of two different notions of anthropocentrism, and 
these two notions are morally not the same. If rights were my invention, this is 
egocentric, because rights originated from me. But that kind of egocentrism is not a 
moral problem. However, it is different from the dangerous egocentrism that claims 
that I am the only person in the world who has rights. 
“If we give animals the right to live, then we should also give them the right to vote.” 
This is an invalid argument because of two reasons: 1) higher intelligence is a capacity 
that is clearly relevant in the right to vote but not the right to live, and 2) meat eaters 
themselves give babies and seriously mentally disabled persons a right to live but not a 
right to vote. 
“If animals have rights like humans, then we should also need a huge number of 
animal hospitals. That is unrealistic.” This argument is valid to some degree: just like 
helping humans we have a duty to help wild animals in need, as far as this is feasible for 
us. There are already wildlife rescue centers (I happen to do voluntary work in a bird 
care center), so it is not unrealistic. 
“Animals mate with conspecifics. So do humans. Isn’t that speciesism as well?” I leave 
it up to the reader to find the morally relevant difference in this case. 
“What’s wrong with the pleasure of the taste of meat? Should we forswear all 
pleasure?” This argument contains a universalization: if A is bad and done for pleasure, 
then anything done for pleasure is bad. However, that rule quickly violates intuitions 
that both meat eaters and vegans share. So the animal rights ethicists come up with a 
more accurate universalization that says that we should forswear all pleasure if 
important rights are violated. 
1.2.1.2 Universalization with respect to the patient 
“What about plants, insects,…? They also have a life.” The morally relevant difference is 
sentience: plants and insects have a much lower probability to be sentient than for 
example vertebrate animals with a complex functioning central nervous system. In a 
later chapter (section 8.5) I will give several arguments why sentience is morally 
relevant in this matter. 
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“Animals can’t think rationally, have no self-consciousness, have no moral agency,…” 
Here the meat eater tries to point at some special mental capacities that animals lack. 
However, also some humans lack them, but most meat eaters give basic rights to e.g. 
mentally disabled persons. 
“Eating plants is allowed because it is natural and normal. Eating meat is natural and 
normal as well, therefore it is also allowed.” Here the meat eater uses a rule that applies 
to plants, and extends it to animals. The problem with this argument is that the criteria 
‘normal’ and ‘natural’ are vague. Depending on how one might more accurately define 
those terms, one can argue that eating humans would be allowed, or rape would be 
allowed. More about the two criteria normal and natural will be discussed in the chapter 
on predation in part 3. 
1.2.1.3 Universalization with respect to the agent 
 “If I am not allowed to eat meat, then lions, the Inuit people,… are not allowed to hunt 
either?” Here the meat eaters says that if A (a lion) is allowed to eat meat, then B (a 
human in a developed country with a moderate climate) is also allowed to eat meat. In 
the chapter on predation in part 3 I will elaborate on this argument, and show that the 
universalization is not valid, because an important necessity criterion is not 
universalized. 
“If everyone (all humans) would be vegan, then it is impossible to feed everyone. 
Agriculture without livestock is impossible (for example no manure to fertilize the 
croplands,…)” This argument points at a Kantian contradiction in conception. It is 
actually a factual claim. There are studies however that indicate that a global vegan 
organic agriculture, without use of chemical and animal fertilizers, is feasible and can 
feed a world of 9 billion people (Fairlie 2007; Olewski, 2010; the Vegan Organic Network). 
Typically, vegan products with the same nutritional value require much less inputs such 
as water, energy, land and chemicals than livestock products (GFN, 2010; Hoekstra, 
2010). And they generate much less negative outputs such as nitrogen pollution and 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
“If everyone (all humans) would eat vegan, then all animal races that we breed in the 
livestock sector would go extinct. That’s also a loss of biodiversity.” The problem is that 
livestock currently is likely the largest threat to wildlife biodiversity (FAO, 2006). And 
secondly, is it really a contribution to biodiversity to intentionally breed animals with 
serious physical handicaps? That is not morally justifiable. 
“Our ancestors ate meat. It would be unfair towards us if we would not be allowed to 
eat meat.” This is a universalization from our ancestors to us. My counterargument is a 
universalization with respect to the act. If such an argument would be valid, then a 
similar argument would be valid for slavery, rape,… We would be allowed to do that 
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because likely one of our ancestors did it. We cannot will this universalization, and 
therefore we have to say that what our ancestors did cannot justify what we do. 
“If everyone (all humans) would be vegan, all people working in the animal food 
production would lose their jobs.” However, new jobs would be created to produce 
vegan food. In the end it comes down to the fact that vegan farming is much more 
efficient in terms of inputs, and therefore less capital intensive. In other words: vegan 
farming makes much more sense economically. And a second counterargument, based 
on the universalization of the act: a same thing has been said about slavery and e.g. 
slave traders losing their jobs. If slavery cannot be justified by pointing at (invalid) 
economic concerns, then animal food production cannot be justified either.  
1.2.2 Universalizations made by animal ethicists 
Of course, in discussions, we often hear animal ethicists giving arguments based on 
universalization as well.  
1.2.2.1 Universalization with respect to the situation or the act 
“Speciesism is similar to racism and sexism.”  
“The livestock industry is similar to slavery, rape,…”  
“If we are allowed to eat cows because we breed them for that purpose, then slavery 
would also be allowed if we breed black people for that purpose.”  
“If we are allowed to eat cows because they owe their lives to us, then we are also 
allowed to eat our babies or humans that we would breed.” 
“If we are allowed to use animals in the livestock industry because they have food, 
shelter and medicines and hence those animals are better off than animals in the wild, 
then it is also allowed to use indigenous people as slaves, because in their natural 
habitat they suffer from predators, parasites, drought, disease,…” 
“If mentally disabled persons get rights because they belong to a group whose normal 
members have rationality, then also a mentally disabled person should have a right to 
vote and go to university. And then also chimpanzees and other primates should have 
rights, because the majority of them (roughly 7 billion primates) has rationality.” 
“If meat consumption is permissible because it is not prohibited by the law, then also 
slavery, rape,… were permissible in times when it was not prohibited by law.” 
“If eating meat is allowed because it is natural, then rape should also be allowed, 
because it is also natural: our ancestors did it for thousands of years, other animals do it, 
men have developed (by evolution) special body parts that enable them to rape women, 
and it is very likely that we owe our lives to the fact that one of our ancestors once 
raped a woman…” 
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“If veganism is not good because it is unnatural in the sense that one needs vitamin 
B12 as supplements (and those B12 products come from a factory), then eating 
processed foods or using toothpaste would also be unnatural and bad. The use of 
toothpaste is a consequence of our choice of diet, just like the use of B12 is a 
consequence of a dietary choice. And both are produced in a factory. It’s even worse for 
the non-vegan person, because drinking cow milk at an adult age, animal 
experimentation, feeding B12 supplements to livestock animals, and much more would 
also be unnatural and hence bad.” 
1.2.2.2 Universalization with respect to the patient 
“If eating pigs is allowed, then eating dogs should also be allowed.” 
“If killing and eating animals is allowed, then killing and eating humans should also 
be allowed.”  
“If animals don’t have rights because they don’t have duties and they cannot 
understand ethics, then the mentally disabled persons also cannot have rights.” 
1.2.2.3 Universalization with respect to the agent 
“If you don’t need to harm sentient beings in order to survive, then you should not 
harm them. Of course that also applies to me, so I became vegan.” 
“If I am the only vegan person, the market will not notice my food choice, and not a 
single cow will be spared. However, I should give the good example and do what 
everyone should have to do. If everyone became vegan, then animal rights violations 
would be much lower and that is good.”  
 
The above examples show that the method of universalization sets a common ground 
for both animal ethicists and meat eaters. But are people always consistent in applying 
the technique of universalization? Do they sometimes use this technique and other 
times not? My claim – based on what we have seen a little bit in the above examples – is 
that especially meat eaters (and sometimes also animal ethicists) do not consistently use 
the technique of universalization. Only when applying the technique of universalization 
consistently (universalize the technique itself, so to speak) is it possible to reach a 
coherent ethical theory. 
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Chapter 2 The goal: consistency and coherence 
In the above section, we started by looking for moral intuitions. That was the non-
reflective part. At the reflective level, these intuitions were first articulated as 
particular ethical rules, and second, these particular rules were universalized to all 
similar situations (acts, patients and agents). Hence, we moved from moral intuitions to 
particular ethical rules to universalized ethical principles. Now we have to see whether 
those universalized ethical principles are internally consistent. If there is an 
inconsistency, we have three options: we can either introduce a new principle that 
overrules the other, we can refine an existing principle or we can simply delete the 
weakest principle (which is based on the weakest, least motivating moral intuition).   
By testing more and more situations, i.e. by looking at whether our moral intuitions 
in all situations agree with the universalized ethical principles, we progressively get a 
coherent system. This is the process of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971). Coherence 
means that several intuitions and principles enforce each other; an interweaving of 
mutually supporting intuitions and principles.  
Here the analogy between constructing an ethical system and solving a crossword 
puzzle becomes clear. In the construction of an ethical system, we start with our 
strongest moral intuitions; those intuitions in which we have the most confidence. 
Similarly, in the crossword puzzle, we have more confidence in a word if there are less 
other words that fit the description. If for example the description is “food” of five 
letters, then the word can be “APPLE” or many other possibilities. If however the 
description is reduced to “pomaceous fruit that grows on a tree”, we are much more 
confident that the word should be “APPLE”. Once we fill in some words, we get new 
evidence for other words. Suppose I have filled in the word APPLE. The first letter 
crosses another word of five letters, with description: “good”, and with the new 
information that the fourth letter should be an A. So I can fill in the word MORAL. The 
last letter of this word crosses a second word of two letters, a music note: LA. And now 
the P from APPLE and the A from LA gives us a new clue about a body organ with eight 
letters: PANCREAS. The whole set-up is not only consistent, but those four different 
words enforce each other. We gain more and more confidence in the whole system.  
Coherence is the combination of three things: universalism (or non-arbitrariness), 
consistency and completeness. Universalism in the crossword puzzle means that all 
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neighboring white boxes in a row or column should form one word; not just 
independent letters or smaller words. If the white boxes were filled in with independent 
letters instead of meaningful words, the crossword puzzle would become completely 
arbitrary. The constraint that the rows and columns of white boxes should be words, 
decreases the arbitrariness. The same goes for ethics: similar situations (or the same 
situation from different points of view) should be judged with the same ethical 
principles. If every situation or viewpoint has its own particular guiding principle or 
moral rule, the ethical system becomes too arbitrary. Universalism strongly decreases 
arbitrariness. 
Consistency in the crossword puzzle means that a white box cannot contain more 
than one unique letter. In ethics, it means that each situation should have one solution, 
one “all things considered” moral judgment. If in a situation there are two different 
inconsistent solutions (two different judgments about e.g. the (im)permissibility of 
action), the ethical system is inconsistent and we are left undecided. In the crossword 
puzzle, there is a difference between trivial consistency and strong consistency. Trivial 
consistency occurs when words do not cross and there is only one cue for a word. For 
example if the given cue is “fruit” and the word contains five letters, “apple” is a 
trivially consistent solution. Strong consistency occurs when words cross each other 
and there are more cues, e.g. for vertical and horizontal words. If the first letter of the 
word “apple” is crossed by a second, vertical word of six letters with cue “nut”, then the 
letter “a” in “almond” is strongly consistent with the same letter in “apple”, because the 
letter “a” has two justifications. In this dissertation, consistency always means strong 
consistency. For example, as we will see, when an ethical principle of well-being has two 
different justifications derived from two different points of view, one based on a 
thought experiment of impartiality and one based on the virtue of compassion (see 
section 4.4), this principle becomes strongly consistent.   
Completeness, as the third condition, means that in the crossword puzzle no white 
box should be left empty. In ethics, it means that the ethical system should be applicable 
to all possible situations and viewpoints.  
This idea of coherence and crossword puzzles was proposed by Haack (1993). She 
called it ‘foundherentism’, as it is a combination of foundationalism and coherentism. 
The foundations are the input data: information about the meaning and lengths of 
words. Compare this with our moral intuitions or with mathematical axioms that also 
act as foundations. But not all our moral intuitions are equally strong. Some are much 
more motivating, others are easily overruled. Most of all: all our intuitions are fallible. 
Our moral intuitions are merely provisional starting points in the construction of a 
coherent system. They are still subject to revision or rejection if they are not compatible 
with the rest of the ethical system. In the construction of a coherent system, there is no 
infinitely strong moral intuition that can serve as the foundation. There is no absolute 
fixed point. Similarly, in a crossword puzzle we can have different levels of confidence 
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in the words, and there is no central word from which to start. In principle, all solved 
words are fallible; we can never be sure that a word in the puzzle is absolutely correct. 
To gain confidence, different words can mutually support each other, and build up a 
coherent system. This is the coherentist part of the story. Both foundations and 
coherence are important, but can be important to different degrees.1 
This principle of coherence (moving towards a reflective equilibrium with principles 
that mutually support each other) is also universal, as it occurs in our six analogies as 
well: 
1) Physics and other empirical sciences. Evidence builds up. A theory is a coherent 
system. And sometimes new strong data from experiments appear that is really 
incompatible with the principles. So the theory needs a revision. And like a crossword 
puzzle, sometimes other aspects of the theory need revision as well. It can ignite a 
cascade of revisions. Even the principles behind the reliability of the experimental 
apparatus itself might need revision. This is characteristic of scientific revolutions 
(Kuhn, 1962). But not to worry, as the more coherent a theory becomes, the less likely 
we need to revise the whole thing. The more words are filled in the crossword puzzle, 
the more likely it is the real solution. The scientific method is nothing but a constant 
searching for a reflective equilibrium: a coherent, parsimonious, clear system of 
knowledge that best fits the most convincing input data. Anomalous data that do not fit 
a strong coherent scientific theory can be discarded, as they are likely the result of some 
error. (See Brophy, 2009, for an elaboration on the analogy between the scientific 
method and the moral method of reflective equilibrium).  
2) Mathematics and algebra. Mathematicians often wondered whether the system of 
natural numbers is a consistent system. Gödel (1931) showed that its consistency was 
impossible to proof from within the system. One needs to extend the system (step 
outside of the system) in order to prove the consistency of the system of natural 
numbers. But then the question reappears: is this extended system consistent? Anyway, 
we do notice that the system of natural numbers is strongly coherent. Let’s take the 
example of the property that the sum of integers from 1 to N equals N(N+1)/2. You can 
test this several times, taking N=3; N=10; N=17 and so on. The more you try it, the more 
plausible it seems. These tests are coherent with a proof that one could give: a proof of 
induction. The property is true for N=1 and N=2. Suppose it is true for some arbitrary N. 
Then for the number N+1 we get the sum from 1 to N+1 should be (N+1)(N+2)/2. And 
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 During the construction of an ethical system, no intuition or principle is absolutely fixed. During the process 
of solving the crossword puzzle, no letter or word is absolutely fixed. However after the crossword puzzle is 
completely solved, we can be (almost) absolutely confident in the completed words. Similarly, after we have 
constructed a coherent system, the final universalized ethical principles can be considered as foundations or 
basic principles.  
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indeed, this equals N(N+1)/2+N+1. This proves the proposition. And then one could give 
a second proof and a third. So these different observations and proofs indicate that the 
system is strongly coherent, which increases our confidence in its consistency. 
3) Geometry. One could test the Pythagorean theorem with some examples of right-
angled triangles. And then one could give different proofs of it (there exist at least 370 
different proofs of this famous theorem (Loomis,1968)). 
4) Grammar. Grammatical rules might give a coherent picture of our intuitions as 
well, by analyzing long sentences, breaking them down in parts according to a 
grammatical rule.  
5) Crossword puzzles. This example I already explained above.  
6) Taste evaluations and esthetic judgments. The fact that I like pears is consistent 
with the fact that I like other fruits, the fact that I liked a particular pear yesterday, the 
knowledge that pears contain sugar and I also like sugar, and so on. So this gives me a 
coherent picture of what I like.  
 
In ethics it is possible that there exist mutually incompatible ethical systems, all 
internally consistent and based on some moral intuitions. This might point at some kind 
of ethical relativism, because each consistent system is equally valid. However, let’s go 
back to the analogy of the crossword puzzle. Here it might be possible that a crossword 
puzzle has multiple solutions: different mutually incompatible patterns of words. But 
the more words a puzzles contains, and the lengthier the words, the less likely that 
there are different solutions. I believe that if we take the set of strongest intuitions that 
both I and a meat eater share, then the only coherent ethical system that we can 
construct, is one that implies veganism. Of course there are meat eaters who have 
totally different moral intuitions. I will never be able to convince the latter by merely 
rational arguments, because we start from different input data. So I want to address 
myself to those meat eaters who have some strong moral intuitions shared with me. 
And looking at discussions with meat eaters, I notice that they also value consistency. 
Why else would they ask me if I’m wearing leather shoes? Why else do they so often 
come up with arguments based on universalized principles, as we’ve seen in the 
previous section? Consistency is important for a lot of meat eaters. So we can agree on 
the goal, the method and the input. We agree on all elements that might settle the issue 
of the permissibility of eating meat.  
Of course, consistency is not the only goal. Suppose someone claims that s/he feels a 
strong intuition that gay marriage is immoral because it is impure. So s/he adds this 
rule to the ethical system, as a dominating principle (it dominates the principle of well-
being of gay people). The resulting theory is now consistent. Yet, the problem is that 
this criterion of purity is not clear at all. I cannot understand this principle (how can I 
detect when something is impure?), thus I am not able to universalize the principle and 
test it in other situations. Therefore, a principle based on an intuition should be very 
Consistency and coherence 
 45 
clear, so that people who do not have that intuition are still able to understand it and 
test it in different situations and thought experiments. In the second part of this 
dissertation, I will present some principles, such as basic rights, which are based on 
intuitions. As we will see, I elaborate on criteria to test whether a basic right is violated. 
The basic right principle is and should be formulated as accurately as possible, so that 
even a computer might be able to test it. This precision allows the principle to be tested 
in well-constructed moral dilemmas and thought experiments.  
In the end, the anti-gay person is requested to formulate his purity principle as clear 
as possible, so that we are able to universalize it and test the consistency of this theory. 
Personally, I doubt whether one can make the system consistent by adding such a purity 
principle.  
To conclude, what I want is a coherent ethical system, consisting of clear and 
mutually consistent universalizable principles that best fit our shared, strongest moral 
intuitions, without adding too many arbitrary elements. That is the goal: a theory in 
coherent reflective equilibrium. It really reflects the scientific approach. In science, the 
hypotheses should be formulated as clearly as possible, in order to test them in 
experiments. The theory should be as parsimonious as possible, and of course internally 
consistent and consistent with the most reliable observations and test results.  
There is one big problem however, a problem we seriously have to deal with: 
illusions.   
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Chapter 3 The problem: moral illusions1 
The question is whether our input data (moral intuitions) can be trusted. Are they 
always reliable? Unfortunately, they are not. As in science, we have to admit that some 
of our observations and experiments were unreliable. In search for a coherent reflective 
equilibrium, we might come to the conclusion that some of our input data were wrong, 
meaning they cannot be reconciled with the rest of the constructed system. After 
stumbling upon a contradiction, there are two options. First our intuitive moral 
judgment might easily change or disappear. Such judgments will be called moral 
mistakes or deceptions. In my personal experience, the judgment that it was allowed to 
eat meat, was a moral deception. I now have developed new insights, a new coherent 
system, and it happened that my previous judgment that we are allowed to eat meat, 
was incompatible with this ethical system. That old judgment completely disappeared; I 
changed my mind.2  
But there is another possibility: sometimes our intuitive judgments do not seem to 
disappear, although we have to admit that they are not compatible with a strong 
coherent system. These moral intuitions will be called moral illusions. They are analog 
to optical illusions. Those optical illusions are characterized by their so called cognitive 
impenetrability (Pylyshyn, 1999). Even after I know that my visual perception of a figure 
is wrong, the illusion persists. Similarly, even after I realize that a moral intuition 
cannot be included in a strong coherent ethical system, that moral intuition might still 
 
                                                     
1
 Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 are based on Moral Illusions in the Trolley Problem, Bruers & Braeckman, 
submitted to Croatian Journal of Philosophy. 
2
 In the method of reflective equilibrium, one first starts with a filtration process: eliminating the initial 
judgments (moral intuitions) which are clearly unreliable, such as the intuitions that arise in conditions 
disposed to error (e.g. heavy emotional influences, morally irrelevant situational elements that trigger 
feelings of disgust,…). What is left is the set of considered (credible) moral judgments, and this set of credible 
moral intuitions is used in the construction of a coherent system in reflective equilibrium. See e.g. Brophy 
(2009), who compares this filtration process with the scientific practice of data selection, rejecting those data 
that were gathered in error-disposed conditions. My hypothesis is that the rejected moral intuitions (those 
that lack some initial credibility) are examples of moral mistakes or deceptions. The set of considered moral 
judgments might still contain moral illusions.  
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persist and ‘stay alive’. If that incompatible moral intuition is weaker than the coherent 
ethical system (if we are less willing to give up the whole ethical system), we should 
declare this outlying intuition to be a moral illusion. 
As optical illusions exist, moral illusions might also exist, and they might have 
cognitive impenetrability just as well. In fact, I will argue in a later chapter that 
speciesism (the intuitive, prejudicial judgment that humans have a higher moral status 
than non-humans) is a moral illusion. If speciesism is a kind of discrimination but is 
cognitively impenetrable, this explains why it sometimes is so difficult to convince a 
meat eater that veganism is a moral duty.  
Moral mistakes are rather easy to deal with, because they will simply disappear. But 
the cognitive impenetrability of moral illusions is a tougher nut to crack. We can’t just 
take all of our intuitions for granted. But how do we know whether an intuition is an 
illusion or not? To clarify this, let’s first look at how we deal with optical illusions.  
3.1 Optical illusions 
A paradigmatic example of an optical illusion is the Müller-Lyer illusion (Müller-Lyer, 
1889). This figure consists of two horizontal line segments, with inward and outward 
pointing arrowheads (see figure). The line segment with the outward pointing 
arrowheads appears smaller than the other line segment. In other words: our intuition 
judges the lower horizontal line to be longer than the upper one. 
 
Figure 1: the Müller-Lyer optical illusion 
 
But how do we actually know that this intuition is illusory? Of course we could simply 
refer to an objective reality to claim without further justification that both lengths are 
equal. The lengths in the Müller-Lyer figure are primary qualities, i.e. factual, objective 
properties of the world. A correspondence theory of truth states that our judgment 
about the lengths is either correct or incorrect, depending on whether the lengths in 
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the figure are objectively equal or not. But that would presuppose that we could get 
direct knowledge of this objective reality. Furthermore, I want to study moral illusions, 
and in ethics there are moral non-cognitivists who do not believe that moral judgments 
state true or false facts about an objective moral realm.3 In that case, a simple 
correspondence theory of truth may not be applicable when it comes to moral 
judgments. It is better not to refer to objective realities, because the strategy to find 
moral illusions should be satisfying for non-cognitivists as well. We should be able to 
study moral illusions even when a realm of non-subjective moral facts and truths does 
not exist. The approach I suggest is based on coherentism that uses intuitions instead of 
objective facts as input data to construct a coherent system. A coherence theory of 
truth, instead of a correspondence theory, should do the job. 
To prove the illusion in the Müller-Lyer figure, we first have to make all our most 
evident intuitions about geometry explicit. Then we will see that this one intuitive 
judgment about the lengths in the Müller-Lyer illusion is in contradiction with two 
other, stronger intuitions.  
The first of those stronger intuitions says that this ruler does not change its length 
when it is shifted in this direction. This translation invariance intuition seems obvious, 
but it is impossible to give a further argument to prove this4, so therefore it is a basic 
optical (or geometrical) intuition. This intuition is expressed and universalized into the 
very important geometrical principle of translation invariance: all rulers keep their 
length when shifted in any direction. This is a universalized principle that is true for all 
rulers and all translation directions in all situations. So it should apply to the above 
figure as well. We accept this principle as self-evident, although it is possible to think of 
hypothetical worlds or complex geometrical systems where translation invariance is 
not valid (mathematicians already constructed lots of counter-intuitive geometrical 
systems: e.g. projective, non-Euclidian or non-commutative geometries).  
A second intuition says that the length of this line segment does not depend on the 
presence of these other lines around. This intuition is translated into the very important 
universalized principle of context independence: all line segments have lengths 
independent from any geometric objects around. This, too, is a universalized principle. 
 
                                                     
3
 I don’t want to defend an intuitionist or naturalist meta-ethical position. These positions are realist-
cognitivist, in the sense that they claim that there exist moral facts in the world, that we can get access to (or 
knowledge of) this realm of moral facts and that some of these facts are true. The approach that I defend is 
constructivist: we construct coherent ethical systems. I leave in the middle whether the constructed coherent 
system is a representation of some objectively existing ethical system in the world.  
4
 With “further argument” I mean an argument based on another foundational principle or intuition. Of 
course, the translation invariance intuition in a particular situation is coherent with similar intuitions in 
other particular situations, but this coherence is not what I mean with a “further argument” for its validity.  
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The arrowheads are the ‘context’, and the claim is that lengths are always independent 
from any context (any other thing floating around).  
This principle of context independence is also related to an intuitive aversion for 
arbitrariness and artificiality.  
Arbitrariness has two aspects: a vertical and a horizontal one. Vertical arbitrariness 
says that it is arbitrary to claim that lengths of line segments are influenced in ‘four-
legged’ figures (two arrowheads with two legs each) instead of ‘N-legged’ figures or 
figures with other objects than arrowheads (e.g. line segments with circles instead of 
arrowheads). Horizontal arbitrariness says that it is arbitrary that, within the class of 
four-legged figures, the length of a line segment decreases when the arrowheads are 
pointed outwards instead of inwards. Compare this double arbitrariness with a 
wardrobe containing vertically arranged drawers. Vertical arbitrariness claims it is 
arbitrary to select the third drawer with pants. Horizontal arbitrariness says that, in this 
third drawer, it is arbitrary to select the brown pants instead of the blue.  
In section 8.4, I will demonstrate the vertical and horizontal arbitrariness of 
speciesism. Also other examples can be given, such as in religious and creationist 
beliefs. The aversion for arbitrariness is a strong motivation for atheists. Consider a 
book: it is unlikely that the book is spontaneously written, because it has a high 
information content. So it is created by a rational being, an author. Creationists  say that 
this author is also too complex to have been spontaneously generated (and those 
creationists do not believe in the third option next to spontaneous generation and 
conscious creation: natural evolution). So they believe that there should exist a meta-
author, a god who created the author (and the rest of the universe as we know it). The 
problem is that most creationists stop at this second level of creation: they say that 
what exists is ‘universe+god’. But of course, by the same reason ‘universe+god’ is also too 
complex for a spontaneous generation, so it should have been created by a metagod. But 
‘universe+god+metagod’ is again too complex, so there should be an even higher 
creator. We end up with an infinite chain, a recursive set of sets of creators. Most 
religious believers pick the second lowest level, where a god created creators such as 
authors of books.  This choice for the second level is arbitrary, because the evidence for 
this level is not stronger than the evidence for any higher level (only the evidence for 
the lowest level, the level of authors, is very strong). This is the vertical arbitrariness, 
which reflects the famous creationist problem: who created god?  
Within this second level, there is a further horizontal arbitrariness. For example a 
Christian creationist does not believe in the many other possible creators and gods: s/he 
does not believe in Brahma, Thor, Jupiter,… As the evidence for a Christian god is as high 
as the evidence for e.g. a Hindu god, the choice for the Christian god is arbitrary. The 
Christian believer is in fact atheist about all those other possible gods. The arguments 
raised by a Christian believer towards atheists bounce back: “You are not open for God” 
(neither is s/he for Krishna), “You cannot prove that God does not exist” (neither can 
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s/he prove that Quetzalcoatl does not exist), “God reveals Himself once you believe in 
Him” (but so will Osiris), “It’s arrogant to claim that God does not exist” (but also 
arrogant to claim that Zeus does not exist).  
Artificiality or complicacy claims that the influence of e.g. the angles of the 
arrowheads on the length of a line segment generates a geometrical rule that is too 
complicated and farfetched. This artificiality introduces a fuzzy factor: what if we 
gradually open the angles of the arrowheads? How should this influence the lengths of 
the horizontal line segments? Such mysterious influence seems artificial. 
In section 8.4, I will argue that speciesism is very artificial. Again we can make an 
analogy with e.g. religious beliefs: looking at religious doctrines from an outsider’s 
perspective, they often look highly complicated and farfetched. Atheists can ask lots of 
puzzling questions about religious doctrines, such as: why did God put the forbidden 
tree of knowledge in the middle of the Garden of Eden instead of somewhere beyond 
reach? Why did he put it there in the first place? Why the snake? Why the seduction? 
What were God’s intentions? Why does He ask for sacrifices? Why sacrificing His son? 
Why does He not stop evil Himself? Why does He work in such mysterious ways? How 
do we know which parts of the Bible should be interpreted only metaphorically? And so 
on and on. 
 
The two principles of translation invariance and context independence imply that we 
can use instruments: we can use a ruler, or we can use something to cover or erase the 
arrowheads. With these instruments, we can clearly demonstrate that both horizontal 
lines are equal. Our two universalized principles cohere with each other. But they are in 
contradiction with this one intuitive judgment about the different lengths of the 
horizontal lines. 
We now have two options. 1) We can abandon two of our strongest and coherent 
intuitions (translation invariance and context independence) and try to make a 
consistent geometrical system without those two principles, in order to save our 
intuition that the horizontal line segments are of different lengths. As mathematicians 
often invent some very exotic geometrical systems, this strategy is not necessarily 
impossible. But everyone would agree that such a procedure to invent a new 
geometrical system would be very difficult, and the resulting geometrical system will 
appear to be very artificial. 2) So a second option is to acknowledge that our intuition 
about the lengths of the horizontal lines is wrong. The intuition does not disappear 
however; it has some cognitive impenetrability, so it is not a mistake or deception. It is 
an illusion. 
Most people automatically prefer the latter option, because the combination of the 
intuitions of translation invariance and context independence is very strong, and we do 
not want to dismiss them so easily. Translation invariance and context independence 
generate a coherent system in narrow reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1979). 
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To this coherent system we can add some background theories to arrive at a wide 
reflective equilibrium. Two background theories are added: one from psychology, one 
from anthropology. Adding knowledge about the underlying psychological mechanism 
generates more evidence that we are dealing with an illusion. We know that the Müller-
Lyer optical illusion is created by our brains in order to adapt a 2D retinal image to 3D-
vision. Two objects of equal physical length can have different images on our retina, if 
one object is further away from our eyes than the other. Our brains correct for this 
difference in appearance. So the mechanism is perspective-adaptation. As we live in a 
3D-world, our brains are trained to make 3D-adaptations. Sometimes they’re stuck when 
looking at a 2D-image such as the Müller-Lyer image.  
What actually happens can be described as a psychological heuristic (Kahneman & 
Shane, 2002). Heuristics are intuitive, efficient rules of thumb that are applied when 
facing complex problems. They work by a process of attribute substitution: a target 
attribute that is computationally complex for our brains is (unconsciously) substituted 
by a heuristic attribute that is easier to calculate. Kahneman (2003) argued that some 
optical illusions are generated by heuristics and attribute substitutions. The following 
image of a staircase clarifies this a bit more.  
 
   Figure 2: the Muller-Lyer optical illusion in a staircase 
 
In 3D, we know that each step has the same size, so each horizontal line has the same 
length in a 3D-world. But in 2D, the lines have clearly different lengths. Now we see this 
picture in 2D, and we have to determine the lengths of the two thick horizontal lines of 
the bottom stair. These lengths are the target attribute. But what do our brains do? We 
often take the stairs, so our brains are used to computing sizes of objects in 3D. Sizes in 
3D are therefore easily accessible, and our brain unconsciously uses them as heuristic 
attributes to determine sizes in 2D-pictures. That is how length judgments in 2D-
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pictures get distorted: the lengths of the two thick lines are, in fact, equal. But in a 3D 
staircase, the lower thick line would be much shorter, so that’s why it appears shorter.5 
A second background theory refers to anthropology. Interestingly, the Muller-Lyer 
illusion is not inborn. Anthropological studies have shown that the illusion depends on 
culture (Segall, 1963; Ahluwalia, 1978). In particular, some indigenous people (who do 
not live in an environment with straight edges of houses, tables and staircases) are less 
susceptible to this optical illusion. So if they don’t see it and we do, who is right? This is 
another part of the evidence that we are indeed dealing with an optical illusion. 
Two principles that cohere with each other, added with background theories about 
the psychological mechanism and the cultural relativity, together form quite some 
evidence to justify the claim that it is an optical illusion. The only counterevidence is 
that the illusion does not simply disappear after reflecting about it.  
Let’s consider a second example of an optical illusion: the grating induction illusion 
(Foley & McCourt, 1985).  
 
Figure 3: the grating induction illusion 
 
The horizontal grey bar is actually uniformly grey, but the left side appears brighter. 
We can check translation invariance by taking a piece of paper with the same grayness 
as the lift side of the bar, and then shift the piece of paper to the right side. Our 
intuition says that the properties of paper (its grayness) do not change when the paper 
is shifted. We can also check context independence by covering the black-white areas 
around the grey bar. Our intuitions say that grayness of an object does not depend on 
things around it. As a third argument, we know that our optical system is also equipped 
with a mechanism of lateral inhibition, in order to increase the contrast and sharpness 
of visual stimuli. This mechanism generates the grating induction illusion.  So we 
understand where the illusion comes from. 
 
                                                     
5
 For a more detailed explanation of this illusion, based on a mechanism of time-delay, see Changizi et al. 
(2008). 
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In summary: two coherent arguments based on strong intuitions of invariance and 
context independence (non-arbitrariness and non-artificiality), and a supporting 
argument that says something about the underlying mechanism in our optical system, 
gives us enough evidence to counter a weak perceptual intuition. Can we apply the same 
method to moral intuitions? 
3.2 Moral illusions 
So let’s turn to ethics now. Moral illusions are obstinate but incorrect intuitive 
judgments, comparable to the famous optical illusions. Sir David Ross (1930) compared 
our moral convictions or intuitions with sense-perceptions: the former are the basic 
data of ethics, just like the latter are the basic data of natural science. But he remarked: 
“Just as some of the latter have to be rejected as illusory, so have some of the former; 
but as the latter are rejected only when they are in conflict with other more accurate 
sense-perceptions, the former are rejected only when they are in conflict with other 
convictions which stand better the test of reflection.” (Ross, 1930, p41) By making this 
analogy with sensory illusions (e.g. optical illusions), Ross might be one of the first 
ethicists to point at the existence of moral illusions. 
Seventy years later, as scientists and philosophers became more and more interested 
in the neurobiology of morality, the notion of moral illusions and its analogy with 
optical illusions reappeared. One philosopher and neuroscientist made the point 
explicitly clear: Sam Harris stated that, for example, the difference in moral disapproval 
between torturing a suspected terrorist (to find the location of a bomb that is about to 
kill hundreds of people) and collateral damage in war is a moral illusion. “Paradoxically, 
this equivalence [between using torture and causing collateral damage] has not made 
the practice of torture seem more acceptable to me […]. I believe that here we come 
upon an ethical illusion of sorts – analogous to the perceptual illusions that are of such 
abiding interest to scientists who study the visual pathways in the brain. The full moon 
appearing on the horizon is no bigger than the full moon when it appears overhead, but 
it looks bigger, for reasons that are still obscure to neuroscientists. A ruler held up to 
the sky reveals something that we are otherwise incapable of seeing, even when we 
understand that our eyes are deceiving us.” (Harris, 2004, p198) Harris continues with 
pointing at a possible psychological bias behind our moral intuitions: “In fact, there IS 
already some scientific evidence that our ethical intuitions are driven by considerations 
of proximity and emotional salience of the sort I addressed above. Clearly, these 
intuitions are fallible. In the present case, many innocent lives could well be lost as a 
result of our inability to feel a moral equivalence where a moral equivalence seems to 
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exist. It may be time to take out our rulers and hold them up to the sky.” (Harris, 2004, 
p198) 
Two questions need to be answered. First: do moral illusions exist? Second, and more 
important, how do we know? How can we agree whether some moral intuition is or is 
not a moral illusion?  
To answer the first question, let us again look at the six analogies of ethics. Do these 
other fields of cognitive activity contain illusions as well? 
1) In modern physics, we encounter contra-intuitive judgments in e.g. quantum 
mechanics and relativity theory. We could say that some intuitions about simultaneity, 
measurements, particle identity or space-time are illusions. 
2) In mathematics and statistics, too, we encounter erroneous intuitive judgments 
such as in the famous Monty-Hall problem or the mysterious Banach-Tarski property. 
Studies on heuristics and cognitive biases (Kahneman et al., 1982) show that our 
intuitive judgments under uncertainty (e.g. in statistics) are not always reliable. 
3) In the field of geometry we have the optical illusions. 
4) In grammar we have an interesting situation. We already mentioned the apparent 
analogy between our grammatical faculty and our moral faculty. If moral illusions 
would exist, then grammatical illusions might exist also. And this is indeed the case. 
(Phillips et al., 2010) A simple example of a grammatical illusion is the sentence: “One 
out of three children are overweight.” According to a lot of people, this sentence 
appears to be grammatically correct at first sight. Yet, it is a violation of a most simple 
rule of subject-verb agreement. The fact that people repeatedly make such errors can 
indicate that it is an illusion instead of merely a mistake. Such errors are too persistent 
to be merely mistakes. 
5) Our example of crossword puzzles might perhaps be too rudimentary to have 
illusions. (Mistakes, however, are often made in solving crossword puzzles. But as we 
have seen, illusions are more persistent than mistakes.)  
6) In our judgments about taste preferences, there can also be deceptions (if you like 
apples and I give you a piece of apple, paint it with a brown, odorless, tasteless color and 
cut it in the shape of a sausage, then you might judge it to be bad) as well as illusions. 
For example, psychological biases can influence our taste preference. Taste evaluation is 
influenced by what we think we eat and whether that food symbolizes values that we 
support. For example meat eaters and vegetarians are susceptible to this kind of taste 
illusions. Researchers (Allen et al., 2008) have given meat eaters two sausages. The 
participants thought that the first sausage was meat (whereas in reality it was a 
vegetarian sausage) and that the second sausage was vegetarian (whereas in reality it 
contained meat). The meat eaters who valued dominance, hierarchy and social status 
tended to prefer the first sausage, because their taste preference is influenced by their 
value scheme. Taste evaluation is not simply a matter of chemistry.  
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Also in other fields illusions do exist. There are auditory illusions (e.g. a pitch seems 
to increase indefinitely; Deutsch, 1992), sense illusions (e.g. the contrast effect: place 
your left hand for some minutes in cold water and your right and in warm water, then 
touch with your both hands the same object) and many more. Illusions appear 
frequently in different areas, and morality is not likely to be an exception.  
Just as optical illusions can learn us a lot about how our visual perception system 
works, and grammatical illusions can inform us a lot about how our language faculty 
works, so could we learn a lot about morality by focusing at moral illusions.  
After having affirmatively answered the question whether moral illusions might 
exist, let’s now move to the second, more interesting question: how do we know 
whether a moral intuition is an illusion?  
One might think that with optical illusions matters are easy, because there is an 
objective reality to refer to. With ethics, we do not have such an objective reality. 
However, in the case of the optical illusion, we do not need to get a direct access to an 
objective reality. In fact, we can use some non-argued basic starting points or intuitions, 
such as translation invariance and context independence. The underlying intuitions 
behind the principles of translation invariance and context independence lack further 
foundational justification. These are principles which we have to agree to accept.  
So how to tackle moral illusions? We in fact already have the answer. We start from 
moral intuitions, because there is nothing else to start from. These intuitive moral 
judgments in particular situations have to be expressed in particular ethical rules. In the 
next step, these particular ethical rules have to be universalized to all other similar 
situations. After formulating universal ethical principles, we have to check whether the 
resulting system has internal consistency. By testing more and more situations, i.e. by 
looking whether our moral intuitions in all situations agree with the universalized 
ethical principles, we get a coherent system. If we arrive at a contradiction, i.e. if a 
moral intuition is incompatible with our universal ethical principles, we could refine 
some principle or introduce a new principle that settles the conflict. If this strategy 
really doesn’t work, then the only option left is that our moral intuition is wrong. If this 
intuition does not disappear, we have found a moral illusion. 
In the Müller-Lyer illusion we had reliable instruments to demonstrate that it is an 
illusion: we need a measuring stick or something to cover or erase the small 
arrowheads. In ethics, our reliable instruments are valid arguments based on 
universalized principles coming from strong intuitions in reflective equilibrium. So, 
valid arguments are the reliable instruments to demonstrate that a moral intuition is an 
illusion. (Yet, in the coherence picture, nothing has absolute reliability. Even the 
strongest intuitions can be mistaken, even measure sticks might be untrustworthy, even 
basic experimental data in science might be erroneous. The strength of arguments or 
principles lies in the overall coherence.) 
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There is one feature that almost all optical illusions have: the influence of context. In 
the Müller-Lyer figure, the small arrowheads are the context. Our geometric system 
requires some context independence, because the context is irrelevant and arbitrary. 
Yet, the context might influence our perceptions and judgments. This might also be the 
case with moral illusions. We can expect that moral illusions are to be recognized by 
their context dependence, arbitrariness, artificiality, complicacy or fuzziness. 
The idea of moral illusions sheds a new light on the problem of moral disagreement. 
Giving us tools to demonstrate that a moral intuition is in fact an illusion will help us to 
accept a coherent theory of e.g. animal equality. In geometry we had tools to 
demonstrate that an intuition is an illusion. We now have similar tools in ethics: strong 
moral intuitions that can be translated into coherent universalized ethical principles.  
So the analogy between optical and moral illusions can help us to better detect and 
understand moral illusions. The strategy for detecting optical illusions – using 
translation invariance, context independence and an underlying optical mechanism – 
can be applied to ethics as well, in order to detect moral illusions.  
There might be quite a lot of examples of moral illusions: perhaps futility thinking 
and projective grouping (Unger, 1996, p.100), moral luck (Nelkin, 2013) or the 
intransitivity problem (Temkin, 1987) are examples of moral illusions. In recent 
literature, as a spin-off of the work of Kahneman & Tversky (1982), the study of moral 
heuristics gained some influence (Sunstein, 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010). As 
Sunstein argued, in certain situations, moral heuristics might create erroneous intuitive 
judgments that we could also consider as a specific kind of moral illusions. In a later 
chapter, I will look at a more debated issue, the prejudicial difference in moral status 
between humans and non-human sentient beings (even when the humans have equal 
levels of mental capacities as the non-human animals). This is to most people an 
intuitive judgment that is used to justify all kinds of (ab)uses of animals, from factory 
farms to pet shops. Can this speciesist intuition be a persistent moral illusion? Is it an 
erroneous moral heuristic? Before we move to the animal issue, it might be a good idea 
to first apply our “moral illusion detection technique” to the psychological mechanism 
of intervention myopia (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) in the trolley problem. 
3.3 An example of moral illusions in the trolley dilemma 
Let’s discuss a moral illusion in some detail. Consider the following trolley dilemma 
(based on Thomson, 1985; for a review on the trolley problem: see appendix). A runaway 
trolley is moving on the main track, endangering three people. You can save those 
people by turning a switch so that the trolley takes a side track. However, on this side 
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track there is one person who will be killed. In summary: doing nothing results in the 
death of three persons, acting (turning the switch) results in the death of one person. 
 
 
In situation B, we change the set-up a little bit. This time, the three people on the 
main track are behind a second fork. Again, doing nothing results in the death of those 
three people. But turning the switch redirects the trolley to the side track, on which 
there is a heavy man, who weighs enough to block the trolley. This is the loop trolley 
dilemma, because the side track loops back towards the main tack.  
 
 
Situation C is again slightly different. This time, you hesitated too long and the 
trolley already passed the first fork, heading along the main track towards the three 
people. The plan to turn the switch will no longer work. But the side track is on a bridge 
above the main track. So you could still stop the trolley by pushing the heavy man from 
the bridge in front of the trolley on the main track.  
 
 
As you can see, the differences in the three dilemmas consist in the positions of the 
trolley and the three people on the main track: they can be either before or behind the 
first and second forks.  
According to psychological studies (Hauser et al., 2008), roughly 90% of the people 
respond that turning the switch is allowed in the first dilemma (situation A). Only 50% 
say that we are allowed to turn the switch in the second dilemma, whereas 10% state 
that we are allowed to push the heavy man from the bridge in situation C. By looking at 
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brain activity, Greene et al. (2001) discovered that persons reacted differently (more 
emotionally) in the third dilemma (situation C), compared to the first. Other brain 
regions became active. 
We can give two differences between the above three trolley dilemmas. The first 
distinction separates situation A from situations B and C. In situations B and C, looking 
at the trajectory that the trolley will take, we place the heavy man in between the 
trolley and the three people. That is necessary, because the heavy man has to block the 
trolley. If the heavy man was not present, the trolley could move on and kill the three 
people. So if your plan is to save those three people, the presence of the heavy man is 
required in order for your plan to work. This first principle can be expressed as a 
deontological right not to be used as merely means. The heavy man is used as merely 
means to save the others. It is a deontological right, as it can be in conflict with a 
consequentialist right to live. According to consequentialism, it is always morally 
required to act in all three dilemmas, because the consequentialist right to live is 
violated only once by acting, whereas it is violated three times by allowing the three 
people on the main track to die. If the deontological right is at least three times stronger 
than the consequentialist right, then action is not permissible in situations B and C. In 
those situations, one deontological right is violated. 
A second distinction, that separates situation C from situations A and B, is that in 
situation C, the action is up-close-and-personal. You have to touch and push the heavy 
man yourself. But suppose you simply have to push a button from a distance, to 
overturn the side track and drop the heavy man on the main track. I expect that even 
then a majority of people (more than the 50% of people who responded favorably in 
situation B) would respond that action is not permissible. This expectation is compatible 
with a second psychological study on the trolley dilemmas (Waldmann & Dieterich, 
2007).  
In that study, all people on the main and side tracks were actually sitting in busses. 
Situation C then consists in pushing the bus from the side track onto the main track: you 
are sitting in a heavy truck that can push the bus, so no personal contact is required. As 
the person on the side track is sitting in a bus, not he, but the bus is used as merely a 
means. If the person was not in the bus on the side track, your plan to block the trolley 
by using the bus would still work. So the death of the person in the bus could be 
considered a side effect. 
As the deontological right is not violated in the bus-trolley dilemmas studied in 
Waldmann & Dieterich (2007), we expect that people are more permissive towards 
action, and that there is no distinction between situations A and B (because the only 
distinguishing factor was the violation of the deontological right). This is indeed the 
case. Respondents could rate the admissibility of action from 1 (definitely not allowed) 
to 6 (definitely allowed). The bus-trolley dilemmas A and B received an average rate of 
about 4,8, without a statistically relevant difference between the two dilemmas. So 
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action in both situations is allowed to a high degree.  But situation C received an average 
rating of 3,7, which is relevantly lower than the other two situations.  
As in situation C there is no longer a personal contact with the victim, there is 
something else at hand. The difference between situation C and situations A and B is 
that in C the victim (the heavy man on the side track) is sent to the threat (the trolley), 
whereas in A and B the threat is directed towards the victim. In other words, looking at 
the causal chain in situation C, the ‘locus of intervention’ is at the person on the side 
track. Sending the victim to the trolley means that the path of the victim is influenced 
directly. On the other hand, turning the switch in situation B means that the locus of 
intervention is at the threat. Sending the trolley to the side track means that the path of 
the threat is influenced directly (and the path of the victim is influenced indirectly 
because the threat will eventually hit him). So the difference between situations B and C 
is the causal path and the locus of intervention. Directly intervening in the path of the 
victim in situation C is a generalization of the up-close-and-personal element of pushing 
a heavy man from the bridge. There is no close contact with the victim, but still there is 
some directness. 
According to the study of Waldmann & Dieterich (2007), direct intervention in the 
path of the victim is considered less permissible than intervention in the path of the 
threat, even in the absence of up-close-and-personal contact. And according to the 
study by Hauser et al. (2008), 50% of respondents said that action in situation B is not 
allowed. From these facts, we can expect that a majority of people (significantly more 
than 50%) would respond that action in situation C is not allowed even in the absence of 
up-close-and-personal contact. With close contact, 90% of respondents said that action 
is not allowed in situation C.  
Note that the results in both studies are not contradictory either, because in 
Waldmann & Dieterich (2007) the situations contained no violations of deontological 
rights, and in Hauser et al. (2008) there was a very close contact with the victim in 
situation C. 
In summary, we have two distinctions between the three trolley dilemmas.  
1) Action in situation A implies no violation of the deontological right not to be used 
as merely a means. In B and C this right is violated. This distinguished A from B and C. 
2) Action in situation C implies that the victim is sent to the threat. In A and B, the 
threat is sent to the victim. This distinguishes C from A and B. 
The first principle says that action is less permissible if a deontological right not to be 
used as merely a means is violated. The second principle says that action is less 
permissible if the victim is sent to the threat. We have seen that these principles 
correspond with two psychological studies on the trolley dilemma. In situation A, action 
means that the deontological right is not violated and the victim is not sent to the 
threat, so it is strongly permissible (as 90% of people say). In situation B, action still 
means that the victim is not sent to the threat, but the deontological right gets violated. 
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So this is much less permissible (only 50% of respondents say it is permissible). In 
situation C, the victim is used as merely a means and is sent to the threat. So in this case, 
the situation is strongly impermissible (as a majority says). 
The question we now have to ask is: are the moral intuitions behind these two 
principles illusions? I will demonstrate that the second principle is based on a moral 
illusion, but the first one is not. To show that the second principle is a moral illusion (as 
was hinted at by Peter Unger, 1996), I present (just as with the optical illusions) two 
arguments based on strong moral intuitions, and one auxiliary argument based on 
knowledge of the underlying psychological mechanism.  
The first argument is based on a kind of translation invariance. So we have to see 
what remains constant as we shift from the first to the second and the third situation. In 
the Müller-Lyer optical illusion, we have seen that what remains constant when shifted 
from the upper to the lower part of the figure, is an intrinsic property of a line segment: 
the length. The length of a ruler does not change when shifted. In the trolley dilemmas, 
what remains constant are intrinsic and morally relevant properties of the people 
involved. The moral status of an individual is such an intrinsic (context independent) 
and morally relevant property.6 When moving from dilemma B to C, the moral status of 
all individuals remains the same, it is independent from the situation. This seems self-
evident, but is in fact a strong intuition that we strongly accept. This moral status can 
consist of different things, such as the consequentialist right to live and the 
deontological right not to be used as merely a means. These are rights that individuals 
have, no matter what the situation may be. Most importantly, we have a strong 
intuition that the moral status of an individual does not change when the locus of 
intervention in the causal chain is changed. The moral status of a victim is not higher 
when the locus of intervention is at the victim instead of at the threat. 
The second argument is based on context independence. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, 
we can cover or erase the irrelevant properties, such as the arrowheads, to check the 
equality of lengths. So looking at trolley situations B and C, what is the irrelevant 
context that we have to erase? The only relevant aspect is the collision between the 
trolley and the victim. Where this collision happens is not relevant. So let’s simply erase 
the tracks and all other things in the environment. We are left with a completely empty 
 
                                                     
6
 With this I mean that an individual has objective properties (such as mental capacities for well-being and 
consciousness) and that we can attribute a moral status to these objective properties. The moral status itself is 
not an objective property (not a moral fact, as cognitivists would say), but an attributed property (comparable 
to secondary qualities such as color). In this sense, color illusions (such as the grating induction illusion) 
might be a better analogy of moral illusions than the Müller-Lyer illusion, because length is a primary quality 
whereas color (greyness in the grating induction illusion) is a secondary quality. For the analogy in meta-
ethics between moral values and secondary qualities, see e.g. McDowell (1984). 
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space, apart from the two relevant entities: the trolley and the victim (the heavy man). 
In situation B, the trolley is moved upwards, towards the heavy man. In C, the heavy 
man is moved downwards, towards the trolley. 
 
 
 
As there is no absolute point of reference around (we have erased all irrelevant 
things), relativity says that both situations B and C are now in fact equal. According to 
Unger (1996, p101), this difference between sending a victim to a threat and a threat to a 
victim is based on what he called ‘protophysics’, in violation of relativity theory. This 
demonstrates that the difference between situation B and C is simply something 
contextual, as the context determines the spatial frame of reference. But of course, this 
argument is just as well based on (strong) intuitions about what is the context and what 
is morally (ir)relevant. The position of the tracks is not morally relevant. The only 
relevant thing is the relative position of the threat and the victim, because this 
determines the collision.  
The third, auxiliary argument is based on a psychological mechanism. This 
mechanism is in fact clearly explained by Waldmann and Dieterich (2007). Their concept 
of ‘intervention myopia’ already indicates that we are dealing with something that is 
not functioning properly. When the locus of intervention is at the threat, as in 
situations A and B, our attentional spotlight is at the threat, and all people (on the main 
and the side track), are background. So from the perspective of the threat, the persons 
are all equal, and it is easier to make consequentialist calculations. But if the locus of 
intervention is at the victim (the heavy man), the focus of attention is at the victim. The 
other three people on the main track are now part of the background. And the myopia 
indicates that it is difficult to take those people in the background fully into account. 
Due to the myopia, we don’t see their moral status so clearly. This distorts 
consequentialist reasoning. In situation C, people tend to focus on the fate of the victim, 
neglecting the death of the three people on the main track. This focus on the one victim 
(the locus of intervention), results in a neglect of other people located in the 
background. As these three people in the background appear to be absent (far away in 
the causal chain), it appears that the heavy man dies in vain when pushed from the 
bridge. Citing Waldmann & Dieterich: “In sum, the general hypothesis is that people 
tend to focus on the causal paths of agents [threats] or patients [victims] targeted by an 
intervention, and neglect other causal processes occurring outside this focus, in the 
background.[…] We are not saying that in cases of intervention myopia, people are 
completely blind to the victims in the background (i.e., the death of the three people); 
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rather, we are saying that because of an attentional focus on the effects of 
interventions, people who are evaluating the morality of options may give victims in 
the background less weight than victims in the attentional spotlight.” (Waldmann & 
Dieterich, 2007, p249) 
With the above arguments, we can conclude that the difference between sending a 
threat to a victim and sending a victim to a threat is a moral illusion. The moral 
relevance of this difference was already criticized by Fischer (1992) and Fischer & 
Ravizza (1994), but now we have a clearer view and we can call it a moral illusion. 
Whether the deontological right not to be used as merely means is also a moral illusion, 
remains to be seen. 
3.4 Is the deontological right a moral illusion? 
As we have seen in the discussion of the trolley dilemmas, there is a possible 
explanation that separates situation A from situations B and C. In situation A, a 
deontological right of the victim is not violated. In situations B and C, the victim is used 
as merely a means, as a trolley blocker or a human shield. The presence of this victim is 
required in order to save the other people on the main track.  
As far as I know, the coherentist approach does not yet imply that this deontological 
right is a moral illusion. On the one hand, the above mentioned intervention myopia 
seems to suggest that the deontological right is an illusion. But on the other hand, there 
seem to be some arguments that suggest that the deontological right is not an illusion. 
First, the deontological right respects a translation invariance: all persons keep the 
same deontological right in any of the trolley dilemmas, because the deontological right 
is related to the moral status of the individual, and this moral status is invariant (it 
remains the same when shifting between different dilemmas).  
Second, there seems to be a context independence. It can be said that all people can 
claim this right, independent from the situation. So it has some intrinsic (context 
independent) character.7  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there are hundreds of other moral dilemmas 
and situations where intuitive judgments of most people are coherent with the 
 
                                                     
7
 However, this right refers to the use as merely a means to someone else’s ends, so it refers to the presence of 
someone else in the environment. It is unclear whether this introduces a context dependence and whether 
this kind of context dependence creates an illusion. 
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deontological right principle. We are not allowed to sacrifice an innocent person against 
his will to use his organs to save five patients in the hospital who need new organs in 
order to live. Neither are the following actions allowed: involuntary experiments, terror 
bombing (killing innocent civilians in order to demoralize the enemy), torturing a 
suspected terrorist (to gain information on the location of a bomb that is going to blow 
up a school), killing under blackmail (a terrorist says that if you kill an innocent person, 
he will not kill his five hostages), trafficking (buying and selling humans), raping women 
(and selling the video to thousands of male consumers), gladiator fights (entertaining 
thousands of spectators), human exhibitions (ethnographic zoos), cannibalism or 
slavery. In all these cases, the presence of the victim is required in order to benefit 
others, so the victim is used as merely a means. The above actions are not allowed, even 
when consequentialist considerations might support those sacrifices and deontological 
rights violations. 
So we have more than ten dilemmas and situations where the deontological right 
might be violated: trolley-bridge, organ transplants, experiments, terror bombing, 
torture, blackmail killing, trafficking, rape, cannibalism, gladiator fights, and slavery. In 
all these different situations, most people have the very coherent intuition that the 
deontological right should be protected against consequentialist considerations. If the 
deontological right not to be used as merely a means trumps the right to live, then we 
are not allowed to use people as e.g. trolley blockers or information sources, even if this 
means that other people will die. 
As the deontological right can be related to the moral status of an individual 
independent from the situation, and as there are a lot of very different situations where 
most people’s moral intuitions are coherent and compatible with the principle of the 
deontological right, I am tempted to believe that this right is not (yet) a moral illusion. 
The only exception to this deontological right intuition known to me is the loop 
trolley dilemma. The loop dilemma (situation B) is often mentioned as a counter-
example to the moral relevance of the deontological right (e.g. Singer, 2005). In the loop 
dilemma, the deontological right is violated, yet, the action is deemed permissible by a 
lot of people (Hauser et al. 2008). Consequentialists can refer to this intuition in this 
particular dilemma to argue that the deontological right is a moral illusion. But from the 
above discussion, we learn something interesting: the permissibility in the loop 
dilemma might be a moral illusion, and if this is the case, then the deontological right 
might still be valid. So the existence of moral illusions might ‘save’ the deontological 
right. 
Now, if the deontological right is not an illusion, what happens with the above 
psychological explanation of intervention myopia? In short, we might hypothetically 
say that intervention myopia does not generate the illusion in the bridge dilemma, but 
‘instrumentalisation myopia’ generates an illusion in the loop dilemma. The structure of 
the loop dilemma is such that we don’t see the instrumentalisation (the use as merely a 
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means) of the person on the side track, because that person seems as far away as the 
non-instrumentalised person on the side track in dilemma A. In other words: the person 
on the side track is too far away for us to see his instrumentalisation. 
In terms of heuristics, the attribute substitution might (very hypothetically) work as 
follows. The target attribute is in this case the deontological right. As it is not always 
easy to quickly detect violations of this right, our brains might use a heuristic attribute 
instead. Note that, if the deontological right gets violated, it means that the presence of 
the victim is required in order to save other people. The required presence is the target 
attribute, and it requires a sometimes computationally difficult counter-factual thought 
experiment to determine whether someone’s presence is required. But when presence 
of the victim is required, this likely means that the focus of the action (the locus of 
intervention) will be on the victim. In other words, the locus of intervention might be a 
good heuristic attribute for detecting deontological rights violations.  Therefore, our 
brains look for this heuristic attribute, which is reliable in most cases, but misfires in 
the loop dilemma. In the loop dilemma, the locus of intervention was not on the victim, 
and hence our brains think erroneously that the deontological right is not violated. 
The above is still very hypothetical, because one might also say that the true target 
attribute is the maximization of well-being or lives saved, as consequentialists would 
have it. So the issue remains open: is the deontological right (the intuition that inhibits 
action in the bridge dilemma) a moral illusion in a consequentialist ethical system, or is 
the loop dilemma intuition (that action is permissible) a moral illusion in a 
deontological system? 
Whether the deontological right not to be used as merely a means is also a moral 
illusion, remains to be seen. As the deontological right, due to its intrinsic and context 
independent character, can be related to the moral status of an individual independent 
from the situation, and as intuitions in a lot of different situations are coherent with the 
principle of the deontological right, I am tempted to believe that it is not a moral 
illusion. This deontological right will be discussed in more detail in the later section on 
the basic right (section 6.2). 
3.5 Heuristics in thought experiments 
Sunstein (2005) criticized the above method of coherentism (reflective equilibrium) that 
uses philosophical thought experiments (moral dilemmas like the trolley problem). His 
claim is that our intuitions in those ‘exotic’ (far-from-ordinary-reality) thought 
experiments are not reliable anyway, because exotic situations are often situations 
where heuristics misfire. Heuristics are common sense rules of thumb that work well in 
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most casual situations that we encounter in our daily lives, because in these situations 
we are trained to make quick and accurate judgments. But in constructing exotic 
thought experiments with trolleys, we create situations where the heuristic does not 
yield reliable results, i.e. where the heuristic attribute strongly deviates from the target 
attribute. At least that is what Sunstein claims.  
Yet, I would not throw away the method of thought experiments. I claim that those 
thought experiments do have some value: they trigger our moral intuitions and 
interrogate our morality, just as experiments in physics allow us to interrogate nature. 
I’d like to defend the coherentist-universalist approach (deriving intuitions from 
thought experiments and translating them in coherent universalized ethical principles), 
by making the analogy with physics. For example, in our daily lives, we often see that 
heavier objects fall at higher speeds. Yet, the intuition that heavier objects have higher 
accelerations deviates from the real law of gravity. So in order to derive the laws of 
gravity, we have to set up exotic situations, e.g. by dropping different objects in a 
vacuum (e.g. on the moon). Those exotic experiments are controllable, they eliminate 
specific contextual variables (like air draft) so they are better suited to interrogate 
nature to find its most fundamental laws. And the same goes for ethics, by interrogating 
our moral brains, using exotic thought experiments, we can derive the fundamental 
laws, the basic forces of our ethics.  
Yet, even in the exotic experiments, we cannot trust everything. In physics, to derive 
the acceleration law of gravity, we have to use clocks. But as Einstein demonstrated in 
his theory of general relativity: clocks measure different times depending on their 
positions in a gravitational field. So clocks can move faster or slower. Hence, even in 
exotic experiments, we cannot completely trust our instruments. In our daily lives, 
clocks are reliable to measure time, so we use clocks as heuristics. The value on the 
clock is a heuristic attribute; the real time is the target attribute. Now, in some exotic 
situations, with strong gravitational fields, the heuristic does not measure real time 
anymore. Consider clocks in GPS satellites. A clock in a GPS satellite experiences a 
weaker gravitational field than clocks on earth, so a satellite clock runs at a slightly 
higher speed than a similar clock on earth. We can use the clock on earth as a heuristic 
to measure time evolution in the universe. But this heuristic misfires (a tiny bit) when 
we want to measure time evolution in the satellite. We know, thanks to Einstein, that 
clocks on earth might not be reliable heuristics in those exotic situations. The only way 
to discover this heuristic misfiring is by setting up other exotic experiments, and 
deriving a coherent framework about how time evolves at different places in a 
gravitational field. That coherent framework was derived by Einstein based on 
(thought) experiments. 
So, indeed, we cannot always rely on moral heuristics in exotic situations. Indeed, 
exotic situations might sometimes be exactly those situations where heuristics misfire. 
But using more and more thought experiments, we can see when our heuristics might 
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misfire. They misfire when they are not consistent with a coherent ethical theory of 
universalized ethical principles. 
There is another, slightly related issue. We construct thought experiments by erasing 
a lot of variables. Like the trolley dilemma, those experiments are characterized by their 
low number of variables. E.g. we don’t consider interpersonal relationships, 
probabilities or people’s virtues in the trolley dilemma. This helps us to look for those 
elements that are crucial in our study. However, one critique can be that they neglect 
the specificities of contexts and particular, real situations. Some complexity and 
situation-dependence is missing.  
Here we can use another analogy with physics. One branch of physics is looking for 
the most fundamental laws: high energy physics (elementary particle physics and 
cosmology). Other branches study other physical contexts: for example fluid mechanics 
or statistical thermodynamics. Although a fluid is composed of elementary particles 
subject to the fundamental forces, fluid mechanics studies other, emergent laws and 
principles.  
In this dissertation, I intend to derive fundamental laws of ethics, the basic ‘moral 
forces’, so it is comparable with elementary particle physics. I use thought experiments 
in ethics, just as particle physicists perform exotic experiments using e.g. particle 
accelerators. Contextualist or situationist ethics, on the other hand, is most suitable for 
complex real life issues. These ethics might be comparable to e.g. fluid mechanics or 
thermodynamics. In these contextualist ethics, new rules or principles might emerge, 
that strongly depend on the specific context (e.g. complex relationships or cultural 
influences). The study of elementary particles is not incompatible with the study of fluid 
mechanics. And for the same reason, a principle-based, universalist ethics is not 
incompatible with more contextualist ethics, as long as the laws of the latter are 
emergent from the laws of the former. Different contexts (cultures, relationships,…) 
might require different emergent rules, just as fluids, gases and solid states have 
different emergent properties.   
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Summary of part one 
In this chapter I have argued that moral intuitions are the starting points. These 
intuitions are spontaneous judgments lacking further justification. The method of ethics 
consists of articulating these moral intuitions into particular ethical rules and then 
universalizing these particular rules with respect to the act, the situation, the moral 
agents and the moral patients. Different universalized principles might cohere with 
each other, giving us more and more confidence in their validity. At the end we arrive at 
a coherent reflective equilibrium, an ethical system that is consistent, clear, 
parsimonious and in agreement with our strongest moral intuitions. If there remains an 
intuition which is in contradiction with the strongly coherent system (which cannot be 
incorporated in the system) and which does not seem to disappear, we have to admit 
that this intuition is a moral illusion.    
Let us visualize this process with the following figures. Figure 4 represents the 
starting point. The grey areas represent moral intuitions that we derived from looking 
at different moral dilemmas. The white areas are unexplored. The question is how to fill 
them in.  
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Let’s start with the bottom part of the figure. There are two grey beams. The simplest 
way is to connect them with each other. In other words, we extend the grey beams into 
the white area. This is a process of universalization: all areas in the figure with the same 
level of grayness reflect all situations with the same moral judgment. Compare it with a 
Ethical Consistency and Animal Equality 
70 
crossword puzzle, whereby we have already found the following letters: UNIVER . . . . 
ZATION. We can now easily complete this word. This gives us the next figure. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
Note that I also erased the two black spots, because they were a bit ‘ugly’ looking and 
didn’t fit the picture. These stains were also easy to erase so they are the analogs of 
moral mistakes or deceptions.  
In the next step, we could extend (universalize) the grey area to the middle of the 
figure. This gives us the next picture. 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
The question now is how far to the left can we extend the grey beam. How far do we 
have to universalize the principle? Should the left part be black or grey? We could 
invent a moral dilemma that represents the left area in the figure, and test our moral 
intuition in that situation. We find out that our moral intuition in that dilemma 
indicates that the area should be black. The next picture shows that this is coherent. We 
had the intuition that it should be black, so the black vertical beam on the left can be 
universalized, and we see that the grey beams at the bottom and the middle of the 
figure are surrounded with black in a similar way. This confirms our solution. 
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Figure 7 
 
And finally, we could fill in the remaining white areas by simply ‘universalizing’ 
(extending) the grayish areas in a consistent way. The next figure shows the end result. 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
But now something strange happens: a moral illusion appears. It seems as if the 
intuitive judgments represented by the left side of the beam are different from the 
moral judgments of the right side. Nevertheless, our system is coherent.  
We have seen a method to check whether an intuition is an illusion: the process of 
moving from our intuitions towards a system of universalized ethical principles in a 
coherent reflective equilibrium. This is also the process that people follow in empirical 
sciences, mathematics, grammar or taste evaluations. We can discover deceptions and 
illusions, even in the area of taste preferences. So rational arguments are possible, at 
least to some degree. 
Four recent developments indicate that the time is ripe to tackle moral illusions. 
First, a few philosophers started comparing erroneous moral judgments with optical 
illusions (Harris, 2004). Second, there is the study of ‘moral heuristics’ (Sunstein, 2005; 
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Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010) and the discovery that attribute substitution is also the 
mechanism behind many optical illusions (Kahneman, 2003). Third, there is the study of 
‘grammatical illusions’ (Phillips et al., 2010) combined with the linguistic analogy 
between our moral faculty and our language faculty (Hauser et al. 2008). Finally, there is 
the (neuro)psychological research of the trolley problem (Greene, 2002; 2008), with the 
hypothesis of intervention myopia in moral intuitions (Waldmann et al. 2007). The 
analogy between optical, grammatical and moral illusions can help us to better detect 
and understand moral illusions.  
In a later chapter, I want to focus at a specific moral judgment that meat eaters have: 
the prejudicial difference in moral status between humans and animals (non-human 
sentient beings). This is to most people an intuitive judgment that lies behind all our 
uses of animals, from factory farms to pet shops. Can this intuition be a persistent moral 
illusion? I will demonstrate that this speciesist judgment is in fact a moral illusion, just 
like I demonstrated that the Müller-Lyer figure is an optical illusion and the trolley 
dilemmas contained a moral illusion.  
In particular, the set of universalized ethical principles that I will discuss contain two 
principles based on strong moral intuitions of invariance and context independence. 
And as an auxiliary argument, I will explain the psychological mechanism behind the 
moral illusion of speciesism.   
As the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the consistency of an ethic of 
animal equality, the most important thing is that both animal rights ethicists and meat 
eaters should agree on the approach: they should both agree on the key ingredients, the 
moral intuitions as input data, universalization as the method, and coherence or 
consistency as the goal. If we agree upon an approach on how to derive a coherent 
ethical system, we have set the rules of the game. In the next chapter, it is time to look 
at what such a system of ethical equality might look like, what ethical principles of 
equality it might contain. We leave the area of meta-ethics and enter the realm of 
normative ethics. 
 
  
  
Part 2  Theories of equality 
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In order to understand the ethics of animal equality, we first need to have a very clear 
picture of the notion of equality. Part 2 of this dissertation is dedicated to a derivation of 
three different, material principles of equality. These principles are derived from 
normative ethical systems (contractualism, consequentialism, ethics of care, virtue 
ethics and deontological ethics). When applying those three principles of equality to 
sentient beings (animals), we will get a nuanced and clear picture of the theory of 
animal equality. This move from normative ethics to the applied ethics of animal 
equality will be discussed in part 3. 
  
  77 
Chapter 4 Impartiality and prioritarian equality1 
4.1 Contractarianism universalized 
Let’s start from the position of a rational egoist. It would not be wise to simply pursue 
your own benefits all the time, because you might get into trouble with other people. In 
particular, it might be better to come to an agreement with those other people, not to 
harm each other and to help each other in need. This is especially true in ‘collective 
action problems’: situations wherein different people would all benefit from 
collaboration with each other, but there is a tendency to cheat, because the cheater 
would be even better off. However, if everyone started cheating instead of collaborating, 
then all will be worse off.  
Collective action problems are omnipresent (the prisoner’s dilemma is a famous 
example where two suspects have to decide whether to collaborate with each other or 
not, see section 7.2). As an example, consider picnicking on the beach. If everyone 
throws away their waste on the beach, no-one will be able to enjoy a beautiful clean 
beach. So it is better if everyone collaborates by throwing their garbage in the dustbin. 
But for you, it would be even better if everyone else collaborates, except you: you can 
enjoy a clean beach but you would not have to make the effort to go to the dustbin. Your 
best option is to throw away your garbage on the beach. But if everyone started 
thinking like that, we end up with no collaboration and a dirty beach. 
The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) based his social contract 
theory on the assumption that people tend to be rationally selfish. This 
contractarianism can solve collective action problems: everyone is bound by a social 
contract to collaborate, help each other and not harm each other. Rationally selfish 
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 Sections 4.2 and 4.6.8 are based on Utility and Personal Identity. A Connectivist Approach, submitted to 
Philosophical Studies. Section 4.6 is based on Aversions Behind the Veil of Ignorance, submitted to Social 
Choice & Welfare. 
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people can benefit from mutual advantages of cooperation. But this contract only 
applies to people having two conditions: 1) an equal power position (e.g. equal 
bargaining power) and 2) rationality. The equal power position simply comes from the 
fact that a rational egoist does not have to maintain a social contract with persons in a 
weaker position (who have no power to harm or help you or have protectors who can 
harm or help you), because it would be easier to simply exploit them. The rationality 
condition is obvious: we can only make agreements with people with whom we can 
negotiate, so those people have to be able to negotiate.  
In this contractarianism of the egoist, the moral community (the set of moral 
patients; those beings who are given moral status) exists of all rational people who have 
roughly equal power. The latter condition however does not correspond with our moral 
intuitions. What about those in the weaker positions? What about impartiality? John 
Rawls (1971) developed a contractualist theory by deleting this equal power condition. 
In his theory, the moral community is extended to all reasonable and rational beings (in 
particular all beings who have a sense of justice and a conception of the good). These are 
beings who are able to perform a thought experiment, which goes under the name of 
the veil of ignorance. Suppose we are ‘impartial observers’ sitting behind a veil of 
ignorance: we have to imagine we will be born as someone on earth, but in order to 
guarantee impartiality, we don’t know yet who we will be. We could be gay, disabled, 
female, black,… The only thing we can do is derive moral/political laws (respecting 
known physical laws) that we would prefer in an ideal world where we don’t know who 
we will be. 
According to Rawls, those laws will only be applicable to rational beings able to do 
the thought experiment. As ‘impartial observers’ behind a veil of ignorance, those 
rational beings need to have a sense of justice (impartiality) and a rational will. The 
problem is that this excludes mentally disabled people, babies with a short lifespan and 
non-human animals. We intuitively see that those beings have a moral status as well: we 
are not allowed to use mentally disabled persons as merely means, harm animals 
without good reasons or torture dogs. The condition that only rational beings belong to 
the moral community is still too partial and it violates moral emotions such as empathy. 
It is a bit arbitrary to give the veil of ignorance some half thickness: we don’t know who 
we will be, but we know we will be rational agents.  
As Rawls proposed an extension of a Hobbesian contractarianism by deleting the 
equal power condition, I propose a second extension, by deleting the rationality 
condition. This is the most extreme universalization of contractarianism. We have to 
make the veil of ignorance as thick as it possibly can be. No criteria are left out: we 
include all physical entities (in the broadest sense) in the thought experiment. Hence, 
we could become an electron, a planet, a car, a computer program, an ink stain, a tree, a 
pig, a person in the year 3000, or whatever. We can now decide what the moral/political 
laws should look like. We remark that electrons, trees, stains and other objects are likely 
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not sentient beings. That means that no-one can influence the well-being of a non-
sentient being. So if you were a non-sentient object, it doesn’t matter to you what 
happens to you. You would not be aware of anything, you would not like or dislike 
anything, you would not want anything, you would not experience harm, you would not 
have preferences, you would not have interests that you care about, your well-being 
would remain constant at level zero (i.e. it is absent). 
The thickening of the veil of ignorance and the extension of contractarianism to all 
sentient beings are no new ideas, but were already discussed by Van de Veer (1979), 
Rowlands (1998), Nussbaum, (2006) and Van den Berg (2011). According to Rowlands, 
who we are (human, pig,…) is just a matter of luck. We did not have a responsibility or 
choice in this, so we should not be rewarded for being a human. As being human is 
beyond the control of an individual, it should be judged morally arbitrary. 
It is clear that taking this thickest veil of ignorance is the most impartial and least 
arbitrary thing to do. We automatically come to the criterion of sentience, because 
sentient beings are the only beings with well-being, and well-being is the only thing 
that really matters to us behind the veil of ignorance. But what do we mean with well-
being and value of life? 
4.2 From feelings and well-being to the value of life 
The central quantity in our theory of justice is the notion of ‘value of life’ or ‘lifetime 
well-being’. This is the value that – behind a veil of ignorance – an impartial observer 
would ascribe to the complete life of a sentient being (i.e. a being that experiences a 
well-being). The value of life or lifetime well-being is a function of all momentaneous 
experiences of well-being during a complete life of an individual. Let us analyze this in 
more detail.   
4.2.1 Affective qualia: from experienced feelings to experienced 
pleasure 
Experienced feelings are subjective, private, direct, conscious, qualitative experiences, 
phenomenological sensations or qualia (Byrne, 2010). These qualia are internal 
representations that have an attention or focus. For example I consciously feel this book 
because I can pay attention to the sensation generated through my fingertips (for the 
connection between qualia and attention, see Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001). Just 
before I paid attention to this feeling of touch, I was not aware of it. There was an 
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unconscious neural activity, and only after I focused on my fingertips, it became a 
conscious experience or ‘quale’ of touch. Qualia are often neutral: I don’t feel an urge to 
avoid touching books. When qualia become affective in nature, i.e. when they are 
evaluated as being positive or negative (when they generate a positive or negative 
attitude in the individual holding the qualia), they become positive or negative feelings, 
i.e. pleasure and pain. A needle in my finger generates a quale that I wish to avoid. This 
quale is called pain and it generates an urge in me to withdraw.  
4.2.2 The importance of preferences: from experienced pleasure to 
momentaneous well-being 
Well-being experienced at a specific moment should be distinguished from mere 
pleasure. I define momentaneous well-being as the composition of all the positive 
(minus negative) feelings and emotions that are the consequence of (dis)satisfaction of 
preferences (the things that one wants)2. This is an important definition. Its formulation 
in terms of feelings and preferences combines a mental state account (having mental 
states such as feelings of pleasure) and a preference satisfaction account of well-being 
(see Shaw 1999, chapter 2).3  
There is a connection between feelings (of pleasure) and preferences (or needs): 
feelings are nothing but indicators to see when something is met or unmet. This 
‘something’ is a preference or need.4 According to the psychology of Maslow (1943), 
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 These preferences can include some unconscious preferences, in particular dispositional and instrumental 
preferences. For example, during my sleep, I have unconscious preferences. Those preferences have the 
disposition to become conscious when I wake up and think about the preferences. An embryo on the other 
hand, is unconscious but does not (yet) have such dispositional preferences. An example of an unconscious 
instrumental preference is the preference that an animal has in staying alive, even if the animal does not have 
a notion of life, death and its own future. Staying alive is important if the animal wants to satisfy other, 
conscious preferences. See Visak, 2011, p78. 
3
 One could restrict the preferences to well-informed, rational preferences in order to avoid preferences that 
are actually bad for us (for example a preference for drugs or a preference to marry someone whom I 
erroneously believe to be my perfect match). But this restriction might not be necessary in my account of 
well-being, because the definition of well-being not only contains the condition that preferences be satisfied, 
but that those preference satisfactions result in an increase of positive feelings (or a decrease of negative 
feelings). The satisfaction of misinformed, irrational preferences would not generate more positive feelings.   
4
 Sometimes feelings are unreliable in measuring a need. For example a malfunctioning amygdala might 
generate an irrational fear, i.e. fear when there is no danger and the need for safety is met. The irrational fear 
does not correspond with an unmet need for safety, so one might think that according to the definition of 
well-being that I proposed, those negative feelings of irrational fear do not negatively contribute to well-
being. The same goes for pains in phantom limbs: those pains do not correspond with an unmet need for 
bodily integrity, because the body part is absent. However, if the patient with the malfunctioning amygdala 
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preferences contain not only physical functioning (food, water, movement, rest, health, 
safety,…) but also for some individuals: social needs (connection, compassion, 
acceptance, warmth, contribution,…), play (joy, humor,…), autonomy (freedom, space, 
independence, spontaneity,…), honesty (authenticity, integrity, trust…), peace (equality, 
harmony, order, beauty,…) and meaning (learning, growth, challenge, efficiency, clarity, 
creativity, purpose,…). 
Needs can have different intensities (e.g. a little hunger vs. being very hungry) and 
satisfactions can also have different levels (e.g. having access to a little bit vs. a lot of 
food). The higher the level of satisfaction and the higher the intensity (subjective 
importance) of the corresponding need, the stronger the positive feeling and the higher 
the momentaneous well-being will be.  
As momentaneous well-being does not look merely at positive and negative feelings 
such as pleasure and pain, but is restricted to those feelings that are the consequence of 
preference (dis)satisfaction, we avoid a hedonist position (a mental state account) that 
only looks at pain and pleasure. The hedonist encounters the problems of the 
‘experience machine’ (Nozick, 1974). Suppose we have an experience machine that can 
give you feelings of pleasure for the rest of your life, by plugging your brains into this 
machine. However, the experiences in this machine are related to a world that is not 
real, and you might have a strong need for authenticity (or connection with reality) that 
will not be satisfied by this machine. The positive feelings generated by the machine are 
not the consequence of preference satisfaction, so they do not contribute to well-being 
as I have defined it. That is why a lot of people will be reluctant to step into this 
machine.  
The veil of ignorance helps to explain why merely feelings of pleasure are not 
sufficient in an account of well-being. From behind the veil, you know you will be 
someone who does not prefer to live a life in an experience machine. Hence, this means 
that a need will not be satisfied and your value of life will be lower. To take another 
example: suppose behind a veil you can decide between two situations. In the first 
situation, you will experience pleasure with your lover, and your lover is faithful. In the 
second situation, you will experience as much pleasure as in the first situation, but your 
lover is unfaithful and you will never know this (you believe your lover is loyal, and 
being loyal is very important to you). From a pure mental state account, both situations 
would be equally preferable, because the happiness is equal. However, if I were an 
impartial observer behind a veil, I would prefer the first situation. That preference 
reflects a need to be in contact with reality or with the truth, and it implies that merely 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
does not want to feel this irrational fear, s/he has an unmet need, i.e. a preference for inner peace. Hence, the 
irrational fear and the phantom pain do lower someone’s well-being according to the definition. 
Ethical Consistency and Animal Equality 
82 
feelings of pleasure are not sufficient in the notion of value of life. If an impartial 
observer behind the veil prefers a situation where s/he will experience a level of 
pleasure to a situation where s/he will experience the same level of pleasure in a virtual 
world of an experience machine, the value of life cannot merely depend on a mental 
state of pleasure. Something else is important, and that something points to a 
preference or need for e.g. the truth.5 
4.2.3 The problem of interpersonal comparability: from individual well-
being to comparable momentaneous well-being 
An individual can measure its momentaneous well-being and the strength of its feelings 
and preferences.6 The big problem is the comparability between different individuals7. 
Feelings are qualia, and hence they are private: they cannot be objectively measured or 
communicated. Asking whether the well-being of person i in situation X is equal to the 
well-being of person j in situation X, is like asking whether my perception of red is the 
same as your perception of red. A theory without interpersonal comparison of well-
being has a very serious counter-intuitive implication: different Pareto optimal 
situations cannot be mutually compared. A Pareto optimal situation is a situation in 
which it is impossible to make any one better off without making at least one individual 
worse off. Consider a huge income inequality: if the income of the poorest cannot be 
improved without lowering the position of the richer person (and if the income of the 
 
                                                     
5
 Another aspect that comes into play here, is the principle of rule universalism (see 1.2). Suppose I lie to you 
by saying that X is the case whereas in reality X is not the case. And suppose that telling the truth (that X is 
not the case) would decrease your positive and increase your negative feelings about X. If you will never know 
that I lied, you will have the same positive feelings about X as when X was really the case. However, if I am 
allowed to lie in this situation, then rule universalism implies that you know that everyone in a similar 
situation as me is allowed to lie. In that case you still do not know that I actually lied, but you do know that I 
think it is permissible to lie. This might give you an uncomfortable feeling of insecurity, because you have a 
need for trust that is not met. As a consequence, you do not want a rule that permits everyone to lie in similar 
situations. Hence, I am not allowed to lie, even if a well concealed lie does not influence your positive feelings 
about X. In other words: a mental state account of well-being combined with rule universalism can avoid some 
counter-intuitive implications of a simple mental state account that is not combined with rule universalism.     
6
 If choices A and B are incomparable for an individual, i.e. if that individual is psychologically unable to 
estimate whether choice A gives him/her a higher well-being than choice B (e.g. getting a weak emotion of 
long duration versus a different emotion which is intense but brief), an impartial observer is permitted to 
make an own estimate. If the impartial observer would choose A, then s/he can make that choice for the 
individual.   
7
 The literature on interpersonal comparison of well-being is vast. See e.g. Elster & Roemer (1991),  Hammond 
(1976), Harsanyi (1955). 
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richer person cannot increase without a cost for the poorest), we have a Pareto optimal 
situation that allows a high inequality.  
Well-being differs from income in the sense that it cannot be interpersonally 
compared. One person can compare his own levels of well-being (as he can compare his 
perception of red with his perception of green), so the best we can get is a Pareto 
optimal situation of well-being: even if we cannot compare the well-being levels 
between the persons, it is possible to know that we cannot increase someone’s well-
being without lowering the well-being of someone else. As Pareto-optimality still allows 
for serious inequalities, a theory of equality needs to go beyond this Pareto criterion. 
Without interpersonal comparability, we would not be able to compare for example the 
harm of death of person A with the harm of a mere pinprick of person B. We need an 
interpersonal comparability of well-being if we want to avoid such counter-intuitive 
implications.8 
A first step to move further beyond merely Pareto efficiency requires a small 
deviation into some metaphysics (something outside the positive sciences, because well-
being cannot be measured from the outside, just as someone’s perception of red cannot 
be measured from the outside). We have to postulate an ideal observer who has an 
impartial, fully informed point of view. Ideally, this person has experienced almost 
anything that anyone can experience, having all kinds of preferences that anyone can 
have, and s/he has a perfect, unbiased memory to compare the levels of well-being 
during those experiences, having those preferences.  
To avoid too much god-like metaphysics in ethics, we quickly have to move more 
down to earth. We can try to approach the perspective of this ideal observer, when we 
use as much of our empathy as we can. This is where the veil of ignorance comes into 
play: we imagine ourselves in the positions of other beings, using our empathy. We do 
not know the well-being of someone else, but we can measure our empathic well-being: 
our estimate of the well-being of the other.9  
Using this empathy, we can see that someone’s potential maximum well-being can be 
higher, the more needs that being has. In other words, a being with more needs can 
reach a higher well-being (compared to a being with only a few needs) if all of his or her 
needs are satisfied. The potential minimum well-being can also be lower when a being 
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 Furthermore, Arrow (1963) demonstrated some impossibility theorems that occur when well-being is not 
interpersonally comparable.  See also Roemer (1996). 
9
 One might object that it is very difficult to empathise with non-human animals or cognitively disabled 
humans, because they are so different from us in the sense that they lack e.g. self-consciousness or a concept 
of one’s future and death. Still, with enough imagination, we can make best estimates of their well-being. The 
experiences of those animals could perhaps be compared with our experiences in certain dream states, where 
we lack full self-consciousness and a concept of our future, but we still feel fear and pain.   
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has more needs and when all those needs are not met. As a simplified example, suppose 
we have a being with only one need. The momentaneous well-being arising from that 
need can vary from e.g.    (needs far from being satisfied, so this being rather prefers 
to die than to experience this negative feeling), to 0 (needs satisfied to some extent, so 
that for this being it doesn’t matter if s/he lives or dies), to +1 (needs highly satisfied). A 
being with two needs (both of the same intensity), however, can have a well-being 
ranging from    to +2, if the contributions of the individual needs can be added. This 
latter addition property is not a necessary condition for our theory we will discuss, and 
is only meant for didactical purposes. Here we want to address the possibility that 
different beings can have different potential levels of well-being. 
A problem arises: if you and I use our empathy to estimate the well-being of two 
individuals, we can get different results. Who has the best estimate? We know that we 
can both be biased in all kinds of ways. To solve this, we can first study our cognitive 
biases and try to counter them. Cognitive biases that might influence decision making 
are e.g. duration neglect, the framing effect, the priming effect, negativity bias, 
optimism bias, selective perception and fading affect bias (see e.g. Pohl, 2004).  
Second, we can communicate and try to move to a consensus. Ideally, all moral 
agents who have empathy can do the veil of ignorance exercise and work towards a 
consensus to get the best, unbiased empathic well-being. This consensual empathic 
well-being best approaches the estimates of the hypothetical ideal person.  
Third, we can introduce objective measures as approximations to estimate someone’s 
well-being. These objective measures can be used to counter biases. Examples are 
primary goods (Rawls, 1971), resources (the resourcist position that looks at economical 
goods that can be distributed (Dworkin (1981)), capabilities (the sufficientarianist 
position of the capabilities approach which looks at basic functionings that one is free to 
choose to improve one’s flourishing (Nussbaum 1992, 2000; Sen 1992)), measures of 
desert (the compensationist position of desert-principles of justice which focus on the 
compensation of virtuous work (Dick, 1975; Lamont 1994; Milne 1986; Sadurski 1985)). 
Objective quantities like economic resources, income, wealth, health, jobs, 
compensations, capabilities or happiness surveys are nothing but approximations of 
well-being: these elements contribute to well-being, but cannot be reduced or set equal 
to well-being. They should be used as tools to objectively counter someone’s biases 
when performing the thought experiment of the veil of ignorance. Hopefully, in the 
future, neuroscientific discoveries could make more accurate estimates and 
comparisons of well-being possible.  
One more thing needs to be said about incomparability. Suppose that individual 1 has 
a well-being at level A, whereas individual 2 can have four levels of well-being: 
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B<B’<B’’<B’’’. Suppose B is so low, that everyone agrees that B<A. Similarly, suppose that 
B’’’ is so high that everyone agrees that B’’’>A. But B’ and A appear to be incomparable, 
and the same goes for B’’ and A.10 In that case, an impartial observer behind the veil is 
permitted to choose for example A=B’, and hence A<B’’. Another impartial observer may 
choose A=B’’. An analogy with physics, in particular special relativity, might be handy 
(see Pivato, 2009). The time dimension corresponds with the level of well-being. The 
space dimension represents different individuals. An individual with well-being A 
corresponds with a unique point (event) in space-time. Each event in space-time has a 
future and a past light cone. The inequality of well-being B<A can be interpreted by the 
claim that space-time event B is in the past of event A, or more exactly: event B lies in 
the past light cone of event A. If B’’’>A, then B’’’ lies in the future light cone of A. But B’ 
and B’’ lie outside the future and past light cones of A (although B’’ lies in the future 
light cone of B’ because B’’>B’). If B’ lies outside of the light cones of A, we can always 
choose a frame of reference whereby B’ and A occur simultaneously, i.e. B’=A. But we 
can also take another frame of reference that gives B’’=A. This analogy with special 
relativity clarifies the intransitivity problem: if B’ and A are incomparable and may 
therefore set equal, then also B’’ and A may be set equal. Hence one could naively say 
that B’’=A=B’. But we saw that B’’>B’.  
We have seen that impartial observers are permitted to make a few estimates and 
choices of their own, such as the choice between incomparable levels of well-being (the 
choice of frame of reference in special relativistic terms). In section 4.6.11 on 
democratic impartial preferences of moral agents, we will see how those different 
choices of the different impartial observers have to be dealt with in a democratic way.  
4.2.4 The lifetime perspective: from momentaneous well-being to the 
value of life 
Until now, I focused on empathic estimates of momentaneous well-being. But behind 
the veil of ignorance, we have to look at the complete lives of individuals, and attach 
values to those lives, because of two coherent reasons.  
First, with a lifetime perspective we can avoid the replaceability problem: painlessly 
killing someone and replacing him/her by another individual who has the same 
momentaneous well-being, is not allowed, even when the aggregate of momentaneous 
well-being would not decrease (see the discussion in section 4.6.4.3).  
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 Nolt (2013) discussed the relevance of this problem in animal ethics.  
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Second, people are allowed to choose when in their lives they experience pleasure 
and pain. Intrapersonal (within the same person’s life), intertemporal shifts in well-
being are permissible. For example it is permissible for me to eat a lot of candy today, 
even if as a result I get a toothache tomorrow (note that today I don’t have a clear 
permission of my future self to cause this toothache). By eating candy today, I harm my 
future self, but that is not immoral. At most it is imprudent. In contrast, it would be 
immoral if I cause you a toothache without your permission. I do not have to consider 
my future self as a separate person, but I have to consider you as separate. A mere focus 
on momentaneous well-being will not be able to make a difference between 
intrapersonal (but intertemporal) and interpersonal distributions of well-being. This 
difference corresponds with a moral intuition that there is a difference between 
imprudent and immoral behavior. 
The value of life (I often use ‘lifetime well-being’ as synonym) corresponds with how 
much we, behind a veil of ignorance, would prefer to live the complete life of that being. 
As we saw, momentaneous well-being is not interpersonally comparable, but at least it 
is a quantity that does not involve moral evaluation: it is a descriptive instead of a 
normative quantity. Integrating someone’s momentaneous well-being into a value of 
life introduces normative elements. The value of life introduces normative elements: 
the impartial observer weighs the momentaneous experienced well-being and s/he 
reflects on this well-being from behind a veil of ignorance. This allows for the 
introduction of elements deemed important by the impartial observer behind the veil of 
ignorance. If s/he wants to, the impartial observer behind the veil can introduce 
elements from an ‘objective list account’ of well-being  (see Shaw 1999, chapter 2; Crisp, 
2008). 
To study lifetime well-being, we first have to tackle the problem of integrating 
momentaneous well-being over a period of time, say one second. There is a difference 
between objective versus subjective rate of time (Bostrom & Yudkowski, 2011). A human 
eye sees roughly 20 frames per second, whereas the eye of a fly can see movement ten 
times faster than a human eye. It is as if in one second, a fly experiences more. The 
objective time is 1 second, but the fly has a ten times faster subjective rate of time. As 
the fly sees more within that one objective second, it is as if one second for the fly 
corresponds with ten seconds for a human. The fly experiences everything ten times 
slower. Suppose the same happens with pain: one individual feels 10 pulses of pain per 
second, another individual feels 100 pulses per second. Then this second individual has 
experienced more. The time-integrated pain over one second of time is ten times higher 
for the second individual. Lifetime well-being should take into account someone’s 
subjective rate of time, not the objective rate of time. 
The value of life is a function of (consensual, unbiased, empathic) momentaneous 
well-being of an individual, but it is not a trivial summation or integration of the 
momentaneous well-being over all moments of a lifetime, from conception to death. For 
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example Velleman (1991) argued that a life with constantly increasing momentaneous 
well-being (starting miserable at birth, ending glorious at death) is preferred to a 
deteriorating life, even if both lives have the same amount of summed momentaneous 
well-being. As a second example, consider the argument of the long living oyster (Crisp, 
2008)11. Which life would you prefer: the life of a normal human being with life 
expectancy 80 years, or the life of an oyster with a life expectancy you may choose (a 
trillion years?), but with a very small but positive and constant well-being?12 In short, 
the human being has a high momentaneous well-being for a short period of time, the 
oyster has a low well-being, but summing this low well-being over the very long course 
of its life, the total (summed) well-being of the oyster can be higher than that of the 
human. Yet, a lot of people would prefer being born as the human, no matter how long 
the life expectancy of the oyster may be. This means that these people value the value of 
life of the human higher than that of the oyster. Why is that? Perhaps because they 
expect that leading a human life is less boring, and they have a need for variation or 
psychological growth. These needs cannot be satisfied in the life of the oyster. Perhaps 
the oyster does not have those needs, but that still means that a human who has these 
extra needs and who has satisfied those needs, has a higher value of life.  
To solve the problem of the long living oyster, the value of life can be expressed as a 
trade-off between quantity (length of a life) and quality (average momentaneous well-
being). When quantity is low and quality high (a very short but very happy life), it 
becomes important to increase quantity (life expectancy). When quantity is high and 
quality low (a very long but moderately happy life), it becomes important to increase 
quality. 
A simplification will clarify the kind of trade-off between quantity and quality. 
Suppose the value of life can be expressed mathematically as something like: 
w.R.T/(R+T), with w the (consensual, unbiased, empathic) lifetime-averaged 
momentaneous experienced well-being13, T the total lifespan and R a reference length of 
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 Parfit (1984, p.161) described a similar argument, comparing two lives: a Century of Ecstacy (high but 
temporary well-being) versus Drab Eternity (very long positive but low well-being). 
12
 As invertebrates, oysters are perhaps not sentient, but for argument’s sake, assume that oysters are sentient 
beings. 
13
 Kahneman (2011) discovered a difference between an experiencing self (evaluating a currently experienced 
momentaneous well-being) and a remembering self (evaluating the remembered well-being of a past event). 
Our distinction between the experienced (momentaneous) well-being w and the value of life can be 
understood in a similar vein. Although the value of life is distinguished from the momentaneous well-being, it 
does not equal the remembered well-being. The value of life is evaluated by a hypothetical well-informed fully 
rational person behind a veil of ignorance, the remembered well-being is evaluated by a real, fallible person 
remembering a past event.  
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a life.14 When T is small, the denominator becomes the constant R, and hence an 
increase in w.T (the well-being integrated over the lifetime) dominates. When T is large, 
the value of life approaches the average momentaneous well-being w times R, and 
hence an increase in w dominates.  
As I will demonstrate in a later section (4.6.8), the reference time length R can be 
understood as a (complex) function of the psychological connectedness (Parfit, 1984), or 
more precisely: the memories and sense of the future of the individual generates a 
psychological identity over time15, making it possible to claim that a person at time t1 is 
or is not the same person at a later time t2. I am to a large degree a different person than 
the person I used to be at age ten, although I still count as the same individual.  
If the hypothetical sentient oyster has a low psychological connectedness, it gets a 
small value of R. A normal human being has a high connectedness and hence a higher R. 
That means that for a human individual, it takes a longer time to change the 
psychological identity to such a degree that s/he becomes a different person than s/he 
used to be.  
This difference of the reference time length R between different individuals has 
important consequences in deciding who to save. Suppose we have to decide between 
extending the life of a normal human versus the life of a sentient non-human animal 
(e.g. the sentient oyster). We see that extending the life of the oyster does not strongly 
increase his value of life if his reference time length R is small. Even if his life is 
extended by many years, it does not much contribute to his value of life. Not much 
value of life is lost by an earlier death of the oyster. For a human however (supposing a 
constant momentaneous well-being), an increase in life span results in an almost linear 
increase in value of life. 
 
                                                     
14
 For reasons I will not explain here, the value of life might read w.T when the average momentaneous well-
being w is negative. 
15
 Note that a psychological identity over time is basically the property that distinguishes Regan’s subjects-of-
a-life criterion (Regan, 1983, p.247) from mere sentience. Subjects-of-a-life not only have the properties of 
sentience (“perception”, “an emotional life”, “feelings of pain and pleasure”, “preferences”, “welfare-
interests” and “an individual welfare”), but according to Regan they also have a “psychological identity over 
time”, which includes “memory” and “a sense of the future”, “including their own future” (p.247). Similarly 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism (Singer, 1993) gives a priority to beings capable of holding preferences 
towards the future over those beings who are only concerned with their immediate well-being. Persons who 
are capable of desiring to continue to live as a subject of experience receive a stronger right to live than 
sentient beings who lack such personal identity over time. The latter are replaceable, according to Singer. The 
harm of death is dependent on having a sense of the future and a capability of seeing oneself as existing over 
time. Self-aware persons who see themselves as continuing selves existing over time are less replaceable, 
according to Singer. Both Singer’s preferences account and Regan’s subject-of-a-life account can be supported 
by a theory that values psychological connectedness.  
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4.2.5 Personal identity and psychological continuity 
Value of life is a function of the momentaneous well-being experienced over a lifetime. 
But what is the lifetime of a single individual? As just mentioned, different stages in the 
life of an individual might correspond with different persons. In our daily lives, the life 
of an individual extends from conception to death (or better: from first till last 
experience), making it easy to determine what is the complete life of the individual. But 
Parfit (1984) presented some futuristic thought experiments that challenge the notion 
of personal identity. A person at a specific moment has a mind that is composed of e.g. 
memories, beliefs, desires and character traits. 
But what happens to a person during e.g. teleportation, when mind and body are 
destroyed at one place and recreated at another? What if a mind can be multiplied in 
two exact copies, for example when the teleportation fails, the original mind and body 
are not destroyed but still a second mind and body are created at the other place? What 
about imperfect copying a mind M into a slightly different mind M’? What about mind 
swapping: putting mind M1 (that originally belonged to body B1) into body B2 and mind 
M2 into body B1?16 What about multiple personalities, two minds in the same body? 
What about splitting a mind into two minds? What about fusing two minds into one? Or 
what about gradual changes of minds and bodies into completely different minds and 
bodies, where mind M1’ in body B1’ has elements from both M1 and M2 and both B1 and 
B2?   
In those hypothetical cases, it becomes difficult to make distinctions between 
different individuals. We should abandon the all-or-nothing relationship of personal 
identity. One radical option would be to consider a continuum of different individuals, 
one for each momentaneous mind at each moment of time. However, Parfit (1984) 
pointed out that an individual can be defined or described by a psychological 
connectedness and continuity between different momentaneous minds at different 
moments in time (see also McMahan, 2002). Compare it with a rope, composed of 
different strands, each strand having a different length. There is no strand that extends 
from one end of the rope to the other, but still the rope has a connectivity in terms of 
connectedness and continuity. Two points of the rope are connected if there is a strand 
that runs from the one to the other point. The more such strands between the two 
points, the higher the connectedness. Two points of the rope are continuously linked if 
there are intermediate points such that each two neighboring points are connected 
(even when the two endpoints are not mutually connected; when there is no strand 
running between the endpoints). The strands of the rope are the analog of properties of 
 
                                                     
16
 See e.g. Williams’ famous thought experiment of torture (Williams, 1970).  
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the mind (e.g. memories, opinions and character traits). In this analogy, one end of the 
rope corresponds with the beginning of life, the other with the end. At the end of your 
life, you might not remember anything from the beginning of your life, but there is a 
continuity: an interlinked chain of memories shared by intermediate momentaneous 
minds. The problem of personal identity is similar to the problem of how to define a 
rope and how to distinguish one rope from another. 
How to deal with this problem of personal identity behind the veil of ignorance? 
Behind the veil, an impartial observer sees the huge set of all minds at all moments. At 
each moment, a mind has a unique momentaneous well-being. One option is that the 
impartial observer groups the set of momentaneous minds in subsets, each subset 
referring to the complete life of one individual. After putting all momentaneous minds 
in subsets, the impartial observer looks at a subset that now corresponds to the life of 
one individual (as defined by the impartial observer). This subset is composed of all 
momentaneous minds of that individual, each element having a momentaneous well-
being that the individual will experience. It is this subset that the impartial observer 
gives a value, the value of life, which corresponds with how much s/he prefers to 
experience all experiences of all the momentaneous minds of that individual (that 
subset).  
In most familiar cases, this grouping in subsets is easy and is restricted to strong 
conditions (i.e. not all possible groupings are allowed). But in the Parfitian situations, 
the grouping becomes complex and to a degree arbitrary. Therefore, in a later 
intermezzo I will present another approach how an impartial observer behind the veil 
can solve this problem of personal identity. That new approach will be more suitable 
(less arbitrary) to deal with futuristic Parfitian situations of e.g. teleportation, mind 
copying and mind swapping. 
All in all, value of life is the totality of everything one prefers from behind the veil of 
ignorance, in the expectation to live the complete life of an individual over time. It is 
everything that would matter to you if you were a sentient being, living its complete 
life. The value of life is a complex function of momentaneous experienced well-being. As 
mentioned above, this momentaneous experienced well-being is composed of all the 
feelings that are the result of (dis)satisfaction of preferences. The term ‘experienced 
well-being’ has two words, which means it combines a mental state account (the 
subjective experiences to like things) with a preference satisfaction account (the well-
being in terms of what one wants). All things that one likes and all things that one wants 
matter to the experienced well-being. The value of life introduces normative elements: 
a weighting of the momentaneous experienced well-being and a reflection on this well-
being from behind a veil of ignorance.  
Value of life is very difficult to measure. All we have is our empathy, our scientific 
knowledge and our imagination. We have to try placing ourselves in the position of 
others, by using empathy, by imagining that we could be the other person, with all his 
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or her needs and feelings. The ‘emotional’ method of sampling empathic feelings and 
the ‘rational’ method of imagination behind the veil of ignorance are rules of thumb to 
make educated guesses about the order of the values of life of different individuals. 
Empathy and imagination are virtues to be developed and already allow us to move 
quite far. 
As all sentient beings have subjective experiences of their feelings and needs, all 
sentient beings have a lifetime well-being or a value of life for themselves. The model 
we are about to discuss therefore applies to all sentient beings. It should therefore also 
include mentally disabled humans and non-human animals. We should not restrict this 
theory of justice to only rational, self-conscious beings. Hence, a person should be 
interpreted as an individual who has personal experiences. In this interpretation, a 
person is equivalent to a sentient being. 
Note that different sentient beings, such as a frog and a human, might have strongly 
different levels of lifetime well-being. There are four reasons why a frog might have a 
much lower lifetime well-being than a normal human. First, frogs likely have less needs 
and preferences (e.g. less need for accomplishments or relationships) than most 
humans. Second, the intensity of preference (dis)satisfaction might be lower in frogs: a 
frog might have less capacity than most humans to experience pain and pleasure, due to 
a smaller brain with less neurotransmitters and less receptors (see Vallentyne, 2006). 
Together, these two reasons imply a much lower momentaneous well-being for the frog. 
Next, frogs have a much shorter lifespan than those of most humans. And as a fourth 
reason, frogs likely have less psychological connectivity between different life stages.  
In summary, two reasons imply a gap between the momentaneous well-being of a 
human and a frog. In terms of lifetime well-being, the gap is even bigger due to two 
additional reasons that refer to the lifespan and the psychological connectivity. 
Vallentyne (2006) and Holtug (2007) discussed the far reaching implications of an 
ethic of redistributive (strict) egalitarianism when animals such as frogs are included, 
due to the vast difference in levels of well-being. Egalitarianism becomes very 
demanding for humans, because in order to close the gap between frogs and humans, 
nearly all resources should go to frogs (and many other non-human animals). The 
theory that I propose has much less demanding consequences for humans due to two 
reasons.  
First, I propose a prioritarian ethic instead of an egalitarian one (prioritarianism was 
also suggested by Holtug (2007), but as we will see, my prioritarian ethic has some 
relevant benefits compared to his). Compared to strict egalitarianism, prioritarianism is 
more considerate to efficiency: the benefit for the worst-off should not come at a cost of 
much more lifetime well-being of the better-off. 
And second, the above four reasons not only indicate that frogs have lower actual 
levels of lifetime well-being, but also lower potential levels. This potential level is the 
level of lifetime well-being that an individual would have when all distributable goods 
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(all means and resources on earth) are distributed to the maximum benefit of this 
individual. Their lower potential levels imply that, after distributing all resources on 
earth to a frog, its lifetime well-being will not increase by the same amount as when all 
resources are distributed to a human. In other words, compared to frogs, humans can be 
benefited much more by the same amount of resources. Humans are more efficient than 
frogs in translating means and resources into lifetime well-being. This higher efficiency 
is relevant in a prioritarian (but not in an egalitarian) ethic.  
Compare it with the problem of distributing an amount of water between different 
glasses. The level of water in a glass represents the actual level of well-being of an 
individual; the volume of the glass represents the potential level of that individual. A 
frog is comparable to a small glass: pouring water into a small glass is more difficult 
than pouring it into a big glass, resulting in more waste for the small glass. The small 
glass more easily results in a spill (overflow). This waste of water decreases the 
efficiency of a distribution of water. Of course, one could increase the volumes of the 
small glasses, just as one could (genetically) enhance frogs to increase their potential 
lifetime well-being. But then we do not have the same glasses (frogs) anymore. 
4.3 The maximin principle 
In the previous section, I discussed the notion of lifetime well-being (value of life). 
However, nothing has yet been said about how to distribute these quantities. The 
maximin distribution principle is a theory of justice, favored by John Rawls (1971), 
which can be derived from the thought experiment of the veil of ignorance. The 
principle says that we should strive for an increase or maximization of the lifetime well-
being of the beings in the worst-off position (the beings with a minimal amount of well-
being). The focus is on the lowest values of life, trying to maximize the lowest levels of 
lifetime well-being.   
Maximin can be derived from the veil of ignorance by realizing that you could be the 
individual in the worst-off position. Keeping that possibility in mind, you may prefer a 
world (or a moral law) where this lowest level is increased and maximized. That means 
you would prefer a society where the lowest levels of lifetime well-being are not so low, 
such that you no longer worry about getting one of these lowest levels. And 
importantly: inequality of well-being is only allowed if it is at the advantage of the 
worst-off positions. Other inequalities of well-being that do not match this condition are 
not accepted. 
Let’s give an example with numbers. Suppose there are two sentient beings, and we 
can choose between different situations. In situation 1, sentient being A has a value of 
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life level 10, B has level 100. So there is a big inequality. However, this situation is 
preferable to situation 2, where A and B both have a value of life equal to 5. Situation 1 is 
also better than situation 3 where A has level 5 and B has level 200, because in situation 
1 the worst-off being has a level of 10 instead of 5. Note that in situation 3, the total sum 
of well-being levels is 205, which is higher than 110 of the first situation. Maximin is 
therefore different than sum-utilitarianism, because it gives absolute priority to the 
lowest levels.   
The reason why someone would prefer the first situation instead of the third, is that 
from behind the veil of ignorance, not knowing whether s/he will be A or B, s/he does 
not want to run the risk of becoming the individual with the worst outcome. Hence, if 
we have to choose between situations 1, 2 and 3 from behind the veil of ignorance, it is a 
choice between three games of chance. Which game do we prefer to play? In each game 
we have an equal probability of becoming individual A or B. But if we have risk aversion 
(Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964), we do not prefer situations 2 and 3, because in those 
situations we know that the worst-off position has level 5, whereas we could have had 
level 10 in situation 1. People with maximal risk aversion are real pessimists and always 
think as if they will become the person in the worst-off position. They ask the question: 
what if I would be the worst-off person? They would prefer situation 1, even if it has a 
lower expectation value, because in this situation they at least have a well-being of 10. 
In general, risk aversion is the reluctance to accept a game of chance with an uncertain 
outcome rather than another game of chance with a more certain, but possibly lower 
expected outcome. 
On the other hand, someone who is risk neutral would take the sum-utilitarist choice 
by looking at the total expectation value of well-being (the sum of products of 
probabilities and levels of well-being). In situation 1, the expectation value is  
½x10+½x100=55. In situations 2 and 3 we have respectively ½x5+½x5=5 and 
½x5+½x200=102,5. The latter has the highest expectation value, so is preferred by the 
risk neutral sum-utilitarist (see e.g. Harsanyi, 1953).   
John Rawls’ theory of justice (1971) incorporates the maximin principle. When it 
comes to animal ethics, Richard Ryder (2001) can be considered as the advocate of the 
maximin principle. His theory of ‘painism’ gives an absolute priority to the so called 
maximum sufferer, the sentient being who is in most pain. This is clearly the worst off 
position. In his theory of animal rights, Tom Regan (1983) also offered two principles: 
the miniride principle and the worst-off principle. Regan’s two principles can be 
interpreted in such a way that they can be unified in the one principle of maximin.  
The miniride principle says: “Special consideration aside, when we must choose 
between overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights of few who are 
innocent, and when each affected individual will be harmed in a prima facie comparable 
way, then we ought to choose to override the rights of the few in preference to 
overriding the rights of the many.”(p.305) To take an example, suppose we have to 
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choose between situation X where one individual would suffer and has a value of life 
equal to 5, whereas ten others would have well-being at level 10, and situation Y where 
the first individual has level 10 and the ten others have all level 5. The harm done to 
each individual is the same (a drop of well-being of 5 levels). The miniride principle 
prefers situation X, and this is also what maximin would say. 
The worst-off principle says that: “Special considerations aside, when we must decide 
to override the rights of the many or the rights of the few who are innocent, and when 
the harm faced by the few would make them worse-off than any of the many would be if 
the other option were chosen, then we ought to override the rights of the many.” 
(p.308) As an example, in situation X one individual has well-being 2 whereas the other 
ten have well-being 10. Situation Y is similar to the previous example: the first 
individual has 10 and the others have 5. The worst-off principle and the maximin 
principle both say that we have to prefer situation Y, because in situation X, the harm 
done to the first individual is a drop of 8 levels of well-being. That’s worse off than the 
other people in situation Y. 
The worst-off principle strikes many people as counter-intuitive in some extreme 
examples. What if instead of harming ten people in situation Y, we harmed a million 
people? The worst-off principle lacks a kind of efficiency. The quasi-maximin principle 
that I am going to discuss in the next section, would be more compatible with an 
intuitive judgment that to some degree efficiency is important in distributing well-
being. 
4.4 The quasi-maximin principle and prioritarianism 
We saw that from behind the veil of ignorance, we could arrive at two different theories 
of justice, depending on our level of risk aversion. Someone who has maximal risk 
aversion prefers the maximin strategy. A risk neutral person prefers the sum-utilitarist 
strategy. These two strategies are but two options in a continuum of theories of justice, 
because there is a continuum in the level of risk aversion. Most people have a high but 
not maximal level of risk aversion. So let’s take a look at another example. In situation 1, 
person A had a well-being of 10, B had level 100. In situation 4, we can increase the well-
being of A by a negligible amount to level 10,01. In order to do this, the level of B has to 
drop a lot, to level 11. It’s as if we drive B to extreme poverty in order to increase the 
level of the extremely poor person A with a negligible amount. According to maximin, 
we would prefer situation 4, because 10,01 is higher than 10. However a person with 
high but not maximal risk aversion would still prefer situation 1. This person would 
adopt a quasi-maximin principle of justice. It is almost but not completely maximin.  
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There is another way to arrive at quasi-maximin. Our empathy is directed towards 
the worst-off individual, which is sentient being A in the above example. But if we have 
a low but not zero need for efficiency, we would not prefer situation 4. It doesn’t seem 
efficient to drop B in order to increase A with just a tiny amount. It’s too much a waste 
of well-being.  
Therefore, we have two reasons to prefer situation 1: impartiality with a high but not 
maximal level of risk aversion (need for safety), and empathy with a low but not zero 
need for efficiency. These two reasons cohere with each other and they are both based 
on moral intuitions of impartiality, safety, empathy and efficiency. The two reasons 
correspond with a rational and an emotional approach, and with two viewpoints: the 
rational approach looks at a situation from the outside, from an impartial point of view 
behind a veil of ignorance. The emotional approach is more down to earth: it looks at a 
situation from the inside, from the subjective experience of compassion with others. 
These two coherent approaches give us some justification for a quasi-maximin principle 
of justice.17  
The quasi-maximin (QMM) principle for a just distribution of values of life. 
Maximize the values of life (lifetime well-being levels) of all sentient beings, 
giving a strong priority on increasing the lowest values of life. I.e. maximize the 
values of life of the worst off individuals, unless this is at the expense of much 
more well-being of others.  
This QMM-principle gives a high but not maximum priority to the worst-off 
individuals. It is therefore a kind of prioritarianism. In prioritarianism, the well-being of 
an individual is weighted with a priority function. The lower someone’s well-being, the 
higher his/her priority. As sum-utilitarianism maximizes the sum of well-being levels, 
prioritarianism maximizes the sum of weighted well-being levels. I refer to the 
mathematical section below for more details. But first, let’s discuss some applications of 
this QMM-theory. 
 
                                                     
17
 For some moral agents, these two approaches might be different. For example someone who has zero risk 
aversion but a high empathic concern for the worst-off and a low need for efficiency will get two different 
ethics. According to the impartial veil of ignorance approach, this moral agent would be a sum-utilitarian. 
According to his/her moral intuitions of empathy and efficiency, s/he would be more maximin-prioritarian. If 
such a dichotomy occurs, the moral agent is allowed to take his/her preferred approach to determine the level 
of priority for the worst-off (this level is then democratically averaged together with the preferences of all 
other moral agents, as will be discussed in section 4.6.11). Furthermore, I expect that most moral agents have 
some (non-zero) level of risk aversion, and most moral agents have a non-absolute need for efficiency (a non-
zero priority for the worst-off). So even when both approaches might differ for one moral agents, when we 
look at the group of all moral agents, we can expect that they might still easily reach a rather big consensus on 
the non-zero level of priority for the worst-off. Looking at an individual, both approaches might be mutually 
incoherent, but on the level of the whole group, they might still be more coherent with each other. 
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4.5 Applications of the quasi-maximin theory 
4.5.1 Rawls’ theory of justice 
Although the comparison between values of life of different individuals in different 
situations is very difficult, we can derive a set of approximate rules of thumb that can 
move us closer to the QMM-distribution of value of life. In his theory of justice, John 
Rawls derived three such principles (Rawls, 1971, 2001):  
1) Equality of basic liberties and rights. 
2) Equality of fair opportunity: if individuals have the same ambition and native 
talents relevant for a position that generates a benefit (e.g. a job), they should have the 
same prospects of success in competition for that position (see also Arneson, 2008). 
3) Equality of economic goods in terms of the difference principle: the distribution of 
economic goods should be according to maximin. That means that economic 
inequalities should be in the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons. 
These Rawlsian equality principles can be considered as rules of thumb to approach a 
QMM-distribution of well-being. Let’s first look at equality of basic liberties and rights. 
We only have to consider rights and liberties that clearly affect the value of life. Take for 
example the right to free speech. If I have a need for sharing ideas, I will feel frustrated 
when I do not have the right to free speech, and this obstruction will lower my value of 
life. However, there are some speech acts (e.g. hate speech or insults) that can lower the 
value of life of other people (the receivers). In most cases, allowing these disdainful 
speech acts will violate the QMM-principle. First, as Rosenberg notes (Rosenberg, 2003), 
someone uttering disdainful speech acts often implies that this person has unmet needs. 
Insults are a tragic expression of a person with an unmet need. If your boss insults you 
by saying that you are lazy, this most likely means that your boss feels frustrated and 
has an unmet need for e.g. efficiency, and that he only found a tragic way to express 
himself. Also hate speech and scapegoats indicate some unmet need (e.g. for social 
security or respect).  
Let’s try to apply our QMM-model to this problem. As a starting point, we have two 
persons. In situation X, there is no free speech. By lack of further details, and by the 
symmetry between the persons, we have to assume that a priori (all else equal) both 
persons have equal value of life, say level 100. This equality is an important assumption 
in dealing with these kinds of problems. In situation Y, there is free speech, and as a 
consequence, person B insults person A. The value of life of person B increases to 101, 
but for person A it decreases to 99. Situation Y violates the QMM-principle. To 
summarize: not all speech acts satisfy the QMM-principle.  
Moving to the second Rawlsian principle, where there is a scarcity of social, economic 
or political positions (education, jobs, elections,…), the equality of fair opportunity (and 
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participation) can be derived from the original position. Only someone who is more 
talented, motivated, trustworthy or experienced to do a job that is beneficial to the least 
advantaged persons (or more generally a socially beneficial job that helps approaching 
the QMM-distribution of lifetime well-being), should have a higher prospect to get that 
job. Hence, equality of fair opportunity is a derivative of the QMM-principle.  
The third Rawlsian principle (the difference principle) can also be easily restated in 
the QMM-framework. First note that this latter Rawlsian difference principle refers to 
economic goods and not to the value of life (the lifetime well-being). Economic goods 
(income, resources, wealth,…) only constitute a subset of factors that contribute to the 
value of life. The QMM-theory as described in this section is more in line with the 
welfare based principles (like utilitarianism), and hence also incorporates the 
distribution of liberties, opportunities, capabilities and all other factors that contribute 
to the value of life.  
Ideally, the economic goods should be distributed according to the rule that realizes a 
quasi-maximin distribution of lifetime well-being. This means that for example disabled 
persons should get relatively more economic goods in order to compensate for their loss 
of well-being, except when the transfer of economic goods to these disabled persons 
cannot be done in a sufficiently efficient way. In other words, when we are only capable 
of increasing the well-being of the disabled person by a negligible amount by 
transferring huge amounts of resources to these disabled persons, we should not opt for 
the transfer.   
But as it is often difficult to determine the optimal distribution of economic goods, 
the economic goods can more easily be distributed according to Rawls’ difference 
principle. So Rawls’ difference principle can be considered as an approximation of the 
QMM-theory. 
4.5.2 Responsibility and desert 
So far for Rawls’ difference principle. Let us also take a look at resource-based (or 
responsibility-based) and desert-based principles. 
In the resource-based principles of justice (Dworkin, 1981), one is concerned about 
the importance of personal responsibility. According to the QMM-theory, society should 
not keep on pouring resources down the drain, if worse-off people act very 
irresponsibly with these given resources (when they negligently squander them) or if 
they are highly inefficient in transforming these resources into lifetime well-being (see 
Cohen 1989, Arneson 1989, Roemer 1996).  
Consider first the issue of acting irresponsibly with given resources. Some facts that 
influence well-being (e.g. being born with talents or discovering new resources by brute 
luck) are beyond someone’s control or responsibility. But, given an amount of resources, 
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an individual has a personal choice and hence a personal responsibility to transfer these 
resources into well-being. What if s/he makes imprudent or irrational choices that 
squander resources? Or what if in the hospital we have to choose between helping two 
patients who are equally bad off and who can be equally benefited by a medical 
operation; the first one has a genetic disease, the second had a car accident because she 
was a reckless driver? Luck consequentialism (or responsibility-sensitive 
consequentialism) claims that the part of someone’s well-being that is under 
responsibility of the individual should not matter in calculating the best distribution of 
well-being. So how much should responsibility and brute luck play a role in the 
distribution of well-being? Let me make three remarks on this.  
First, it might be likely that there is no such thing as a free will. People might make 
bad choices (e.g. reckless driving, gambling or being addicted), but they are not 
responsible for choosing brains that make them vulnerable for those bad choices, just as 
persons with genetic diseases are not responsible for choosing the bad genes. Hence, we 
might overestimate the role of personal responsibility. As having a certain brain is a 
result of brute luck, a lot (or all?) of our personal choices might in the end be beyond 
our control, beyond our responsibility. 
Second, in the hospital example (choosing between the reckless driver and the 
person with the genetic disease), the choice who to help might influence the 
distribution of well-being. A choice to help reckless drivers (or other people who make 
bad choices) might give wrong incentives to some people. For example people might 
become less dissuaded to make some bad choices. In this sense, personal responsibility 
plays only an instrumental role. Similarly, when lazy workers or imprudent people 
experience a disadvantage due to their choice to be lazy or imprudent, they should be 
helped, benefited or rewarded less compared to the hard working and prudent people. 
The level of benefits and rewards should be tuned to give the optimal incentives for 
everyone to reach a QMM-distribution of well-being. 
Third, from a lifetime perspective, we have to take into account that the reckless 
driver, the lazy worker or the drug addict already enjoyed a benefit in the past (the 
pleasure of driving recklessly, the pleasure of relaxing at work, the pleasure of the 
drugs). This benefit in the past means that they have less right to a benefit in the future, 
compared to someone who had brute bad luck (all else equal). 
As a result of these three considerations, I am tempted to minimize the importance of 
the distinction between well-being that is a result of brute luck and well-being that is a 
result of personal choices. All types of well-being are important in QMM-theory, and the 
difference between brute luck and personal choice can only play an instrumental role in 
tuning incentives for behavior. 
Now consider the second issue, the problem that people might be highly inefficient in 
transforming resources into value of life. QMM-theory keeps track of the inefficiencies 
when distributing benefits. For example consider a benefit that generates a well-being 
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of 5 units to a well-off person who has initial well-being 5. If this person gets the benefit, 
his well-being will end up at the level 10. Now consider a redistribution of this benefit 
from the well-off person to a worse-off person having initial well-being 1. As the worse-
off person is less efficient in transforming the benefit into well-being, she will only 
receive an extra 3 units of well-being, ending up at level 4. Hence we have to decide 
between option X=(10;1) and option Y=(5;4). QMM-theory prefers option Y.  
We can distinguish between two kinds of inefficiencies in the transformation of 
resources into lifetime well-being. First, there are the things that are beyond the control 
of the individual: an individual might have medical needs such that a lot of resources 
are required to generate a unit of well-being. The second inefficiency occurs in the 
development of e.g. expensive tastes. Having an expensive taste means that one needs a 
lot of resources to satisfy the taste and to increase the well-being with one unit. Here we 
should make a distinction between modifiability and satisfiability of preferences. 
Modifiability means that an individual can influence the presence of the preference: the 
individual has some power to switch the preference on or off. This modifiability should 
be distinguished from satisfiability: the power of an individual to satisfy a preference.  
Expensive tastes are not only inefficient, they are modifiable, and this property of 
modifiability is highly morally relevant. According to our QMM-theory, as people are 
responsible for developing expensive tastes, they have a duty not to develop those 
modifiable tastes, because those tastes generate extra inefficiencies. Instead of pouring 
resources down the drain, therapy (e.g. meditation) can be a cheap method to conquer 
those modifiable expensive tastes and addictions. And in order to dissuade people to 
develop expensive tastes, we should refrain from redistributing resources to satisfy 
expensive tastes.  
Next to responsibility is the issue of desert. In the desert-based principles, one wants 
to emphasize effort (Sadurski 1985, Milne 1986) or costs incurred in work (Dick 1975, 
Lamont 1994), or someone’s contribution to society (Miller 1976, Riley 1989). Hence, the 
notion of desert that is used in QMM-theory is based on two aspects. First, it has a 
compensationist approach: compensate for the efforts, costs or risks taken by an agent’s 
past actions. Second, it can refer to virtuous actions that contribute to the well-being of 
others. 
Compensation. According to the desert principle, we should distribute economic 
goods corresponding to the virtue or deservingness of a person (see e.g. Kagan 1999).  
According to desert-based principles, things done in the past (e.g. someone who worked 
hard yesterday) influence the just distribution of current resources (e.g. higher payment 
for the one who worked hard yesterday). The QMM-theory uses a lifetime perspective (a 
focus on lifetime well-being), and this lifetime perspective allows to take into account 
an agent’s past actions. Hence, the lifetime approach allows for a compensationist 
desert-based principle. Hard work in the past means that someone’s momentaneous 
well-being in the past is low. This low past momentaneous well-being can be 
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compensated by a higher future momentaneous well-being to increase the lifetime well-
being. 
Contribution. We can interpret virtuous work as work that contributes to the society, 
and more specifically that promotes the QMM-distribution of well-being. The more 
someone contributes to QMM, the more she should be rewarded in order to support her 
choice for QMM. And the more her value of life decreases by doing this important work 
(e.g. by doing hard, long, boring or dangerous work), the more she should be 
compensated for her loss of well-being. So the more her value of life decreases and the 
more her work contributes to QMM, the more virtuous and deserving she is.  
Someone who contributes more to the well-being of the worst-off persons, should get 
prior access to more economic goods. For example a nurse should receive a higher 
income than a professional athlete, because the nurse’s contribution to the value of life 
of the worst-off individuals is higher. Free market distributions of economic wealth are 
not always compatible with the QMM-theory. 
In a desert-based theory of justice, one often adds the ‘greater gap principle’. The 
greater the gap between what someone deserves and what someone has, the more 
priority should be given for decreasing that gap. In a sense, this is a generalization of 
prioritarianism as defined above, where priority should be given to the most deserving 
person. The more deserving person is not always the worst-off person, but can also be 
the more virtuous person. So not only the well-being of an individual should matter (as 
in simple prioritarianism), but also someone’s contribution to society (to approach the 
QMM-distribution, i.e. to contribute to the total weighted well-being of all people in 
society) should be rewarded. And this latter reward is only possible when it is not in 
conflict with the QMM-theory itself.  
Consider the following example. Suppose we have an ill person (well-being level 1), a 
poor physician (level 10) and a very rich and wealthy person (level 100). The value of life 
distribution in situation X can be described with the three values (1;10;100). Now, the 
rich person can give money to the physician so that the physician is motivated to heal 
the ill person. We now get situation Y=(10;30;30). Situation Y is better than X according 
to QMM. Note that the increase in well-being of the physician (30 – 10 = 20) can be larger 
than the increase of well-being of the ill person (which equals 9 in the example). We 
might compare this desert principle with a negative feedback mechanism which acts as 
a stable attractor when there are disturbances that push us away from the QMM-
equilibrium position. This feedback mechanism actively pulls us back towards the state 
of QMM, by stimulating (rewarding) people who contribute most to the total priority 
weighted well-being of society.  
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4.5.3 Future orientation and restorative justice 
In the above section we saw that responsibility plays two roles in QMM-theory. First, the 
lifetime perspective of QMM-theory allows us to take past actions into account, in a way 
that some compensationist notion of desert becomes important. Second, the QMM-
theory also looks at how we can praise or blame people to influence their future 
behavior. Hence, the QMM-theory has both a past and forward looking aspect. 
The forward looking aspect has major implications for the criminal justice system 
that needs to be revised. If the behavior of a person is in strong violation of the QMM-
principle (and with other ethical principles to be discussed in next chapters), then some 
rights of that person should be taken away in order to protect society from future 
violations of the QMM-principle. Especially when we know that someone has malicious 
intentions, it is likely that this person will violate the QMM-principle in the future. 
Imprisonment should be considered as a kind of quarantine to protect society from 
threats (such as murderers, pathogens) that endanger a QMM-distribution of lifetime 
well-being. Moral responsibility for criminal behavior (i.e. behavior that deviates from 
the QMM-principle) should be a measure of the likelihood that the person will do other 
crimes in the future (because e.g. his/her brains are wired in a certain way that makes 
him/her more susceptible to do crimes). The probability of recidivism (i.e. the risk that 
someone might perform actions in the future that deviate from the QMM-principle) 
should be taken into account when liberties and rights are distributed.18  
Some behavior such as stealing or lying would be permitted, however, if the behavior 
is in correspondence with the QMM-principle (for example a poor thief who steals from 
the rich, a person who lies to protect someone’s life).  
Restorative justice might be preferred to retributive justice, because it might be 
better for the well-being of both victims and perpetrators. Most perpetrators typically 
are victims themselves who tend to have a low well-being (they might have strong 
 
                                                     
18
 For example my right to use self-defense against someone who is about to harm me depends on the moral 
responsibility of that person who is a threat for me. The more responsible s/he is, the more likely s/he will be 
a threat to others in the future. Consider a) a construction worker who stumbles by accident and falls right on 
me, b) a reckless car driver who is about to hit me by accident with the car and c) a murderer who intends to 
kill me. In all three cases, I can defend myself, by doing something that will harm the threat (the worker, 
driver or murderer). But the level of harm that I am allowed to use depends on the level of moral 
responsibility of the threat. The more responsible, the more harm I am allowed to cause to the threat in 
defending myself (still avoiding any unnecessary harm). This moral responsibility measures the likelihood 
that the threat will be a threat again in the future. It is more likely that a murderer will commit a similar 
crime in the future than that a car drive will again hit someone, and the latter is still more likely than the 
probability of the construction worker falling again by accident right on someone else. As a consequence, I am 
more entitled to kill the murderer in self-defense, than to kill the construction worker. 
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feelings of frustration due to discrimination, lack of education, lack of opportunities, or 
traumatic experiences in the past). The QMM-principle, combined with neuroscientific 
evidence (about e.g. the lack of free will), implies that the legal justice system should be 
more forward looking (a restorative justice that focuses on how to improve well-being 
and how to most efficiently change a criminal’s brain and behavior) instead of backward 
looking (a retributive justice that focuses on punishment, guilt and blame). The only 
backward looking part in QMM-theory has to do with compensations for past actions, 
which relates to a notion of desert as we saw in the previous section. Instead of 
punishing people as retributive justice, it is better to create circumstances in such a way 
that people tend to behave more morally. 
To summarize, we see that the QMM-theory combines and encompasses a lot of 
different ideas: prioritarianism (keeping the balance between Rawlsian maximin and 
sum-utilitarianism) and desert-based, welfare-based and resource-based theories.  
4.6 Aversions behind the veil of ignorance: a mathematical 
description for a theory of justice 
4.6.1 Why a mathematical model? 
In this section I want to unify different theories of justice and equality, by placing them 
in a coherent framework. In order to do this, I will try to use mathematical modeling as 
much as possible. Economists and natural scientists are familiar with the use of 
mathematical models. In moral philosophy however, only a few theories of justice (e.g. 
utilitarianism) have some more or less explicit reference to quantitative objects (e.g. 
utility).  
Using a mathematical framework will help us to see different theories of justice and 
their mutual relationships in more clarity. Mathematical modeling offers an efficient 
toolbox that helps us to work towards a more unified theory of justice. The 
mathematical equations in this section should therefore not to be taken too literally, but 
they should be used as ways to simplify expressions of complex ideas. What I will 
attempt to do, is combine different theories (utilitarianism, maximin, prioritarianism 
and egalitarianism) into a mathematical expression that contains some parameters. 
These parameters can take different values, and for specific values we get a specific 
theory of justice.  
As mentioned in a previous section, there are two arguments for quasi-maximin 
(QMM) prioritarianism: one is based on a Rawlsian argument of impartiality (the veil of 
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ignorance), whereby we assume that the person in the original position has a high but 
not absolute need for safety (high but not maximum risk aversion), and one based on 
empathy for the worst-off individuals, combined with a low but non-zero need for 
efficiency in terms of well-being. Hence, efficiency is inversely related to risk aversion. 
In this section I derive a mathematical formulation of the quasi-maximin prioritarian 
principle, using the veil of ignorance as starting point.  
4.6.2 The mathematics of consequentialist welfare ethics 
Prioritarianism is a consequentialist theory that looks at the outcomes of actions in 
terms of well-being. It was made popular by Parfit (1991, 1997) and states that we should 
maximize everyone’s well-being, giving priority to the worst-off individuals. As a 
consequentialist theory, it lends itself to mathematical modeling using e.g. utility 
functions. In particular a priority weighted utility function is used to describe 
prioritarianism (see e.g. Broome 1991; Brown, 2007; Holtug 2006; Rabinowicz 2002; 
McCarthy 2003, 2008). These utility functions are the elements of a welfare function, a 
quantity that represents the consequentialist betterness relations between different 
choices (different situations or world histories). 
A consequentialist welfare ethic such as prioritarianism faces serious problems when 
it comes to choices involving variable and future populations. These problems are 
relevant in animal ethics, because animals are consciously bred and brought into 
existence by our choices. Population ethics (Arrhenius, 2000; Blackorby et al., 2005) is 
the branch of ethics that deals with variable populations. Population ethics is perhaps 
the branch of ethics that is mostly plagued with impossibility theorems: using 
mathematics, some ethicists proved that we cannot find a theory or welfare function for 
variable populations that meets certain basic moral intuitions. Always some moral 
intuition has to fall (for an overview of such impossibility theorems, see e.g. Arrhenius, 
2000; Blackorby et al. 2003). The goal is therefore reduced to finding a welfare function 
that still satisfies the strongest moral intuitions regarding variable populations, such 
that only the weakest intuitions are violated. 
In this section I derive a general welfare function from a ‘veil of ignorance’ thought 
experiment (Harsanyi, 1953; Rawls, 1971), borrowing some concepts of prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In particular, I suppose that the impartial observer 
(decision maker) behind the veil can have different decision aversions: risk aversion 
(Arrow, 1965), loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) and uncertainty aversion 
(Epstein, 1999). Rawls (1971) took only the latter uncertainty aversion to arrive at his 
maximin principle behind a veil of ignorance, but an impartial observer might have or 
use other aversions as well. Those aversions set the parameters in the welfare function. 
Applying the veil of ignorance to population ethical situations (problems with variable 
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populations and potential beings), is tricky. But as I will demonstrate, the welfare 
function that corresponds with those three aversions also corresponds with some moral 
intuitions in population ethics. 
Risk aversion deals with the problem that the impartial observer behind the veil does 
not know whose life s/he will live once the veil is lifted. The observer has a probability 
to become any of the individuals born in the real world, with known, uniform 
probability distribution: s/he has a probability 1/N to become any of the N individuals. 
Having risk aversion results in a prioritarian ethic: it corresponds with the moral 
intuition that some priority for the worst-off is important. This prioritarian intuition 
reflects a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Combining prioritarianism with a 
lifetime perspective, where the lifetime well-being levels count as the utility variables in 
the welfare function, also solves the replaceability and non-identity problems (Parfit, 
1984). Hence, risk aversion behind a veil of ignorance results in a welfare function that 
is consistent with strong moral intuitions about efficiency, equality and replaceability.  
Loss aversion deals with an asymmetry between preferences for gains and losses. 
People have a tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). An impartial observer with loss aversion can fix the parameters of the 
welfare function such that it includes number-dampening population factors. These 
population factors allow avoiding some counter-intuitive conclusions in population 
ethics: the repugnant conclusion (Parfit, 1984; Arrhenius et al., 2010) and the reverse 
repugnant conclusion for positive levels of well-being and the strong sadistic conclusion 
for negative levels of well-being (Arrhenius, 2000). Hence, loss aversion behind a veil of 
ignorance results in a welfare function that is consistent with strong moral intuitions 
about variable populations. 
Uncertainty aversion occurs when the veil is thickened in a way that the impartial 
observer no longer knows the probability to become any of the individuals. It reflects a 
preference for known risks over unknown risks: when the possible outcomes and the 
probability to become an individual are known, the risks are known. When the veil is 
thickened, the risks are not known. This lack of knowledge of risks, which is stronger 
than the lack of knowledge of outcomes, influences the preferences of the impartial 
observer. I will argue below that this uncertainty aversion generates a second kind of 
prioritarian theory called moderate egalitarianism (Jensen, 2003). It differs from 
prioritarianism in the sense that the level of priority for the worst-off does not depend 
on the absolute values of lifetime well-being of the worst-off, as in prioritarianism, but 
depends on the relative positions of the worst-off, relative to the better-off. Moderate 
egalitarianism has a generalized Gini welfare function (Weymark, 1981). This moderate 
egalitarianism solves the intransitivity problem (Temkin, 1987) and the problem of the 
misery for the ultra rich (Dorsey, 2009), at the serious cost of losing independence (or 
strong separability; see McCarthy, 2008). The problem of independence is related to 
Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). 
Impartiality and prioritarianism 
 105 
I will demonstrate that combining the three aversions, together with the reflection 
effect of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), results in a welfare function as a 
sum of two terms: a positive, number-dampened, weighted power mean prioritarianism, 
and a negative, weighted total utilitarianism. Including the number-dampening factor 
in the first term generates a trade-off between quantity (the population size), quality 
(efficiency in terms of maximally increasing everyone’s well-being) and equality 
(equalizing well-being). 
The weighted power mean of the first term contains free parameters. The power p of 
the power mean can vary from minus infinity, which results in a maximin theory, to 1, 
which results in a weighted average version of moderate egalitarianism. A negative 
value for this power corresponds with a quasi-maximin (QMM) prioritarian theory. The 
weight factors in the power mean can also take different values, ranging from an 
absolute weight for the worst-off individual, which corresponds with maximin, to a 
uniform distribution of weights, resulting in unweighted power mean prioritarianism. 
When the power is 1 and the weights are uniform, we get average sum-utilitarianism. 
Hence, there are two ways to move from sum-utilitarianism to maximin: using a power 
mean and using a weighted averaging. These two ways are based on respectively risk 
aversion and uncertainty aversion. 
However, some mathematically proven impossibility theorems in the literature (see 
e.g. Arrhenius, 2000; Blackorby et al. 2003) indicate that the proposed welfare function 
violates some moral intuitions in population ethics. I discuss the three most important 
counter-intuitive implications of the number-dampened prioritarian theory. These 
moral intuitions might be moral illusions, and I briefly present solutions or ways to deal 
with those two problems.  
Another challenge for prioritarianism, apart from the problems related to variable 
populations, are lotteries. A lottery represents a policy choice which has different 
possible world histories as outcomes. A probability distribution over world histories 
introduces some new complications.   
Finally, I will re-examine the problem of interpersonal comparability of lifetime well-
being. Each moral agent can perform the thought experiment of the veil of ignorance, 
using his own risk attitude and his own evaluations of lifetime well-being. To make the 
theory as objective as possible, we look at distributions of measurable distributable 
goods (i.e. resources and liberties distributed among all sentient beings). Each moral 
agent can maximize his own preferred welfare function, respecting the constraints on 
those distributable goods. Hence, each moral agent can derive his own optimal 
distribution of goods, and based on a democratic equality of all moral agents, we can 
take an average of all those distributions as the impartial, optimal distribution of goods. 
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4.6.3 The impartial observer behind the veil of ignorance 
Imagine there are NB potential beings behind a veil of ignorance. You are one of them. 
When the veil is lifted, you will live the life of a sentient being in the real world, but 
behind the veil you do not know yet who you will be. You are an impartial decision 
maker (an impartial observer) behind the veil, and you can decide between different 
world histories. In order to study world histories, you can first look at a finite time 
interval Δt. In this time interval, the number of sentient beings born in front of the veil 
(i.e. born in the real world) is finite. You can be born and live the life of one of these 
sentient beings. After deriving the optimal world history that you prefer for this finite 
time interval, you can take a longer time interval and perform the same process. If the 
time interval gets longer, more future beings are taken into account, and you might 
derive a slightly different optimal world history for that longer time interval. In theory, 
this process should be repeated to the limit of an infinite time interval, encompassing 
the complete future containing a potential infinite number of beings. But in practice, it 
will be enough to stop at a sufficiently long time interval. 
So consider a world history h limited to the time interval Δt. In this world history, a 
number NF(h) of individuals are born in front of the veil during that time interval. The 
number of beings behind the veil, NB, is equal to or larger than NF. The difference 
between NB and NF is the number NU of unborn beings, the potential beings who are not 
born in the relevant time interval of the world history. The population size NF can be 
split in three parts: N+ is the number of individuals with a positive lifetime well-being, N0 
the number with a zero well-being and N- the number with a negative well-being.  
Each individual i in world history h has a lifetime well-being xi(h).
19 For all   [    ] 
we can define 
 
                                                     
19
 We have to assume some properties for the lifetime well-being levels. First, the values    and    for the same 
person   are ordinal numbers, which means they can be ordered in a complete well-ordered set. In other 
words, it is meaningful to say that e.g.      , even though these values cannot be quantified. The order 
relation is complete if for all    and    we have either      ,       or      . This assumption is not a 
strong assumption: in nearly all our choices we can compare our different needs and feelings affecting our 
value of life. We might prefer visiting a friend over reading a book, we might prefer short term satisfaction of 
one need over long term satisfaction of another need,… So we are able to compare the values of life of 
different choices.  
A much more difficult assumption is the following step: there is an ordinality relationship between different 
individuals. I.e.: we should be able to compare    with   . This is the central most difficult (or vulnerable) 
point in our theory of justice: how to compare the value of life of different individuals? Is my satisfaction of 
visiting a friend higher that your satisfaction of reading a book? There is no clear method to solve these kind 
of questions. All we have are two heuristic methods: empathy and the Rawlsian thought experiment of the veil 
of ignorance (Rawls, 1971; 2001).  
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   is a projection of all well-being levels on   , 
the positive and zero values. Similarly,    is a projection on all negative and zero 
values.   
4.6.3.1 The welfare function 
As an impartial observer, you can construct a welfare function W, i.e. a function that 
evaluates world histories. The world history which has the highest value should be 
preferred: if W(h)>W(g), then world history h is better than world history g. We can 
start with the following general expression for the welfare function: 
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the weighted power mean (Hölder mean20) of x+ with power p between ]    ] and 
weights ai such that ∑   
  
      . The same goes for the negative well-being levels with 
parameters t, {  }   
   and q. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
A third assumption we have to make seems a big leap into superficiality: the values    and    are assumed to 
be cardinal numbers, i.e. quantitative numbers that can be multiplied, added, subtracted,… Although this step 
might seem superficial, it is in fact only for didactical purposes that I assume cardinality, because now we can 
use clear mathematical expressions. Therefore, I will speak of a quantitative “model” for a theory of justice. 
20
 The power mean in the welfare function can be further generalized to a weighted generalized f-mean or 
weighted Kolmogorov mean (Kolmogorov, 1930) with an invertible function f: 
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4.6.3.2 Invariances 
The above general expression of the welfare function satisfies some important 
invariances.  
A first property of the welfare function is time scale invariance. The number of 
individuals with positive well-being N+ born in time interval Δt is proportional to the 
time interval Δt, and the same goes for N-. We can write the reference population size NR 
as BRΔt, with BR a constant reference birth rate. Now all numerators and denominators 
in the welfare function are linear in Δt, which allows us to take the limit Δt→∞ without 
expanding or shrinking a term in the welfare function. 
A second invariance is the scale invariance of the well-being (RFC-invariance in 
Brown, 2007). Rescaling all x→αx, with α positive, results in W→αW. This means that 
the ordering between histories h and g remains the same after rescaling. This invariance 
is important when the unit of well-being is not fixed. It is like comparing the lengths of 
two sticks in terms of meters or centimeters.  
When the weights ai are uniform (equal to 1), the welfare function has a third 
important property: permutation symmetry of the well-being levels of the different 
individuals. Reordering the individuals gives the same welfare function. This means that 
all individuals are treated impartially. When the weights are not uniform, we can 
reformulate the theory to keep it impartial. Write the lifetime well-being vector as 
   ( [ ]  [ ]   , i.e. in ascending order ( [ ]   [ ]     [ ]). In this 
interpretation,  [ ] does not refer to the well-being of individual l, but to the l-th level of 
well-being.   
4.6.4 Deriving the welfare function behind the veil of ignorance 
The parameters in the above proposed welfare function will be determined behind the 
veil of ignorance, by borrowing some elements from prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). 
A first important element in prospect theory is the reference point relative to which 
losses and gains are measured. The lifetime well-being is the value you as impartial 
observer would ascribe to the complete life of a sentient being, i.e. your preference for 
living that life. A lifetime well-being higher (lower) than 0 is a life that is (not) worth 
living. You prefer not being born to being born as someone with a negative lifetime-
well-being. So we can assume that living a life of value 0 is equally preferable to not 
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being born at all21, to living a completely unconscious life without any experiences, or to 
living a conscious life without any positive and negative feelings or preferences (these 
three options are equal in terms of well-being, although only the latter, conscious life is 
the life of a sentient being and is included in the welfare function). The zero value is the 
reference point, and positive (negative) lifetime well-being levels are considered as 
gains (losses) behind the veil. 
As the impartial observer does not know the identity of the individual that s/he will 
be in the real world, s/he does not know what lifetime well-being s/he will get. For the 
impartial observer, it becomes a game of chance. In the next three sections, I apply 
three elements from prospect theory, to our game of chance: risk aversion towards 
gains, the reflection effect (no risk aversion towards losses), and loss aversion. Next, I 
also discuss uncertainty aversion.  
4.6.4.1 Risk aversion for positive well-being levels 
Suppose the probability distribution is uniform: you have an equal probability of being 
born as any sentient being. If there are N sentient beings in time interval Δt, then your 
probability of being individual i is 1/N. Due to impartiality, this uniform probability 
distribution implies uniform weights ai in the welfare function. 
When the possible outcomes are gains, people often tend to be risk averse 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Suppose there are two histories, both having two 
individuals. In history    the individuals have well-being   (      (   . Behind the 
veil of ignorance, you don’t know whether you will get the lower or the higher level of 
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 This assumes that a non-existing life has a zero lifetime well-being. It requires that lifetime well-being is an 
‘extensive’ instead of an ‘intensive’ quantity. In physics, examples of extensive quantities are lengths, masses, 
energies and electric charges, whereas densities, pressures, temperatures and chemical potentials are 
examples of intensive quantities. Also averages are intensive quantities. Consider the example of me holding a 
non-existing cup of tea in my hand. The question how much tea I hold in my hand is well defined, even if the 
cup does not exist: 0 liter. In contrast, the question what the average amount of tea is per cup in my hand, is 
not well defined: 0 liter divided by 0 cups is mathematically not defined. Such an average is an intensive 
quantity, and intensive quantities cannot properly deal with non-existence. I believe that lifetime well-being 
is an extensive quantity, which means that it is defined in cases of non-existence. But the welfare function is 
an intensive quantity, as it is an average over sentient beings. This implies that we can compare a life that has 
a well-being with the absence of that life. But we cannot compare the value of a world that contains sentient 
beings with a world without sentient beings. As the welfare function is an average, a non-sentient or non-
existing being adds 0 lifetime well-being to the numerator and 0 to the population size in the denominator. On 
the other hand, an existing, sentient being that has 0 lifetime well-being adds 0 to the numerator but 1 to the 
denominator. Hence, in the denominator we can see the difference between non-existing, non-sentient beings 
and existing, sentient beings.   
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well-being, so it becomes a game of chance. In history    there is no gambling, which 
means that   (      (   .  
In the theory of risk aversion (Arrow, 1965), there is the notion of a utility function 
u(x) which allows comparison of both histories. This utility function can be derived by 
using the condition that when the two histories are equivalent, the average utilities in 
both situations should be the same. Hence, if the welfare function represents your 
preference for a certain history, then we first have to ask what is the relation between 
the levels of well-being in both histories such that you would have an equal preference 
for both histories. In other words: when would the certain outcome in history 2 be equal 
to the game of chance of history 1? Equality of the welfare function  ( (     
 ( (     solves this question. This gives  
  (      (    (
  (   
    (   
 
 
)
 
 
 
Using the condition that when the two histories are equivalent, the average utilities 
in both situations should be the same, we get as a condition: 
 (  (   )   (  (   )
 
 
 (  (   )   (  (   )
 
  ((
  (   
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)  
We see that this equality is solved when the utility function is identical to the power 
function: u(x)=xp.  
The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964) with 
respect to the well-being is defined as: 
 (     
   (  
  (  
     
This relative risk aversion is constant, which means that the utility function is so-
called iso-elastic. When p=1, the relative risk aversion is 0 and we get average 
utilitarianism. When p→-∞, the risk aversion goes to infinity, and we get a maximin 
welfare function. In between these two extremes, a non-zero and non-infinite risk 
aversion behind a veil of ignorance results in prioritarianism.22 
 
                                                     
22
 Note that when    , then <x+>p=0 as soon as there is at least one xi less or equal to 0. As a result, once 
there is at least one being with zero or negative lifetime well-being, the positive part of the welfare function 
either becomes trivially zero, or the risk aversion parameter p should be higher than 0. The latter restriction 
on the risk aversion implies that we cannot move close to a maximin theory. One could try to take a power p 
that depends on the levels of well-being (i.e. p=p(x)), such that p>0 when there are individuals having a well-
being at or below 0. Another, perhaps more elegant option to avoid this problem is to take an exponential 
function of the lifetime well-being, instead of a power root function (see Lumer, 2006). Take the exponential 
lifetime well-being 
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4.6.4.2 Priority for the worst-off 
For positive well-being levels, the first term of the welfare function corresponds with 
the priority view (Scheffler, 1982; Weirich, 1983; Parfit, 1991; Parfit, 1997; Holtug, 2006): 
in distributing benefits to individuals and maximizing lifetime well-being, the worst-off 
individuals should get a priority. Mathematically, this can be expressed as the Pigou-
Dalton principle: transferring a quantity Δx from the better-off (lifetime well-being x1) 
to the worse-off (lifetime well-being x2<x1), without reversing the order (i.e. x2+Δx<x1-
Δx) increases the welfare function. 
Note that the welfare function for positive well-being levels has maximin and sum-
utilitarianism as limits. When the power p→1, the welfare function becomes a sum of 
well-being levels, which means that no-one has a priority, as in sum-utilitarianism. 
When the power p goes to minus infinity, the theory becomes maximin, where the 
worst-off individual gets absolute priority for its well-being. The latter is not true for 
traditional expressions of concave prioritarianism, where the welfare function W=∑f(x) 
with f a concave function (as in Broome, 1991; Brown, 2007; Holtug, 2006; Lumer, 2006; 
Rabinowicz, 2002; McCarthy, 2008). The power 1/p in our welfare function allows us to 
take this limit p→ -∞. When p is very negative, we get a quasi-maximin prioritarianism.  
In the previous section (4.4), I mentioned a second justification for prioritarianism, 
next to impartiality (the veil of ignorance) with a high but not maximal risk aversion: 
empathy with a low, but not zero need for efficiency. The efficiency can be measured by 
looking at extended Pigou-Dalton transfers (Vallentyne, 2009, p.158). Such a transfer is 
given by the inequality conditions:    (      (       (      (   . This means 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
  (   
 
   
(       
instead of   (    
 , with the parameter    . If this parameter a equals 1, we get (number-dampened) 
sum-utilitarianism because   (    . In the limit of the parameter going to infinity, the welfare function 
becomes maximin. The positive part of the welfare function now becomes a (number-dampened) Kolmogorov 
mean (Kolmogorov, 1930) with exponential functions:  
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the inverse of the exponential function. This new welfare function has a priority for the worst-off and reflects 
a constant absolute risk aversion, defined as 
 (    
   (  
  (  
   (    
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that switching from history    to   , the well-being of the lowest level increases and the 
well-being of the highest level decreases (but the order of the levels doesn’t change). 
The extended Pigou-Dalton transfer efficiency E is determined by the ratio of the 
benefit for the lowest level to the cost for the highest level, where benefits and costs 
mean increases and decreases in well-being: 
  
  (      (   
  (      (   
  
If we take small, neutral extended Pigou-Dalton transfers, i.e. infinitesimal transfers 
with W(h1)=W(h2), then using the derivatives of the power function evaluated in   (    
and   (   , the efficiency becomes approximately  
  (
  (   
  (   
)
   
  
When p=1, the efficiency is always 1, i.e. maximal. When relative risk aversion 1-p 
increases, the efficiency decreases. Infinite risk aversion always corresponds with zero 
efficiency, which results in maximin prioritarianism. 
4.6.4.3 Avoiding the replaceability problem 
An objection to a total utilitarian theory (taking a sum of the well-being of all 
individuals) is that sentient beings are treated as nothing but receptacles of well-being. 
In total utilitarianism it is not a moral problem if a person is simply replaced by another 
person with the same level of well-being. For example, you are allowed to kill someone 
as long as you let another person be born, who will have the same expected well-being 
as the murdered person would have if s/he was not killed. This is counter-intuitive. 
One can counter this replaceability problem by simply stating that persons have a 
unique intrinsic value, which simply means that these persons cannot be replaced 
without violating something deemed important. However, an advantage of using the 
lifetime perspective is that we can avoid this replaceability problem without a need to 
introduce such an intrinsic irreplaceability value. Due to the lifetime perspective, the 
number NF of individuals over time is well defined. Hence, we can construct a welfare 
function that uses this number of individuals. We can use for example an average 
instead of a total of (priority weighted) well-being (i.e. we can include a division by NF) 
or include a number-dampening factor in the welfare function. 
As an example, compare situation h=(100), i.e. a situation where one person has a 
lifetime well-being equal to 100, with situation g=(50;50), i.e. a situation where one 
person is killed somewhere in the middle of his life (so he has lifetime well-being 50), 
and is replaced by a second person who will get the remaining lifetime well-being of 50. 
According to total utilitarianism, both situations are equally good. But applying the 
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prioritarian theory, we see that W(g)<W(h). Hence, the person should not be killed and 
replaced. Due to the lifetime perspective we can avoid the replaceability problem.23 
4.6.4.4 Avoiding the non-identity problem 
The non-identity problem (Parfit, 1984) asks questions like: Can we harm someone if the 
other option we had would be that this sentient being would not have existed? Or can 
we harm a future being by bringing that being into existence (e.g. breeding an animal in 
the livestock industry)? The problem is that both yes and no answers somehow violate 
our moral intuitions. It is difficult to imagine how we can harm someone if we’d say to 
that person: “But if you didn’t want to be harmed, it means you’d prefer not to exist.” 
On the other hand, it also seems wrong to let someone be born, knowing that this 
person will suffer tremendously.  
The reason why the non-identity problem is avoided in our QMM-prioritarian theory 
is because the QMM-theory is actually not about harming someone, but it’s about just 
distributions of lifetime well-being. With the above welfare function, we can simply 
avoid the tricky questions raised by Parfit, because I didn’t say anything about the 
identity of the different persons. It doesn’t matter if person 1 in situation X equals 
person 1 in situation Y.24  
 
                                                     
23
 Average utilitarianism combined with the lifetime perspective also avoids the replaceability problem, 
because in average utilitarianism the welfare function is divided by the number of individuals, and we get 
100/1 >(50+50)/2. 
24
 The QMM-theory uses a notion of ‘impersonal harm’ (Parfit, 1984, p.387) or ‘wide person affecting harm’ 
(Visak, 2011). One could argue that every notion of harm requires an impersonal or wide person affecting 
view. Consider diachronic harm: A harms B at time t if B gets a lower momentaneous well-being after t than 
before t. But as discussed in section 4.2, the notion of a personal identity over time is tricky and vague. In fact, 
B might become a (slightly) different person after time t, so A harms a different person. The same applies to a 
counterfactual notion of harm: A harms B at time t if the well-being of B after t in a world where A does act is 
lower than the well-being that B would have got after t in a parallel, counterfactual world where A did not act. 
As with the Parfitian thought experiments of copying and splitting persons, we can say that person B in the 
real world is a (slightly) different person than person B’ who lives in the counterfactual world. An example: A 
builds a house for B. The house is quickly built, which means that B is able to move in the house a month 
earlier. As a consequence, that first month in his new town, B happens to meet a girl who will later become his 
wife and who will change his life (and personality) profoundly. But as the house was quickly built, it has a 
weaker construction, and at one day collapses and kills B. In the parallel world, B’ would have to wait another 
month before he can move in the house. As a consequence, B’ does not meet the girl and he will live a 
completely different future life. But the house does not collapse and B’ is not harmed. The question is: at the 
moment of collapse, is B in the first world the same person as B’ in the counterfactual world? If not, then the 
non-identity problem already occurs in counterfactual notions of harm, and the narrow person affecting view 
(Visak, 2011) would run into counterintuitive troubles. 
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4.6.5 The reflection effect and risk neutrality for negative well-being 
levels 
According to the reflection effect of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the 
risk attitude towards losses is different than the risk attitude towards gains. For 
negative well-being levels, people behind the veil of ignorance are no longer risk averse; 
they become more risk seeking. As the parameter p determined the risk attitude for 
positive well-being levels, the welfare function for negative well-being levels is 
dependent on a similar parameter q. When q<1, we get risk seeking behavior for losses. 
This corresponds with the proposal of triage as discussed in Brown (2007). However, 
triage can be counter-intuitive, as it gives priority to the better-off of the negative well-
being levels. Therefore, and for simplicity, I take risk neutrality for losses. This 
corresponds with q=1, i.e. total utilitarianism for negative well-being levels.   
4.6.6 Loss aversion 
According to prospect theory, people have a tendency to prefer avoiding losses to 
acquiring gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Loss aversion can be introduced in the 
welfare function, by taking the parameters s=1 and t=0 in the number-damping 
functions.  
Consider a history h with a population divided in two equal subpopulations N+=N- and 
for each individual i in the positive population there is a corresponding individual j in 
the negative population with:   
     
 . In other words: the well-being levels are 
distributed symmetrically around the reference value 0.  
Looking at the welfare function for this situation, noting that 〈  〉  〈| 
 |〉  and 
    (        (   , we get W(h)<0. This indicates a loss aversion: one would rather 
have a well-being 0 with certainty, than taking a gamble with a symmetric distribution 
of well-being levels around zero, because the possible losses count heavier than the 
gains.  
This loss aversion is consistent with some moral intuitions in population ethics. Due 
to loss aversion, and in particular the choice of the parameters s=1, we can avoid the 
repugnant and reverse repugnant conclusions. The choice of t=0 allows us to avoid the 
strong sadistic conclusion. This will be explained in the next sections. 
4.6.6.1 Avoiding the repugnant conclusion 
The Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit, 1984) is one of the most challenging arguments in 
population ethics. The argument goes as follows. Start with a population of very happy 
people who have well-being 100. So, situation A=(100)  The total-utilitarianist would say 
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that a situation B=(100;98) is better than A: the total number of happy persons 
increased, and the total happiness increased by adding people who are only slightly less 
happy than the existing population. This addition of happy people is the first step. The 
second step consists of equalizing the levels of well-being: situation C=(99;99) is 
considered to be even better than B, because now there is more equality. One can repeat 
step 1, by introducing a third population with well-being levels equal to 97. After 
repeating step 1 and step 2, we move to the optimal situation Z which contains an 
almost infinite number of people with an almost zero (but still positive) well-being. Each 
of those individuals still has a life that is worth living, because their lifetime well-being 
remains positive, though very low. So Z is better than A, or in other words, we should 
boost population growth, even if all well-being levels become very low. But this 
conclusion is repugnant. 
The first term in the proposed welfare function shows how the repugnant conclusion 
can be avoided: for large populations N+, the population factor     (    becomes 
constant and we end up with the power mean of well-being levels. Adding more and 
more persons with lower and lower well-being, lowers this power mean, and hence 
lowers the welfare function. 
As a side remark, the repugnant conclusion might also be avoided in total 
utilitarianism, i.e. when p=1, when three conditions are met.25 First, an individual 
lifetime well-being is dependent on a resource with decreasing marginal utility. Hence, 
the lifetime well-being can be written as a concave function f(r) of a resource r available 
to the individual. Second, there is a critical consumption level c of the resource required 
for a positive well-being. And third, the total amount of the resource R is limited. If all 
individuals have an equal access r=R/N to the resource, then we can write well-being for 
each individual as  
  
  √
 
 
    
The welfare function      
  is maximal for a finite, optimal population   
    
    . In this optimum, the lifetime well-being of an individual becomes √ . Under 
these realistic conditions, the population size does not explode as in the repugnant 
conclusion. Nevertheless, a worry remains: what if the average well-being √  is very 
 
                                                     
25
 Shiell (2005) gave a more general proof that total utilitarianism avoids the repugnant conclusion when 
there are five restrictions which reflect universal properties of physics, biology and preferences: essentiality 
of material consumption (the fact that x depends on r), positive subsistence consumption (a positive critical 
consumption level c), upper bounds on resources (R) and non-material goods, and the law of conservation of 
matter. 
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low? This optimum might be repugnant enough in total utilitarianism. To play it safe, I 
prefer the power mean prioritarianism to avoid the repugnant conclusion.  
4.6.6.2 Avoiding the reverse repugnant conclusion 
If using a power mean of well-being levels solves the repugnant conclusion, we have to 
be aware of a reverse repugnant conclusion. Maximizing a power mean implies that it is 
not good to give birth to beings who will get a lower well-being than the power mean of 
well-being of the existing individuals. So if we systematically exclude births of potential 
beings who will have lower well-being levels, in the end, only the person with the 
highest well-being should be born. Instead of overpopulating the world, an average 
well-being welfare function says that we should underpopulate the world.  
Due to the choice for s=1, the population factor in the positive term of the welfare 
function is a concave function of the population size N+.
26 That means that for low 
populations (lower than the reference value NR) the welfare function increases linearly 
in N+. This pulls us away from an under-populated world, because it is good to increase 
the population size.27 
4.6.6.3 Trade-off between quantity, quality and equality  
As the priority view lies between maximin and utilitarianism, it represents a trade-off 
between equality and efficiency. According to maximin, inequality is only allowed if it 
benefits the worst-off. According to utilitarianism inequality is always allowed as long 
as the distribution of well-being is efficient, i.e. as long as total well-being is maximized.  
 
                                                     
26
 Note that this adapted moral weight expression has a similar structure as the value of life expressed in 
section 4.2.4, generating a trade-off between quantity (number of individuals, or length of a lifetime of a single 
individual) and quality (values of life of different individuals, or experienced well-being of a single individual). 
27
 Another way to avoid the reverse repugnant conclusion, is by introducing a deontological permission that is 
related to the 3-N-principle to be discussed in section 1.1(10.4. Suppose the welfare function simply contains a 
generalized f-mean (Kolmogorov, 1930) 
   ( (  )    
  (
 
  
∑  (   
  
   
) 
with the weight function for example the exponential lifetime well-being (Lumer, 2006): 
  (   
 
   
(        
This welfare function does not include a population factor. It is simply an average, so the repugnant 
conclusion is avoided, but the reverse repugnant conclusion is not avoided. However, we can add a 
deontological permission which says that everyone is allowed to procreate, even if the new individuals would 
get a lifetime well-being lower than the generalized f-mean of all other individuals. As we will see in section 
10.6, procreation is always allowed, because procreation is natural, normal and necessary for e.g. biodiversity. 
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Adding the population factor     (   , we get a trade-off between three elements: 
quantity (population size), quality (efficiency) and equality. These three elements 
correspond with three factors in the welfare function28:  
  ( (    
  
     
  (    (    ( 
  )  
with  (    〈  〉  the average well-being and 
  ( 
     
〈  〉 
〈  〉 
 [   ] 
the Atkinson inequality index (Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1982). When p<1, this inequality 
index is zero only when all xi are equal.  
4.6.6.4 Avoiding the strong sadistic conclusion 
The negative mere addition principle (Arrhenius, 2000, p. 66)29 says that adding 
individuals with a negative lifetime well-being always lowers the welfare function. 
However, consider a negative average utilitarianism, with average well-being -100. In 
such a theory, adding someone with lifetime well-being -1 would increase this average, 
and hence would be an improvement. This is the strong sadistic conclusion of negative 
average utilitarianism: adding someone whose life is not worth living might increase the 
welfare function.  
Our welfare function contained a negative term      (   〈| 
 |〉 . If the parameter 
t=0, then the strong sadistic conclusion is avoided, because in this case the negative 
term does not have a  in the denominator. If the negative term would have a   in the 
denominator of the population factor, the term can increase (become less negative) 
when   increases, i.e. when people are added whose lives are not worth living.
30   
 
                                                     
28
 This expression of the welfare function gives 2-dimensional indifference surfaces in a 3-dimensional space, 
as discussed in Carter (1999). 
29
 This corresponds with the “Hell Three” thought experiment in Parfit (1984, p. 422). 
30
 Another way to avoid the strong sadistic conclusion, is by introducing a deontological constraint that is 
related to the mere means principle to be discussed in section 6.2. Suppose the welfare function simply 
contains a generalized f-mean (Kolmogorov, 1930) 
   ( (  )    
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)  
This welfare function includes the negative levels of well-being and does not include a population factor. 
Hence it is vulnerable to the strong sadistic conclusion when the generalized f-mean is negative: the welfare 
function increases when a new individual is added who has a negative lifetime well-being which is higher than 
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4.6.6.5 Priority for negative levels of well-being  
The welfare function is discontinuous around 0: when a positive well-being level 
decreases till it reaches the zero value, the population factor suddenly drops from 
    (    to     (     , because the number positive well-being levels decreases. 
Similarly, the population factor     (    suddenly increases if the well-being further 
drops below zero. 
The discontinuity of the population factors might seem counter-intuitive to some 
people, but a nice feature is that the welfare function now contains a sufficientarian 
(critical threshold) element: lifting a negative well-being up to a positive well-being 
becomes very important.  
Note that avoiding the discontinuity by taking a population factor     (    instead 
of     (    generates stronger counter-intuitive problems, such as a strong sadistic 
conclusion. If the population factor contains the total number of beings NF, and if NF is 
much lower than NR, then the welfare function might increase when a new being with a 
small negative well-being is introduced. 
Note also that the power mean 〈  〉  contains the total number of beings NF instead 
of only   . If the power mean was restricted to the positive well-being levels, another 
very strong sadistic conclusion might occur: decreasing someone’s well-being till it 
reaches the zero value might suddenly increase the welfare function. 
4.6.6.6 Preference for (not) being born 
The choice of the population factors     (    and     (    generates loss aversion 
relative to the zero well-being reference. These factors can also have a very different 
interpretation, not related to loss aversion. We can formulate the veil of ignorance in 
such a way that the population factors correspond with conditional probabilities of 
being born as an individual with a positive or negative lifetime well-being. This 
conditional probability is related to the question: how many potential beings are sitting 
behind the veil, and how many of them will be born in front of the veil?  
Suppose you are an impartial observer behind the veil of ignorance. The number NF 
of beings actually born in front of the veil in time interval Δt, depends on your choice of 
history h. For the number of beings behind the veil, there are three options.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
this generalized f-mean. But this new individual will be used as merely a means to increase the welfare 
function: the presence of the individual is required and the individual does not want to live because s/he has a 
negative lifetime well-being. 
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Option 1: you are as impartial observer alone behind the veil, and after your choice of 
world history, NF –1 extra beings are created, so NB = NF. In this case, you are certain to 
be born. 
Option 2: the number NB of potential beings behind the veil is already determined 
before you, as impartial observer, choose a certain history. NB can be written as ZΔt, 
with Z the maximum possible birth rate. Of those NB potential beings, only NF will be 
born. Your probability to be born might be very low, because NB might be very high. 
Option 3: something in between the previous two option: there is an infinite pool of 
all possible beings. Once a world history h is chosen, a number       is drawn from 
the pool. NF of them will actually be born. Your probability to be born is now NF/NB , 
which might be low, but not as low as in option 2. 
Suppose first that all well-being levels are positive or zero. According to the first 
formulation, you are sure to be born, so you can as well maximize the (power) average 
well-being:  
   〈 
 〉   
This expression faces the reverse repugnant conclusion.  
According to the second formulation, you can increase your probability of being born 
by increasing the actual population size NF. The welfare function reads  
   
  〈 
 〉 
   
  
with the denominator     a constant (independent from NF). This expression faces 
the repugnant conclusion.  
The third option avoids both repugnant conclusions. Not knowing whether you have 
to maximize total or average weighted well-being, we could take a combination, such as: 
   
  〈 
 〉 
  
  
with NB = NF + NR. This equals number-dampened prioritarianism.    
When some well-being levels are negative, the third option can be reinterpreted. You 
first get a probability N+/(N++NR) of being born with a positive well-being. You want to 
maximize this probability, but there is a trade-off with the quality, i.e. the power 
average well-being. If you are not selected to have a positive well-being, you are left 
with a probability of being born with a negative well-being equal to N-/NR. This equals 
the population factor for negative well-being levels. Note that this is a conditional 
probability (conditional on not being born with a positive well-being), so it no longer 
contains a term N+ in the denominator. The number of unborn beings equals NU= NR – N-
– N0. This number is variable, such that NR can be treated as a constant (independent 
from N-), to avoid the strong sadistic conclusion. Note that if N- is big, NR should also be 
big. That means that when there are a lot of individuals with negative well-being levels, 
the population factor for positive well-being levels     (    increases almost linearly 
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in N+. In other words: the more individuals whose lives are not worth living are born, 
the more individuals should be born whose lives are worth living.  
We see that the population factors     (    and     (    have three different 
justifications: 1) they correspond with moral intuitions to avoid the repugnant, reverse 
repugnant and strong sadistic conclusions, 2) they correspond with a loss aversion 
behind a veil of ignorance and 3) they correspond with conditional probabilities in a 
differently constructed veil of ignorance thought experiment. These different 
perspectives generate a coherent picture. 
4.6.6.7 Summary: positive number-dampened power mean prioritarianism and 
negative total utilitarianism 
For uniform probability distributions (ai = bj = 1), the reflection effect combined with 
risk and loss aversion allows taking the parameters    ]    [, q=1, s=1 and t=0. Then 
the welfare function reads: 
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This expression has two parameters (p and NR) that can be tuned to correspond with our 
intuitions. 
The first term of the welfare function is a number-dampened power mean 
prioritarianism. Here, prioritarianism refers to a welfare function with a sum of concave 
utility functions such as u(x)=xp, with   ]   [ (Broome, 1991; Brown, 2007; Holtug, 
2006; Lumer, 2006; Rabinowicz, 2002; McCarthy, 2008). The power mean prioritarianism 
is a generalization to negative powers (this generalization is made possible due to the 
overall reverse power 1/p in the welfare function). The number-dampened property 
refers to the extra factor that is linear in N+ for very small populations and nearly 
constant for very large populations (see number-dampened utilitarianism: Hurka, 1983; 
Blackorby et al. 2002; Ng, 1986). 
The second term of the welfare function corresponds with a kind of negative total 
utilitarianism, a theory where only negative lifetime well-being levels count, and where 
the only objective is to decrease this total amount of negativity.  
This welfare function corresponds with some moral intuitions in population ethics. It 
gives a priority for the worst-off (and a special priority for the beings with a negative 
well-being), generates a trade-off between quantity, quality and equality, and avoids the 
replaceability problem, the repugnant conclusion, the reverse repugnant conclusion 
and the strong sadistic conclusion. 
However, in population ethics, a lot of impossibility theorems are proven (see e.g. 
Arrhenius, 2000; Blackorby et al. 2003; Brown, 2007). That means that our welfare 
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function cannot escape some problems. In fact, it faces three troublesome, counter-
intuitive conclusions. 
4.6.7 Problematic properties of number-dampened prioritarianism  
4.6.7.1 Independence and the mere addition paradox 
Roughly speaking, independence or strong separability (see e.g. McCarthy, 2008) says 
that the choice that maximizes the welfare function should not depend on individuals 
whose presence and well-being levels cannot be influenced. This means that the moral 
judgment of a change that only affects a subpopulation does not depend on the rest of 
the population. More accurately: suppose we have to decide between two histories h 
and g, and in h there is an unaffected subpopulation of Nun people who have the same 
levels of lifetime well-being as the corresponding Nun people in history g. This 
subpopulation consists of the unaffected people, because in both choices their well-
being is the same. Imagine this subpopulation on a far away island, outside the influence 
of our choices. Now we transform h and g to h’ and g’ respectively. For people not in the 
subpopulation, i.e. for people in the affected population of size Naf =Ntot -Nun, individuals 
in h’ have the same well-being as individuals in h, and the same goes for g’ and g. But for 
the people in the unaffected subpopulation, the well-being levels are changed in the 
same way for both histories: for the subpopulation, the transformation from h to h’ is 
the same as the transformation from g to g’. So, for example the well-being of all people 
in the unaffected subpopulation is raised (e.g. the people on the far away island 
discovered new resources). In that case, independence says that W(h)>W(g) if and only 
of W(h’)>W(g’), i.e. the order of preference should not change. 
The principle of independence (strong separability) is valid in our prioritarian theory 
in situations where the numbers of people with positive and negative levels of well-
being remain constant. However, the principle is violated in two cases: in mixed 
populations (where choices can influence the numbers of people with positive and 
negative well-being) and in variable populations (where choices can influence the total 
number of people).  
Consider mixed populations first: suppose that in history h the affected 
subpopulation has some people with positive and some with negative lifetime well-
being levels, whereas in g the affected population has different numbers of people with 
positive and negative levels. For example some people with positive well-being in h get 
a negative well-being in g. Suppose that the unaffected people in h have positive levels 
of well-being, whereas they have negative levels in h’. In that case, it is easy to 
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demonstrate that W(h)>W(g) does not necessarily result in W(h’)>W(g’), because the 
unaffected population influences the population factors.31 
If most of our policy choices do not flip the sign of someone’s well-being (i.e. do not 
change a positive into a negative well-being or vice versa), this violation of 
independence is not a serious problem. The violation only implies that the amount of 
priority for negative levels of well-being (how important it is to raise someone’s 
negative well-being instead of raising someone else’s positive well-being) can depend on 
unaffected populations.  
As most policy choices can influence the population size, there is a second, perhaps 
more serious kind of violation of independence in situations with variable populations. 
Take for example the power p=1/2, NR very low and consider two times two histories, 
each with populations having well-being levels h1=(1), h2=(1;9), h’1=(1;81) and h’2=(1;9;81). 
We see that history h’1 is related to history h1, just as history h’2 is related to h2: I simply 
added a population (having a well-being 81 per individual) to both histories h1 and h2 in 
order to get histories h’1 and h’2. We can imagine that this happy population is added on 
a far away island, so we expect that this population does not influence our choices here. 
The choice we face is between a situation with a population having well-being 1, versus 
a situation with a doubled population, whose individuals have well-being levels 1 and 9. 
However, W(h1)<W(h2) but W(h’1)>W(h’2). In other words: the existence of a population 
on a far away island might reverse the order of preference here. 
These violations of independence are counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, restoring 
independence would result in the violations of two other moral intuitions: the 
preferences that an impartial observer has behind the veil of ignorance and the 
intuition that we should avoid the repugnant conclusion. The latter two moral 
intuitions might be stronger (have more coherence) than the single moral intuition of 
independence. If that is the case, then constructing the most coherent reflective 
equilibrium would imply that it is better to violate independence.  
Related to this violation of independence for variable populations is the mere 
addition paradox. We encountered this paradox in the first step towards the repugnant 
conclusion: how can it be bad to add very happy people? In order to avoid the 
repugnant conclusion, this badness came down to the observation that the average 
well-being decreases when people are added who are (slightly) less happy than the 
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that includes the negative levels of well-being and does not include a population factor, has independence for 
mixed populations (but not for variable populations).  
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existing group. By moving from A=(100) to B=(100;98), no-one is harmed, the total well-
being almost doubles, and all lives are worth living. For small populations, such 
additions are good according to our welfare function. Yet, such additions are not good 
when N+ becomes larger than the reference NR. For large populations, quality dominates 
over quantity. 
It seems paradoxical that merely adding happy people could lower the welfare 
function. The paradox gets worse when we imagine far away planets with trillions of 
super happy extraterrestrial beings. Our human happiness cannot compete with theirs, 
so we only lower the average well-being if we keep on procreating. It would be better if 
humans stopped procreating. The same goes for a world history time interval Δt that 
includes a past era of dinosaurs: what if scientists discovered that they were happier 
than humans? How is it possible that the ethics of human procreation would depend on 
such discoveries? 
Three remarks are in order. Combining those three remarks will sufficiently weaken 
the problem of the mere addition paradox. 
First, a weak remark: this paradox only occurs in situations when populations are 
already large. The mere addition paradox is avoided in small populations, due to the 
population factor P(N) that becomes linear in N. However, for large populations (or if 
populations include all far away planets), this is not much of a consolation.  
Second, and more importantly, we can soften the contra-intuitive mere addition 
paradox by writing the welfare function as a sum of a changeable and an additional part: 
W= Wch+Wadd. The changeable part looks like the expression presented above and 
contains individuals whose lifetime well-being can be changed amongst each other. The 
additional part is simply the sum of lifetime well-being of additional beings. The point is 
that this additional part contains only those beings whose lifetime well-being cannot be 
exchanged with beings from the changeable group. In particular it is impossible to 
transfer well-being from the changeable to the additional group. Adding individuals 
who have a lower lifetime well-being than the critical level determined by Wch (e.g. 
lower than the population weighted, power mean of the levels of well-being of the 
changeable group) will increase the total welfare function if those individuals belong to 
the additional group. Writing the welfare function like this avoids the repugnant 
conclusion, because the argument towards the repugnant conclusion breaks down at 
the second step: a move from A=(100) to B=(100;98) is allowed (satisfying mere addition), 
but the second move from B=(100;98) to C=(99;99) is impossible because the second 
person belongs to the additional group. 
Third, and most importantly, even though adding people who belong to the 
changeable group and who have a too low lifetime well-being is not good according to 
the welfare function Wch, we can include some deontic permissions. These are 
permissions that are always allowed, even when they violate the prioritarian welfare 
ethic.   
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Most people have moral intuitions about three such deontic permissions. They 
become particularly visible when we include non-human animals as sentient beings in 
the welfare ethic. The first deontic permission says that predation is allowed (we do not 
have a duty to protect prey from predators), even when predators violate the welfare 
ethic by killing a lot of prey. Second, animals are allowed to move around, even if small 
insects would have a well-being that is lowered when they are in huge numbers 
trampled by the large animals. And third, procreation is allowed, even if an animal 
species does not contribute enough to the welfare function. Compare a frog with a low 
lifetime well-being (a poor emotional life over a short, eight year lifespan, with a low 
psychological connectivity) with a normal human with a high lifetime well-being (a rich 
emotional life over a longer, eighty years lifespan). The frog still has a life worth living: 
his lifetime well-being is positive. 
Two explanations might justify such deontic permissions. First, biodiversity might 
have a moral value. If frogs (and all other life forms with lower lifetime well-being) were 
not allowed to procreate when happier humans exist (or if humans are not allowed to 
procreate when happier ET’s or dinosaurs existed), then biodiversity would drastically 
decrease. This decrease in biodiversity trumps the prioritarian welfare ethic. The same 
goes for the extinction of all predators when they are not allowed to prey on animals 
and for large animals when they are not allowed to move and kill insects by accident. A 
second solution is a kind of behavioral fairness: if humans are allowed to procreate, then 
so are frogs. If zebras are allowed to eat for survival, then so are lions. If insects are 
allowed to move, then so are elephants.  
Both arguments of biodiversity and fairness can be combined into the following 
deontic permission of procreation: if person X is allowed to do something that 
necessarily contributes to biodiversity (such as procreation), then so is person Y, even if 
the welfare function decreases (i.e. even if Y’s child has a positive lifetime well-being 
below the power mean). These explanations of deontic permissions can be further 
refined, but I will leave that to a later chapter on the predation problem (Chapter 10). 
Here, it is sufficient to note that there might exist such deontic permissions that are 
coherent with moral intuitions about e.g. predation, motion and procreation.   
In summary, even if some behavior such as procreation would lower the welfare 
function, it is always allowed (but not obligatory)32. Welfare functions are applicable to 
different, incomparable regimes, corresponding to different populations. Once new 
beings with lower well-being are added, we enter a new regime. Such a shift from 
regime is always permissible. In this new regime, we have to move on maximizing the 
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 Some restrictions might be included: perhaps it is never permitted to add an individual with a negative 
lifetime well-being. Hence, species who can only have negative well-being levels are not allowed to procreate.  
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welfare function. Killing the added beings would not be an improvement: it is impossible 
to return to a previous regime.  
4.6.7.2 The weak sadistic conclusion 
Arrhenius (2000, p65) pointed out that a theory such as number-dampened 
prioritarianism is vulnerable to a weak version of the sadistic conclusion. As mentioned, 
the addition of people with low positive well-being levels lowers the average. Adding a 
lot of persons with a well-being slightly above 0 might result in a stronger decrease of 
the welfare function compared to adding one individual with a small negative lifetime 
well-being. In other words, adding one person whose life is not worth living might be 
better than adding thousands of people whose lives are (barely) worth living.  
This seems counter-intuitive, but I believe we are dealing with a moral illusion here. 
As with the mere addition paradox, three remarks are in order to sufficiently weaken 
the weak sadistic conclusion.  
First of all, both additions decrease the welfare function, and it is possible to avoid 
such decreases by simply not adding any of those people. So it is not a dilemma between 
adding the one sufferer versus adding the barely happy people, but a trilemma between 
those two options and a third option: no addition. The latter option is always preferable.  
Second, the weak sadistic conclusion only occurs when the mentioned well-being 
levels of the added people are as high as they can possibly get. In more realistic cases, 
the well-being levels of the added people are not maximal. For example, in the above 
scenarios moving to the repugnant conclusion, we assumed that we could redistribute 
well-being from B=(100;98) to C=(99,99). So the well-being 98 of the added person is not 
its maximal possible level. If the well-being was already maximal, then the repugnant 
conclusion is already avoided because a move to situation C would not be possible. 
Similarly, if the well-being levels of the added people in the problem of the sadistic 
conclusion are not fixed or maximal, a redistribution of well-being is possible. And the 
sacrifice for the better-off people is low when they have to redistribute their well-being 
with the one person at a negative level. In contrast, when the better-off people have to 
redistribute their well-being with the thousands of people at a low positive level of well-
being, their well-being might drop drastically towards a very low averaged level.  
Related to this is the abovementioned suggestion to write the welfare function as a 
sum of two parts W= Wch+Wadd. If the added person with a negative well-being belongs to 
the changeable group, i.e. if other people can transfer their well-being to this miserable 
person, the weak sadistic conclusion becomes weak, because those other people would 
prefer a small redistribution of their well-being towards the one miserable person over 
a huge redistribution of their well-being towards a huge number of added people who 
have small positive levels of well-being. But if a transfer of well-being towards the added 
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person is impossible, the added person belongs to Wadd, which contains a sum of well-
being. Adding a miserable person with negative well-being would lower Wadd. 
Third, as mentioned above, we can say that procreation is allowed as a deontic 
permission, as long as the new lives are worth living. 
4.6.7.3 No replication invariance 
The above welfare function contains a positive and a negative part. Those two parts are 
weighted with two different population factors     (    and     (   . This implies 
that the theory is not replication invariant when a situation X is replicated into a 
situation X’=X+X, doubling the population size. The welfare function of this doubled 
situation X’ is not simply proportional to the welfare function of the old situation: W(X’) 
does not equal for example 2W(X). This means that reversals might occur after 
replication: if W(X)>W(Y) it can happen that W(X’)<W(Y’). Replication invariance is 
defined as the impossibility of such reversals.  
It is easy to demonstrate that our welfare function has no replication invariance. 
There are in fact two reasons why there is no replication invariance. First, suppose that 
there is no negative part in the welfare function. In that case, the theory is replication 
invariant only when the parameter s=0. When the parameter s>0, we would still have a 
violation of replication invariance (unless we would also duplicate NR into NR’=2NR, but 
that is cheating). But this is a rather weak violation of replication invariance, because it 
only occurs for intermediate population sizes. When N is very low or very high, the 
theory becomes replication invariant.  
A second, more serious violation of replication invariance occurs for mixed 
populations when the two population factors are different.33 We could restore 
replication invariance for such mixed populations by adapting the welfare function into 
for example: 
 (       (  〈 
 〉      (  〈| 
 |〉   
The population factors are now the same for the positive and negative parts, and they 
use the total number of beings N.  
This welfare function has replication invariance for mixed populations, but 
unfortunately it implies the strong sadistic conclusion: in some situations the welfare 
function might increase by adding a person with a (small) negative lifetime well-being. 
Yet, this strong sadistic conclusion can be avoided by introducing another deontological 
constraint that prohibits the addition of a miserable person to increase the welfare 
function. This deontological constraint refers to the mere means principle that will be 
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 This kind of violation of replication invariance is equivalent to Parfit’s ‘absurd conclusion’ (Parfit, 1984, p. 
410). 
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discussed in section 6.2. The miserable person would be used as merely a means to 
increase the welfare function, because the person has to undergo and do something that 
s/he does not want: s/he has to be born and live, whereas s/he would rather not live at 
all. Such deontological mere means principle helps to avoid the strong sadistic 
conclusion.  
Nevertheless, when s>0, we are still stuck with a violation of replication invariance. 
There does not seem to be a solution, an adaptation of the welfare function, that 
respects replication invariance without violating another important moral intuition. 
The question is: which intuition is the weakest? I would answer that the violation of 
replication invariance is less bad than a violation of e.g. the (reverse) repugnant 
conclusion or the strong sadistic conclusion.34  
  
In summary, the mere addition paradox, the weak sadistic conclusion and the lack of 
replication invariance are three weak counter-intuitive implications of the theory. We 
can simply split the welfare function into changeable and additional parts and we can 
furthermore add a deontic permission: procreation is always allowed (as long as the 
maximum attainable level of well-being of the added person is positive). This is 
sufficient to deal with those problems.  
4.6.8 Intermezzo: a more complex formulation to solve the 
replaceability problem 
The above welfare function uses the levels of lifetime well-being as input parameters. 
Hence, an impartial observer behind the veil of ignorance is required to group 
momentaneous minds together into mutually exclusive subsets that represent strictly 
separated persons. However, as we have seen in the section on personal identity and 
psychological continuity, personal identity between momentaneous minds is not always 
an all-or-nothing issue.  
In this intermezzo I want to propose a more accurate welfare function that deals with 
a more complex account on personal identity. All we have is a set of momentaneous 
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that includes the negative levels of well-being and does not include a population factor, has replication 
invariance. But this theory requires a deontological constraint (the mere means principle discussed in section 
6.2) and a deontological permission (the 3-N-principle discussed in section 10.4) to avoid respectively the 
strong sadistic conclusion and the reverse repugnant conclusion. 
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minds (indexed by  (  , i.e. momentaneous person   at time  ) who experience a 
momentaneous well-being   (  . The impartial observer behind the veil does not have 
to group these momentaneous minds into an individual’s lifetime well-being   . Hence, 
difficulties in grouping momentaneous minds into subsets that represent all-or-nothing 
personal identities can be avoided. Instead, the impartial observer can work with a 
connectivity function   (    (   . This connectivity can have two different 
interpretations that are coherent with each other.  
First, behind the veil of ignorance, the connectivity function might be proportional 
to the conditional probability: if the impartial observer would experience 
momentaneous well-being   (  , then his/her probability to experience momentaneous 
well-being    (  ) (of another momentaneous person  
  at another time   ) will be 
proportional to the connectivity. The impartial observer, once incarnated in front of the 
veil, might travel around between momentaneous minds and have multiple 
momentaneous experiences belonging to multiple minds. Hence, the idea is that the 
impartial observer behind the veil first calculates his/her probability to experience 
momentaneous well-being   (   and next ascribes conditional probabilities to 
experience other momentaneous minds given that s/he already experienced (or will 
experience)   (   somewhere during his/her stay in front of the veil.  
As a second interpretation, the connectivity function represents how strong the two 
momentaneous minds  (   and   (    belong to the same person over time. The 
function represents the psychological and physical connectivity between two 
momentaneous minds. The futuristic Parfitian thought experiments (e.g. teleportation, 
mind copying, mind swapping, splitting minds or changing personalities) imply that 
momentaneous minds can be mutually related in degrees: it is not an all-or-nothing 
question whether or not two momentaneous minds belong to the same personal 
identity over time.  
If for example the personal identity splits like the splitting of a rope into two 
branches (i.e. the momentaneous minds generate a Y-shape in space-time), we can look 
at three momentaneous minds at times t, t’>t and t’’>t:  (   and   (    are connected 
through   (    (     , and also  (   and  
  (     are connected through   (     (     
 , but    (      (      , and hence  
 (    and    (     do not belong to the same person 
although  (   and   (    do and  (   and    (     do. 
Now we have to derive the welfare function over a considered time-interval   . First, 
we calculate the time-average number of momentaneous minds  
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with   (   the number of momentaneous minds in front of the veil at time  . If the 
impartial observer will experience   (  , then his/her integrated well-being can be 
written as 
 ̂ (   ∫ ∑   (    (      (  )   
  ( 
 )
  (     
  
 
  
As with the values of life   
  and   
 , these integrated well-being levels now have to 
be projected to the positive and negative values  ̂ (  
  and  ̂ (  
 . Write    and    as the 
time-average number of positive and negative values of integrated well-being, and    as 
a reference number. The welfare function can then be written as a summation (integral) 
over the momentaneous minds  (    
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This expression does not require a grouping in subsets that represent different 
beings with a unique personal identity over time. The impartial observer merely has to 
ascribe values to the levels of connectivity between each two momentaneous minds. 
This is the connectivity function. The higher the connectivity, the more the impartial 
observer believes that two momentaneous minds belong to the same person over time. 
The connectivity function is new in a consequentialist welfare ethic. It indicates that 
not only momentaneous well-being matters, but also connections between 
momentaneous minds matter. The connectivity function can be represented as a web 
where the momentaneous minds are the nodes and the threads connect the different 
momentaneous minds. The thicker the thread, the more the two minds are 
psychologically and physically connected, the more they can be said to belong to the 
same person over time, and the higher the connectivity function will be. 
Now the problem of replaceability can be understood in a simple way: if you kill a 
person (who has a strong identity over time) and replace him by another person whose 
momentaneous minds are not connected to the minds of the killed person, it is as if you 
cut some threads in the connectivity web. Some connectivities are set to zero. Hence, 
the welfare function decreases. In other words: not only the levels of well-being at the 
nodes of the web (the momentaneous minds) have moral (intrinsic) value, also the 
threads between the nodes have moral value. 
Let’s study the consequences of different connectivity functions. First, the most 
trivial connectivity function is   (    (      (    (   , i.e. the connectivity is infinite if 
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 (     (    and 0 otherwise.35 There is no connectivity between different 
momentaneous minds; there is no personal identity over time. In this case, the different 
momentaneous minds are treated as completely different persons. It is as if all persons 
briefly pop up into existence. All persons immediately die and are replaced by other 
persons. In this case, the problem of replaceability will not be solved: momentaneous 
minds are fully replaceable, because they are in fact replaced all the time. 
The other extreme is to take   (    (     , i.e. all momentaneous minds at all times 
are connected, as if there was only one superperson who experiences everything. In this 
case, we end up with sum-utilitarianism, simply adding up the momentaneous well-
being of all minds. If the connectivity function remains equal to 1 even when persons 
are replaced, the problem of replaceability will not get solved: replacing a person will 
not influence the welfare function.  
In between the above two extreme options for the connectivity function, there is an 
interesting one. Suppose the momentaneous minds can be easily grouped into sets that 
correspond with persons having a clear personal identity over time. We can write the 
connectivity as 
  (    (    
  
     
   ( (    
 (    
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with    ( (    
 (       if the two momentaneous minds  (   and   (    belong to 
the same person i, and it is 0 otherwise. N(T) is a normalization factor that can be 
included in order to avoid a kind of double counting (the welfare function has a double 
integral, so the well-being of some momentaneous minds will be counted multiple 
times). For simplicity we can taken N(T)=T.36 The factor   (     ⁄   might correspond 
with the impartial observer’s probability to experience momentaneous mind   (    
given the experience of  (    In another interpretation, the parameter    is a reference 
time-length of individual i and    is the lifespan of that individual. We briefly 
encountered this expression in the section on the lifetime perspective (section 4.2.4). As 
was mentioned there, the reference time-length was related to the psychological 
connectivity. The above expression of the connectivity function clearly demonstrates 
this relation. After plugging the connectivity function in the welfare function and 
setting N(T)= T, we get a simplified expression: 
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 Mathematically speaking, this is the Dirac delta function. 
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 Due to this normalization factor, the connectivity function approaches the Dirac delta function when   
 . 
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with  ̅ 
  the time-average momentaneous well-being of individual i, averaged over the 
lifespan   , and projected on the positive values. We encountered this welfare function 
before, when the value of life equals  
  
  
     ̅ 
 
     
  
As mentioned before, this expression avoids the problem of replaceability. It also 
presents a new solution to the excessiveness (demandingness) problem of 
prioritarianism raised by Holtug (2007): the animals with the shortest lives are the 
worst-off and should get the highest priority. As humans have a long lifespan, humans 
should sacrifice a lot in order to increase the lifetime well-being of animals such as 
frogs.  
This prioritarianism is very demanding for humans. To weaken the demandingness 
objection, Holtug (2007) proposed a time-slice prioritarianism: at each separate moment 
of time, momentaneous well-being should be distributed in a prioritarian way. This is 
less demanding for humans than a lifetime perspective prioritarianism, because as we 
have seen above, the gap in momentaneous well-being between a human and a frog is 
lower than the gap in lifetime well-being (the difference in lifespan and the difference 
in psychological connectivity between humans and frogs add to the gap in lifetime-well-
being).  
But Holtug also mentioned some counter-intuitive problems of his proposal. His 
time-slice prioritarianism is insensitive to inter-temporal compensations that can take 
place in a life. Suppose individual A has a high lifetime well-being, but at time t she has a 
very low momentaneous well-being. In contrast, individual B has a high momentaneous 
well-being at time t but a low lifetime well-being. Then time-slice prioritarianism says 
that at time t well-being should be redistributed from B to A. But if this is the only 
moment when a redistribution between A and B is possible, A ends up with an even 
higher lifetime well-being. 
In contrast, the above presented connectivist prioritarianism not only has a weaker 
demandingness objection just as Holtug’s proposal, but it avoids the counter-intuitive 
conclusion of time-slice prioritarianism as well. With the above expression, if the animal 
has a low connectivity and hence a low value Ri, a unit increase in average well-being or 
in lifespan will give a relatively low increase in lifetime well-being, compared with a 
unit increase in average well-being or in lifespan for a person having a strong 
connectivity (a high value Rj). This will compensate the priority for the shortest 
lifespan, resulting in a less demanding ethic for humans.    
We can also look at the issue of abortion. As McMahan (2002) argued, killing an adult 
human is worse than killing an early human embryo, because the human has a stronger 
connectedness with his future self than the embryo has with hers. For the embryo, 
death means the loss of a higher amount of future well-being, because the embryo has a 
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longer potential future ahead of her compared to the adult. But this amount of future 
well-being should be multiplied by the psychological connectedness that the embryo 
has with her future self at the moment she is killed. As this psychological connectedness 
is very low, the result is a lower loss of weighted future well-being for the embryo. 
The above can be mathematically expressed with the integrated well-being  ̂ (  , 
which includes the connectivity function. This means that the difference between  ̂ (   
(the integrated well-being of the non-killed embryo π at time t) and  ̂ (  
  (the 
integrated well-being of the embryo when she is killed at time t) is lower than the 
difference between  ̂  (  ) (the integrated well-being of the non-killed human adult π’ at 
time t’) and  ̂
  (  )
 
 (the integrated well-being of the adult when he is killed at time t’). 
Even if this difference of the integrated well-being is lower for the embryo, it does 
not yet imply that the difference of the welfare function between killing and not killing 
the embryo is lower compared to killing and not killing the adult. That is because killing 
an embryo not only results in a slightly lower integrated well-being  ̂ (  
 , but it also 
results in the loss of all future integrated well-being states. The latter loss can easily be 
bigger than the loss of all future integrated well-being states of the adult. 
 
In this intermezzo I argued that not only the momentaneous experienced well-being 
is important in a consequentialist welfare ethic. The momentaneous well-being is 
experienced by momentaneous minds, and these minds form the nodes of a vast 
connectivity web. Between two nodes can be a link: the connectivity that measures how 
strongly the two momentaneous minds are psychologically connected. Not only has 
each node a moral value, the momentaneous well-being, but also each link has a moral 
value, the connectivity. Lowering the value of a node lowers the welfare function, but 
also lowering the connectivity between nodes lowers the welfare function.  
With this connectivist welfare ethic, we get a new, elegant reframing of the 
replaceability problem: killing and replacing persons that have the same momentaneous 
well-being means cutting links between nodes, setting some connectivities to zero. The 
number and values of the nodes remain the same, but the connectivity web is less 
connected. Hence, the welfare function decreases even if the momentaneous well-being 
remains the same.  
The connectivity web also allows for intrapersonal, intertemporal shifts in well-
being: well-being can be shifted from node to node, following a connected path between 
the nodes. The connectivity allows for those shifts, because connectivity means that the 
two nodes belong to the same person. However, if the connectivity between two nodes 
is very weak, not much well-being is allowed to be shifted from one node to the other. If 
there is a weak connectivity between my current self and my future self over 30 years, 
my future self should be treated as an almost different person. As a consequence, 
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smoking today will not only be imprudent but also to some degree immoral: it harms 
(without permission) an almost different future person who will get cancer. 
Finally, the connectivity is not necessarily a binary function that takes only two 
values: one (personal identity between two momentaneous minds) and zero (no 
identity). This means that it is not an all-or-nothing issue whether two momentaneous 
minds belong to the same person: it can be a matter of degree. Personal identity over 
time can be more fluid, especially if futuristic thought experiments such as 
teleportation, mind copying, mind splitting and mind swapping would one day become 
reality. We now already have an ethical theory that is fit to deal with those tricky 
situations. 
 
What about fractional consciousness?  
My intuition says that consciousness is an all-or-nothing issue: either it is switched 
on or it is switched off, either the neural program runs correctly or it doesn’t. Still one 
might object that scientists might discover that consciousness comes in matters of 
degree. We should distinguish quality versus quantity of an experience. A fractional 
consciousness deals with the quantity of an experience, not the quality. The quality can 
have e.g. an intensity, and intensity of feelings can come in degrees. For example pain is 
stronger than another. This difference in intensity is a difference in the quality of an 
experience: a weak pain feels different from a strong pain. On the other hand, fractional 
consciousness deals with the quantity of an experience and asks the question: what if 
there is not an integer, but a fractional number of momentaneous minds? What if 
consciousness itself is a matter of degree instead of an on/off switch? Bostrom (2006) 
offers the most challenging thought experiments to argue that at least in theory, 
fractional minds are conceivable. Bostrom’s thought experiments extend those of Parfit 
(1984) and deal with brain-duplication to argue that consciousness comes in degrees, 
that there might be for example 1,5 instead of two conscious people.  
The above welfare function can be easily adapted to deal with fractional 
consciousness. First, we replace the integer number of momentaneous minds at time t 
by: 
  (   ∑  
  (  
 
 ∑   (  
  (  
 (    
  
with   (   a fractional number for a momentaneous mind   (  . This fractional 
number can be e.g. 0,75 or 1,32 or whatever. It corresponds with the fractional number 
of minds that have the same mental state, i.e. the mental state of the momentaneous 
mind   (  . In the numerator of the welfare function, we replace   (     (    (  . If 
the fractional number is 1, we get the previous welfare function. If a momentaneous 
mind comes with a very low level consciousness, the fractional number is so low that 
the momentaneous mind does not strongly influence the welfare function. 
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4.6.9 Uncertainty aversion  
In the previous sections, we assumed a uniform probability distribution behind the veil 
of ignorance: the impartial observer knows that s/he will be born as individual i with 
probability 1/N. This assumption can be justified: it is the only probability distribution 
with maximal information entropy, i.e. least information content (Cover & Thomas, 
1991, chapter 11), at least if you have no further information about, for example, what 
the average well-being or the standard deviation will be. 
However, we can also assume that behind the veil, you do not know the probability 
distribution, and you have an uncertainty aversion.37 This is what Rawls originally 
intended in his theory of justice (Rawls, 1971). A person who has a maximum 
(unrestricted) uncertainty aversion prefers playing any gamble with known 
probabilities above a gamble with unknown probabilities. Any gamble also means: the 
gamble with the worst probability. The maximum uncertainty averse person would 
prefer playing the gamble where s/he will become the worst-off person for sure, instead 
of playing the gamble where s/he does not know the probability to become the worst-
off person.  As mentioned above, the weights ai refer to the probability to get a lifetime 
well-being level  [ ]. Hence, the worst probability distribution is the one with a1=1, i.e. 
the highest probability to become the worst-off individual. As with the situation of 
maximum risk aversion, maximum (i.e. unrestricted) uncertainty aversion also results 
in maximin (see Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989). 
Gajdos & Kandil (2008) gave a mathematical proof for a welfare function that is a 
linear combination of maximin and average utilitarianism38:  
      [ ]  (    〈 〉   
where  [ ] is the worst-off and θ is a parameter between 0 and 1. In other words: a1 = 
1/(1+(N–1)(1– θ)) and ai>1 =(1– θ)/(1+(N–1)(1– θ)). The proof is based on a restricted kind 
of uncertainty aversion (restricted mixture neutrality). No uncertainty aversion 
corresponds with θ = 0, unrestricted (maximum) uncertainty aversion corresponds with 
θ = 1. 
The restricted mixture neutrality used in the proof, is only one way to restrict 
uncertainty aversion. Although I do not proof it here, I postulate that there are other 
restrictions of uncertainty aversion that will result in other weights ai, and perhaps one 
kind of restriction results in a moderate egalitarianism (Jensen, 2003) discussed below.  
 
                                                     
37
 Risk aversion assumed a knowledge about the probability distribution, and resulted in a concave utility 
function f=xp. Uncertainty aversion assumes a lack of knowledge of the probability distribution.  
38
 Gajdos & Kandil assumed a risk neutral but uncertainty averse impartial observer. 
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4.6.9.1 Moderate egalitarianism 
Like Gajdos & Kandil (2008), I choose the weights in such a way that we get average 
utilitarianism and maximin as limits. Take for example:  
    
    
∑         
  
with   [   ]. If Q=0, we get maximin; if Q=1 (and the power p=1, i.e. no risk aversion), 
we get average utilitarianism. A welfare function with the above weights is called a 
generalized Gini welfare function (Weymark, 1981). When distributing benefits, the 
worst-off should get a priority because they have a higher weight factor al. In contrast 
with (power mean) prioritarianism, the priority in this moderate egalitarianism 
depends on the position of an individual relative to the well-being levels of the others. 
Prioritarianism uses a concave utility function u(x) that does not depend on the relative 
position (relative to the well-being of others). 
This generalized Gini welfare function can be derived as follows. First, start with a 
population of two individuals and two situations:   ( [ ]  [ ] , and   ( [ ]  [ ] . 
We can write three consequentialist theories of justice in a simple set of mathematical 
inequalities: 
 Strict egalitarianism: X is better than Y if and only if 
 [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ] 
  i.e. the difference between the values of life should be minimized. 
 Maximin: X is better than Y if and only if 
 [ ]   [ ] 
  i.e. the value of life of the person in the worst position should be maximized. 
 Sum-utilitarianism: X is better than Y if and only if 
 [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ] 
i.e. the total value of life (total utility) should be maximized. 
These expressions can be unified in one inequality 
 [ ]    [ ]   [ ]    [ ] 
where the parameter Q takes the values: 
     :  strict egalitarianism, 
     :  maximin, 
     :  utilitarianism. 
We can write  (    [ ]    [ ] as the welfare function of situation X. 
Generalizing to situations with N number of individuals can be done using a recursive 
relation. The welfare function of situation X then reads: 
 (  ( [ ]   [ ]))   [ ]   ( [ ]   ( [ ]   ))  ∑  
    [ ] 
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In order to avoid the repugnant conclusion, we have to normalize this welfare 
function with the sum ∑         . The result is the Gini welfare function 
     (    
∑      [ ]
 
   
∑         
  
 
4.6.9.2 Replication invariance 
The weight   can be adapted to make the theory replication invariant. If we start with a 
world with two individuals and    ( [ ]  [ ] , then replication invariance means that 
making a copy of this world, i.e.     ( [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ] , does not change the welfare 
function. Using the above weights, the generalized Gini welfare function does not 
remain invariant under replication (see e.g. Fleurbaey et al. 2009). More generally, start 
with the N-individual situation    ( [ ]   [ ]   [ ]  and replicate this K times 
    ( [ ]
    [ ]
    [  ]
  , with  [ ]   [ ]
   [ ]
     [ ]
 ,  [ ]   [   ]
  
   [  ]
  and so on for the other  [ ]. Applying the welfare function gives 
     (     
∑       [ ]
 
   
∑         
 (
    
     
)∑   (     [ ]  
∑   (     [ ]
 
   
∑   (        
 
   
  
This expression is not the same as the above     (   , but there is a similarity. If we 
rescale     , we get the same expression. That means that invariance under 
replication is restored if the parameter Q depends on the number of individuals. So we 
can start with a fixed parameter in the two-individuals world:   . The parameter in a 
world with N individuals then becomes      
   
. This is in line with our intuition: the 
more individuals, the higher the parameter    should become, because otherwise the 
higher well-being levels will rapidly get extremely low weight factors. So the replication 
invariant expression for the welfare function of Gini-moderate egalitarianism becomes: 
     (  (    
∑   
 
 (     [ ](  
 
   
∑   
 
 (     
   
  
This shows that a geometric generalized Gini welfare function can be made 
replication invariant, if the weights properly depend on the population size N.39 
 
                                                     
39
 As with power mean prioritarianism, we can adapt this expression to deal with non-trivial psychological 
connectivities. Write  ̂[ (  ]  (∫ ∑   (    (      (  )   
  ( 
 )
  (     
  
 
)
 
 in increasing order, and [ (  ]    
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4.6.9.3 Avoidance of intransitivity and misery for the ultra rich 
The moderate egalitarian welfare function solves Temkin’s intransitivity problem 
(Temkin, 1987). This intransitivity problem comes down to a line of reasoning where 
choice A is better than B, and B better than C, but C is better than A (as in the rock-
paper-scissors hand game). In his argument, Temkin refers to a First Standard View 
(FSV) and a Second Standard View (SSV).  
The FSV states that a situation in which one person suffers a lot is better than a 
situation where two people suffer a lot, but their suffering is a little bit less than the 
suffering of the one person in the first situation. In other words: two almost extreme 
sufferers is worse than one extreme sufferer. And three almost almost extreme sufferers 
is worse than two almost extreme sufferers. And four almost almost almost extreme 
sufferers is worse still. Continuing in this way, we end up with a situation where a very 
high number of people suffer only a little bit (from a light headache). If transitivity 
applies, then the FSV means that this final situation is the worst of all.  
But that conclusion violates another intuition, the SSV, which says that the first 
situation, where everyone is really happy except one extreme sufferer, is much worse 
than the final situation where a very high number of people are almost really happy and 
no-one really suffers.  
This SSV corresponds with the problem of the ‘Misery for the Ultra-Rich’. One 
critique of sum-utilitarianism and (power mean) prioritarianism is that according to 
these theories, there are situations where it is good to sacrifice the well-being of a 
worst-off person if this sacrifice results in a huge benefit that can be distributed 
amongst a huge amount of best-off people (the ultra rich), each getting a tiny share that 
increases well-being. As long as the total number of ultra-rich beneficiaries is high 
enough, any amount of cost for the worst-off will be offset by the sum of small benefits 
for the many ultra rich. The ultra rich can get richer while the poorest person gets 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
[      ] with ∫   (    
  
 
     . Then we can write   
∫  
 
    
    
  ̂   
∫  
  
    
    
   
 
  When 
  (    (    
  
     
   ( (    
 (    , the function  ̂[ (  ] becomes an increasing step function between 0 and 
     where each step corresponds with the life of an individual (and the width of a step, Ti, corresponds with 
the lifespan Ti such that ∑        
  
   ). The welfare function then reduces to   
∑  
∑      
    (   
  
      [ ]
  
   
(    
 
with  [ ]  
     ̅ 
     
. This is a slight generalization of the Gini welfare function: only when all Ti=Tj, i.e. all 
lifespans are equal, we get     (    
∑  
 
  
(    
 [ ]
  
   
∑  
 
  
(      
   
. 
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poorer. This seems counterintuitive according to many people (Broome, 2004 p.58; 
Holtug, 2006 p.134; Dorsey, 2009, p.54). 
Let’s apply the intransitivity problem to the equations of moderate egalitarianism 
with the Gini welfare function. We first note that in contrast with the repugnant 
conclusion, in the intransitivity problem the total number of people    is constant and 
very large. Let’s start with history    where    (much smaller than   ) of extreme 
sufferers have a well-being w below the happy state H, and all the other       people 
are in the happy state H. So we get: 
     (    
∑     (     ∑      
  
      
  
   
∑     
  
   
  
with 
        
      
In history    there are       people with well-being        (with    small 
but positive), and the others still have well-being H. For history    there are       
people with well-being         . Moving on, we get history    where   people 
have well-being      , with ∑   
   
      .  
Let’s suppose that the FSV is always valid. Then from the inequality      (    
     (    and using  
∑    
 
   
 
    
   
  
we get 
(    (
     
   
)   (
     
   
 
     
   
)  (      ) (
     
   
)  
When    becomes very large, and Q is lower than 1, the factor  
   goes to zero. This 
simplifies the above inequality to:      
    .  
We can conclude that if the FSV is always satisfied, the total increment    is always 
strictly lower than w. So we will never be able to get the well-being arbitrarily close to 
H. If we want to proceed and move close to H, we at one point have to violate the FSV. 
So we have an history    where the inequality flips: 
 (     (       (  )   (    )     Only when Q = 1 (sum-
utilitarianism) we have the constraint      that allows us to move close to H. And if Q 
= 0, then      and FSV is always violated. Moderate egalitarianism solves Temkin’s 
intransitivity paradox, in the sense that it has a point in the series where the FSV no 
longer becomes valid and the SSV takes over. 
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4.6.9.4 The problem of independence and Allais paradox  
As we have seen, unweighted power mean prioritarianism has a welfare function that 
has the property of independence or strong separability (see e.g. McCarthy, 2008), 
except for mixed populations and variable populations. The situation with moderate 
egalitarianism is worse: strong separability is violated, even when populations are not 
mixed and population size is constant.   
Suppose we have two times two histories, each involving three individuals. History 
h1=(1;1;1), h2=(1;0;5), h’1=(0;1;1) and h’2=(0;0;5). We see that history h’1 is related to 
history h1, just as history h’2 is related to h2. Suppose the impartial observer behind the 
veil can choose between either h1 and h2 or between h’1 and h’2. Independence now says 
that h’1 is better than h’2 if and only if h1 is better than h2. The presence of the first 
person should not matter (whether s/he has well-being 1 in the first two histories, or 
well-being 0 in the last two histories). We can apply the welfare function     . When Q 
< 1/2, we get      (                (         . But if Q > 1/4, we see 
that     (               (          In other words, when Q is in the range 
 
 
   
 
 
, it is possible that situation h’2 is better than situation h’1, although situation 
h2 was worse than situation h1. Independence is restored when we exclude the first 
person.  
In decision theory, Allais paradox (Allais, 1953; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is 
similar to the problem of independence. An example of the paradox goes as follows. 
Suppose we have two experiments, each consisting of two gambles. In the first 
experiment, you can choose between gamble 1, where you have probability 100% to gain 
$100, and gamble 2, where you have probability 89% to gain $100, 1% to gain nothing 
and 10% to gain $500. Most people would choose to play gamble 1, especially when they 
have risk aversion, because in gamble 2 they risk to gain nothing. In gamble 1 they are 
always certain to receive some benefit.  
In a second experiment, people can choose between gambles 1’ and 2’. Gamble 1’ has 
the following probabilities: 89% to gain nothing and 11% to gain $100. Gamble 2’ has 90% 
to gain nothing and 10% to gain $500. In this second experiment, people would prefer to 
play gamble 2’, because they gain $500 at an almost equal probability as gaining $100 in 
gamble 1’. The curious thing is that both experiments are in fact quite similar, as can be 
seen by writing it as in the following table. 
Gamble 1 Gamble 2 Gamble 1’ Gamble 2’ 
89%  100$ 89%  100$ 89%      0$ 89%       0$ 
1%    100$ 1%        0$ 1%    100$ 1%         0$ 
10%  100$ 10%  500$ 10%  100$ 10%   500$ 
 
In the first experiment, we can decouple a 89% probability to gain $100. So we can 
write for gamble 1 that you have 89%+1%+10% to gain $100. But if we would now set the 
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gains for those 89% in gambles 1 and 2 equal to zero, we get gambles 1’ and 2’. So it is 
strange why people prefer gamble 1 over 2, but 2’ over 1’, because gamble 2’ is quite 
similar to gamble 2, and 1’ is similar to 1. Gambles 1 and 2 are both changed in the very 
same way (setting a gain to zero), and yet the order of preference of the gambles 
suddenly changes.  
The analogy with this Allais paradox and the above veil of ignorance example is 
clear.40 If the impartial observer behind the veil would have preferences as in Allais 
paradox, s/he could end up with a welfare function of moderate egalitarianism. 
4.6.9.5 Summary 
In summary, we basically have two theories that have maximin as a limit: moderate 
egalitarianism with a generalized Gini welfare function (having maximin in the limit 
   ) and prioritarianism with a power mean welfare function (having maximin in the 
limit when the power     ). Moderate egalitarianism solves Temkin’s intransitivity 
problem, but this theory is not strongly separable, not even when population size is 
fixed. Power mean prioritarianism does not solve Temkin’s intransitivity paradox, 
because it always respects the FSV and hence it faces the problem of the Misery for the 
Ultra-Rich. If the latter problem is considered less bad than the problem of 
independence (strong separability) for unmixed, fixed populations (i.e. for situations 
with constant numbers of people with positive and negative levels of well-being), then 
prioritarianism is the better theory. Both moderate egalitarianism and power mean 
prioritarianism can be derived from a veil of ignorance with respectively uncertainty 
aversion and risk aversion. Both theories can be unified in one expression: a weighted 
power mean. 
4.6.10 Prioritarian theories for lotteries 
In the above descriptions, the impartial observer had to choose between different 
histories from behind the veil of ignorance. However, it is possible that outcomes are 
not certain. In this case of probabilistic outcomes, we have to apply the theory to 
lotteries (Rabinowicz, 2002; McCarthy 2003; 2006; 2008; Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009). 
 
                                                     
40
 In the veil of ignorance example, the impartial observer might ascribe a probability 1/3 for each individual, 
because we have a population of 3 persons. If we would like to use the probabilities 89%, 1% and 10% as in the 
former example, we can take a population of 100 individuals, whereby 89 individuals have well-being 1 in the 
first history, and so forth. 
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A lottery L can be written as a set of m histories, where each history has a probability 
and all probabilities sum to one:   {(       (        (      } with ∑     
 
    
and    the r-th possible history. From behind the veil of ignorance, we now have to 
choose between different lotteries (instead of different histories). So there are now two 
elements of risk: first you don’t know who you will be, and second you don’t know 
which history will be actualized.  
We can write the expected well-being of individual i in lottery L over all histories as: 
〈  (  〉  ∑     (   
 
   
  
The welfare function  (   can take three different forms: an ex-ante, ex-inter and 
ex-post (for simplicity I take again a uniform distribution ai=1).  
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In the ex-ante version, we first calculate the expectation values of the well-being 
levels, and afterwards use them in the welfare function, whereas in ex-post we apply the 
expectation value at the end, after calculating the welfare functions for the different 
histories. Ex-inter is a so-called weighted power mean, weighted by the probabilities of 
the lotteries. 
Let’s apply our three theories of prioritarianism to the following example. Suppose 
there are four lotteries, each with two persons (A and B) and two histories (h1 and h2). 
The values of well-being are summarized in the following table.  
 L1 L2 L3 L4 
h1 h2 h1 h2 h1 h2 h1 h2 
A 2 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 
B 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 
 
L1 is the worst lottery, because we know for sure that only A will win (B will get 0), 
ending up with an inequality. Lottery L2 is a bit better, because now both A and B at least 
get an equal chance to win. L3 is better still, because we will always end up with a 
situation of equality, and both A and B get an equal probability to win. Finally, from a 
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risk averse point of view, lottery L4 is the best, because now each person will at least win 
something, end both will end up equal.  
The following table summarizes the welfare functions for all four lotteries.  
 L1 L2 L3 L4 
W+
EA  
  
 
    1 1 1 
W+
EI  
  
 
     
  
 
     
  
 
    1 
W+
EP  
  
 
     
  
 
    1 1 
 
We see that each of the three welfare functions satisfies one of our judgments.41 For 
example according to the ex-ante WEA, the first lottery is the worst, the other three 
lotteries are equal. However, the ex-ante welfare function encounters a problem when it 
comes to variable populations, i.e. when the population size N differs between histories. 
If person B does not exist in history h2, we cannot calculate W
EA.42  
How to decide between the ex-inter and ex-post versions of the welfare function? We 
have seen that from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing who you will be, there is 
some risk involved, and prioritarian theories show a non-zero risk aversion. When the 
choice is between lotteries, a second kind of risk is introduced. In the above example, 
there is the risk of becoming person A instead of B (a risk related to impartiality), and 
there is the risk of having one history instead of the other (a risk related to lotteries). 
The ex-inter welfare function treats these two risks in a same way: WEI has coherent risk 
aversion towards both kinds of risks (this can be seen in the mathematical expression: 
the two probabilities pr and 1/NF are treated in the same way). The ex-post welfare 
function, however, treats these two kinds of risks differently.  
This apparent incoherence of ex-post prioritarianism is not a real threat to the 
theory, because one might argue that the two kinds of risk are not comparable and 
should not be treated in the same way. The impartiality risk can be related to the notion 
of separability of persons, which is – morally speaking – something other than a 
separability of outcomes of a lottery. If the separability of persons is morally more 
relevant than the separability of outcomes, the two kinds of risks can be treated 
differently.  
 
                                                     
41
 As with populations ethics (problems related to variable populations), situations of risk also has unavoidable 
counter-intuitive implications: it is not possible (or very difficult) to respect all of our seemingly self-evident 
moral intuitions. See e.g. Dougherty (2013) who argued that we have intuitions both for and against the ex-
ante view.  
42
 Assuming that person B has well-being 0 in history h2 would not work, because why should one include this 
potential person in the calculation and not include all other potential persons as well? Including all potential 
persons, setting their non-existent well-being levels equal to zero, will result in a division by an infinite 
population size N.   
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Furthermore, Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) expressed the intuition that a one-person 
decision under the risk of a lottery should be treated differently than a multi-person 
decision (without the risk of a lottery). The one-person decision under risk should 
follow the expected utility theory to reflect the ‘unity of the individual’ (see also Porter, 
2012). When there is only one individual, the ex-post welfare function indeed becomes 
the expected well-being: 〈(      〉  〈 〉.   
The multi-person decision should follow the prioritarian approach to reflect the 
separability of persons. So, the incoherence of ex-post prioritarianism might not be a 
weakness after all, as it might reflect the intuitions shared by e.g. Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve.  
The veil of ignorance can also be reframed in order to make it compatible with this 
apparent incoherence of the difference in risk attitude between situations with multiple 
persons versus multiple outcomes. If there are N individuals in front of the veil, you are 
going to live the life of just one of those individuals. You will be person i with a 
probability 1/N, and it is not irrational to be risk averse with respect to the lifetime 
well-being of this one person. On the other hand, if you would ‘reincarnate’ N times and 
live the lives of all N persons, you will experience everything and there is no reason to 
be risk averse towards an individual well-being behind the veil of ignorance.  
The point is that behind the veil of ignorance, lotteries can be understood as 
reincarnations. If in a lottery person i has a probability p=S/T to have an outcome O and 
a probability q=(T-S)/T to have outcome O’ (with T and S natural numbers), it is as if you 
will live the life of person i a number of T times, S of which you will get outcome O, and 
T-S of which you will get outcome O’. It is as if you will be reincarnated T times into 
parallel worlds, leading again the life of person i. There is no reason to be risk averse if 
you will experience everything of the T copies of person i.  
The ex-post approach does however have a problem of independence. Compare the 
above lotteries L2 and L3. In both lotteries, the outcomes of individual A are the same 
(outcome 2 of history h1 is realized, outcome 0 if the second history is realized). If there 
is independence between the two persons, we can change the outcomes of person A in 
both lotteries in the same way. The following table represents such a transformation 
into new lotteries L’2 and L’3.  
 L’2 L’3 
h1 h2 h1 h2 
A 0 2 0 2 
B 0 2 2 0 
 
We saw that WEP(L3) > W
EP(L2), because L3 has always equal outcomes for both 
individuals (either both 2 or both 0). But now we have WEP(L’3) < W
EP(L’2), so 
independence is no longer valid in an ex-post theory (see also Fleurbaey and Zuber, 
2012) .   
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4.6.11 Democratic impartial preferences of moral agents 
The prioritarian theory uses undetermined values: the risk parameter p43, the reference 
population size NR, the choice between ex-ante, ex-inter and ex-post decisions, and the 
values of life (lifetime well-being levels) xi. As mentioned in a previous section (4.2), the 
values of life are functions of experienced well-being of individuals, but these 
experienced well-being levels are not interpersonally comparable, just like I cannot 
compare my perception of a red color with your perception of red. Therefore, the values 
of life are the values attributed by an impartial observer behind a veil of ignorance. This 
impartial observer uses empathy to guess how situation x for person i would compare to 
situation y for person j.  
In reality, we do not have an ideal impartial observer. What we do have, are moral 
agents. These are all persons who are able to perform the thought experiment, using 
empathy or imagination. Each moral agent will imagine him/herself as an impartial 
observer behind the veil.  
In a first step, a moral agent a classifies all momentaneous minds in subsets that 
represent the NF
a different real world persons: the number of persons in front of the 
veil, according to moral agent a (see the section on personal identity and continuity). 
This classification reflects the importance of personal identity and non-replaceability 
according to moral agent a (see the section on the replaceability problem above). If the 
moral agent has no problem with replaceability of persons, s/he can treat all 
momentaneous minds independently as different persons. Alternatively, the moral 
agent can ascribe a connectivity function between all the momentaneous minds to 
represent the level of irreplaceability of persons (see the intermezzo).   
In a second step, the moral agent a performs the thought experiment, choosing 
his/her preferred welfare function (e.g. a positive number-dampened power mean 
prioritarianism with negative total utilitarianism, or an exponential lifetime well-being 
generalized f-mean), deriving his/her own preferred risk aversion parameter pa, 
population reference NR
a, lottery decision rule and estimates of lifetime well-being xi
a 
(or momentaneous well-being   
  and connectivity function ca). These parameters and 
values can lie in a certain range: the broader the range of e.g. the risk aversion 
parameter, the more flexible is moral agent a’s attitude towards risk aversion.    
Next, the moral agent calculates his/her own welfare function Wa(pa, NR
a, xi
a) with 
respect to the range of parameters. Of course, different moral agents will end up with 
different welfare functions and different maximizations, even when they do the thought 
experiment as sincerely as possible. Who is right? Who has the best risk attitude? Who 
 
                                                     
43
 Or ln(a) in case of the exponential lifetime well-being in the Kolmogorov mean. 
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has the best empathy? We have to respect the principle of universalization: if you are 
allowed to do the exercise (the thought experiment of the veil of ignorance) using your 
preferences (e.g. your risk attitude), then everyone who is capable (i.e. every moral 
agent) is allowed to do the exercise using one’s own preferences.  
Furthermore, each moral agent has his/her own welfare function Wa, but the welfare 
functions of different moral agents are not mutually well-calibrated. Different moral 
agents might use different scales or units for e.g. the levels of well-being. As estimates of 
well-being are not interpersonally comparable, a level of well-being equal to 100 
according to moral agent a might mean a level equal to 10 according to moral agent b. 
As a result, the welfare function used by moral agent a might have much higher values 
than the welfare function used by moral agent b. How do we compare those welfare 
functions when they are not properly gauged? 
These problems can be solved as follows. Consider the set G of all objective (i.e. 
quantifiable) distributable goods and burdens. These are goods and burdens in the sense 
that they can positively or negatively influence someone’s well-being, they are 
distributable in the sense that we are able to distribute those goods between sentient 
beings (the goods are in our direct control, whereas someone’s well-being is not in our 
direct control), and they are objective in the sense that they should be measurable 
(quantifiable). The latter property is important, because we want to avoid subjective 
estimates that differ between moral agents. Examples of such objective distributable 
goods are resources (economic wealth, income, energy, materials) and liberties (e.g. 
primary goods according to Rawls (1971), capabilities according to Nussbaum (2000)). 
The goods are subject to some constraints, such as maximum available resource levels 
and logically possible distributions of liberties.  
Moral agents can now do the thought experiment as sincerely as possible, 
distributing the goods and burdens to maximize their own preferred welfare functions, 
respecting the constraints on the goods. Each of the momentaneous minds that 
compose person i gets a part of the distributed goods compatible with the lifetime well-
being   
 (    where ga is the distribution of goods (for example a person i gets a certain 
income at a certain time). Each moral agent a can now calculate the optimal distribution 
of goods   
   
 that maximizes moral agent a’s welfare function at     
 . As G is a 
compact (bounded) set, the maximal welfare function is finite (it cannot grow to 
infinity). 
We can now maximize the average of weighted welfare functions 
 ̅   
 
  
∑
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with   the number of moral agents. This averaging means that the subjective estimates 
of all moral agents count equally.44 Using the relative welfare functions (W/Wmax) 
implies that the optimal distribution of goods according to moral agent a is as valuable 
as the optimal distribution of goods according to moral agent b. This solves the problem 
of gauging the welfare functions of different moral agents. Even if moral agents might 
use different scales or units for e.g. the levels of well-being, taking the relative welfare 
function gives a good calibration for the welfare functions.  
This is the democracy in impartial preferences of moral agents (a slightly different 
approach was proposed in Moreno-Ternero & Roemer, 2005). It turns a collection of 
subjective estimates into an objective, impartial solution.  
In reality, this optimal impartial distribution of goods will be very difficult to 
determine, because each one of all the moral agents have to imagine being each one of 
all the current and future living sentient beings, experiencing each momentaneous 
well-being. It is like using the standard model of elementary particle physics to solve 
problems with many particles (e.g. to study the efficiency of a combustion engine). How 
do physicists deal with the complexity? Two considerations can make the principle 
easier to apply in daily life situations.  
First, we can restrict the set of moral agent and sentient beings: in a lot of daily life 
situations, only a limited number of sentient beings are measurably (relevantly) affected 
 
                                                     
44
 There are three subtleties. 1) Do all moral agents (who exist and will exist here and everywhere) have a 
vote, or do only those moral agents who are able to influence the distribution of the respective goods have a 
vote? Ideally, I would say all moral agents should have an equal vote, but this is impossible in practice, so I go 
for the second option: only those moral agents who exist at the time of decision making and who can 
influence the decision, count. 2) What if the preferences (e.g. the level of risk aversion) of a moral agent 
changes over time? Either we take the average of the preferences of the moral agent over his/her life, or only 
the preferences at the moment of decision making. I would leave this choice up to the moral agents 
themselves. Most importantly, we have to be aware that the moral agents do not have cognitive biases at the 
moment of decision making. Effects of e.g. framing and priming or the influence of e.g. smells (triggering 
disgust) should be avoided. Experimental moral psychology can help us to determine all influences that 
generate such biases. 3) What if all except one of the moral agents do not feel an emotional problem with the 
resulting average distribution? Imagine that you would feel very unhappy when no-one except you has risk 
aversion behind the veil, i.e. when everyone chooses sum-utilitarianism whereas you really would want that 
we give some priority to the worst-off. For you, prioritarianism is very important. So imagine, that your well-
being in a chosen sum-utilitarian ethic will be much lower than everyone’s well-being in a chosen prioritarian 
ethic. If everyone has one vote, the result is close to a sum-utilitarian ethic, which has lower well-being due to 
your unhappiness. This loss of well-being should be taken into account, so a weighted democratic voting 
might be required. This is comparable to situations in physics, where a gravitational field created by heavy 
objects influences the path of another object, but the presence of the mass of this other object itself also 
influences the gravitational field to which it is subjected. This results in complex, non-linear interactions and 
effects. The (physical/moral) force (the gravitational field/the welfare function) is influenced by the objects 
(the masses/the decisions of moral agents). 
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by the policy of only a limited number of moral agents. These moral agents can hence 
apply the democratic approach, limiting the thought experiment of the veil of 
ignorance to only those sentient beings who are measurably affected. This is similar to 
what physicists do when they study interactions between a few number of particles (or 
a few number of planets and stars), assuming interactions with a background field of 
particles far away are negligible.  
Second, if we know that moral agents do not have strongly divergent risk attitudes 
(that they can easily find a consensus on the issue of priority for the worst-off), and if 
the lifetime well-being estimates according to those moral agents are not so divergent 
when considering important, extreme cases (e.g. cases of extreme poverty or factory 
farms), we can easily derive rules of thumb to quickly decide the best estimate for the 
optimal distribution gopt. Compare it with thermodynamics in physics: when a lot of 
particles interact, physicists use approximations (rules of thumb) to study e.g. the 
efficiency of combustion engines (I used the same analogy between branches of physics 
and approaches to ethics in section 3.5). These approximated rules are e.g. the laws of 
thermodynamics and fluid mechanics. In the end, they can be derived from the standard 
model of elementary particles, using a lot of statistical mechanics. But as engineers do 
not use the standard model of elementary particles to study combustion engines, 
ethicists and politicians do not have to use the complex welfare function all the time. 
They can derive equations or laws that are easier to apply in those daily life situations. 
And these new, derived moral rules can look completely different than the underlying 
QMM prioritarian principle, just as the laws of thermodynamics look completely 
different than the standard model in particle physics.  
Of course, even when there was only one moral agent, s/he should appeal to 
approximate, derived moral rules, because it will be practically impossible to estimate 
past and predict future levels of lifetime well-being and to calculate the welfare 
function over a vast period of time. Science is necessary to tell whether the derived 
moral rules match the target principle of QMM prioritarianism.  
4.7 Summary 
In this section, I derived the quasi-maximin prioritarian principle as a model for 
consequentialist theories of justice. Along the road, we encountered multiple problems: 
how to define well-being, how to integrate well-being over a lifespan (when persons 
change), how to compare well-being between persons, how to distribute well-being 
between persons, how to deal with variable populations (e.g. future generations) and 
how to deal with uncertain outcomes (lotteries).  
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Quasi-maximin is a theory close to maximin, but with a small tendency towards sum-
utilitarianism. The ‘quasi’ in QMM-theory is derived in two different ways: first from 
impartiality (the veil of ignorance) with a high but not maximal risk aversion (a high 
preference for security), and second from empathy (the equality principle) with a small 
but not zero preference for efficiency. QMM is a special form of prioritarianism that is 
compatible with the moral virtue of empathy and the moral intuitions of impartiality 
and efficiency.  
Some implications of QMM-prioritarianism were discussed, and an elegant 
mathematical expression of the welfare function W(h) of a world history h was derived 
using the veil of ignorance (with risk aversion for gains, risk neutrality for losses, and 
loss aversion), and using moral intuitions in population ethics.  Quasi-maximin 
prioritarianism says that we have to choose the situation or world history which has the 
highest value of the welfare function.  
Note that quasi-maximin, although a rational theory, already incorporates some 
moral intuitions in some subtle ways. In particular the level of risk aversion and the 
need for efficiency cannot be derived from purely rational reasoning. These non trivial 
(not zero or one) values for risk aversion and need for efficiency result into a 
prioritarian theory that best fits those intuitions (better than the extreme theories of 
sum-utilitarianism and maximin).  
However, there are a lot of other intuitive judgments that are in conflict with and 
cannot be derived from the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. In the next sections, we will 
encounter some other moral intuitions that might overrule the QMM-principle. These 
moral intuitions are important in the ethics of care and the ethics of rights (Kantian 
deontological ethics). 
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Chapter 5 Partiality and tolerated choice 
equality 
The consequentialist theory of prioritarian justice can be very demanding. Real 
impartiality might imply that we need to sacrifice many of our resources and much of 
our well-being in order to advance the worst-off individuals. Two replies can be given to 
this ‘demandingness objection’. First, we should require that governmental institutions 
and political laws are really impartial. Second, we note that for a moral agent some 
partiality can be tolerated under some conditions. Especially social or empathic beings 
have difficulties being perfectly impartial. We often have difficulties being impartial, 
because we have strong emotions towards our relatives, friends or co-living animals. 
This partiality might conflict with consequentialist theories like QMM-theory. Partiality 
can also be important for some moral patients. Imagine children growing up in a family 
of perfectly impartial parents. This will raise concerns about their emotional 
development and well-being.  
According to an ethics of care (Noddings, 2002) we do not always have a duty to take 
the impartial point of view, because that would not respect interpersonal relationships. 
We have stronger empathy with people that we know well, and stronger personal 
involvement when we have a closer contact with someone. These emotions (of 
friendships) influence our decision making, which is not necessarily immoral.  
To make the theory of justice less demanding, we can allow for some partiality. 
Partiality can trump the impartial theory of justice described in the previous section, 
under two conditions: 1) the violation of impartiality should not be too strong, and 2) 
the level of partiality should be universalized according to the Kantian categorical 
imperative: we should want to live in a world where everyone behaves with similar 
levels of partiality. These two conditions are related: if the level of partiality is too high, 
if the QMM-theory is too much violated, we would not want to live in a world where 
such levels of partiality are universalized. So partiality can weakly overrule the QMM-
principle, and the principle of universalization (of section 1.2) is crucial. Partiality is 
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allowed to some degree as long as we are willing to respect similar levels of partiality of 
everyone else. 
5.1 Tolerated choice equality  
The inclusion of a tolerated partiality in ethics generates an equality principle which is 
different from the prioritarian equality principle of the previous section. For reasons to 
be discussed, I will call it ‘tolerated choice equality’.  
Consider an example of the burning house dilemma. In animal rights discussions 
people sometimes give such a dilemma, whereby we have to choose between rescuing 
our child or a dog from a burning house (Gary Francione (2000) also referred to this 
dilemma in his book “Your child or the dog”). Of course the meat eater expects that also 
animal rights activists would save their own child, so they point at this kind of partiality 
to justify speciesism. The argument can easily be countered by changing the dilemma a 
bit: choose between your child and a child with another skin color. Of course, people are 
not necessarily racist when they prefer to save their own child. I will explain why not.  
There is indeed an emotional inequality between children. But suppose you were at 
the burning house, and you chose to save the other child instead of mine. If I’d tell you 
that my child has a higher moral status and a stronger right to live, due to its skin color, 
I would be a racist. But if I tolerate your choice to save the other child instead of my 
child, I would not be racist. The reason is that I consider you and me to be morally equal, 
and the children in the house inherit this kind of equality. I tolerate your partiality, and 
therefore the children have inherited a tolerated choice equality which is not in 
contradiction with the emotional inequality that I feel. This new principle of equality 
can be formulated as follows: 
The tolerated partiality principle. You are allowed to be partial as long as you 
tolerate similar levels of partiality for everyone else, and if the partiality is not 
based on false beliefs or prejudices. 
More specifically: when helping others, you are allowed to give (to some level) 
priority to those with whom you feel a personal or emotional concern or 
involvement, on the condition that you should tolerate the choice of other 
caregivers to give priority to whom they prefer (their loved ones). So you should 
tolerate the choice of other helpers.  
Tolerated choice equality. If 1) you want to help a person X (for whom you feel an 
emotional concern) and another helper wants to help person Y, if 2) you consider 
the other helper as being equal to you, and if 3) you tolerate the choice of the 
other helper to help Y, then persons X and Y inherit a tolerated choice equality.  
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5.2 To whom applies the tolerated choice equality? 
In this section I try to answer the question who we need to take into account for this 
new principle of equality? When we look at consequantialist principles such as QMM-
prioritarianism, it was self-evident that all sentient beings should be taken into account, 
because well-being is what matters from behind a veil of ignorance.  
Suppose in the burning house dilemma I had to choose between saving a child, a dog 
or a car. In principle, as with the veil of ignorance, all entities in the universe should be 
taken into account, including cars. But if I saved the car, it could not be tolerated, 
because the QMM-principle will be violated far too much. Therefore, the tolerated 
choice principle should only be applicable to sentient beings. It ‘inherits’ this criterion 
of sentience from the QMM-principle, and in the QMM-principle it was derived from the 
veil of ignorance. Cars are not sentient, so we cannot influence their well-being, no 
matter what we do. Another reason why the tolerated choice principle is applicable to 
all and only to sentient beings is that the principle stems from feelings of personal 
connection and empathy with others. Of course feeling empathy only makes sense 
towards sentient beings. We cannot feel empathy with a car. 
It is important that this partial aid or care is motivated by feelings of empathy and 
concern. Tolerated choice equality therefore meets some criticism by proponents of an 
ethics of care, who claim that impartiality is too ‘cold’.  
Going back to the dilemma between saving a child or a dog, a true antispeciesist 
should have to tolerate the choice of someone who saves the dog. Note that a lot of 
people give more food and medicines to their pet dog than to starving children, but 
those choices are already tolerated to some degree. According to the QMM-principle, we 
would have to calculate the well-being of all individuals involved; whereby we have to 
take into account the life expectancies and potential levels of well-being (some sentient 
beings have a richer and more complex emotional life than others). So it might be 
argued (from behind the veil of ignorance) that saving a mentally healthy human child 
would better correspond with the QMM-principle than saving a dog. Nevertheless, the 
principle of tolerated choice says that some slight violations of the QMM-principle 
should be tolerated. Otherwise we end up with a too demanding impartial view that is in 
contradiction with some of our strongest moral intuitions. You might save a mentally 
disabled child instead of a mentally healthy child, even if the disabled child will have an 
opportunity for well-being as high as a dog, i.e. lower than the healthy child.  
Let’s give another dilemma to clarify some points. A trolley is moving at great speed. 
On the main track you see someone you hold dear (e.g. your child or your partner). You 
are standing next to a switch. You can turn the switch to save that beloved person, but 
on the side track there is another person whom you do not know. You have the choice 
between doing and allowing harm. If you do nothing, you allow your beloved person to 
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be harmed. If you turn the switch, your action causes harm to someone. According to 
our theory, there is no morally relevant distinction between doing versus allowing harm 
in this set-up. You are allowed to turn the switch to save that beloved person.  
What if on the side track there are two persons? Are you allowed to be partial to such 
a degree that you cause more harm by your action? If you turn the switch, I can 
understand your choice, so I might tolerate it a little bit. But only a little bit, because 
your action definitely violates the QMM-principle. My intuition says that we should not 
cause more harm by saving someone we hold dear. But there is another subtle slightly 
similar situation: imagine there are three tracks. If you do nothing, the trolley will take 
the main track and kill five unknown people. You can turn the switch, so the trolley 
takes the second track and will kill someone you hold dear. The third alternative is 
turning the switch further, sending the trolley to the third track where it will kill two 
unknown people. In this case, you are allowed to turn the switch to save the five people 
on the main track. But my intuition says that you are allowed to send the trolley to the 
third track. I.e. you do not have to choose the second option that saves most lives and 
best respects the QMM-principle.   
In section 6.1 I will elaborate more on these kinds of dilemmas. I will put forward 
another principle that backs up the above intuition that we are allowed to send the 
trolley to the third instead of the second track, killing two people instead of one. And I 
will demonstrate that there are situations where we are not only allowed to tolerate the 
partial choice of a helper, but that we should tolerate it in order to respect the helper. 
What is relevant in this distinction between doing and allowing is the intention. 
Suppose on the main track there are five people whom you don’t know, and on the side 
track there is one person whom you really hate. You always wanted to kill that person, 
so now you see your chance to do so by turning the switch. The trolley will take the side 
track and kill that hated person. The action itself is allowed because it is in agreement 
with the QMM-principle. But the intention is wrong. So you would not be punished for 
turning the switch, but you are a risk to society by having malicious intentions. We can’t 
trust you anymore to respect the QMM-theory in the future. Imprisonment might be 
necessary, not because of a punishment, but because of a protection. You have a duty to 
change your malicious intentions. 
I have given examples to indicate that some of our moral intuitions say that the 
tolerated partiality principle weakly overrules the QMM-theory of prioritarian equality. 
This adaptation of the theory is not inconsistent, it is better in line with our intuitions, 
and therefore I consider it a better theory. In Chapter 6 we will encounter moral 
intuitions that generate a principle that more strongly overrules the QMM-theory as 
well as the tolerated partiality principle. Before we move to that section, I briefly 
discuss a possible unification of tolerated choice equality and equality of opportunity. 
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5.3 Tolerated choice equality and equality of opportunity 
The principle of equality of opportunity (Arneson, 2008) says that all people who are 
equally qualified should have equal prospects for benefiting positions such as jobs. Jobs 
should go to the most qualified (e.g. most talented and motivated) persons and not to 
persons for arbitrary, irrelevant reasons such as sex or race.  
Tolerated choice equality says that we are allowed to be partial to some degree. If a 
heterosexual man prefers to marry a woman instead of a man, one might say that this 
heterosexual man violates the equality of opportunity between women and 
(homosexual) men. So the heterosexual man is partial towards women, and we tolerate 
such partiality. The heterosexual man is not sexist if he tolerates the choice of 
homosexual men to marry homosexual men. If he says that no man is allowed to marry 
a homosexual man, then it would be sexist.  
Now consider a white employer who chooses a white job applicant instead of a black 
person. This choice might violate equality of opportunity, and it might be a racist kind 
of discrimination. Is the employer willing to tolerate similar degrees of partiality of 
everyone else? The employer might say that s/he would tolerate the choice of another 
employer to hire a black person. But this does not yet guarantee tolerated choice 
equality, because in a competitive market the employer might look at other employers 
as competitors, and hence as being unequal in some sense (see the condition in the 
above formulated principle of tolerated choice equality: you should consider the other 
helper as being equal to you). The employer might have prejudices towards black 
people, thinking that black people are not good workers. So the employer might be glad 
to know that other employers hire such bad workers. 
The above implies that in competitive environments, tolerated choice equality 
cannot always be derived: if employers are competitive, an employer cannot justify a 
partial choice (a partiality towards some job applicants) by tolerating the choices of the 
other employers. For the heterosexual man, there was no competition with homosexual 
men, so tolerating the choices of those homosexual men generates tolerated choice 
equality between men and women. The same goes for a man who is more sexually 
attracted to white women than to black women. He prefers to marry a white woman, 
but if he tolerates the choices of other white men to marry black women, especially if he 
considers those other white men as his equal (for example if his brother wants to marry 
a black woman), he would not be racist.      
It is allowed to violate equality of opportunity; as long as there is a tolerated 
partiality (tolerated choice equality). We can further explore the difference between a 
racist employer who prefers to hire a white job applicant, and a non-racist man who 
prefers to marry a white woman. The motivation becomes important: what drives the 
employer to prefer white people? If the employer is afraid of black people, s/he is not 
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necessarily racist. But if s/he has prejudices towards black people, it becomes 
discrimination. The employer can overcome those prejudices. The man who prefers 
white women can also overcome his preference for white women. But this preference is 
much more difficult to overcome than the prejudices. Changing opinions is easier than 
changing taste preferences. The tolerated partiality principle refers to personal or 
emotional concerns, and such concerns are not easy to overcome.  
The above can be summarized in the following combination of tolerated choice 
equality and equality of opportunity. 
Tolerated choice equality of opportunity. Suppose persons A and B offer two 
similar positions1 and persons X and Y compete for the position offered by A. A 
prefers to give the position to X. Then A respects the tolerated choice equality of 
opportunity if the following conditions are satisfied: 1) A considers B as being 
equal (excluding competition between A and B), 2) A would tolerate the choice of 
B to give B’s position to Y, and 3) A’s preference for X is not based on false beliefs 
(prejudices) but on taste preferences that are not easy to overcome. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                     
1
 Here, the offered positions can be interpreted as jobs, permissions to marry someone,… 
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Chapter 6 Basic right equality1 
6.1 Moral dilemmas and strong moral intuitions 
In a previous chapter (3.3) we encountered some trolley dilemmas. Those dilemmas 
were an interesting tool to demonstrate the importance of deontological judgments. In 
the first dilemma, referred to as the switch dilemma, a trolley is going to kill five people 
on the main track. However, you can hit a switch so that the trolley takes a side track, to 
save those five people. Unfortunately, on this side track there is one person. The 
structure of the dilemma is: doing nothing results in the death of five people, acting 
(pulling the switch) results in the death of one person. Our theory of prioritarian justice 
states that one person dead is better than five people dead, so we should turn the 
switch.  
However, in another dilemma, referred to as the bridge dilemma (similar to situation 
C in the previous chapter 3.3), again a trolley is about to hit five people. You can push a 
heavy man from a bridge in front of the trolley in order to block the trolley. The heavy 
person will die, but the five people on the track will be saved. A lot of people have the 
intuition that pushing the heavy man is not allowed (Hauser et al., 2008). 
In a third dilemma, called the hospital dilemma, five patients in the hospital need 
new organs in order to survive. However, no organs are available anymore. Is it allowed 
to kill a visitor (against his will) and use his kidneys, liver, heart and spleen for 
transplantation to save the five people? Here as well, most people are deontologists: 
they are very reluctant to allow such actions, even if they could save more lives. 
What are the distinctions between those dilemmas’s that can explain the different 
judgments? As Greene (2001; 2004) pointed out, there is a difference between up-close-
and-personal situations (pushing the heavy man), and more distanced/detached 
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 Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.6 are based on Can Deontological Principles be Unified? Reflections on the Mere Means 
Principle, submitted to Philosophical Studies 
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situations (pulling a switch). This results in an emotional inequality that we can tolerate 
(see previous section about the tolerated choice principle). But there is more. What if we 
did not have to push the heavy man, but simply push a button that will topple the heavy 
man from the bridge? My intuition says that even then, action is not permitted. 
6.1.1 A first approach: uncertainty aversion 
Let us look at this bridge trolley dilemma from behind the veil of ignorance. Suppose 
you don’t know who you will be: you can be any of the six persons involved (the heavy 
man on the bridge and the five people on the main track). You can now decide between 
two possible worlds. In the first, the heavy man will not be pushed, in the second he 
will. Which world would you prefer? If you are really sure that the plan to block the 
trolley by the heavy man will work, you would rationally speaking rather be in the 
second world, because your chances of survival are five times higher. Only if you were 
the heavy man, you would die. In the first world, you would die if you are one of the five 
people on the track. But now suppose, as in real life situations, you are actually not sure 
that the plan of blocking the trolley will work. Perhaps the trolley is too fast and the 
heavy man not heavy enough to stop it? Then one or more people on the track would 
die as well.  
We already mentioned that from behind the veil of ignorance, we might have risk 
aversion that results in a quasi-maximin strategy. But risk aversion implies that we 
know the probabilities of survival. In this case however, we don’t even know the 
probability of the plan to work. We don’t know the chance on survival. It is a situation, 
not of risk, but of uncertainty (or ambiguity).  
In order to understand the effects of uncertainty, let’s consider the example of the 
Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). An urn contains 60 balls. You know that there are six 
different colors of balls, and that there are ten green balls. That’s the only information 
you have. You can now choose between two games of chance. In the first game you win 
when you draw a green ball. In the second game you win if you draw a blue ball. People 
who have strong uncertainty aversion prefer the first game, because then they at least 
know their probability to win (1/6). In the second game, they only know that their 
probability is somewhere between 0 (if there are no blue balls) and 5/6 (if there are only 
green and blue balls). So people can not only have risk aversion; they can have 
uncertainty aversion as well.  
Looking back at the trolley dilemma, we also have a choice between two games of 
chance. In the first game (the world where the heavy man is not pushed), you have a 
probability to survive (to win) equal to 1/6. In the second game, you don’t know your 
probability of winning. You have uncertainty about probabilities, and if you have an 
aversion for such uncertainties, you’d prefer the first game.  
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We see that the veil of ignorance already comes pretty close to a lot of our moral 
intuitions. First, it values impartiality and well-being, as in a consequentialist theory. 
Second, having a high but not maximum risk aversion, we arrive at a prioritarian 
justice, which is coherent with our empathy and small but not zero need for efficiency. 
Third, having uncertainty aversion, we arrive at moral judgments that correspond with 
some deontological moral intuitions. In a later chapter on the predation problem (see 
Part III), we encounter another implication of uncertainty aversion from behind the veil 
of ignorance, which might be able to explain our tolerance towards predation. 
We might ask ourselves the question how much risk aversion and uncertainty 
aversion we should (or are allowed to) have. The veil of ignorance does not provide an 
answer. But we could introduce a second veil. Behind the first veil, you are a moral 
agent who does not know which being in the real world s/he will be. Behind the second 
veil, you do not know what kind of moral agent sitting behind the first veil you will be. 
So imagine that you are behind a second veil: you know that you will soon be a rational 
(moral) being that is about to perform a thought experiment of the veil of ignorance. 
But at this moment you don’t know how much risk and uncertainty aversion you will 
have. You do know that most rational beings (moral agents) have some risk and 
uncertainty aversions (because based on psychological studies, most humans have these 
aversions). So likely you will also get a high level of risk and uncertainty aversion when 
you are behind the first veil. 
From behind this first veil of ignorance, having uncertainty aversion, you might 
prefer a situation where the QMM-principle might be violated if the alternative would 
be a situation of uncertainty. But not all has been said yet. Our moral intuitions say that 
we are not allowed to push the heavy man or sacrifice a visitor in the hospital for 
transplantation, even if we can be very sure that the plan of saving five other people 
(the people on the track or the patients in the hospital) will work. So let’s look for a 
universalized ethical principle that clearly expresses these moral intuitions. I will first 
criticize some tentative accounts encountered in the literature. 
6.1.2 Tentative ethical principles 
In a previous chapter we encountered some possible explanations for the differences in 
moral judgments in the trolley dilemmas. Some people (Boorse, 1984; Harris, 2000; 
Postow, 1989; Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007) proposed that there is a morally relevant 
distinction between sending a trolley to the victim (which is done in the switch 
dilemma) and sending a victim to the trolley (which is done in the bridge dilemma by 
pushing the heavy man). But we demonstrated that this was a moral illusion.  
Also in relation to the hospital dilemma, people make a distinction between death by an 
existing threat (e.g. an organ disease) and introducing a new threat (killing a visitor 
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with a knife). But such differences appear to be artificial constructions. Consider the 
following dilemma. Five persons are on a moving platform on the rails. If you do 
nothing, the trolley will crush the platform and kill those people. But you can move the 
platform away from the rails in order to save the five. But this move will push another 
person (who is next to the platform) to an electric cable. This one person will 
consequently die by electrocution. I believe that action is allowed. But here we see that 
first a new threat is introduced (the electric cable), and second the victim is pushed 
towards this threat (the cable is not moved towards the victim).  
Some people (e.g. Kamm, 1989) say that there are morally relevant differences 
between the causal chains in the switch and the bridge dilemmas. In the bridge, the 
action first results into threatening and harming the heavy man, and after that the five 
people are saved. In the switch dilemma, the action simultaneously saves the five on the 
main track and threatens the one on the side track. The harm done to the one person on 
the side track occurs later in the causal chain, compared to the harm done to the heavy 
man. So the structure of the causal chains is different. The problem with this approach 
is that we can invent dilemmas such as situation B encountered in a previous chapter 
(3.3), where it becomes complicated to see what the morally relevant aspects of the 
causal chain are. And neither does it seem really relevant when harm is done in a causal 
chain. A ‘causal myopia’ might also be a moral illusion just like we demonstrated that an 
intervention myopia was an illusion. 
Some people (Reibetanz, 1998; McIntyre, 2001; Fischer & Ravizza, 1992; Shaw, 2006) 
refer to intentions and the Doctrine of Double Effect to justify the differences between 
the switch and the bridge dilemmas. The doctrine says that there is a moral difference 
between the intentional harm as a means versus the foreseen harm as side-effect 
(Quinn, 1989b). One critique is that this doctrine refers to the moral difference between 
an intentional harm as a means and a foreseen harm as a side-effect. However, the 
interpretation of this difference becomes very difficult in e.g. the loop trolley dilemma 
(discussed in section 3.3). So the interpretation of this doctrine, and its application to 
trolley dilemmas, is not clear. In the appendix, this point is discussed a bit further. A 
second critique is that actions can be permissible even when agents have bad intentions. 
For example when person A hates person B who is on the side track, and person A turns 
a switch that sends a runaway trolley to person B in order to kill him, this act is 
permissible if turning the switch implies saving the people on the main track. Person A’s 
intentions and moral character are bad, but my intuition says that the act is good.2 
 
                                                     
2
 This intuition is consistent with the universalization criterion that focuses on rules instead of acts (“You may 
follow the rule that everyone may follow in similar situations.”). The criterion says you may do an action if 
you can find a rule that justifies the action, if the rule is compatible with the ethical system and if you can 
want to see this rule universalized. Suppose I kill a person on the side track. I am allowed to do this action if I 
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All the above tentative explanations and principles could be applied to animal ethics, 
even if they are moral illusions. But I prefer a clear criterion that distinguishes between 
the dilemmas, a criterion that can be translated in something morally relevant, such as 
a right. If we could refer to such a right, then we might arrive at a new principle of 
equality, where everyone has an equal claim to this right. The right not to be killed will 
not do, as in both trolley dilemmas an innocent person will be killed when the agent 
acts (when he pulls the switch or pushes the heavy man). As we have seen in a previous 
chapter, another special right is able do the job. 
6.2 The basic right and the mere means principle 
The right that solves the problem of the difference between the switch and the bridge 
dilemmas is the deontological or basic right not to be used as merely a means to 
someone else’s ends. We can see that the heavy man will be used as a trolley blocker 
(human shield), and that the visitor in the hospital will be used as an organ donor. But 
the person on the side track will not be used as merely a means to save the others. One 
does not need that person in order to pull the switch and save the five.  
This basic right does not follow from the veil of ignorance, although it can be 
compatible with it in situations of uncertainty mentioned above. Neither does the basic 
right follow from a feeling of empathy. The basic right has different origins, and is 
highly coherent with many moral concepts and moral intuitions. 
1) The basic right stems from a feeling underlying respect, which is considered a 
moral virtue to be developed. Treating someone as merely a means is not respectful. 
2) The basic right is related to the notion of intrinsic value, which is to be 
distinguished from instrumental value. We give something intrinsic value when that 
thing is important (valuable) beyond its use value.  
3) The basic right is related to the notion of dignity and resembles a version of the 
Kantian categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
can find a justifying universalized rule. A rule that will not work, is: “Turn switches in order to kill people you 
hate.” If I only have such a rule, I am not allowed to act. But I can find another rule, such as “Turn switches in 
order to satisfy the prioritarian theory, as long as no other principles of the ethical system are violated.” I can 
do the same act (turning the switch) by following this rule. This universalized rule can justify turning the 
switch, even if in reality I happen to have a bad intention. In other words: a (bad) intention is not important in 
judgments of permissibility of an action if there is a justifying rule for that action that does not refer to the 
(bad) intention.  
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your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but 
always at the same time as an end.” (Kant, 1785) According to Kant, humans have 
dignity. But as I am going to demonstrate, there are good reasons why not only humans 
but also other sentient beings have dignity and should get a basic right.   
4) The principle of the basic right is a universalized ethical principle that is 
consistent with our moral intuitions in a lot of moral dilemmas. I will list ten of them.  
a) The trolley dilemma: we are not allowed to push a heavy man from a bridge, 
to fall in front of a runaway trolley, in order to block the trolley that is about to kill 
five people on its track. We should not use a person as human shield (Thomson, 
1985). 
b) Organ transplantation: we are not allowed to sacrifice a person against his 
will, using his organs in order to save five patients in the hospital who will die 
without new organs.  
c) Human cannibalism: survivors in a lifeboat should not sacrifice and eat 
another person in order for them to stay alive. We should not use a person as food. 
d) Involuntary experimentation: we are not allowed to perform experiments on 
a person in order to find a therapy that will save many people. We should not use a 
person as laboratory equipment. 
e) Terror bombing: we are not allowed to kill a few innocent civilians in order to 
demoralize the enemy, win the war and save more lives. 
f) Torture interrogation: we are not allowed to torture a person in order to gain 
information about a bomb that will kill many people (especially when the person 
is an innocent eyewitness who discovered the location of the bomb but is 
threatened by terrorists not to reveal the location, or when the person is the 
innocent child of the terrorist and the terrorist will only reveal the location when 
his child is tortured). 
g) Blackmail murder: we are not allowed to kill an important person if a 
terrorist threatens to kill five hostages instead. We should not use a person as 
ransom.3  
h) Nude photography: we are not allowed to take and sell nude pictures of a 
person against his/her will in order to satisfy thousands of porn consumers. 
i) Gang rape: a woman should not be forced to have sex with frustrated men. We 
should not use someone as sex toy, even when the increase in total well-being of 
the rapists would more than compensate for the loss of well-being of the victim. 
 
                                                     
3
 This example is similar to the thought experiment proposed by Williams (Smart & Williams, 1973, p.97-100): 
should Jim kill one Indian if refusing to kill this Indian implies that armed men will kill twenty Indians 
instead?  
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j) Human zoos: we should not lock up a strange looking person in a circus or zoo 
for the entertainment of many other people. 
k) Scapegoat: we should not prosecute an innocent individual, even if such a 
prosecution would stop a riot that will kill many people.4 
l) The sadistic conclusion: we should not allow the birth of someone who will 
have a life not worth living, even if the (weighted) average well-being were 
negative (i.e. even if the welfare function would increase by introducing a life that 
is not worth living, see section 4.6.6.4). 
Many more situations can be given, such as trafficking (buying and selling humans), 
slavery or gladiator fights. All these practices have something special in common: a 
person is used as a means (as a human shield, trolley blocker, experimental object, 
deterrent, information source, ransom, sex object, toy, painting, scapegoat,…) against 
his or her will. Many people have the intuition that the above practices are 
impermissible, even if the overall consequences in terms of lives and well-being would 
be better. The more examples we can give of situations where an action is not allowed 
when the victim is used as merely a means, the less likely it is that our intuitive moral 
judgment of impermissibility is a moral illusion. The coherence between those 
dilemmas gives credibility to our moral intuitions and our corresponding universalized 
ethical principle. 
5) The basic right is also related to a restricted kind of propertarian libertarianism. 
This kind of libertarianism is based on bodily autonomy, as a special property right over 
one’s own body. In contrast with most libertarian theories, this restricted version allows 
some space for distributive justice and avoids the conclusion that taxation is 
comparable to slavery. This will be discussed in the next section (6.3). 
6) The basic right is a formulation of the mere means principle. It can be interpreted 
as a specification of the doctrine of double effect (McIntyre, 2011). This doctrine of 
double effect (DDE) refers to an action that has a good and a bad effect. One of its crucial 
conditions states that such a double effect action is not allowed if the bad effect is 
intended as a means to the good effect (or if it is intended as an end in itself). The 
problem with the DDE is that in some moral dilemmas it is not always clear what it 
means to intend (rather than foresee) a harm as a means to an end. The basic right 
(mere means) principle avoids the intention-foreseeing distinction and instead specifies 
the means-end distinction. As we will see, this is done by a more algorithmic procedure: 
 
                                                     
4
 This example is similar to the dilemma of ‘framing the innocent man’ (McCloskey, 1965): a race riot (angry 
white people retaliating and killing black people) can be stopped by quickly arresting an innocent black 
person, bearing false witness and punishing him in order to quiet down the situation. 
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the counterfactual question whether the end could be achieved if the victim was not 
present. 
7) As I will discuss below (section 6.6), we can extend the mere means principle in a 
way that it is not only immoral to use but also to consider someone as merely a means. 
This extension can explain other deontological intuitions such as the difference 
between doing versus allowing (Howard-Snyder, 2011), the permissibility of partiality in 
imperfect duties of beneficence (Beauchamp & Childress, 2011), and the asymmetry of 
procreational duties (Narveson, 1967; Mulgan, 2006, McMahan, 2009). It is as if this 
extended mere means principle unifies a lot of deontological principles and intuitions. 
 
In section 3.4, I already demonstrated that the deontological basic right is not 
necessarily a moral illusion. If we now look at the above points, we see a strong 
coherence of the basic right principle with moral virtues (respect), moral intuitions (in 
at least ten different dilemmas, as well as in situations of imperfect duties and 
procreational duties), moral concepts (intrinsic value, bodily autonomy, libertarian 
property) and deontological principles (double effect, doing versus allowing). This 
strong coherence indicates that the intuitions underlying the basic right principle are 
not moral illusions. The basic right principle is not arbitrary, artificial or farfetched. The 
principle can be clarified, as I will do in the next section, so we avoid fuzziness as well. 
And looking at the totally different situations where it applies (the abovementioned ten 
dilemmas), we see that it is not really context dependent. Another argument to see why 
it is not context dependent is that the basic right is something that individuals always 
have, independent from the situation. (Compare it with the fact that in the Müller-Lyer 
illusion a length is something that line segments intrinsically have, independent from 
their environment). This is something different than the tentative solutions presented 
in the previous section (and chapter 3.3), such as the ‘protophysical’ explanations.   
Of course, the above is not solid proof, the basic right might still stem from moral 
illusions. Note that not everyone has the intuitions underlying this basic right. But these 
intuitions seem to be culturally independent. It has more to do with different brain 
(mal)functionings (Greene et al., 2001). Most people (most moral agents) have these 
intuitions, and they are likely inborn. People who lack those intuitions might still be 
able to derive a consistent ethic, which will more resemble a 
utilitarian/consequentialist ethic. For those utilitarians, animal equality has to be 
applied as well (e.g. Singer, 1975). Here, however, I follow and respect those ‘basic right’-
intuitions that the majority of moral agents appear to have.   
 
Looking at the formulation of the basic right – use someone as merely a means for 
someone else’s ends – we have to answer three questions: 
1) What do we mean by use as ‘merely a means’?  
2) What do we mean with ‘ends’?  
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3) Who is the ‘someone’? I.e. who gets the basic right?  
The first question will be answered in the next section. Questions 2 and 3 are related 
and will be dealt with in the subsequent section (6.4). 
6.3 When is the basic right violated? 
The mere means principle finds its roots in Kant’s categorical imperative (Kant, 1785): 
never treat a person merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end. 
Yet, this landmark principle in deontological ethics lives on being (re)interpreted and 
discussed until today (for recent work, see e.g. Scanlon, 2008, ch. 3; Parfit, 2011, ch. 9; 
Kerstein, 2009). 
When do we use someone as merely a means? Slavery, human trafficking, rape, 
cannibalism, involuntary organ donations, involuntary human experiments and 
pushing a heavy man from the bridge in order to stop a trolley are all examples of basic 
right violations of humans. What have these situations in common? And how to 
distinguish these examples from actions that do not violate the basic right? E.g. using a 
baker to get some bread, using an employee, sending your children to school against 
their will, imprisoning a criminal or killing a person on a side track in order to save five 
people on the main track. These actions are not immoral, and therefore should not be 
classified as basic right violations. 
6.3.1 Two words, two conditions 
The ‘mere means’ principle that generates the basic right, contains two words. Hence, 
two conditions need to be satisfied. The first condition says that an agent (the user) 
forces (in the broadest sense) the victim to do or undergo something against the will or 
interests of the victim (for example the victim does not want the treatment). This is the 
‘mere’ part. The second condition says that the presence of the victim is required in 
order to reach an end of the user or someone else.5 This is the ‘means’ part.6 
 
                                                     
5
 If the victim undergoes something against his/her will for an end of the victim, s/he is not used as merely a 
means for someone else’s ends, and the mere means principle is not violated. For example keeping a scared 
patient in a hospital for his/her own sake is not impermissible. This is particularly true in wildlife rescue 
centers, where injured or ill animals are kept against their will in order to help them. Paternalism might 
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The first condition, the ‘mere’ part of the mere means principle, is something a 
(rule7) utilitarian or consequentialist can agree with: doing or undergoing something 
against your will generally lowers your well-being and can be considered as a harm. It is 
the second condition that gives the mere means principle its deontological flavor. 
Looking at the above examples, we see that the presence of the victim is required in 
order for the plan to work. If the innocent civilian was not present in the terror 
bombing situation, the enemy would not become demoralized. If the important person 
was not present in the blackmail situation, you could not kill him and use his death as a 
ransom to free the hostages. If the fat man was not on the bridge, you could not push 
him and use him as a shield to block the trolley. On the other hand, consider the switch 
trolley dilemma: most people claim that when a runaway trolley is about to kill five 
people on the main track, we are allowed to turn a switch in order to redirect the trolley 
onto a sidetrack, where the trolley will kill one person. Although killing this one person 
likely goes against her will, she is not used as a means, because her presence is not 
required in order to turn the switch and save the five people on the main track.    
The same goes for other situations where a victim “could not possibly consent” (to 
use Korsgaard’s expression (Korsgaard, 1996, p.138)). A rule utilitarian can agree with 
her: if the rule (the maxim) of our action precludes the possibility of the victim’s 
consent (the victim could not rationally will to be treated that way), we are not allowed 
to treat the victim that way. Korsgaard gives the examples of deception and coercion. A 
rule utilitarian might prefer to stick to the rule “do not lie”, because such a rule 
generally promotes well-being. But in contrast to Korsgaard’s view, I think the mere 
means principle is only violated when the liar wants the presence of the deceived 
person in order to reach someone else’s end.  
Another example is imprisonment: violating someone’s liberty without consent. 
Imprisoning a murderer does not violate his basic right, because the presence of the 
criminal was not necessary in order to reach the end (a safe society). On the contrary, 
his absence was preferred. Imprisoning him might be the best strategy to reach the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sometimes be immoral, but not in the wildlife rescue center, because it does not violate the mere means 
principle and it promotes well-being. 
6
 These two conditions come close to the two conditions in Bognar & Kerstein (2010 p.15). 1) “A person treats 
another person merely as a means if it is reasonable for her to believe that something she has done or is doing 
to the other person renders that person unable to consent to her treating him as a means to her aim.” 2) “A 
person treats another person as a means if she intentionally does something to the other’s body or mind in 
order to realize one of her ends and she intends the other’s body or mind to contribute to her end’s 
realization.” This condition refers to the required presence of the body. 
7
 A rule utilitarian looks for those rules that, when they would be consistently respected in all similar 
situations, would in general generate most well-being. A rule utilitarian prefers to stick to the rule even if in a 
particular situation a violation of the rule would promote well-being.  
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quasi-maximin principle, even if we deprive his liberty. But using this murderer for 
forced labor violates his basic right. 
The next two sections explain the two conditions in more detail. 
Condition 1: the agent’s behavior violates the interests of the victim.  
When the victim has a will, this condition says that the victim does not want the agent’s 
behavior8. For autonomous beings, this condition refers to autonomy and consent, but 
there is a whole spectrum of possible interpretations of autonomy. At the two extremes, 
there are stronger (narrower) and weaker (broader) interpretations of the ‘mere’ part in 
the mere means principle. 
What is consent?  
The strongest interpretation says that the victim is used as merely a means when s/he is 
not able to give rational, informed consent. I refer to Beauchamp and Childress (2001, 
ch.4) for a discussion on consent, but it is clear that according to this interpretation, the 
mere means principle is only applicable to rational beings: beings who are able to 
understand relevant information and give free consent. This is the traditional 
interpretation of Kant (1785), Korsgaard (1996) and many others. 
The weakest interpretation says that the victim has to do or undergo something that 
s/he does not want.9 In this interpretation, not wanting something means: having 
negative emotions about it (or having a negative attitude towards it). Positive and 
negative emotions indicate that a being has subjective preferences or interests. For 
example, when pain generates a loss of well-being, it indicates that the individual wants 
to avoid bodily injury. Fear indicates a need for safety, and similar needs or interests lie 
behind other emotions. The mere means principle now becomes applicable to all 
sentient beings, i.e. beings who have developed (and not yet permanently lost) the 
capacity to experience positive and negative feelings that indicate the satisfaction of 
preferences. The advantage of this weaker (broader) interpretation is that the mere 
means principle is also applicable to mentally disabled (a-rational) humans. This 
corresponds with the intuition of many people. 
 
                                                     
8
 Of course the agent’s behavior has to be related to the use of the victim. If I buy bread from my neighbor, I 
use my neighbor as a baker. If I annoy my neighbor when I put my music loud, I do not use my neighbor as 
merely a means, because the loud music is not related to buying bread. However, if my intention is to annoy 
my neighbor with loud music in order to coerce him to bake bread for me, it will become a use as merely a 
means. 
9
 We should understand this in a broad sense, which includes not wanting deception. A deceived victim might 
not actually experience negative emotions, but if this victim does not want to be deceived that way, it counts 
as a violation of consent. 
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In the next section on who gets the basic right, I discuss the possibility of an even 
weaker interpretation, leaving the notion of consent behind, and focusing exclusively 
on interests. This is a very broad interpretation, because now non-sentient beings with 
interests (e.g. living beings such as plants) can be victimized. 
Why consent?  
According to a consequentialist welfare ethic, consent is important and counts in the 
utility calculus. But the consequentialist does not see a difference between the consent 
of someone whose presence is required, versus the consent of someone else. So the 
difficult question becomes: Why is the consent of the person whose presence is required 
so much more important than the consent of the person whose presence is not 
required? The deontologist has difficulty answering this question. Of course, s/he can 
refer to the coherence of his/her moral intuitions in the situations given in a previous 
section. Alternatively, s/he can give a rationale such as: if presence becomes important, 
autonomy dictates that consent becomes especially important. But as the next example 
demonstrates: it is not the general (lack of) consent of the victim that is important. Only 
the consent about the presence of (the behavior of) the user has a special status.   
An example from economics: the poor baker  
The condition that the victim does not consent with the agent’s behavior is important. 
Consider a poor person who decides to work in a bakery. He hates getting up early in the 
morning to bake some bread, but his poverty gave him no choice except bake or die. If I 
buy his bread, I am using him: his body is necessary to make the bread. But although he 
hates baking bread, the poor baker does not have a negative attitude towards my 
behavior. In other words: my behavior did not cause his poverty. If my behavior was not 
present, the baker would still be poor. Therefore, I am not using him as merely a means. 
On the other hand, if I threaten or force someone to work in a bakery, it becomes 
slavery and I am causally responsible for his bad situation. The agent causes a violation 
of the rights of the victim, if the presence of the agent is a necessary condition of the 
harm.   
Timeframe of the agent’s behavior  
A tricky question concerns the boundaries of someone’s behavior. Consider a slave 
owner who claims that his slaves are better-off as slaves than they would be in the wild, 
because as indigenous people in the wild they would face predators, diseases, drought, 
hunger and other nasty things. The owner protects the slaves and gives them food. So it 
might be true that a slave would prefer a life as a slave over a life in the wild. Hence the 
slave prefers the total behavior of the owner over the complete absence of the owner, if 
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absence means a miserable life in the wild. According to a broad interpretation of the 
behavior, this slave is not used as merely a means.  
But based on my moral intuitions, I prefer a narrow interpretation that focuses at a 
particular behavior at a particular time. According to this interpretation, the slave is 
used as merely a means as soon as the owner does a particular thing that the slave does 
not want, for example whipping the slave (even if the slave prefers the total life of a 
slave with whipping over the alternative life in the wild). The same goes for the practice 
of breeding slaves: even if a slave would prefer the life of a slave over the absence of a 
life (the slave would not have been born if the owner did not breed slaves), it does not 
mean that the slave is not used as merely a means when s/he is whipped.  
The latter resembles a situation of livestock farming: what if the life of a cow raised 
in a humane livestock farm is better than no life at all and better than a life in the wild, 
but the cow is still slaughtered for meat? For the cow, the procedure of breeding, raising 
and slaughtering, considered as a whole, might be preferable to not being born at all or 
being born in the wild (and e.g. being eaten by a predator at an early age). But we should 
not look at the procedure as a whole: it is the act of slaughtering itself that violates the 
mere means principle. Slaughtering (for meat) is a single act that the cow does not want 
and where presence of the body of the cow is necessary. According to the non-
consequentialist (non-welfarist) mere means principle it is better that a cow is not born 
at all than that a cow with a life worth living is used as merely a means when she is 
slaughtered. This is the same logic as with the whipping of human slaves who have a life 
worth living. We do not have a duty to breed and raise happy cows (see the section on 
the asymmetry of procreational duties below), but once we cause the birth of a happy 
cow, we should not violate its basic right. We should not slaughter and eat the cow.10 
It might be the case that other moral agents have another intuition than I have, that 
they want to take a broad interpretation of the mere means principle, judging the 
morality of a use in terms of the total behavior instead of a particular behavior at a 
particular time. Those moral agents might conclude that some kinds of slavery and meat 
consumption are permissible: when the lives of the slaves and animals are worth living 
and when the alternative would be that those slaves and animals were not born. To deal 
with this difference in moral intuitions, a democratic decision procedure amongst all 
moral agents (everyone who is capable of understanding this moral problem) might be a 
way out.  
 
                                                     
10
 McMahan (2008) also discussed this issue of humane farming, arguing that we should not kill a happy cow, 
even if the life of the cow being raised and killed might be better than no life at all. This ‘Logic of the Larder’ 
(purchasing animal products is good because it can increase the number of animals whose lives are worth 
living) was also criticized by Matheny & Chan (2005). One of their claims is that animal farms prevent positive 
lives of wild animals. 
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Condition 2: the agent wants the presence of the victim’s body  
The second condition of the mere means principle can also refer to a mental state of the 
agent, namely what the agent wants. This subjective mental state is connected to an 
objective fact: the presence of the victim that is causally required for the end of the 
agent. This can be tested by a counterfactual thought experiment: does the agent’s plan 
still work if the victim was not present? If not, then the victim is used as a means.  
But what exactly should be present? What belongs to the victim that should be 
present? Looking at the situations presented above, we note something peculiar: it is 
the victim’s physical body that should be present. The body is used as a means, if, for 
example, the bodily integrity is violated (e.g. meat production, experiments, organ 
transplantation, bodily manipulation), if there is a sexual act with the body (e.g. rape, 
harassment), if the body is forced to do something (e.g. slavery), if the body is forced to 
be somewhere (e.g. in a cage), if the body is photographed or viewed (e.g. nude 
photography without consent, violations of bodily privacy) or if the body has an 
economic price (e.g. trafficking). 
What is the body?  
If the victim’s body plays a central role, we have to ask the question: what is the body? 
One rather artificial definition of a body is: the composition of all living cells with the 
same DNA that are connected to each other. The artificiality makes this definition less 
suitable in ethics. We can also ask the question what about artificial limbs or tools that 
extend the body? Those extensions are strictly speaking not part of the body because 
the person does not have an internal representation of those extensions. Having an 
internal representation might be a morally relevant condition for something to belong 
to the body of a person. From the early stages of development, a subject creates an 
internal representation of his/her body: s/he learns what is part of her body and what is 
not.  
However, there are different kinds of internal representations: I can say that this arm 
belongs to me, because I can autonomously move it, or because I can feel it. If I have 
sensations (if I can feel for example pressure, temperature and pain) in something, that 
thing belongs to my body. A body can be defined as those things of which someone has 
sensations or internal representations (think about the representations in the motor 
cortex and somatosensory cortex). 
If internal representations – and especially sensations – are important: what about 
paralyzed or anesthetized limbs? As the mere means principle is related to the notion of 
bodily autonomy, we can say that those limbs belong to someone’s body if that person 
still believes they belongs to his/her own body. In other words, we should respect what 
the individual believes is part of his/her own body. This belief can either be a conscious 
cognitive state, or can be the internal representation itself. 
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But there is more. What about your gut bacteria? Or internal parasites? Suppose you 
are infected with a (rather harmless) parasite. I want to cut you open in order to do 
important experiments on the parasite. Or I want to kill you to use your gut bacteria for 
some important purpose. Even if strictly speaking those bacteria and parasites do not 
belong to your body, I still violate your basic right, because I transgress a bodily 
boundary. We could say that, broadly understood, everything that can only be accessed 
by transgressing something that has sensations, belongs to someone’s body. You have 
sensations in your belly, so I cannot cut your belly open.  
Another way to look at the problem of the use of parasites and gut bacteria is the 
observation that those things would not be present if the victim’s body was not present. 
In other words, if I want to use your gut bacteria, the presence of your body (defined as 
those things of which you have sensations or internal representations) is required. And 
if you do not want to be treated (cut open) that way, the conditions of the mere means 
principle are met. I use your body indirectly without your permission, if I cut you open 
to reach your gut bacteria. 
The strange thing about the mere means principle is that it points to the importance 
of the body, but it is not (yet) able to clarify what exactly belongs to the body. Although 
more has to be said on this, I will not discuss it further here. Let me conclude by 
mentioning that a vague boundary of what belongs to someone’s body does not 
necessarily present a problem in the construction of a non-arbitrary consistent ethic, 
because the strength of the basic right (see section 6.5) might also have a gradation. We 
could couple this gradation with the gradation of how strongly something belongs to 
someone’s body. If a thing definitely belongs to someone’s body, the mere means 
principle would be strongly violated when that body part is used without consent. But if 
it doubtfully belongs to someone’s body, the violation of the mere means principle 
should not count so gravely.  
The reference to the body also leaves the mere means principle with another very 
basic question. 
Why the body?  
What is so important about someone’s body, to give it a privileged status? From a theory 
of property rights, we could say that the body is the only thing that a being owns 
completely. The body falls under the absolute competence of a person. The 
deontological mere means principle, with its focus on the body, corresponds with a 
restricted kind of propertarian libertarianism. In the libertarian theory of property 
rights, agents fully own themselves and can acquire property rights in external things 
(Vallentyne, 2012). Propertarian libertarianism states that private property is the sole 
source of legitimate authority. Its non-aggression principle is restricted to violations of 
private property. These property rights are non-negotiable (Nozick, 1974).  
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The mere means principle fits in a propertarian libertarianism, where people have a 
full property right over their own bodies. People have a full bodily autonomy. The mere 
means principle does not imply that external things are owned to the same degree as 
bodies are owned. Owning a body is much more important than owning an external 
object. 
In slavery and trafficking, the bodies of the victims are treated as someone else’s 
property in the legal or economic sense. They are merchandise. This property status is 
not respectful, because only the victims themselves possess their own bodies. The 
victims do not have to be aware of this property status. For example selling babies is 
immoral, even when the babies do not understand the notion of private property. 
According to animal rights activist Gary Francione (2000), we should also abolish the 
property status of animals. So we should not be allowed to buy and sell animals (e.g. 
buying a pet from a breeder), even if those animals (like babies or mentally disabled 
humans) cannot be aware of their property status. 
An example from economics: paying taxes versus forced labor  
According to Nozick’s libertarianism, raising taxes is in some way comparable to 
slavery: the state appropriates a part of the work and time of persons, without their 
consent (Nozick, 1974, ch.7). But if a libertarian restricts absolute property rights to only 
the body, taxation is no longer impermissible. Raising taxes is possible (even if the 
presence of the tax payer is necessary to raise the tax, and even if the tax payer did not 
give permission), because money is not completely owned by a person. Money is not a 
direct product of only the body of the worker.  
The worker not only uses his/her own body, but s/he also uses something external. A 
farmer’s manual labor belongs to the farmer. But the mere means principle allows for an 
assertion that the soil used by the farmer is not completely owned by the farmer. The 
soil, and everything else that is external to the bodies of persons, belongs to society. So 
the state can say to the farmer that if the farmer wants to use something external to his 
body, the state (society) has a right to interfere to the benefit of society. Hence, a part of 
the harvest can be given to society, in order to benefit the total good of society or the 
well-being of the worst-off individuals, i.e. for distributive justice. If you don’t want to 
give away a part of your harvest, fine, but then you are not allowed to use something 
that is external to your body and that belongs to society. 
In this sense, we can clearly distinguish taxation from slavery. Forcing someone to do 
labor is not allowed, because in that case the body of the slave plays a central role. It is 
not allowed to force someone against his will to use something external to make a 
product. But if persons themselves want to use something external to make products, 
society has a right to interfere by taxation.  
If external things can be owned completely by persons, as in propertarian 
libertarianism, utilitarians have no grounds at all to improve well-being, and there is no 
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space for distributive justice. But if absolute property is restricted to the body, as in the 
mere means principle, utilitarians can still use taxation to improve well-being and a 
(Rawlsian) system of distributive justice is still possible to some degree. Hence, the only 
playing field for consequentialists (such as utilitarians, egalitarians, prioritarians) who 
want to improve or equalize well-being exists when people want to use something 
external to their bodies.  
The deontological mere means principle takes a position between 
utilitarian/egalitarian/prioritarian consequentialism and propertarian libertarianism. 
The latter says that people can have an absolute property right over everything, the 
former says that there are no absolute property rights, not even over the own body. 
According to a consequentialist, people can not only be forced to pay taxes, but can also 
be forced to let their own bodies be used. We have a duty to help others in need, by 
paying taxes to help the poor. But the utilitarian can go further by claiming that we also 
have a duty and should (even without our permission) donate our blood or a kidney. The 
mere means deontologist can respond that such donations are morally good but not 
obligatory or enforceable. They are ‘supererogatory’ (good but not obligatory) because 
our blood and kidneys are completely owned by us as parts of our bodies so we can 
decide what happens to them. 
6.3.2 Conclusion 
The above two conditions give us a fairly precise, clear and nuanced picture when a 
basic right is violated. If the agent causes harm to a victim, violating his interests in a 
way that the victim does not want, and if the presence of this victim’s body was 
required in order to reach an end, then the victim is used as merely a means for 
someone else’s ends. We see a dual role of the presence of the bodies of the agent and 
the victim: the presence of the body of the agent is a necessary condition in the 
causation of the harm, and the presence of the body of the victim is a necessary 
condition in achieving the goal. 
In the next section I will argue who gets the basic right. There are a lot of beings, 
each with different levels of complexity and interests. So giving them all an equal claim 
for this basic right will be difficult. There is a gradation in complexity and interests, and 
there is also a gradation in someone’s ends. Could it be possible to make a coherent 
picture by coupling those two gradations? We will see that the questions “Who gets the 
basic right?” and “What are the ends?” are related to each other.  
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6.4 Who gets the basic right? 
Looking at the consequentialist QMM-principle, it was easy to see to whom the principle 
applied: all beings who have a well-being, i.e. all sentient beings. I also argued that the 
principle of tolerated choice equality naturally applies to all sentient beings, because we 
can only feel empathic concern for sentient beings. So we might think that the basic 
right principle also applies to all and only to sentient beings. But we have seen that this 
principle is not derived from the veil of ignorance, and it is not based on empathy.  
The two conditions of the mere means principle indicate two criteria for granting 
someone a basic right. Each of the two criteria has a broad and a narrow formulation. 
The first criterion refers to the presence of the body, so the being should have a body. 
More narrowly formulated: the being should have an internal representation of his/her 
own body (it should know where its body ends and the environment begins). The second 
criterion refers to the interests of a being, so the being should have interests. More 
narrowly formulated, the being should be able to want something. In this 
interpretation, the being should be sentient in the sense that it has a well-being 
composed of positive and negative feelings related to (dis)satisfaction of preferences. 
Those feelings and emotions indicate what a being wants. This criterion can be 
narrowed further by requiring higher mental capacities for autonomy or rationality. 
As the basic right is based on respect, there is a second way to solve the question who 
gets the basic right. We can ask who or what earns respect? My guess is that respect is 
connected to something complex and vulnerable. There are different complex and 
vulnerable things in the universe, such as living beings and sentient beings. These 
beings are characterized by having complex interests. Cars or stones do not have 
complex interests, because they don’t even act to protect their interests. They can have 
an interest not to be broken, but that is a trivial interest. We might say that complexity 
in interests is related to respect. And as we have seen, respect means that we should not 
violate someone’s basic right. Now, rights are nothing but devices to protect interests. 
So it is not farfetched to couple the notion of interests with the basic right. How can we 
do this in a natural way? 
First, we observe that there is a gradation of complexity in terms of a gradation of 
interests (needs). Roughly speaking we have non-living objects with only trivial 
interests and low complexity. Living beings have complex interests (to eat, to live,…) 
and they have a high complexity (DNA, metabolism,…). But some living beings can 
perceive their environments, or respond to their environments in even more complex 
ways, because they have nervous systems that allow them  to have inner, neural 
representations of their bodies and environments.  Although they are unconscious (like 
robots), these sensorineural,  perceptive or responsive beings, such as invertebrate 
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animals, have even more complex interests and they have complex reactions towards 
them. 
But some responsive beings have more: a central nervous system that generates a 
perceptual consciousness. They are subjectively aware of their environments and 
bodies. The representations of their environments and bodies are accompanied with 
‘qualia’ (Byrne, 2010), the subjective, private, direct, conscious experiences. Together 
with qualia, a sentient being has a focus or special attention towards an object 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). For example: the feeling of touch in my fingertips 
only happens when I focus on my fingertips. Just before I paid attention to this feeling of 
touch, I was not aware of it. There was an unconscious neural activity (no 
anaesthesia), comparable to what responsive beings might experience. But only after I 
focused on my fingertips, it became a conscious experience or ‘quale’ of touch.  This 
focus or attention is important in the conscious experience, and it might be possible to 
see this in the behavior of some animals, because the focus decreases the awareness of 
other things. For example, a cat focusing at his prey is no longer paying attention to 
other things. Or a fish  (e.g. a trout) injected with a venom becomes preoccupied with 
the pain,  so that it pays no heed to a threat coming towards him (EFSA, 2009). These are 
indicators that those animals have qualia, because they are analogous to our behavior 
when we have qualia and focus. Now, qualia are often neutral. I don’t feel an urge to 
avoid touching books. The touch of a book has no influence on my will. But other qualia 
are affective in nature; they are evaluated as being positive or negative. For example, 
the feeling of a needle in my finger generates a quale that I wish to avoid. This quale of 
pain generates an urge in me. Those affective or evaluated qualia are the positive or 
negative feelings and emotions such as pain, fear, distress or joy. This is where well-
being comes into play. These feelings are related to interests or needs, they are nothing 
else but subjective experiences of (un)satisfied interests. Fear indicates that the need for 
safety is not satisfied, pain indicates that the interest of bodily integrity is violated; 
frustration may indicate a need for freedom. Responsive beings who have evaluated 
(affective) qualia are called sentient beings. They are subjectively aware of their 
interests, so they not only have interests, they not only react to them in complex ways, 
but they can also subjectively feel them. These are the beings that have a subjective 
well-being, so things subjectively matter to them. They want things. Responsive beings 
with only unconscious experiences or neutral qualia, have no well-being, because the 
well-being is composed of evaluated qualia that are positive (joy,...) or negative (pain, 
frustration,…). These beings do not want anything. 
Finally there are the rational beings. These are sentient beings with a self-
consciousness and rational agency. They not only have complex interests, they not only 
react to them, they not only feel them, but they know and understand them. These 
beings have the most complex emotional lives, with a future perspective, dreams and 
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projects. These rational beings not only want things, they are also able to give informed 
consent.  
The above distinction between rational, sentient, responsive and living beings can 
offer us some extra degrees of freedom to construct a consistent ethic that best fits our 
moral intuitions. We clearly have a gradation of complexity of beings. Now, looking at 
the definition of the basic right, it refers to the use as merely a means to someone else’s 
ends. But the ends also have a gradation. There is a difference between luxury and vital 
needs. So it would be very natural to couple the gradation of complexity in interests to 
the gradation of the ends. Let’s look at this gradation in ends in more detail, from luxury 
needs to survival ends. 
Luxury: these are needs that have a positive contribution to someone’s well-being 
when satisfied, but these needs are created by society. We can create circumstances 
where these needs no longer need to be satisfied in order to have an increase in well-
being. Luxurious needs are volatile, relative and variable. Examples are fashion, social 
status symbols and needs created by commercial advertisements. 
Basic needs: these are needs not required in order to stay healthy and alive, that have 
a positive contribution to someone’s well-being, are stable and not determined by 
society. Examples are social contact, knowledge and recreation. 
Vital needs: these are needs that need to be satisfied in order to stay alive and 
healthy, such as medicines and health care (e.g. new organs for patients with an organ 
failure). 
Survival ends: these are vital needs that are not only important for individuals, but 
for biodiversity as well (e.g. survival of species). Examples are food, water, air, sexual 
activity (procreation) and motion. In part 3 (Chapter 10) I will discuss the predation 
problem, whereby we will see that there is a morally relevant distinction between 
survival ends and merely vital needs. Vital needs are characterized by one criterion: 
necessity. Survival ends, on the other hand, are characterized by three criteria: natural, 
normal and necessary. Natural means that the behavior is directly developed by 
evolution (genetic mutations and natural selection), and as biodiversity is defined by 
everything that directly evolved from evolution, natural behavior contributes to 
biodiversity. Natural plus normal means that the behavior is natural and happens a lot, 
and therefore contributes a lot to biodiversity. Natural plus normal plus necessary 
means that much biodiversity will be lost when the behavior stops. Eating food is 
natural, normal and necessary. Organ transplantations or medical experiments are 
necessary, but not natural or normal. Therefore, for a patient in the hospital, new 
organs or medicines can be a vital need but not a survival end. In summary, survival 
ends are in some sense stronger than vital needs. The difference between survival ends 
and vital needs is related to the moral value of biodiversity, which is threatened if 
survival ends are not satisfied. 
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The following figure represents the coupling of two gradations: complexity in 
interests and ends. What we see is that our approach contains the Kantian idea that 
rational beings are never to be used as merely a means. But we extend this basic right to 
other beings. Doing this makes our theory more coherent with some moral intuitions. 
The first intuition says that mentally disabled humans (non-rational beings) are not to 
be used for vital, basic and luxury needs. The second intuition is that it is self-evident to 
couple the basic right with the notion of interests, because rights are devices to protect 
interests. The third intuition is that it is self-evident to couple the complexity in 
interests with respect for that being, and to interpret respect in terms of the basic right 
not to be used as merely a means. The fourth intuition says that it is self-evident to 
couple gradations with each other, and the formulation of the basic right in terms of use 
as means for ends serves perfectly for such a coupling. This coupling immediately solves 
the question of who gets the basic right.   
 
 
 
Figure 9. The coupling between ends and complexity. An X means that the being has 
a right not to be used as merely means for the respective ends. For example: it is not 
allowed to kill and use a living being for luxury needs. Rational beings are never to be 
used.   
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Looking at the above figure, we get four ethical principles.11 
1) All non-responsive living beings (e.g. plants and living cells) have an equal claim to 
the basic right not to be used a merely a means for our luxurious needs. This is a 
reflection of a biocentric (Taylor, 1989) or deep ecology ethics, which implies sobriety, 
no commercial advertisements and no status consumption. 
2) All non-sentient responsive beings (e.g. invertebrates) have an equal claim to the 
basic right not to be used as merely a means for luxury and basic needs. We are allowed 
to use them for vital needs (e.g. experiments). Eating animal products (from both 
sentient and non-sentient animals) is not a vital need for us, because we can live healthy 
with a well-planned vegan diet (ADA, 2009). So eating animal products is not allowed 
when it is not a vital need or a survival end.  
3) All non-rational sentient beings (e.g. vertebrate non-human animals and mentally 
disabled humans) have an equal claim to the basic right not to be used as merely a 
means for vital, basic and luxury needs. Experimenting on animals or using them for 
organ (xeno)transplantation would not be allowed. But eating animals is allowed when 
it is a survival end, as we will see in the section on predation in part 3. Predators (and 
some indigenous people) are allowed to eat meat, because they became dependent (by 
evolution) on other animals in order to survive. It’s a survival end, because biodiversity 
will be lost if all predation was prohibited. Of course they are only allowed to eat 
animals until feasible alternatives for them are found.12 
We have to add that sentient beings are beings who developed the capacity to feel 
and have not yet permanently lost this capacity. This is relevant, because we are not 
allowed to use sentient beings when they are asleep or temporarily unconscious. Even 
when they can temporarily not feel anything, it is not respectful to use them as merely a 
means.   
4) All rational beings (mentally healthy human adults and children) have an equal 
claim to the basic right never to be used as merely a means, for no ends at all. Eating 
rational beings is never allowed, not even for survival ends. We should protect rational 
beings from predators if we can.  
Of course violations of the basic right are allowed when the QMM-principle is very 
strongly violated. The basic right is not absolute, because our moral intuition says that it 
would be inefficient to let thousands of people die simply because we don’t want to 
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 It is actually a continuum of principles, because not only are there four types of beings, but a spectrum of 
beings with gradually increasing complexity. There is also a spectrum of ends, because there are no sharp 
boundaries between e.g. luxury and basic needs. We can couple these two spectra. 
12
 In some situations, killing and eating mentally disabled humans might equaliy be permissible (otherwise it 
would be speciesist). But the tolerated partiality principle says that it is equally permissible to prefer eating 
non-human animals instead of those disabled humans.  
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violate the basic right of one individual. We have a small but non-zero need for 
efficiency, just like we had a small but non-zero need for efficiency in the context of the 
QMM-principle. This brings to the next section.  
6.5 How strong is the basic right?  
If the mere means principle is an absolute principle, it would correspond with a basic 
right of infinite strength: a constraint that can never be passed. But a lot of people have 
the intuition that the mere means principle should not be absolute. Looking at the 
bridge trolley dilemma, we can say that the basic right is stronger than at least five 
times the right to live. But in the end, a lot of people have a non-zero need for efficiency 
in well-being: the death of millions of people might surpass the basic right of one 
individual, because the loss of utility (well-being) becomes too big. This means that the 
moral force (the strength) of the basic right is lower than the moral force of a huge 
amount of well-being. 
As in principlism (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001), some intuitive balancing between 
the mere means principle and the consequentialist principle (QMM-prioritarianism) is 
required. It is a balancing of ‘moral forces’, comparable to the forces in physics: gravity 
is much weaker than electromagnetism, so gravity can surpass electromagnetism only 
when gravitational masses are very big and electric charges are relatively small.  
Well-being can sometimes surpass the basic right, or in other words: the ends can 
sometimes overrule and justify the means. Hence, a first advantage of a finite strength 
(a non-absolute principle where the basic right has a finite weight) is that our intuitive 
need for efficiency can still be met. But the strength of the mere means principle can 
also depend on some other variables: how much harm is caused to the victim? How 
strongly does the victim want to avoid the treatment? How much of the treatment is 
disliked by the victim? How much consent does the victim give to the treatment? How 
strongly does something belong to someone’s body? And what are the mental capacities 
for autonomy of the individual? These variables should be included in the intuitive 
balancing.  
As a consequence, a second advantage of a basic right with a finite strength is that it 
allows a coupling between different gradations: the strength of the basic right can be 
correlated with how much harm is caused, how much the victim does not want the 
treatment, how strong something belongs to the victim’s body and how directly the 
body is used. 
Finally, a third advantage of a finite strength is that it allows for a consequentialism 
in deontological rights: a world where the basic right of one individual is violated is 
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better than a world where the basic rights of two individuals are violated in a similar 
way. If the strength of the basic right would be infinite (absolute), we do not have this 
property (as two times infinity equals infinity).  
So we have three advantages of a non-absolute mere means principle: compatibility 
with a need for efficiency, coupling with gradations and consequentialism of basic 
rights violations. One disadvantage is that a non-absolute principle requires an intuitive 
balancing. This intuitive balancing should be done by all moral agents in a democratic 
way13 (see section 4.6.11): we should take a democratic average of the moral force of the 
basic right. This can also be done mathematically, see the next intermezzo: the welfare 
function can include R-parameters that measure the violations of the basic right. The 
average is democratic in the sense of being unweighted (taking an unweighted average 
of the R-parameters in the welfare function): all preferences (intuitive balancing of the 
moral forces) of all moral agents count equally.  
Just as physics is not inconsistent when electromagnetism counteracts gravity, so is 
ethics not necessarily inconsistent when the mere means principle counteracts the 
QMM-principle. Inconsistency might occur when the balancing between these two 
principles is arbitrarily applied in different situations. As if gravity arbitrarily gains 
strength even when masses remain equal. The strength of forces in physics should 
conform to universal laws.  
An example of an inconsistent balancing of moral forces occurs in situations of 
discrimination, where the moral force of the basic right of one individual is estimated to 
be stronger than the basic right of another individual who should have an equal moral 
status. As we will see in the next chapter, speciesism is a kind of discrimination that is a 
moral illusion. Such moral illusions can create biases in the balancing of moral forces by 
moral agents. Moral agents who are vulnerable to moral illusions might have 
inconsistent estimates of the strength of the basic right of different individuals. This is 
important in e.g. discussions on the use of sentient beings for medical experiments: 
animal researchers, as moral agents, might have an illusory bias towards using non-
human animals, as if the basic right of those animals is weak compared to well-being (of 
humans). However, they would have very different estimates for the basic right of some 
mentally disabled humans: those humans have a much stronger basic right although 
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 Note that experiments demonstrated that a moral agent can have differing intuitive estimates of the 
strength of the basic right, depending on some irrelevant circumstances and cognitive biases: the influence of 
induced feelings of disgust and humor (Greene, 2008), the framing of the description of a situation 
(Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Lanteri et al., 2008; Ray & Holyoak, 2010) or the order in 
which dilemmas are presented (Liao et al. 2011; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Di Nucci, 2012). Therefore, a 
moral agent would have to agree that his/her intuitive estimate lies in a certain range, so s/he should be very 
flexible and tolerant towards changes of the strength of the basic right within this range.    
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there is no consistent justification for that difference in estimated strength between 
those humans and animals. Hence, the democratic averaging of the moral force of the 
basic right is only valid if the moral agents do not have moral illusions such as 
speciesism. 
The basic right principle not only overrules the QMM-prioritarian principle in a lot of 
situations, but also overrules the tolerated partiality principle (tolerated choice 
equality) in all situations. The tolerated partiality principle is too weak and can never 
trump the basic right. To see this, take another look at the burning house dilemma: your 
child or an unknown child? If you save your child, you are not using the other child as 
merely a means. Now let’s look to a dilemma that is structurally very similar to the 
burning house dilemma. Suppose you are a surgeon and in the hospital is your child and 
an unknown child. Your child needs a spleen, the other a liver in order to survive. For 
the moment, you can keep them both alive for some days by administering a drug. If you 
do nothing, both will die, as in the burning house. However, you could stop giving the 
drug to the other child, so that child dies. Then you could use his spleen to save your 
child. In this situation, people are very reluctant to say that the surgeon is allowed to let 
the other child die in order to use his organs. So, the ethical principle that you may 
prefer to save your child from the flames in the burning house does not imply that you 
are also allowed to save your child in the hospital, by killing (or letting die) another 
child in order to use his organs for a transplantation.  
6.5.1 Intermezzo: combining the basic right with the prioritarian 
theory 
This intermezzo is meant for the people who have read the mathematical section in the 
chapter on the QMM-theory. The question is: Can we incorporate this new basic right 
principle in our mathematical formulation? We suggest the following possibility: apart 
from their values of life, all individuals have a ‘basic right parameter’   
 , which is zero if 
the basic right of individual   in situation (world history) X is not violated, and very 
large if her basic right is violated. The quantity   
  can also take different values, 
depending on what the ‘ends’ are and how seriously someone’s will is violated. With 
these basic right parameters, we add a new term to the welfare function: the basic right 
function  
 (    ∑   
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When the basic right of person   is violated, the value   
  should be very large, but 
not infinite: there might be a threshold value, above which one prefers the 
consequentialist outcome.14 For example: when there are, say, a billion people on the 
main track of the trolley dilemma (all threatened), one might be tempted to push the 
heavy man from the bridge in order to save those billion people. Another reason why   
  
should not be infinite, is because it is difficult to count with infinities, as infinity plus 
infinity equals infinity. So when we have to choose between situation X where one basic 
right is violated and situation Y where the basic rights of two persons are violated, we 
should be able to conclude that the situation X is preferred over Y.  
There is a basic right equality if   
    
  when the use as a means of subject   in 
situation X is similar to the use of subject   in situation Y (i.e. for the same kind of ends). 
Having said this, we can now write the new mathematical formulation of the QMM-
principle extended with the deontological rule of the basic right. In the intermezzo in 
section 4.6.8, I presented a welfare function that depends on the momentaneous well-
being and a connectivity function. Similarly, we should write the basic right term as 
  (  , which represents the level of basic rights violations of the momentaneous mind   
at time t. I will also include the ex-inter approach to lotteries, i.e. using expectation 
values, written by the brackets < >, that calculate the probability weighted average. Now 
we can write a moral weight, which is composed of two terms: the welfare function of 
consequentialist ethics and a basic right function of deontological ethics. This moral 
weight function reads: 
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This moral weight function can be considered as the standard model of ethics, just as 
a Lagrangian represents the fundamental quantity in the standard model of physics 
 
                                                     
14
 The strength of someone’s basic right (the value r) can depend on both the number of lives saved and the 
number of lives at risk. If for example a trolley is about to kill N number of people (N lives at risk) and pushing 
a heavy man in front of the trolley saves M number of people, the permissibility of pushing the man can 
depend on M as well as on the ratio M/N. An experimental study found that the higher N, the higher M needs 
to be to make the act permissible (Rai & Holyoak, 2010). This dependency on the ratio M/N passed a coherence 
test.  
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(Weinberg, 1996). The moral weight combines the consequentialist welfare ethic with 
the deontological mere means principle. We should not try to maximize the moral 
weight directly. Instead, we should use the method of rule universalism: derive those 
rules that, under universal compliance, would maximize the above moral weight. Those 
rules should be followed by all moral agents who are capable of following them. 
In the next section, we will see an extended mere means principle, which generates 
the tolerated partiality principle. Hence, the basic right function  (   in the above 
expression can refer to the extended mere means principle, which says that we should 
not use nor consider someone as merely a means. As we will see in the next section, not 
considering someone as merely a means implies that we should allow for some level of 
partiality.15 If we consider a person as merely a means, i.e. if we do not allow that person 
to be partial whereas we should allow such degree of partiality according to the 
extended mere means principle, then a negative r-term is added to the moral weight. Or 
in other words: when you want to be partial to a degree that should be universally 
permissible, and when I prohibit you to be partial in that way, then a negative term is 
added to the equation.16 
In this way, all three principles are included in the above mathematical expression: 
QMM-prioritarianism, tolerated partiality and the mere means principle. With this 
expression of the moral weight, including the tolerated partiality principle in the basic 
right function, we can get a very rich ethical system that is compatible with a lot of 
moral intuitions that a lot of people have.  
6.6 The extended mere means principle 
This section discusses an interesting relation between the basic right (mere means) 
principle and the principle of tolerated partiality. The mere means principle can be 
extended, from using someone as merely a means to considering someone as such. This 
extension can help us to explain the differences between doing and allowing as well as 
positive and negative duties. I will demonstrate that making these differences, using the 
 
                                                     
15
 As we will see, the extended mere means principle does not allow for levels of partiality where someone’s 
basic right is violated. Saving your child by killing another child and using its organs for transplantation, is 
not allowed. Such behavior would be too partial. 
16
 If you do not want to be impartial, I cannot prohibit you to be partial. The only thing I can do is try to 
convince you to behave more impartially. Suppose I convinced you such that you want to be impartial. Then I 
do not consider you as merely a means when I want you to be impartial. In that case, no basic right is violated.   
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extended mere means principle also generates an argument to justify the tolerated 
partiality principle. 
6.6.1 Doing versus allowing 
Many people have the intuitive moral judgment that doing harm is worse than allowing 
a similar level of harm (Kagan, 1989, p. 94). Pushing a child in the water to kill him is 
worse than not saving a drowning child. However, this often heard drowning child 
example is not a real moral dilemma: it is not a choice between pushing versus not 
saving. So this example is misleading. A better example would be the following, ‘switch 
trolley dilemma’. A runaway trolley is about to kill one person on the main track. You 
can turn a switch and send the trolley to a side track, where it will kill another person. It 
is a dilemma, because you now face a choice between actively turning the switch versus 
doing nothing. In this dilemma it becomes less obvious that turning the switch and 
killing the person on the side track is worse than allowing the person on the main track 
to die. A lot of people say that it is permissible to turn the switch (especially if the 
person on the main track is your child) (Hauser et al. 2008).  
Now imagine there were three people on the main track, and the person on the side 
track is someone I know. I do not want to kill this person on the side track, so I let the 
three people on the main track die. You could say that I had a duty to turn the switch, 
because one dead person is better than three dead people. But if you would say that to 
me, you would consider me as merely a means to the ends of the three people. You 
would not literally use me as merely a means, but according to your judgment, my 
presence was required to save the three people, and I would have to do something 
(turning the switch) I do not want.  
If you are not allowed to judge me for not turning the switch, it appears as if allowing 
the three people to die is not worse than killing one person. Hence, if we extend the 
mere means principle, from using someone as merely a means to considering someone 
as such, we have coherence with a deontological rule of doing versus allowing. The 
extended mere means principle generates an apparent17 difference between doing and 
allowing. This difference corresponds with a counterfactual account of the doctrine of 
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 Note that the extended mere means principle merely says how I am not allowed to judge or consider you. 
This does not imply that you do not have certain duties. You still might have a duty to turn the switch to save 
the three people. That duty is compatible with my duty not to judge you if you do not turn the switch. Even if I 
am not allowed to consider you in a certain way, not much follows from this how you are allowed to act. We 
have to distinguish primary duties (how to act) from secondary duties (how to judge actions). Nevertheless, 
we could say that my secondary duty (not to judge you) counts as a justification for your (lack of) primary 
duty.   
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doing versus allowing (see Howard-Snyder, 2011), which says that the presence or 
absence of the agent is morally relevant: a ‘doing’ requires the presence of the agent. If 
an upshot would not have occurred if the agent had been absent from the scene, the 
agent was not positively relevant to the upshot (see Kagan, 1989, p. 94). 
The difference between doing and allowing also corresponds with a difference 
between positive and negative duties. A positive duty is a duty of beneficence, where the 
presence of the agent (the helper) is required in order to benefit someone. A burning 
house dilemma exhibits positive duties: the helper can only save someone and cannot 
cause harm to someone (when the helper does nothing, s/he allows harm). A negative 
duty of non-maleficence (the no-harm principle) does not require the presence of the 
agent: if the agent is not present, the no-harm principle is trivially satisfied because the 
agent cannot cause harm when s/he is absent.  
In situations of negative duty, we can judge someone for violating his duty of non-
maleficence, without considering him/her as merely a means. However, if you do not 
want to help someone, and if I claim that you violate the duty of beneficence, I would 
consider you as merely a means. Therefore, violations of positive duties are considered 
less bad (more tolerable) than violations of negative duties. In the next section, I explain 
why partiality not only is, but actually should be more tolerated in positive duties than 
in negative duties. 
6.6.2 Tolerated partiality and imperfect duties  
In the previous Chapter 5, I discussed the principle of tolerated partiality, which violates 
the consequentialist prioritarian principle. But also the mere means principle (the basic 
right) violates the consequentialist principle. There is a subtle connection between the 
partiality principle and the extended mere means principle.  
Positive duties are imperfect duties, in the sense that, while we are not required to 
live up to them at all times, these duties are deserving of admiration. Helping others is 
an imperfect duty, because there is a whole range of possible levels of assistance that 
one could give. Perfect duties on the other hand can and should be respected at all times 
(for example the duty not to use someone as merely a means).  
Looking at the intuitions of a lot of people, we appear to tolerate partiality in 
positive, imperfect duties, but we are not so tolerant towards partiality in negative, 
perfect duties. The reason why partiality is, and in fact should be, tolerated in imperfect 
duties has to do again with the mere means principle in its extended version: do not 
consider someone as merely a means.  
Consider a double trolley dilemma, which is similar to the burning house dilemma 
(choosing between one person you hold dear versus three unknown persons), but has a 
better structure to discuss the issue of partiality in imperfect duties.   
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Figure 10: the double trolley dilemma 
 
There are two tracks, two trolleys and two switches. Trolley A will kill your child on 
track A, trolley B will kill three unknown children on track B. You can only run to one 
switch. If you run to switch A, trolley A will move to track B, and your child will be 
saved. If I say that you must run to switch B in order to save the three children, I would 
consider you as merely a means: your presence is required to save the children (the 
‘means’ part), and you would have to do something you do not want (the ‘mere’ part). I 
am not allowed to consider you as merely a means, I am not allowed to judge you, and 
therefore I should tolerate your partiality towards your own child. Therefore, this 
partiality is tolerated. The same goes for the situation when trolley A is not present: you 
do not have a duty to kill your own child by turning switch B in order to save the three 
children.  
The question remains whether partiality should be tolerated when trolley B is not 
present. When you run to switch A in order to save your child, can I blame you? In this 
case, three children are harmed by your action (you cause harm; it is not an allowing to 
die). If I would say that you should not have turned switch A, I am not considering you 
as merely a  means, because your presence is not required in order to do what I want 
(saving the three children). According to my intuition, I would not easily tolerate a 
partiality where you do more harm, but I do not know what the intuition of most people 
is in this situation.  
In a previous Chapter 5 we encountered a slightly related trolley problem involving 
three tracks. Imagine a trolley moving towards five people on the main track. They will 
all die, unless you send the trolley to a side track, where it will kill someone you hold 
dear. But this time you also have a third option, sending the trolley to a third track, 
killing two people. You are allowed to save the five people on the main track. But are 
you allowed to send the trolley to the third track, killing two unknown people instead of 
the one beloved person on the second track? If you send the trolley to the third track, I 
am not allowed to judge you by saying that you should have send the trolley to the 
second track. That is because such a judgment would still imply me considering you as 
merely a means (because your presence was necessary to turn the trolley away from the 
five people on the main track, and killing your beloved one is not what you like). 
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Therefore, the extended mere means principle implies that you are allowed to cause 
more harm than you could have avoided. You are allowed to kill two unknown people 
instead of one beloved person, violating the consequentialist prioritarian principle, only 
if your action is the result of saving even more people (i.e. saving the five people on the 
main track).   
To conclude: the extended mere means principle can explain what kinds of partiality 
we should tolerate. Not tolerating some partiality would imply considering someone as 
merely a means, which is immoral. 
6.6.3 The asymmetry of procreational duties  
The ‘asymmetry of procreational duties’ (Narveson, 1967; Mulgan, 2006; McMahan, 2009) 
says that we do not have an obligation to give birth to happy children (out of the 
interests of those children), but we do have an obligation not to give birth to children 
when we know that the lives of those children will be miserable. Think about the 
problem of parents knowing they have a genetic defect which means that their 
potential child will be seriously handicapped. Or think about animals raised in the 
livestock industry. Those animals are bred for their high productivity, which often 
means that they suffer from serious physical problems (e.g. big udders, lower immunity, 
deformations).  
As we have seen in a previous chapter on population ethics, the welfare function 
derived behind the veil of ignorance shows a threshold of well-being for high 
population sizes: if a newborn sentient being gets a lifetime well-being below some 
power-averaged value, it lowers the welfare function. I argued that a deontic permission 
still allows for the procreation of such beings. But what if a newborn sentient being will 
get a lifetime well-being above the threshold, such that the welfare function increases? 
Do the parents have a duty to procreate in this case? The extended mere means 
principle says that we cannot judge parents who do not want to procreate, even though 
their future children would increase the welfare function. That is because we cannot 
consider those parents as merely a means (as breeding machines), doing something that 
they do not want. In other words: the asymmetry of procreational duties is coherent 
with our deontic extended mere means principle. Other possible solutions to explain the 
asymmetry (as in e.g. McMahan, 2009) are not needed. 
In summary, there are two relevant levels of lifetime well-being and two different 
principles that make procreation permissible (i.e. neither a duty nor a prohibition). 
1) If a potential being would have a lifetime well-being above some positive threshold 
such that the welfare function would increase if the potential being gets born, we do not 
have a duty to procreate, because we cannot consider a woman as merely a means to 
increase the welfare function. The mere means principle implies that the woman is 
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allowed to be partial towards her own preferences, because the woman can decide what 
happens to her body.  
2) If a potential being would have a lifetime well-being below that positive threshold 
but still above zero, i.e. if the potential being would still have a life worth living, then we 
definitely do not have a duty to procreate (because that would lower the welfare 
function), but we have a deontic permission to procreate. We may procreate and give 
birth to that potential being if we want to. The biodiversity principle (the 3-N-principle, 
to be discussed below in section 10.4) implies that procreation is still allowed.  
3) If a potential being would have a lifetime well-being below zero, i.e. a life not 
worth living, we have a duty not to procreate.18  
6.7 Application: the least harm principle and vegetarianism 
The basic right principle has a lot of implications. It might solve an important objection 
against vegetarianism. Davis (2003) argued that an omnivore diet, killing and eating big 
grazing animals (e.g. cows) would cause less harm to sentient beings compared to a 
vegan diet. A vegan needs a crop field, so it might be possible to count how many 
animals (e.g. mice) die by accident using this crop field. Suppose that five mice are 
accidently killed in the harvesting process to produce the same amount of nutrients as 
the omnivore’s diet where only one cow is used. Then the omnivore causes less harm 
than the vegan.  
Whether a vegan diet causes more suffering or death is a scientific question that is 
strongly debated due to lack of good data. At least Matheny (2003) and Lamey (2007) 
criticized the argument of Davis. But here we can somehow avoid this issue, by 
introducing the basic right. The omnivore uses the cow as merely means, so the basic 
right of the cow is violated. On the other hand the field mice are accidently killed, so 
they are not used as merely a means. If the basic right trumps the right to live, a vegan 
diet remains more ethical.  
 
                                                     
18
 Although I am not so sure about this third rule. It might be the case that a lot of animal species (especially 
the species with a reproductive strategy of so called r-selection) give birth to short miserable lives that are not 
worth living: a majority of those animals starve or are preyed upon and die shortly after they come into 
existence (see e.g. Horta, 2010c). If all those species are not allowed to procreate, a lot of biodiversity will get 
lost. I suggest we take much more effort and do scientific research to increase the lifetime well-being of those 
animals by e.g. redesigning nature. 
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We can compare this with driving a car. It is true that car traffic sometimes 
accidently kills children. Now imagine (hypothetically) that we invent a new form of 
transportation, some kind of teleportation device. However, this device can only work if 
you kill a person and use his body to drive the teleportation device. Are we allowed to 
kill and use an innocent person as merely a means, in order to save more children from 
car traffic? I expect that most people have the intuition that using a person for the 
teleportation is not allowed. 
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Chapter 7 Summary: principles of equality and 
further refinements 
In the previous three chapters, we encountered three ethical principles of normative 
ethics. Each principle corresponds with a normative ethical theory: an ethic of welfare 
(consequentialist ethic), an ethic of care (relational ethic) and an ethic of rights 
(deontological ethic). The quasi-maximin theory is the consequentialist principle of 
prioritarian justice. It is based on the fundamental ethical notions of impartiality 
(justice) and well-being. This serves as an underlying structure or backbone for the 
other two normative ethics. Due to some moral intuitions that violated this QMM-
pinciple, we introduced two other universalized ethical principles that overrule the 
QMM-principle. The first is a weak overruling that uses elements of an ethic of care 
(empathy in personal relationships). It says that we are allowed to be partial to some 
degree, as long as we respect similar levels of partiality of others (it generates a 
tolerated choice partiality). The second is a strong overruling, based on a deontological 
notion of a basic right. This basic right not to be used as merely a means strongly 
trumps both the weak overruling principle of tolerated choice, and the consequentialist 
theory of QMM. The following scheme gives an overview of the relation of the three 
principles of normative ethics. 
 
Figure 11: weak and strong overruling of the QMM-theory 
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All three principles contain a notion of equality. Also the universalist principle 
discussed in the first part of this dissertation contains a notion of equality. This leads us 
to four principles of equality, one formal and three material principles. 
1) Formal equality of universalist impartiality: treat all equals in all equal situations 
equally. This is a formal principle because it does not say how we should treat everyone. 
This formal principle is applied to the other three, material principles of normative 
ethics. For example in the QMM-theory, this formal equality results in an important 
symmetry property of the mathematical formulation: the lifetime well-being of 
individuals is interchangeable. 
2) Prioritarian welfare equality. This equality means that governments, professional 
health care and economic and legislative structures should be impartial and should 
strive towards a just distribution of well-being, according to the QMM-principle. It is a 
material equality principle, because it gives content to how well-being should be 
distributed. Formal equality of impartiality says that a unit of well-being counts equally 
for all sentient beings in all similar positions. I.e. the identity of individuals is not 
important when it comes to distributing well-being. But the material equality adds 
substance, by claiming that priority should be given to the individuals in the worst-off 
positions. As a result of this priority, if total lifetime well-being is constant between 
situations, the situation which has the most equal distribution of lifetime well-being is 
the best.1 Hence, prioritarianism lies in between sum-utilitarianism (maximizing well-
being) and egalitarianism (equalizing well-being).  
3) Tolerated choice equality: even though we would save our own child in the 
burning house dilemma, we would tolerate the choice of someone else who has saved 
the other child. In general we should tolerate small levels of partiality, especially when 
personal relationships are involved. This partiality in personal relationships is central in 
an ethic of care. 
4) Basic right equality: all beings with a same level of complexity in interests, should 
have an equal claim to a basic right not to be treated as merely a means to someone 
else’s end.  
With these four principles2 we can get a fairly nuanced picture of animal equality, as 
we will see in the next part of this dissertation. The reason why we get a nuanced 
 
                                                     
1
 This was seen on the expression of the welfare function: W=P.A.(1-I), with P the population factor, A the 
average lifetime well-being and I an inequality metric. 
2
 In the next chapter I will discuss a fifth equality principle to solve the predation problem. This fifth principle 
is a principle of behavioral fairness: if a zebra is allowed to eat for survival, then so is a lion. More generally: 
everyone has an equal right to a behavior that is both natural, normal and necessary (a behavior that 
contributes to biodiversity). So we end up with five principles of equality. 
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picture is that the equality principles correspond with our moral intuitions, and are not 
in contradiction with at least two other kinds of inequality.  
1) Inequality of outcomes. This is strict egalitarianism, which strives for complete 
equality in well-being. This is not undesirable. It violates a strong moral intuition that 
says that inequality in well-being is permissible if it is at the advantage of the worst-off 
individuals. It is better to have two persons with levels of well-being 10 and 20, than 
levels of well-being both equal to 1. 
2) Emotional inequality. We are allowed to give some preference to those individuals 
we hold dear. We do not have a duty to be impartial in our personal relationships. We do 
not have to toss a coin in a burning house dilemma, if we have to choose between saving 
our own child and saving another child.  
Emotional inequality is not in contradiction with e.g. the universal declaration of 
human rights, which says that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. But in the third part of this dissertation, we will argue that it is a kind of 
discrimination to limit this equality principle to only humans. We will see that it is 
possible to extend the moral community (the ‘circle of equals’) to all sentient beings, 
claiming that all sentient beings are equal in the above four senses. This extension is 
necessary if we want to stick close to our strongest moral intuitions in a consistent way. 
Such an extension would make our theory more compatible with our strongest 
intuitions, compared with the current inconsistent ethics of our speciesist society.  
7.1 Equality and veganism 
If we extend the material principles of equality to animals, then we see that animals in 
the current livestock and fishery industries are maltreated in three ways.  
First, the consumption of animal products is likely a violation of the QMM-principle: 
it is impossible to imagine that humans, if they were not allowed to eat animal products, 
would be worse-off than animals bred in factory farms and slaughtered in 
slaughterhouses. The pleasure of the taste of animal products (meat, milk, fish,…) does 
not outweigh the suffering of those animals. From behind the veil of ignorance, you 
cannot prefer a world where eating cheese is allowed. In such a world, you have a non-
zero probability to end up being a dairy cow with a low value of life equal to say 3 
(because you suffer in the livestock industry, and you have an early death). You also 
might end up being a human who is able to enjoy the taste of cheese (he has a value of 
life equal to say 11). On the other hand, in a vegan agriculture, this person can no longer 
enjoy eating cheese, so his value of life decreases a tiny bit, to say 10. But there will be 
no dairy cows in lower positions, so you would not have a probability to end up worse. 
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Being risk averse, you would prefer the vegan world, because then you do not have a 
probability to get a value of life equal to 3. If a cow is born, the impartial observer 
behind the veil prefers the cow to have a well-being of e.g. 5 instead of a lower well-
being of 3 in the livestock industry. Quasi-maximin prioritarianism would therefore 
imply veganism. 
Also the principle of tolerated partiality is violated in the livestock industry. If we 
tolerate the choice of a dairy farmer to use the milk of a cow in order to increase the 
well-being of a human who loves cheese, then we should also tolerate someone who 
makes the opposite choice, such as breeding women and using their breast milk to make 
cheese to give to animals who like breast milk cheese. This, however, we would never 
tolerate. 
Third, the use of animals and animal products is a violation of the basic rights of 
animals, because these animals are used as merely a means. The bodily integrity of dairy 
cows is violated (by artificial insemination, forced milk production and early death) and 
they are treated as property.  
These three different criticisms of the livestock and fishery industries should not be 
confused with each other. Speciesism causes serious violations of three ethical 
principles of equality, based on justice, empathy and respect. When applied to animal 
ethics, the equality principles give a complete picture of equality that extends 
approaches in the literature. For example, Francione (2000) only focused at the basic 
right (the property status of animals). This is a ‘negative’ approach, in the sense that it 
only says what we are not allowed to do (related to negative rights of not being treated 
in some ways). The prioritarian theory of justice also offers a ‘positive’ ethics, because it 
says something about our duty to help others (and a corresponding positive right to be 
helped). 
The three material principles of equality do not stand on their own. They have to be 
combined with a universalist imperative. As we have seen, this principle of universalism 
implies four universalizations, two of them are particularly important: universalization 
with respect to the moral agents and with respect to the moral patients. The first 
universalization with respect to moral agents will be further discussed in the next 
section, where it is related to non-ideal theory (i.e. situations without universal 
compliance). After that, the second universalization with respect to moral patients will 
be discussed. As we will see, this second universalization is related to antidiscrimination 
and the absence of certain hierarchic dualisms. 
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7.2 Ideal and non-ideal theory: applying the universalist 
imperative 
The universalist imperative says that we should not directly follow e.g. the prioritarian 
quasi-maximin principle on our own. This universalist imperative is a bit related to the 
golden rule. We can state it in different ways. For example according to the Kantian 
categorical imperative: Act only according to that maxim (moral rule or guiding 
principle) whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. 
Or: abide by those principles which we would like everyone to abide by. Or: give the 
good example and follow the rule that every moral being (everyone who is capable, 
rational and informed) should have to follow, even if no-one else does so.3  
This universalist imperative reflects an unconditional commitment and we should, if 
need be, swim up against the stream. We should abide by those rules which are 
universalizable, which means that if every moral agent (who is capable and informed) 
should follow those rules and consequently apply them, there will be no undesirable 
consequences that violate one of the above principles of equality. 
When choosing a rule-based action (an action based on a maxim or a guiding 
principle), we should ask ourselves: what are the consequences if everyone (who is well 
informed and able to do that action) does a similar action or follows that rule? In other 
words: what are the consequences in an ideal utopian world with universal compliance 
to the rule? If the consequences are good (if they satisfy the three material principles of 
equality), then we should do that action or follow that rule, even if others don’t.  
If we want to do an action, but we cannot find an underlying ethical guiding principle 
or rule for that action that can be universalized to all similar situations, we should not 
do that action. Actions are only permissible if you can find a justifying universalized 
rule that is consistent with the ethical system (i.e. a rule that does not violate a principle 
of the system). For example: if I want to take the train this morning, the rule “Everyone 
has the right to take this train this morning” cannot be applied to all persons, because 
that would result in an overcrowded train. But I can find another guiding principle that 
guides my action to take the train and that can be generalized: “Everyone has the right 
to take the train when there is still some place available on the train, when a fair 
distribution of train rides is possible and when there is no-one left who wants to occupy 
the free place and has an equally strong or stronger right or reason to take that train”. 
So I can justify my use of the train by referring to this second principle.  
 
                                                     
3
 This reference to rules turns the theory in a “rule consequentialism” instead of an “act consequentialism” 
(Hooker, 2011).  
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In other words: I am allowed to do an action (or inaction) only if I can find a rule or 
guiding principle that can be used to guide the action, given that 1) it is okay for me if 
this rule gets universalized (the non-arbitrariness condition) and 2) the rule is 
compatible with all other principles of the ethical system (the consistency condition). 
When I can’t find a consistent, universalized guiding principle that justifies the action, 
the action (or inaction4) is not allowed. 
It might be possible that the universalist imperative does not give an exclusive 
answer to the question what guiding principles we should act upon. If we see that two 
different kinds of actions or rules are compatible with the universalist imperative, i.e. if 
universal compliance to guiding principles A and B give the same good consequences, 
then we break the tie by a reality check. In reality, i.e. in a less ideal world without 
universal compliance, not everyone will follow that specific action or guiding principle. 
So we should look at the consequences of our rules and actions in the current, real non-
ideal world (without universal compliance). If guiding principle A would have preferable 
outcomes in the current  non-ideal world than principle B, we should act according to 
guiding principle A.  
So we start with an ideal theory: deriving those guiding rules that, with universal 
compliance (amongst all people who are able to follow the rules), generate the best 
results according to our principles of equality. If there is a tie between those derived 
rules, we can select the best of those rules by looking at non-ideal theory, i.e. by looking 
at the consequences if there is no universal compliance (and in particular: if there is as 
much compliance as in the current real world5). Non-ideal situations will serve as tie-
breakers.6 
 
                                                     
4
 The inaction refers to e.g. not helping someone in need. When I don’t help someone, I should come up with a 
rule that explains my not helping. If I can’t find such a rule that I am willing to see universalized, I have the 
duty to help. If my guiding rule is simply “I never help” or something like “I never help when I don’t feel like 
helping”, I will not be willing to do the universalization, because that would mean no-one might help me when 
I am in need. If my rule is “I don’t help at moments when I recently already helped a lot of others”, I am 
willing to universalize this rule, so then it is okay not to help at that moment. 
5
 There are many degrees of non-compliance, so there will be many different non-ideal theories. The 
preferred non-ideal theory is the one that is applicable to the current real world, i.e. the one derived from the 
current level of non-compliance.  
6
 Parfit (2011) discussed a similar solution to the “ideal world objections” where a universalized rule might 
have bad consequences in non-ideal situations lacking universal compliance. According to Parfit, we should 
adopt new, conditional rules. For example: “Follow the rules whose being followed by everyone would make 
things 
go best, unless some other people have not followed these rules, in which case do whatever, given the acts of 
others, would make things go best.” (p.262). This principle needs further refinements that I will not discuss 
here. 
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The prisoner’s dilemma in game theory can illustrate non-ideal theory. The dilemma 
faces a choice between cooperation and defection. If both players in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game cooperate, they generate the best outcomes (according to the 
prioritarian QMM-theory). However, if one of the two players defects, the cooperator 
loses and the gains for the defector increase. If both players defect, they generate a 
suboptimal outcome. The following table presents the possible outcomes (levels of well-
being) of a prisoner’s dilemma for the two players (bold type values for one player, italic 
values for the other). 
  Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 Cooperate 3,3 5,0 
Defect 0,5 1,1 
 
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma allows for multiple, successive rounds. Ideally, the 
best outcome for both players in an iterated game is mutual cooperation. But if a player 
who always cooperates encounters a defector, the cooperator loses. It is shown that in a 
non-ideal world, with defectors, often the best strategy in an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma is ‘tit-for-tat’ or ‘equivalent retaliation’ (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004, 
p.191). According to this strategy, the first move (in the first round) is always 
cooperation. The second move (in the second round) is the same as the other player’s 
move in the previous round. If the other player defects, you retaliate in the next round 
by defecting. If the other player cooperates again, you are forgiving and cooperate in 
the next round.  
So a player has at least two good rules in the ideal world: ‘always cooperate’ and ‘tit-
for-tat’. If everyone follows tit-for-tat, the result will be continuous cooperation. To 
break the tie between these two strategies, note that tit-for-tat is better than ‘always 
cooperate’ in a non-ideal world. So the player can follow tit-for-tat7 (preferably with 
some level of forgiveness8).   
 
                                                     
7
 Adding an exception, a rule like “always cooperate” is specified into a rule like “always cooperate, unless 
others don’t (then follow tit-for-tat)”. A criticism of rule consequentialism is that you can always further 
specify a rule, such that in the end you end up with an infinitely specified rule, which is equivalent to act 
consequentialism (Smart & Williams, 1973). Rule consequentialism collapses into act consequentialism as long 
as there is room for adding exceptions to the rule (“Do X unless Y”). I think that the approach of specifying 
rules (using exceptions) is valid and permissible. It is allowed to move closer to act utilitarianism, on the 
important (non-trivial) condition that one does so on a path of universalized rules, i.e. that one always refers 
to (specified) rules that everyone should follow. The more specified, the more complicated a rule becomes, 
and complicated rules have disadvantages. Where you stop along this path is up to you. As long as you can find 
a (specified) rule that permits your action after universalization, your action is allowed.  
8
 It might happen that the other player defects by mistake, ending up in a vicious circle or an unending “death 
spiral” of mutual defections. To avoid this, a good player should sometimes be a bit more forgiving, by 
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In real life situations, there are often more than two players who can cooperate or 
defect. As the universalist imperative (do what everyone should do) is related to the 
important idea of giving the good example, I believe that in multiple player situations it 
is good to tend as much as possible towards cooperation, because that strategy is most 
visibly the strategy of ‘the good example’.   
Let’s look at some political animal rights issues to discuss the importance of this 
universalist imperative.  
7.2.1 The argument of futility 
A lot of meat eating people object that if they became vegetarians or vegans, the impact 
on the food market and the livestock sector will be negligible: not a single cow will be 
spared. However, the rule says that if everyone became vegan, then the end situation 
will be one without a livestock industry, which is better according to the three 
principles of equality. So therefore any individual has a moral duty to give the good 
example and become vegan. 
7.2.2 Tit-for-what? 
Suppose someone kills and eats ten small animals (chickens), unless I kill a big animal (a 
cow) and give it to him. Minimizing violations of basic rights and well-being implies that 
it is better to use one big animal as merely a means, than to use ten small animals as 
merely a means. So I should kill a big animal and give the meat to that person? This 
becomes a subtle issue. What if I take the conditional rule: “Do not kill animals, unless 
others kill small animals for consumption and you can reduce their killing by killing a 
big animal yourself and sell the animal’s products to those people”? Universalizing this 
rule in an ideal world will generate the best outcome, because no animal will be killed. 
The unconditional rule “Do not kill animals” also generates the best outcome in an ideal 
world. But in a non-ideal world, the conditional rule will be better.9  
The argument to kill a big animal is similar to an argument given by domestic fur 
farmers: “If we don’t produce fur, then people will buy fur from countries with weaker 
animal welfare laws. I can produce cheaper and animal-friendlier fur that will 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
occasionally cooperating, even when the other player defects. If the other player plays tit-for-tat (with 
forgiving) as well, both players can escape the circle of defection.  
9
 Williams (Smart & Williams, 1973, p.97) offered a similar thought experiment to counter utilitarianism: 
should George accept a job at a laboratory for chemical warfare if refusing the job implies that another person 
takes the job and will do the unethical research with far greater zeal?  
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outcompete the fur from those horrible foreign fur farms. As a consequence, those fur 
farms have to lower their production. Hence, my production of fur will decrease the 
total animal suffering in the world.” Of course there will be other political strategies to 
decrease animal suffering (e.g. negotiations, import restrictions), but for the sake of the 
argument, suppose that those domestic farmers are right. Those domestic fur farmers 
work in a non-ideal world (non-compliance of foreign fur farms). Hence, they could use 
the conditional rule not to produce fur, unless it outcompetes worse fur production.  
However, I do not believe that the conditional rule should be followed. There are two 
replies to this, one from a deontological (mere means) perspective, the other from a 
game theoretic perspective. The deontological consideration goes as follows: If I kill that 
big animal, then the animal will be used as merely a means in two ways: as consumption 
product by the other person (the other person uses the meat of the animal) and as 
ransom or a medium of exchange by me (I use the animal in order to save the lives of 
the other small animals). We can say that this double use, and especially the new use as 
medium of exchange, is never permitted, not even in non-ideal situations.  
Related to this is the issue of the (non-)consequentialism of deontic principles: do we 
have a duty to minimize basic rights violations by violating someone’s basic right? We 
can say that if we violate the basic right of the big animal in order to stop ten basic 
rights violations of the ten small animals, the former basic right violation (of the big 
animal) counts heavier than a latter basic right violation (of a smaller animal) just as a 
latter basic right violation counts heavier than a right to live.10 
As a second reply, the next table presents the outcomes from a game-theoretic point 
of view. The values represent the number of animals that stay alive. If both players 
cooperate, the eleven animals (the one big and ten small animals) will live. But player 2 
wants to kill ten small animals. If player 1 refuses to sacrifice a big animal (i.e. if s/he 
cooperates), then ten small animals will die and the big animal lives. If player 1 kills a 
big animal, perhaps player 2 no longer kills the ten small animals. If both players 
‘defect’, then all eleven animals will die. 
 
  Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 Cooperate 11 1 
Defect 10 0 
 
 
                                                     
10
 In a previous section (6.5.1), we saw a mathematical equation with a basic rights term  ∑  
 . We can say 
that   
    
  when individual i (e.g. the big animal) is used in situation X as merely a means to stop the basic 
right violation of individual j (e.g. a small animal) that would have occurred in situation Y. 
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As with the above mentioned iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, player 1 can play the 
strategy of tit-for-tat. But in contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma, the new game has the 
worst outcome when both players defect. Hence, the retaliation strategy of player 1 is 
tricky. If player two does not cooperate, we end up with the worst outcome. But if 
player 2 cooperates (does not kill ten small animals), then tit-for-tat requires that player 
1 also cooperates in the next round (does not kill a big animal). 
The example of the fur farmer clearly demonstrates where this game strategy leads 
us. If the domestic fur farmer succeeds in out-competing the foreign fur production, 
then the domestic farmer has to stop his fur production. But then the foreign farmers 
might get new market space. The foreign production increases again, the foreigners 
defect, and the domestic fur farmer will defect again by producing fur, resulting in a 
decrease of the foreign fur production. This results in a continuous, high frequency 
cycle of quick changes between defection (domestic fur production) and cooperation 
(no domestic fur production). 
There are two ways out of this cycle: (almost) always defect or (almost) always 
cooperate. The first way is a choice of continuous defection. Instead of a tit-for-tat 
strategy, it becomes a tit-for-what strategy. This strategy follows a rule: always defect if 
you believe the other person would defect when you cooperate. Player 1 might believe 
that player 2 will defect again and again once player 1 cooperates. In that case, player 
one might decide to continue defecting, no matter what player 2 does. The domestic fur 
farmer continues his fur production, even when the foreign production is out-
competed.  
However, this strategy of continuous defection has two problems. First, how can 
player 1 know that player 2 will cooperate even when player 1 would cooperate? The 
belief of player 1 that mutual cooperation is impossible, can never be disproven as long 
as player 1 keeps on defecting: player 1 does not even give player 2 the opportunity to 
demonstrate his unconditional cooperation. If player 2 would decide to cooperate even 
when player 1 cooperates, player 1 will never be able to know this if s/he always defects 
because of a false belief.   
A second danger of such tit-for-what strategies is that outsiders cannot easily infer 
the rule or true motives of those domestic fur farmers: the rule depends on what player 
1 believes about player 2, instead of what player 2 did. But outsiders cannot get reliable 
access to what player 1 believes. The fur farmers might lie when using the above 
argument: their true intentions might just be to sell fur, not to fight for animal rights. 
Related to this is the importance of giving the good example. I believe a lot of people 
would have difficulties in seeing the good example behind the strategy of trying to stop 
fur production by producing fur yourself. Therefore, in such fur farmers’ games, I 
believe it is better to apply the rule to always cooperate.  
In conclusion, in non-ideal situations we should 1) not introduce a new use as merely 
a means (e.g. a use as ransom), 2) not follow a tit-for-tat strategy if it result in a high 
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frequency cycle of cooperation and defection and 3) not follow a tit-for-what strategy 
(continuous defection) because of the risk of false beliefs and the lack of clarity of 
intentions behind the defection.   
7.2.3 Prohibition laws 
Consider a prohibition law: the government will punish anyone who eats, buys or sells 
meat. Imagine that if our government enforces this law, a black market of animal 
products will be generated. These products are smuggled illegally from a foreign 
country, where the rights of animals are violated on a much larger scale than the rights 
violations in our domestic livestock industry before the prohibition. In other words: 
imagine that animal products are subject to the same ‘iron law of prohibition’, like 
alcohol products. This iron law says that, in many countries, prohibiting alcohol 
production and trade will result in more alcohol abuse. Making alcohol illegal will 
generate worse consequences. Of course, there is a difference between illegal alcohol 
production and trade on the one hand, and illegal livestock production and trade on the 
other. Likely, the livestock prohibition will not be subject to the iron law of prohibition, 
because some basic conditions that led to the iron law of prohibition for alcohol are not 
met in the prohibition of animal products. A government will be able to forbid the trade 
and production of animal products, just as with human products. Due to characteristics 
of livestock industry, illegal livestock production and trade is much easier to find than 
illegal alcohol distillers and bootleggers. But for the sake of the argument: imagine that 
prohibition of animal products would make matters worse in terms of animal rights 
violations. What should we do then? Should we give in to a kind of blackmail if meat 
eaters say that prohibition will result in worse animal rights violations overall? If they 
say that making meat illegal results in a temptation to eat more meat and a worsening 
of conditions for the animals (e.g. smaller cages, no more government control)? 
If no-one trades, produces and consumes animal products, no basic rights will be 
violated, so therefore I should not buy, sell, produce or consume animal products. This 
rule applies to the ideal world of universal compliance, and, as it gives the best results in 
this ideal world, we should stick to this rule in a non-ideal world as well. But what about 
prohibiting and punishing others who produce or consume animal products? What 
about a government policy to make meat illegal? In the ideal world, prohibition and 
non-prohibition would be equally good, because there will be no-one to be punished. So 
prohibition and non-prohibition would result in the same consequences in the ideal 
world. We have a tie between two rules: prohibition and non-prohibition. The best rule 
should now be derived by a reality check. The move to a non-ideal world will be a tie-
breaker. What if, as in reality, not everyone will follow the rule to abstain from animal 
products? If it would occur that a prohibition in a non-ideal world would result in more 
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animal rights violations, compared to a non-prohibition, then non-prohibition should 
be preferred. In other words: if animal products would be subject to the iron law of 
prohibition (as with alcohol), if prohibiting and punishing the production and trade in 
animal products would result in worse animal rights violations (which is likely not the 
case), then prohibition and punishment would not be a government’s duty. In this case, 
our only duty will be to abstain from buying and selling animal products ourselves, but 
we should not prohibit and punish others.  
7.2.4 Self-defense against culpable attackers and innocent threats 
Non-ideal theory also deals with situations of self-defense against attackers who violate 
a moral rule. To discuss this issue, let us consider a trolley problem that represents a 
rather broad picture of self-defense against both culpable and innocent threats.  
Imagine some people start driving a trolley, and this trolley is then heading towards a 
number of potential victims on the main track. If the people in the trolley have the 
intention to hit the victims, and if there is no sufficiently strong justification to hit the 
victims, then those people in the trolley are culpable attackers. In general, a culpable 
attacker is someone who consciously wants to do an action that violates a moral rule; in 
particular an action that decreases the welfare function or the more general moral 
weight (that contains the welfare function plus some additional terms that represent 
violations of the mere means principle). It might also be the case that the people in the 
trolley are unaware of the victims on the main track (i.e. they are misinformed), are 
coerced to start the trolley (i.e. they act under duress), or are innocent in some other 
way (i.e. they are insane or hypnotized). In those cases, the people in the trolley are 
innocent threats.   
Furthermore, imagine that the potential victims can save themselves by turning a 
switch that sends the trolley to a side track. This side track ends in a ravine, so turning 
the switch will result in harming the people sitting in the trolley. But on this side track, 
there may be a number of innocent bystanders who also might be harmed when the 
switch is turned.  
From a moral point of view, I make no distinction between innocent bystanders on 
the side track and innocent threats in the trolley. So in general we have a number of NV 
potential victims on the main track, NC culpable attackers in the trolley and NI innocent 
people in the trolley and on the side track. The level of damage per person that might 
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befall each of the potential victims if they don’t defend themselves is dV.
11 Hence, the 
total damage of all the victims when they don’t defend themselves is NVdV. Similarly, if 
the victims defend themselves by turning the switch, they cause total damage NIdI* and 
NCdC* to respectively the innocent people and the culpable attackers. (The * refers to 
the situation where the victims act in order to defend themselves.) To make it more 
general, we can also consider a damage NVdV* that the victims might still receive even 
when they defend themselves (for example when turning the switch would be harmful 
for the defending victims as well), and a damage NIdI that the innocent people get when 
the victims do not defend themselves (for example when the innocent people on the 
side track are blown away by the trolley passing by at full speed on the close-by main 
track, or when the innocent people in the trolley get hurt when the trolley hits the 
victims on the main track).  
The question now is: when is it allowed for the potential victims to defend 
themselves, respecting a proportionality condition on self-defense? There are three 
proportionality constraints that the defending victims should respect. First, the most 
obvious constraint: in their defense, the potential victims should take the option that 
avoids any unnecessary harm. If the same results could be achieved with a lesser harm, 
then they should opt for the defensive action that causes the lesser harm. 
Second, note that the culpable attackers, by consciously wanting to violate a moral 
rule (i.e. consciously wanting to decrease the welfare function or moral weight), place 
themselves in a sense outside of morality. In that case, the defending victims should 
avoid decreasing the restricted welfare function or moral weight. This restriction means 
that the harms (the loss of lifetime well-being) suffered by the culpable attackers as a 
result of the defensive action of the potential victims, are not included in the equation. 
In other words, in the restricted welfare function the levels of lifetime well-being of the 
culpable attackers is constant and equal to the levels they would have when they did 
not violate the moral rule. Hence, a defensive action by the potential victims is allowed 
if the following inequality constraint is satisfied: 
    
      
             
This means that the total harm of the defensive action (excluding the culpable 
attackers) should be lower than the harm suffered by the victims and innocent people 
when the victims don’t defend themselves. Here, again, the harm is measured by the 
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 Looking at the welfare function, this damage per person might be written as     (     (    
 , with 
    the loss of lifetime well-being of a victim. When a victim is used as merely a means, the damage becomes 
much bigger, because dV includes the parameter rV that measures the victim’s basic right violation.  
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decrease in welfare function or moral weight. The harms suffered by the culpable 
attackers are not included in this inequality constraint.12 
What if we suppose that the culpable attackers should be treated exactly as innocent 
threats? Imagine there are five culpable attackers (NC=5) and only one potential victim 
(NV=1). The lifetime well-being of the five attackers might trump the lifetime well-being 
of the one potential victim. This would mean that if the life of the victim is at stake, the 
defensive action of the victim should not result in the death of more than one of the 
attackers. This seems counter-intuitive. If you are attacked by five killers, you are 
allowed to kill all of them in self-defense, if killing them is the least harmful option you 
have in your defense. 
As an example of animal ethics, consider a person being attacked by five predators. If 
the only option of self-defense is to kill everyone of those five predators, then my moral 
intuition says that the attacked person is allowed do kill all five predators, even when 
the death of five predators might be worse (in terms of loss of lifetime well-being) than 
the death of one prey.13 
That is why the harms caused to the culpable attackers should not be included in the 
welfare function or the moral weight. But the culpable attackers are not completely 
placed outside of morality. True, the culpable attackers consciously violate a moral rule 
against harming others. The total damage they cause is D=NVdV+NIdI. Are the victims in 
their defense allowed to do anything with the culpable attackers? No, there is a third 
proportionality constraint that they should respect, given by the following inequality 
  
               
In other words: to make the permissibility of self-defense in line with our moral 
intuitions, we can state that each single culpable attacker who consciously wants to 
cause a total level of damage D is liable to that amount of damage in the defensive action 
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 The permissibility of self-defense is determined by the choice between the welfare function W(xI,xV,xC’) 
where the potential victims (who have a well-being xV) do not defend themselves, and W*(xI*,xV*,xC’) where 
the potential victims defend themselves. Note that the culpable attackers have the constant lifetime well-
being xC’ instead of xC  and xC*. This constant lifetime well-being is the level the culpable attackers would have 
when they did not attack, i.e. when they did not violate a moral rule. Similarly, in the welfare function of the 
psychological connectedness description, we fix the value of  ̂  (  , i.e. the integrated well-being of a person 
who has at time t the culpable intention to violate a moral rule, when that person did not violate that rule (as 
indicated by the quotation mark’). The extra constraint on self-defense in this formulation becomes more 
complicated. One option is for example:   (  
   ̂  (    ̂ (  
      ∑ ( ̂ (  
   ̂ (   
  (  
 (  , i.e. the damage to 
the culpable person (the difference of the integrated well-being between the no-attack situation and the 
defense situation) is less than the time-maximum of the sum of damages of all victims (the difference between 
the no-attack situation and the no-defense situation).  
13
 In chapter Chapter 10 I will argue that predators are still allowed to hunt. This does not contradict the 
permissibility of prey to defend themselves. 
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by the victims. Hence, the maximum permissible level of damage dC* that the victims 
can cause to each one of the culpable attackers is D.  
This third proportionality constraint does not follow from the maximization of the 
welfare function or the moral weight. It is a constraint that is applicable only to non-
ideal situations, where some people consciously want to violate the welfare function. So 
we should follow the following conditional rule: “Maximize the welfare function, unless 
others (the culpable attackers) consciously don’t. In that case, maximize the restricted 
welfare function (excluding the harms suffered by the culpable attackers) and respect 
the proportionality constraint on the harms of the culpable attackers.” If everyone 
complies with this rule (the ideal situation), the welfare function is obviously 
maximized. But compared to the unconditional rule “Maximize the welfare function”, 
this conditional rule works better in non-ideal situations: it better fits with our moral 
intuitions about self-defense. 
7.2.5 Summary 
In summary, we start by looking at an ideal theory. In a Utopian world with universal 
compliance, we could derive the following rule that generates the best outcome relative 
to our theories of equality: don’t consume, trade or produce animal products. This rule 
should also be applicable to a non-ideal world. On the other hand, ideal theory could not 
make a decision between the rules of prohibition versus non-prohibition. Then we have 
to look at a non-ideal world lacking universal compliance. In such a world, under certain 
specific conditions (resulting in an iron law of prohibition), non-prohibition (non-
punishment) would be preferable. These conditions might be met for alcohol production 
and trade, but likely not for animal products. Non-ideal theory is also relevant to derive 
proportionality constraints in defensive action.  
So far for universalization with respect to the agents. In the next section, I will shed 
more light on the second kind of universalization, with respect to the patients. This 
relates to discrimination as a violation of the formal principle of equality. But 
discrimination is also related to ideologies of hierarchic dualisms. Before I argue in the 
next chapter that speciesism is a discriminatory hierarchic dualism, I will briefly discuss 
the properties of hierarchic dualisms. 
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7.3 Formal equality, discrimination and hierarchic dualism  
Formal equality is related to the notion of discrimination. Let’s define discrimination as 
causing a disadvantage to an individual (or a group), based on a value-laden distinction 
between individuals (or groups), where the distinction is not justified or refers to 
properties of the individuals (or groups) that are not deemed morally relevant in that 
situation.   
In other words: a person A discriminates B against C, if A believes (and acts on the 
belief) that B has lower value than C (meaning C should have more rights, advantages or 
opportunities than B), where this value difference has no justification or is derived from 
properties of B and C that are not morally relevant or are not an acceptable motive for 
the decisions and behavior of A.   
The question is: what are morally (ir)relevant properties or criteria? In part 3 I will 
argue that being human is not a relevant property, and sentience is. But for now, if we 
place it in the QMM-framework, the answer is simple: morally relevant properties are 
all properties that are related to improving the value of life of all individuals who have a 
well-being, in line with the QMM-principle. We argued that desert based and resource 
based principles follow from QMM. So morally relevant properties are amongst other 
things: desert (contribution to the value of life of others), effort, incurred costs and 
personal responsibility. 
We now move from the QMM-principle to the principle of tolerated choice. In the 
burning house, we would save our own child instead of an unknown child. Now, the 
tricky point is that your child is not more deserving or responsible, simply because it is 
your child. Actually, the fact that it is your child is not important in the light of QMM-
theory. Of course, if you lose your child, your value of life will be affected. But don’t 
forget that the parents of the other child in the burning house will also feel sad when 
their child dies. The death of your child is as bad as the death of the other child, if we 
look at QMM-theory.  
So do we have discrimination? In some sense yes: there is an emotional inequality in 
our behavior towards different children. Yet, there can still be some subtle form of 
equality present, which is the tolerated choice equality. It is related to the words ‘value-
laden’ in the definition of discrimination. What do we mean by this? Suppose the parent 
of the other child passes the burning house, and saves his child. There are two ways how 
you can react. You can say that what that person did was immoral, because your child 
has more intrinsic value, a higher moral status or a stronger moral right to live. Or you 
can say that, although you regret that your child died, you accept and tolerate the 
choice of that person to save his child. In the latter case, you and the other parent are in 
some sense equal, and therefore your children inherit a tolerated choice equality, 
although there is an emotional inequality from your point of view.  
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As we have seen, there is one subtlety with tolerated choice equality: what if a white 
employer refuses to give work to a black person? If the judgment of the employer is 
based on prejudice, the employer makes a value-laden distinction between white and 
black employees, which is racist discrimination.  
Hence, tolerated choice equality should be distinguished from a moral value-laden 
inequality, which results form a discriminatory ideology such as racism, sexism or 
speciecism (Ryder, 1975). These kind of ideologies are hierarchical dualisms (Plumwood, 
1993) between an upper side (the oppressors) and a lower side (the oppressed). 
Hierarchical dualisms can be characterized by one or more of the following properties 
(this is a small extension of the theory of Plumwood). 
1) The lower side is radically excluded from the upper side, by believing that there is 
a deep gap between the two sides. Any overlapping between the two sides is denied.  
2) The lower side is negatively defined: the oppressed lack the properties which are 
used by the oppressors to justify the oppression.  
3) The lower side is homogenized, individual differences between people from the 
lower side are denied, by use of e.g. stereotyping. 
4) The lower side is marginalized: the oppressors do not show care and empathy. The 
personalities and needs of the oppressed are denied or scorned.  
5) The lower side is unjustly criminalized, they are the scapegoats. The innocence of 
the lower side is denied. 
6) The lower side is instrumentalized (objectified), they are used as tools, as means to 
the ends of the upper side. The intrinsic value of the lower side is denied. 
The first three characteristics are psychological mechanisms to sustain and justify 
unequal treatment. These mechanisms result in violations of the tolerated choice 
principle. Characteristics 4 and 5 are violations of the QMM-principle. The sixth is a 
violation of the basic right principle. So we see that our three material principles of 
equality are related to ideologies of hierarchical dualisms. When one or more of these 
characteristics are present, there is a value-laden difference, and we can speak of 
immoral discrimination.  
In the next part of this dissertation, we move from normative ethics to applied ethics, 
in particular to applied animal ethics. An animal ethic gives a fundamental critique on 
the ideology of speciesism. Looking at the above six characteristics of hierarchical 
dualisms, all of them are present in our current speciest society, just like they are 
present in racist and sexist societies. Although this is not yet proof that speciesism is a 
kind of immoral discrimination comparable to racism and sexism, it strongly enforces 
that idea. The proof will be given in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 Speciesism as a moral illusion1 
8.1 The current situation: patho-anthropocentrism 
In this chapter I argue that speciesism is based on a moral illusion. The species 
boundary is not morally relevant. Sentience is the morally relevant criterion. Our 
current speciesist society is discriminating non-human sentient beings (animals).  
Anthropocentrism is the ideology that ascribes a central moral value to all humans 
(individuals belonging to the species Homo sapiens). However, not all entities with 
human DNA have an equally high moral status. In a lot of countries, abortion is legal2 
(not murder), and human embryos are also sometimes used in stem cell research and 
therapy. An often heard justification for this use of embryos (as merely a means, 
because those embryos die), is that those individuals have not yet developed a complex 
central nervous system that gives them the capacity to feel and be conscious. Apart 
from conservative religious people, most people are in favor of legal abortion and 
embryonic stem cell research and therapy. As a lot of other people, I do not consider a 
fertilized human egg cell as a human being. True, it has the complete genome of a 
human being, but by that criterion a skin cell would also be a human being. At most, the 
fertilized egg cell can (under the right circumstances) develop into a human being.  
It appears that there is some fuzziness when exactly we call a being a human being. A 
lot of people are in favor of using non-sentient embryonic humanlike beings as merely a 
means in scientific research to help other people. So, the criterion of sentience already 
drips in the ideology of anthropocentrism. Feelings are relevant as well, so we might 
 
                                                     
1
 Sections 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 are based on Can Speciesism be a Moral Illusion?, submitted to Journal of 
Moral Philosophy. Section 8.8 is based on Bruers (2013), Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic, Philosophia. 
2
 However, the legality of abortion (especially in cases of rape) does not yet imply that human fetuses and 
embryos have a low moral status. One could argue that the fetus is not allowed to use the pregnant woman as 
merely a means. The pregnant woman has autonomy over her body. 
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rather call the current ideology ‘patho-anthropocentrism’ (although this still might be 
an oversimplification of our current society). This states that sentient humans have the 
basic right and belong to the moral community.3 Figure 12 illustrates this.  
 
 
Figure 12: the moral community according to patho-anthropocentrism 
 
I am now going to argue that it is a kind of discrimination to include the criterion 
‘Homo sapiens’. If we value a sentient Homo sapiens higher than another sentient being, 
then this is a kind of moral illusion. 
8.2 Moral illusions and discrimination 
The Müller-Lyer optical illusion, presented in the first part of this dissertation, is a very 
illuminating analogy of the moral illusion of discrimination. It can be used to represent 
speciesism (Ryder, 1975; Singer, 1975; Regan, 1983). The suggested correspondence can 
be seen as follows. 
The two horizontal lines in the figure can be interpreted as the respective moral 
statuses (or intrinsic values) of a non-human animal and a human. The length of the line 
segment is the analogue of the level of moral status. A lot of people have the intuition 
that the moral status of a pig is lower than the moral status of a human, just like a lot of 
people have the intuition that the upper line segment is shorter than the lower one.  
The small lines (arrowheads) represent the morally irrelevant properties, such as 
specific genes, physical appearance (such as having a tail), or having the capacity to get 
 
                                                     
3
 Note that also conservative religious people value sentience in some sense, because sentience is an 
important aspect of their notion of the soul, and they believe a soul enters the body at the moment of 
conception. Scientifically, this is not true: there is no evidence for this and it is against a coherent scientific 
theory that says that brains generate sentience. 
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fertile offspring with someone. Those things do not matter, just like having a white skin 
color or having a penis doesn’t matter for moral status. But according to racists, skin 
color does influence their intuitive judgment that black people have a lower moral 
status. Just like those morally irrelevant criteria, the arrowheads in the figure are 
geometrically irrelevant as well. They do not determine the lengths of the two 
horizontal line segments. As we have seen, this is the notion of context independence.  
We can now make the analogy with discrimination: If you judge that the two 
horizontal lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are dissimilar whereas in reality they are 
not, then you discriminate. If the lines are in reality dissimilar, then judging them to be 
different in length is not discrimination. 
We have seen that not everyone is susceptible to the Müller-Lyer illusion (some 
indigenous people have no differential judgment when they grow up in environments 
without straight lines of tables and staircases), and we have seen how the underlying 
psychological mechanism works (3D adaptation of a 2D image). We also know something 
about the psychological mechanisms behind discrimination. It is based on an in-group-
out-group bias (Tajfel, 1981; Whitley & Kite, 2010). Although in-group-out-group value 
judgments occur intuitively, several studies (Kurzban et al., 2001; Cosmides et al., 2003) 
demonstrated that the choice of in-group-out-group (e.g. based on race) is not inborn, 
but is culturally dependent and can be influenced by changing cultures. Speciesism is 
also culturally dependant. In some cultures (e.g. Jainism) and in a big part of the animal 
rights movement, people do not (or no longer) have the prejudicial judgment that the 
moral status of humans is higher than other animals. The intuitive judgment is not 
universal and not inborn. But people growing up in a speciesist society assimilate this 
ideology until they get this discriminating moral intuition. The same happened with 
people growing up in racist societies. They often perceive their in-group-out-group 
distinction as being natural, but it is not.  
Similarly, people growing up in an environment with houses and tables, often see 
straight edges, and therefore they assimilate optical intuitions about lengths of lines. 
The disposition for such an assimilation process is natural (inborn), but the result is not. 
In-group-out-group thinking is natural, inborn and universal as well, but the result 
(which group is the in-group), is not.  
This means that ideologies such as white-dominant racism, male-dominant sexism or 
human-dominant speciesism are strongly culturally determined. These ideologies are 
not universal, and perhaps the underlying intuitions behind those ideologies are more 
flexible and can change more rapidly than some of our ‘deeper’ moral instincts. The 
dividing line between the ingroup and the outgroup can be influenced by society and is 
vulnerable to change. It remains to be seen whether intuitions behind e.g. the mere 
means principle are equally flexible and influenced by culture. Although there remains 
some experimental controversy (Sachdeva et al., 2011), I slightly expect that those 
intuitions behind e.g. the mere means and QMM principles are more universally ‘hard 
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wired’ in our brains. Some evidence for this ‘universal moral grammar’ hypothesis can 
be found in Mikhail (2000; 2007), Hauser et al. (2008) and O’Neill & Petrinovich (1998). 
8.3 How do we know whether speciesism is a moral illusion? 
In the Muller-Lyer illusion we had reliable instruments to demonstrate that it is an 
illusion: we could use a measuring stick or something to cover the small lines. In ethics, 
our reliable instruments are valid arguments, so we need arguments based on ethical 
principles that form a coherent system and are compatible with our strongest moral 
intuitions. These two requirements, coherence and compatibility, are very important. In 
the optical illusion, we used a coherent theory of geometry, which is compatible with 
two very strong intuitions: translation invariance and context independence. If we want 
to argue that speciesism is really discrimination, we need tools of similar power.   
And we have those tools. We will present no less than ten arguments: five arguments 
against the species boundary (to demonstrate that the criterion Homo sapiens is not 
morally relevant), and five other arguments to show that sentience is really important. 
Those ten arguments are also based on moral intuitions, some of them quite strong. And 
they form a coherent theory: the arguments mutually support each other. For the 
speciesist it would be very difficult to attack this system.  
The five arguments against the species boundary can be compared with the principle 
of context independence in the Müller-Lyer illusion. The five other arguments in favor 
of sentience can be compared with the principle of translation invariance. So, as in the 
Müller-Lyer figure, we have one intuition (the human-animal value difference in ethics 
or the length difference in geometry) which is in contradiction with several other 
intuitions (e.g. the importance of impartiality in ethics and the context independence in 
geometry). And as in the optical illusion, in the moral illusion we have two options. 
First, we could abandon all ten arguments and their underlying strong moral intuitions. 
This would save our intuitive judgment about the human-animal value distinction. Or, 
second, we could admit that this value distinction is an illusion, and we can save the 
stronger moral intuitions. I believe that the combination of the latter ten intuitions 
(underlying the ten arguments) is stronger than the one intuition about the value of 
humans versus animals. So the easiest thing to do is to acknowledge that this human-
animal value distinction is a moral illusion, similar to the optical illusion in geometry. 
This acknowledgment is furthermore acceptable if we keep in mind that the in-group-
out-group distinction is – just as the Müller-Lyer illusion – not inborn but culturally 
dependent. And the fact that even after realizing it is an illusion, the intuition persists, 
does not justify this intuition. The Müller-Lyer intuition, too, was ‘cognitively 
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impenetrable’ (Pylyshyn, 1999): our intuition keeps on saying the one line appears to be 
longer than the other, even after we have measured them.  
Before we give the ten arguments, I suggest we first have a look at the following 
figure.  
 
 
Figure 13: mental capacities of responsive beings 
 
Each vertical bar in the above figure represents a responsive being (an animal with a 
nervous system). We can (for simplicity’s sake) consider three mental capacities: 
sentience, self-consciousness and moral consciousness. These capacities are represented 
as grey horizontal bars, because the thresholds are often vague. When does a being 
exactly have a moral consciousness? Although the threshold is vague, we can clearly see 
that only humans (but not all of them!) possess a moral consciousness. Non-human 
great apes (but not all of them!) possess self-consciousness. And quite a lot of animals 
possess sentience.  
Looking at this figure, how do we decide the moral community? Which vertical bars 
(individuals) do we take into account? Racists only considered white people (and 
perhaps not all white people). Speciesists could consider all Homo sapiens. But what 
about great apes and potential human-animal hybrids? (See next section to learn more 
about such hybrids.)  
Another possibility is to take only the vertical bars that reach above some threshold. 
E.g. Kant (1785), Rawls (1971), Cohen (1997), Scruton (1998) and many other anti-animal 
rights philosophers took only those beings who have a moral consciousness. So they did 
not know what to do with the humans below the threshold of moral agency. A lot of 
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anti-animal rights philosophers refer to such mental capacities that mentally disabled 
persons lack. For people who are concerned about the rights of those disabled persons, 
this approach is often offensive.  
But I suppose that the argument from marginal cases is valid (Dombrowski, 1997), 
meaning that mentally disabled human orphans have a high moral status and basic 
rights (as they have in modern societies). In other words: criteria such as higher mental 
capacities, language, self-consciousness, moral consciousness or social bonds are already 
excluded and are morally irrelevant in the contexts I am thinking about, i.e. when it 
comes to our treatment of animals for food or experiments.  
The great ape project (Singer, 1993) might take self-consciousness as the relevant 
threshold. But even proponents of this project exclude some seriously mentally disabled 
humans. I will argue that we’d better take the threshold of sentience. This includes 
almost all mentally disabled humans. Only those human beings who are merely alive or 
responsive but not sentient, would be excluded. (But as we have seen in the chapter 
about the basic right, also responsive and living beings should be given some weaker 
version of the basic right.) 
In the next section I give five arguments against the species boundary, and five other 
arguments in favor of the sentience criterion. Some important remarks are in order 
before I present the arguments.  
1) With moral status, I am referring to an agent-independent moral status, which 
means agent-dependent relational aspects are not (and cannot be) the basis of the 
human-animal distinction in our current society. Consider the burning-house dilemma: 
I have to choose between saving my child or the dog. I prefer to save my child, because I 
feel a stronger connection or relationship with my child than with the dog. I also feel a 
stronger connection with my child than with yours, so again I would prefer to save my 
child. Some partiality might be allowed, as long as we tolerate similar levels of partiality 
of other moral agents. I would tolerate your choice to save your child instead of mine. 
But if I believe that my child has a higher moral status independent from my 
relationship with my child, I would not tolerate your choice to save someone with a 
lower moral status, and this will become a kind of discrimination.  
The agent-relative relational moral status is important in an ethic of care, but cannot 
explain the huge gap in moral status between humans and non-human animals in our 
current society. The partiality reflected in this gap is intolerably big, because we would 
not tolerate similar partiality in the other direction, where animals would have the 
status that humans have now, and vice versa. We would not tolerate that a non-human 
animal would kill and eat a human just for taste. Similarly, I would tolerate your choice 
to save your child instead of mine from the burning house, but I would definitely not 
tolerate that you kill my child for the gustatory pleasures of your child. Your special 
relation with your child does not allow you to do the latter.    
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2) I am supposing a moral individualism as defined by McMahan (2005) and Rachels 
(1990): the agent-independent moral status of an individual is uniquely determined by 
his/her own particular characteristics. Hence, his/her group memberships are 
irrelevant. In fact, this assumption is an analogue of the principle of context 
independence in the Müller-Lyer figure: the length of a line segment is uniquely 
determined by an intrinsic property and its belonging to the group of line segments 
with outward pointing arrowheads should have no influence. Moral individualism takes 
an eraser to gum out the irrelevant elements such as group memberships. 
3) When I refer to species, I refer to the biological (scientific) notion of a species, and 
when I refer to humans, I refer to the species Homo sapiens. This might seem obvious, 
but I don’t want to target a straw man: people who defend speciesism refer to ‘humans’ 
and ‘species’, and I don’t know of any other notion that makes sense of these terms 
apart from the biological notion. Some philosophers defend speciesism, not by relying 
on the scientific notion of species, but rather by using a ‘folk’ notion of ‘human beings’ 
as a (natural) kind (e.g. Chappell, 2011). However, those philosophers are not clear on 
whether the group of human beings (according to the folk notion) equals the group of 
Homo sapiens (according to the biological notion). If those two groups are identical, 
there are two options: either this equality is a mere coincidence, or there is a (causal) 
explanation of why these two groups coincide. The former case is very unlikely, the 
latter case means that the folk notion can be reduced to the scientific notion (or 
perhaps the scientific notion is based on the folk notion, which means that biologists 
would be guided by folk intuitions). If the two groups are not identical, those 
philosophers should clarify what which human beings are not Homo sapiens or which 
Homo sapiens are not human beings. 
In the section on essentialism and heuristics, I will elaborate more on folk notions of 
natural kinds. 
4) I do not assume that all speciesists (people believing in the status gap between 
humans and animals) believe that species is the only morally relevant criterion for 
moral status. In fact, speciesists who defend stem cell research or abortion likely include 
sentience as necessary criterion, next to species membership. According to them, non-
sentient humans such as fertilized embryos have a lower moral status. And most 
speciesists also support animal welfare laws, which implies again that sentience has 
some importance. 
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8.4 Five arguments against the species boundary 
The arguments that I will present, are based on a moral intuition: in order to avoid the 
risk of opportunism in our ethics, we should try to avoid adding arbitrary, artificial, 
farfetched or fuzzy elements to our ethical system. The arguments are strongly based on 
the biological sciences. As Rachels (1990) and Hull (1986) demonstrated, especially the 
Darwinian paradigm undermines some metaphysical beliefs about ‘humanity’, ‘human 
nature’ or ‘the human kind’. 
1) The biological species boundary is arbitrary. There are two kinds of arbitrariness: a 
vertical and a horizontal one. The vertical arbitrariness asks the question why we 
should select ‘species’ from the list of biological categories? I belong to the kingdom of 
animals, the phylum of chordates and vertebrates, the class of mammals, the infraclass 
of eutheria, the order of primates, the suborder of dry-nosed primates, the infraorder of 
simians, the superfamily of Hominoidea, the family of great apes, the genus Homo, the 
species Homo sapiens, the subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens and the ethnic group of 
whites. There are different genetic affinities. It is arbitrary to pick out the species. One 
could reply that individuals within a species are characterized by similarities (in terms 
of e.g. common genetic heritage, physiology or behavior), but the same goes for the 
other biological categories. There are multiple similarities, and they come in degrees. It 
remains arbitrary to pick out some similarities as being important, and also to pick out a 
specific degree of those similarities as being important.  
Next to vertical arbitrariness, horizontal arbitrariness asks that, if we select species 
as the relevant category, why should we take one species instead of another? Also the 
choice for a specific species amongst the many species is arbitrary.  
Note again that the existence of mentally disabled humans demonstrates that there is 
no exact correlation between mental capacities and species. Note also that referring to a 
folk concept of ‘human being’ as a kind (as proposed by e.g. Chappell, 2011) instead of a 
specific biological conception currently favored by science, would not avoid the 
arbitrariness. Not only is the notion of a ‘kind’ ambiguous (is it a natural property or a 
construct?), each clarification of this notion results in the observation that there are 
many possible ‘kinds’. If ‘human being’ is a kind, then for example ‘primate’, ‘two-legged 
being’ or ‘caucasian’ can be kinds as well. It is not clear why the kind of human beings is 
an exceptional kind, compared to the many other possible kinds that one can think of.  
Also other discriminations have a double arbitrariness. For example in religion, there 
are the groups of Benedictines, Roman Catholics, Catholics, Christians, Abrahamists,… 
Why should people in Northern-Ireland pick the third category in this row? And within 
this category, why should they pick Catholics instead of Protestants? The same applies 
to ethnicity: it is arbitrary to pick the second category in the ranking of a) people from 
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Antwerp, b) the Flemish people, c) Belgians and d) Europeans. And it is arbitrary to 
prefer the Flemish people to the Walloon people in Belgium.   
2) The biological definition of species is very complicated and too artificial and 
farfetched to be used in a moral system. One of the many definitions of species refers to 
the possibility of interbreeding and getting fertile offspring. But why should this 
possibility be relevant? It is too farfetched to say that a being has a moral status if its 
close relatives (parents) could have gotten fertile offspring with some other morally 
relevant beings. (I refer to its close relatives because the individual itself could be 
infertile.) It is unfair that an individual gets rights because his parents are able to do 
something with others. It is unjust to take a principle where non-human animals simply 
have bad luck having the wrong parents.  
Related to this is the issue of so called ring species such as the Larus gulls, the 
Ensatina salamanders or the Greenish Warbler. Such ring species consist of different 
populations, whereby A can get fertile offspring with B, B with C, C with D, but D not 
anymore with A. Just as populations of ring species are spatially related to each other, 
we can say that all species in nature are temporally related in a similar way. Ring species 
"are only showing us in the spatial dimension something that must always happen in 
the time dimension." (Dawkins, 2004, p.303). Look at the phylogenetic tree.  A modern 
Homo sapiens could have fertile offspring with an ancestor, that ancestor with an older 
ancestor, and so moving up a branch of the phylogenetic tree until we reach a common 
ancestor of both Homo sapiens and another species. Then we move down the branch of 
that other species. So there is a chain of populations connecting our species to any other 
species. The clue is that the higher moral status of A (a Homo sapiens) compared to D 
(an individual of another species) strongly depends on the fact that B and C are dead. 
Formulated this way, it becomes clear that such dependency on the accidental non-
existence of individuals cannot be morally relevant.  
Again one might object that speciesism does not refer to the biological notion of 
species, but to the folk concept of ‘human being’ as a kind. But this escape maneuver 
does not work either: the folk concept is perhaps even more complicated than the 
biological concept of a species. The folk concept of ‘human being’ might be based on a 
pattern recognition: when we are confronted with an object, we can spontaneously 
recognize the pattern and see a human being. But if such a pattern recognition is based 
on an algorithm, it is a highly complicated algorithm. The folk notion looks trivial, but it 
is not.  
3) There is a potential fuzzy boundary: it is not unlikely that a human-chimpanzee 
hybrid (humanzee or chuman) can be born. Nearly 10% of mammal species can form 
interspecies hybrids. In the wild and in zoos, there exist lion-leopards, lion-tigers, 
camel-lamas, dolphin-killer whales, sheep-goats, grizzly bear-polar bears and off course 
the well known horse-donkeys (mules). If these are possible, and if the genetic distance 
between humans and chimpanzees is not larger than the distance between those 
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interbreeding species, it is possible that humanzees can be born. What would the moral 
status of this hybrid human be? There is an arbitrariness here as well. And what if a 
neanderthal (Homo neanderthalensis) would still exist? Would we give him the basic 
right? And what about other ancestors such as the Australophitecus and the Homo 
habilis? And there is more arbitrariness when we look at the possibility of human-
animal chimeras. A chimera is an individual composed of genetically distinct cells that 
originate from human and animal zygotes. The body cells of chimeras can range from 
100% human to 100% non-human. Where to draw the line of humanity? What would the 
moral status of such chimeric individuals be? And we could also genetically modify 
humans and animals. All of this blurs the line between humans and non-human animals. 
Science will not be able to propose criteria to determine whether beings such as 
neanderthals, hybrids, chimeras and genetically manipulated beings should be called 
‘human’, just as scientists are not able to determine whether grains of sand should be 
called a heap. This fuzziness is a philosophical issue, not a scientific one.  
Similar fuzzy boundaries occur in other kinds of discriminations: sexism is faced with 
different kinds of transsexuals and intersexuals (who have genital ambiguity or mixed 
chromosomal genotypes) and racism is faced with different kinds of mixed races such as 
mulattoes. This also makes it very complicated to define sex and race.  
4) Species boundary refers to genes or appearance, and these are not morally 
relevant, because racism and sexism are also often based on genes or appearances and 
antiracism/antisexism states that such a basis is not morally relevant. If we say that skin 
color (or the genes that generate skin color) is not morally relevant, we should apply 
this rule consistently (universally) and state that no reference to appearance or genes is 
morally relevant when it comes down to someone’s basic rights, as long as we do not 
have an argument that some appearances or genes are exceptional. A racist should be 
able to explain why skin color is morally relevant but e.g. hair color isn’t, and if he can’t 
explain it, then he should treat skin color as hair color. Otherwise we open the door for 
opportunism. So we should universalize the rule that genes and appearance are morally 
irrelevant for everyone in all situations related to basic rights violations. Also, there is 
no ‘interest gene’ connected to all and only to humans; there is no gene that makes a 
being to have interests.4 
5) Belonging to a certain species instead of another is not something that we can 
choose, it is not something we achieved, it is beyond our responsibility. Belonging to a 
certain species is also not related to subjective needs and preferences. Hence, we should 
not be rewarded for belonging to a species. We do not deserve special treatment by 
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 Recently, Liao (2010) developed a ‘genetic basis for moral agency’, but that approach was criticized by Grau 
(2010). I would add that this genetic basis account is as farfetched as genetics is complex. 
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having some specific genes. Giving a higher moral status to beings who did not choose 
to be born that way is in violation of the merit principle. If we are to be rewarded, it is 
not merely because we are born in some way rather than another, but because we either 
have a certain responsibility for an action (for example we did an effort or we 
contributed to something valuable) or we have needs and are able to subjectively 
experience and prefer things (for example we have a well-being and feel our needs). 
Moral advantages (rights, resources, opportunities,…) should be given to someone who 
deserves it or someone who needs it. But someone’s species is not related to merit 
(responsibility) nor need. On the other hand, as we will see below, sentience is related to 
having subjective needs and preferences, so sentience is a reason to give someone a 
moral advantage. 
 
Note that the above five arguments are very similar to the principle of context 
independence of the Müller-Lyer optical illusion. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, the 
irrelevant context (the arrowheads) was characterized by arbitrariness, artificiality and 
fuzziness. As the species distinction has those same characteristics, we can say that the 
species are part of an irrelevant context. The first, second and third arguments above 
are similar to the (vertical and horizontal) arbitrariness, artificiality and fuzziness of 
introducing a geometrical rule that says that four-legged figures with outward pointing 
arrowheads decrease the length of line segments.  
Also in the fourth argument, bodily appearance of a being is, just like the arrowheads, 
some external factor, and we have to universalize the rule that no external elements are 
important. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, this is the universalized rule that context is 
never important for determining a length. In daily life, we often (unconsciously) use the 
rule of context independence (you can simply ask an architect who makes a drawing of 
a house). It would be inconsistent to always use this rule, except in the case of the 
Müller-Lyer figure, because there is nothing really special about this figure. So we 
should apply context independence consistently. It would be strange that exactly in the 
Müller-Lyer figure context independence would not apply. That is why antiracists and 
antisexists should apply antidiscrimination consistently and hence become 
antispeciesists as well. 
8.5 Five arguments in favor of sentience 
In the previous part of this dissertation, I already addressed some arguments why 
sentience is morally relevant. In this section I summarize them again, and give a few 
more arguments. One of the reasons why there are different arguments for sentience is 
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that there are different moral virtues (empathy, impartiality, respect) and different 
normative systems. Different arguments for sentience stem from these different 
normative ethical systems and moral virtues. All the arguments have the same 
structure: starting with two assumptions (one factual and one value statement) one can 
derive that sentience is morally relevant. 
1) Welfare ethics (consequentialism) and fairness ethics (contractualism): 
Fact: Our own well-being matters to us.  
Value: Impartiality is important. The thought experiment of the veil of ignorance 
(Rawls, 1971) is a nice tool to check impartiality. John Rawls only limited his theory to 
rational beings. But this thought experiment can be made more impartial (more 
consistent) when applied to all entities in the universe, as was proposed by Rowlands 
(1997, 1998). Imagine that you might be any object or entity in the universe, but you 
don’t know who or what you might be. You could be a non-sentient thing without well-
being, or a sentient being. How would you like to be treated? If you were non-sentient, 
this question would not matter to you, because nothing done to you will influence your 
well-being. You would not experience or prefer anything. So being sentient will imply a 
different treatment, because well-being matters to you5.  
2) Virtue ethics and ethics of care: 
Fact: We can feel empathy with all and only with sentient beings (beings who can feel 
and have a well-being). 
Value: Developing the virtue of empathy (compassion) is important. 
3) Rights ethics (deontologism): 
Fact: A sentient being is a being that has interests and can subjectively feel its 
interests. Feelings are nothing but affective conscious mental states that indicate that 
needs or interests are satisfied or not. For example pain indicates that bodily integrity is 
not satisfied, fear indicates that safety is not satisfied.  
Value: Protection of interests by respecting rights is important. It is not farfetched to 
see a connection between rights, interests and feelings: feelings detect interests, 
interests are protected by rights. This is at least less farfetched than making a 
connection between e.g. rights and having certain genes, belonging to a certain 
biological group, or getting fertile offspring. 
4) Other ethics: 
 
                                                     
5
 Being human is not what would matter to you. To see this, ask yourself the question what you would prefer: 
you remain a human being but will be in a persistent coma without consciousness, or you turn into an animal 
but keep your mental capacities for well-being. I would prefer the latter, which means that I value mental 
capacities such as sentience more than biological categories such as species. Similarly, being male and being 
white is not what matters to me.  
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Fact: Mental capacities such as consciousness are something very complex and 
vulnerable in the universe.  
Value: We should protect and respect entities that have vulnerable and complex 
mental capacities. Having a consciousness is at least something much more remarkable 
than having the genes of an arbitrary species. If a sentient being becomes a non-sentient 
being, he loses something valuable and does not gain something in return. On the other 
hand, if a white person becomes a black person, he loses one skin color but gains 
another; if a man becomes a woman, he loses one sexual organ but gains another; if a 
human becomes a non-human animal, he loses some physical properties and genes, but 
gains other.   
5) The argument from marginal cases (Dombrowski, 1997): 
Fact: Perceptual consciousness (sentience) is the only mental capacity that mentally 
disabled humans share with other humans. 
Value: Our intuition says that mentally disabled persons are to be respected because 
of some inherent, mental capacity that they posses. The real reason why we help them 
is because they can suffer, they have interests, they can be harmed. Other reasons, such 
as indirect rights or a slippery slope argument made by Carruthers (1992), are in a sense 
disrespectful towards those individuals, because they deny their intrinsic value (see the 
heuristics argument in section 8.8). Neither is ‘being alive’ a sufficient criterion for 
giving mentally disabled persons rights, because human egg cells and embryos are also 
alive but they have a different moral status. 
 
The above five arguments cohere with each other and indicate that sentience is a 
basis for moral concern and moral status. It is not farfetched to see a connection 
between rights, interests and sentience. This is at least less farfetched than making a 
connection between e.g. rights and the possibility of getting fertile offspring.  
This set of five arguments is related to the translation invariance in the Müller-Lyer 
illusion. Just like length is an inherent property of a line segment, these arguments refer 
to a characteristic value of sentience. The first two arguments, which refer to 
impartiality and empathy, can be related to the idea that a ruler can be seen as a device 
to make our length judgments impartial (objective instead of subjective). As the ruler is 
a device to shift (translate) from one position to another, empathy and the veil of 
ignorance are (emotional and rational) devices that also help us to ‘translate’ ourselves 
into the positions of other sentient beings and measure how rich their emotional lives 
are (how important things are for them). Hence, impartiality in ethics is the analogue of 
translation invariance in geometry. Ethicists should develop compassion as a virtue, just 
as geometers should value the accuracy of rulers. 
One might argue that the notion of sentience also has fuzzy boundaries, just like the 
notion of a species, as we have discussed above. When is a being sentient? What about 
invertebrates, plants,…?  
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This is first of all a matter of fact (science). As we’ve seen, scientists do not have and 
will never find indicators to determine at what point a being (a hybrid, a chimera, an 
ancestor or a genetically modified person) should be called human. But scientists 
already do have quite a lot of indicators to test whether a being is sentient (see next 
chapter). And they will likely discover new indicators when they gain more knowledge 
about how consciousness works. The species boundary has an inherent fuzziness; the 
sentience boundary is rather a matter of scientific uncertainty. A being cannot be both 
sentient and non-sentient at the same time. A being cannot both feel and not feel 
something at the same time. As with computers: either the ‘sentience program’ works 
(is switched on), or it doesn’t. 6  
But a hybrid is half human and half non-human at the same time. A species always 
has an inherently arbitrary cut-off point. The boundary of a species is continuous, 
because a lot of properties that characterize a species are continuous properties. Hence, 
it is always arbitrary to select a point on this continuum. The cut-off point for sentience, 
on the other hand, is at the value of zero (i.e. the point where all positive and negative 
feelings become absent, where the ‘feelings program’ in the brains does not run). Such a 
zero point is (at least in theory) well-defined for sentience, but it is not well-defined for 
species. Look at all the ancestors of humans and ask the question: what exactly needs to 
be absent in order for an individual (an ancestor) to stop being a human being? This 
question cannot be answered in a non-arbitrary way. 
Second, in our culture, non-human animals already have some moral status: look at 
the animal welfare laws. These laws refer to the welfare (sentience) of animals, so we 
are already able to use this criterion, even when there is still some scientific uncertainty 
about e.g. invertebrates.  
Third, in human rights ethics as well there is scientific uncertainty about sentience: 
consider the discussion on abortion and stem cell research. There is scientific evidence 
that fertilized human egg cells are not (yet) sentient, so they have a lower moral status 
according to many people. Here also we are able to deal with this scientific uncertainty.  
Fourth, even if there is an inherent gradation in the levels of sentience (from simple 
to complex emotions), it is not really a threat to the theory, because it makes sense to 
couple the gradation of sentience to a gradation of moral status (see the chapter on the 
basic right, section 6.4). All beings with a developed, complex, functioning central 
nervous system, all beings with a level of sentience equal or higher than those of (most) 
vertebrates, developed human fetuses or mentally disabled humans, have a very high 
moral status.  
 
                                                     
6
 However, see the discussion about fractional number of minds (fractional consciousness) in section 4.6.8.  
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Fifth, if the sentience boundary is fuzzy, why add a second fuzzy boundary, the 
species? In ethics we should strive to avoid as much fuzzy notions as possible (otherwise 
we risk opportunism). We should delete the most arbitrary of the fuzzy boundaries: the 
species. 
Referring to the Müller-Lyer illusion, we see that line segments have a continuous 
gradation (from short to long), but that is different from the gradation of the angles of 
the arrowheads. The former is an inherent property of line segments, the second is 
something external (contextual). 
 
In summary, our current society has a patho-anthropocentric ethic. It takes two 
criteria into account: sentience and species. But it is better to drop the latter criterion, 
because the species boundary cannot determine or influence someone’s moral status, 
just like arrowheads cannot influence the length of a line segment. 
There is a very simple thought experiment that demonstrates that sentience, not 
species, is what matters. Imagine that tomorrow you will either remain a human being, 
but you will permanently lose consciousness, or you become a non-human sentient 
animal who is able to feel joy and other positive emotions. Which choice would you 
prefer? I would prefer the latter option.  
8.6 Speciesism and cognitive impenetrability 
As mentioned before, one characteristic of optical illusions is its cognitive 
impenetrability (Pylyshyn, 1999): even after measuring the lengths of the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, they still appear to be different. The question is whether speciesism has a 
similar kind of cognitive impenetrability: do our spontaneous, intuitive judgments 
regarding the moral status of humans versus animals still reflect some speciesism after 
we learn about the above arguments against speciesism? Although this question is 
difficult to answer, I am inclined to say yes, based on four reasons. 
First, in discussions with meat eaters, a lot of people remain speciesist after learning 
about the above arguments. Those people give inconsistent counter-arguments 
(fallacies) to justify speciesism. This looks like a moral dumbfounding (Haidt, 2001; 
2012), where people have strong intuitive moral judgments but fail to express a rational 
principle to explain their intuitive reactions. 
Second, even some animal rights activists exhibit some speciesist language that 
reflects essentialistic thinking (see next section). For example in discussions those 
animal rights activists often refer to the notion of humans. This might indicate that 
those antispeciesist animal rights activists have difficulties in overcoming the moral 
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illusion. My personal experience confirms this: I am an animal rights activist, but I am 
aware that I still have some intuitive speciesist judgments about the moral status of 
humans and animals. It takes some cognitive effort to overcome those intuitions, just as 
it takes a cognitive effort for utilitarians to overcome the strong emotional intuition 
that we should not push a fat man from a bridge in order to stop a runaway trolley 
(Greene et al. 2004; Greene, 2008).  
Third, it seems that a lot of antispeciesist animal rights activists have an emotionally 
different response towards eating human corpses versus non-human corpses. Eating 
dead human bodies (even if no human was killed and no human rights were violated) is 
accompanied with a strong feeling of moral disgust. A lot of animal rights activists do 
not have a similar strong feeling of disgust when it comes to eating dead animals (e.g. 
from road kill). It is unsure whether this difference in the feeling of disgust is related to 
a difference in moral status and whether it reflects a cognitive impenetrability of 
speciesism, but it might be an indicator.   
Fourth, perhaps the best scientific evidence that speciesism is to some degree 
cognitively impenetrable, comes from studies on implicit associations (Greenwald et al., 
1995; 1998; Devine, 2001). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is an experiment to 
measure spontaneous implicit attitudes that people have towards e.g. races. The 
reaction speed is measured when experimental subjects have to associate pairs of 
concepts. Those concepts can refer to races (e.g. faces of black and white people) and 
values (e.g. positive and negative words like ‘joy’ and ‘pain’). According to IAT studies, a 
lot of people have implicit racist attitudes, although those people have explicit 
antiracist attitudes: they can explicitly state that they are against racism and that they 
value black and white people equally, although they have shorter reaction times when 
they have to associate black people with negative values. Implicit prejudice and 
stereotyping might explain this difference between explicit and implicit attitudes 
(Devine, 2001).  
Although an IAT-test about speciesism is not yet performed, I expect that those IAT-
studies about racism and sexism can be extrapolated to speciesism. What these IAT-
studies show, is a kind of cognitive impenetrability: even if a racist learns everything 
about racist prejudices and stereotyping, even if s/he recognizes how immoral racism is 
(that race is arbitrary, artificial and not morally relevant), his/her implicit negative 
attitudes towards other races do not simply disappear.  
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8.7 Psychological background theories: human prejudices and 
essentialism 
One more thing needs explaining: what is the mechanism behind the moral illusion of 
speciesism? In the Müller-Lyer optical illusion, the coherent intuitions of context 
independence and translation invariance are brought into a ‘wide reflective 
equilibrium’ (Rawls, 1971) by introducing background theories about the underlying 
psychological mechanism. We know that the Müller-Lyer illusion is created by our 
brains, in order to adapt to 3D-vision. Our optical system has a bug; it’s stuck when 
looking at a 2D-image that reflects elements of 3D-perspective, such as the Müller-Lyer 
image. We have seen that our brains use a kind of heuristic (attribute substitution) to 
estimate lengths, using 3D-interpretations of e.g. staircases. 
Also in the case of speciesism we have some well-established psychological 
knowledge about prejudice, stereotyping, the influence of language and words,…  (see 
e.g. Plous, 2003, for some mechanisms behind prejudices towards animals). Let us 
summarize the psychological background theories that turn antispeciesism into a wide 
reflective equilibrium. 
In-group-out-group bias  
Psychologists studied the mechanisms behind optical illusions such as the Müller-Lyer 
illusion (Purves & Lotto, 2002). Also a lot of research has been done on the psychology of 
discrimination, focusing on e.g. stereotyping and prejudice (Whitley & Kite, 2010). In-
group-out-group discrimination is based on a cognitive bias: in-group-out-group bias or 
in-group favoritism (Tajfel, 1981; Whitley & Kite, 2010) refers to a pattern of favoring 
one’s in-group members over out-group members. This bias contains elements such as 
out-group homogeneity (Quattrone & Jones, 1980; Rubin & Badea, 2012), a pattern of 
underestimating the differences between out-group members. Also in the case of 
speciesism we have some well-established psychological knowledge about prejudice, 
stereotyping and the influence of language and words (see e.g. Plous, 2003). 
Essentialism 
Our brains appear to be trained in essentialist thinking to categorize groups. The first 
three arguments I presented against the species boundary indicate that there really is 
no essence related to a species (see also Hull, 1986). Essentialism means that there are 
characteristics that all elements of a specific set (e.g. a species) possess and elements of 
other sets don’t possess. All elements of that set can be accurately described and defined 
by those characteristics. That specific set therefore has a unique definition.  
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Essentialism in biology is rooted (or reflected) in ancient philosophical thinking (e.g. 
Platonism), as well as major religions. In those religions it is believed that there is 
something special to all and only to humans: all humans, and only humans, have an 
eternal soul, or are created in the image of God. But since Darwin, the scientific 
consensus says that there is nothing special about a species. It is just an arbitrary 
abstract classification with its limitations and difficulties (Rachels, 1990). Similarly, a 
racist thinks of races or ethnic groups as being essentialized natural groups, even 
though it is now well known that there really is no essence related to an ethnic group or 
race.  
Even more: several studies give explanations for this phenomena that people rapidly 
(but incorrectly) tend to categorize entities in terms of essentialized groups (Gil-White, 
2001). Our intuitions are not always in line with science. According to Gelman (2003) and 
many other psychologists, children and adults intuitively describe biological entities in 
essentialist terms. People (from different cultures and backgrounds) automatically think 
that biological categories have invisible essences (Bloom, 2010). As we have seen in the 
section on discrimination in part two of this dissertation, the psychological mechanisms 
of hierarchic dualisms also tend do work with essentialistic concepts: e.g. the big gap 
between the upper and lower side, the homogenization of the lower side,… 
Looking at the literature, it is remarkable how many people defending speciesism are 
essentialists, by referring to personhood or humanity (the human species) as a ‘kind’, 
having a ‘substantial nature’. (See e.g. Chappell, 2011; Cohen, 2001; Finnis, 1995, p.48; Lee 
& George, 2008; Scanlon, 1998, p.186; Scruton, 2000. See McMahan, 2005 and Tanner, 
2006, for an extensive critique of the ‘argument of kinds’.) 
This subtle mechanism is also reflected in our language. It is amazing how often one 
encounters human-centric notions in our culture without even noticing. Look again at 
the title of this section: what is the word ‘human’ doing there? Why not ‘primate’? Or 
look at definitions of discrimination: how often are these definitions already from the 
start restricted to humans (or persons, where a person automatically means a human)? 
If people might restrict the definition of discrimination to our species, then a racist is 
allowed to restrict this definition to whites. It is better to start from a really impartial 
definition, as we have done in the chapter about discrimination (section 7.3).  
Look at discussions between speciesists and vegans. How often do speciesist people 
respond with: “But humans…”? ‘The human’ does not exist. If it exists, then ‘the 
primate’ or ‘the mammal’ would also exist. Why does no-one mention them? 
Antispeciesists who grew up in a speciesist society, really have to ‘deprogram’ 
themselves. Often animal rights activists still use some essentialistic language. Once you 
are completely deprogrammed, you start to see how strange this constant referring to 
‘humans’ really is. It sounds like someone is constantly referring to ‘dry-nosed 
primates’. If you hear someone saying ‘humans and animals’, it sounds as crazy as 
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‘primates and animals’. The reader is invited to read any book on animal ethics, and to 
replace everywhere ‘humans’ into e.g. ‘primates’ or ‘placental mammals’.  
So if in a discussion about animal rights people respond by saying something like: 
“But most humans have rationality and the capacity of moral thinking”, the very same 
statement would be true for the family of great apes or perhaps also primates. Most 
great apes also have rationality (just count them: more than 6 billion great apes have 
high levels of rationality).7 And if species has an essence (of say rationality), why should 
the class of mammals not have an essence either? It is equally possible to look at 
mammals as a kind. If mentally disabled persons get special rights because they belong 
to the kind of humans with a rational nature (most humans have rationality), then it is 
also fair to say that humans do not get special rights, because they belong to the kind of 
mammals, lacking a rational nature (most mammals are not rational beings). Our 
language is strongly biased towards one group (the species of humans), by presenting 
this group as having a substantial nature or a kind. Meanwhile, it neglects the other 
possible groups, natures or kinds. 
Does language simply reflect our essentialist thinking, or is our essentialist thinking 
amplified by our language? In any case, the fact that a speciesist tends to think of 
species as essentialized groups does not imply that there is an essence to a species.  
Let’s briefly refer back to the Müller-Lyer illusion. We can say that straight lines have 
an important essence, as they are primitive geometrical objects or can be defined in a 
unique, simple way (e.g. zero curvature, shortest distance between points). But it would 
be strange to speak of an important essence related to all line segments having outward 
directing arrowheads. These figures do not form an important category of geometrical 
objects, because they are vaguely and arbitrarily defined. It requires a lot of information 
to correctly define such geometrical objects, just as it requires a lot of information to 
correctly define a species such as Homo sapiens. And many elements in those 
definitions will appear highly arbitrary. We built a geometry on lines; we do not built a 
geometry on special figures with arrowheads. Similarly, we should built an ethic on 
morally relevant criteria (e.g. well-being), not on highly complex categories such as 
species. 
There is more to say: essentialism is a very clear example of a heuristic that uses 
attribute substitution (see Sunstein, 2005). The next section gives an extensive 
discussion on speciesism as a prime example of a moral heuristic.8 
 
                                                     
7
 Interestingly, after hearing this statement, people often have an automatic response that most of the great 
apes do not have rationality: only humans have rationality, whereas orang-utans, gorillas, chimpanzees and 
bonobos do not. That is four against one. This is other evidence that people tend to think in terms of species 
(or genera, because there are different species of gorillas) instead of individuals. 
8
 The section is based on Bruers (2013a). 
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8.8 Speciesism as a moral heuristic 
Ever since Ryder (1971) introduced the term speciesism – a prejudicial discrimination on 
the basis of species membership – more than 40 years ago, it has attracted a great deal 
of controversy9. This chapter combines the philosophical reflections on speciesism with 
a recent development in moral psychology, namely moral heuristics (Sunstein, 2005).  
Do the test: ask any person what justifies our current use of animals for experiments, 
food, clothing or entertainment. Chances are high that you will hear an answer that 
sooner or later refers to a distinction between humans and non-human animals. Next, 
you can ask them what it is about humans that other animals lack and that justifies a 
different treatment of humans and animals. Most people will answer this question, so it 
is a common belief that this is a meaningful question. Now, again the chances are very 
high that the answer will refer to a mental capacity that most humans have and animals 
lack: self-consciousness, creativity, rational reflection, the ability to speak, understand 
ethics, sign social contracts, have a sense of justice, and many others. The list of authors 
and philosophers who have defended speciesism by referring to such mental capacities 
is long (see e.g. Carruthers, 1992; Cohen, 1997; Scruton, 1998).   
The antispeciesist now comes up with the ‘argument from marginal cases’ (see e.g. 
Dombrowski, 1997; Wilson, 2001), which might be better (more neutrally) termed 
‘argument from atypical humans’. Atypical humans refer to a minority group of Homo 
sapiens who lack mental capacities such as rationality. The argument says that such 
atypical humans exist, and giving those atypical humans a moral status comparable to 
typical humans would be inconsistent if the mental capacity is a necessary condition for 
moral status.  
Confronted with this argument from atypical humans, some people defending 
speciesism attempt to extend or refine their criteria in the hope of including all atypical 
humans (and still excluding all non-human animals). They refer to the potentiality of 
developing a certain mental capacity in the future, the possibility that they themselves 
might later become mentally handicapped, or the presence of interpersonal 
relationships between those atypical humans and typical humans.  
However, it is striking that those attempts are too often doomed to failure (some 
authors who have defended the argument from atypical humans against such attempts 
include: Dombrowski (1997), Huther (2005), McMahan (2005) and Tanner (2006, 2009)). 
The antispeciesist can persist by referring to more extraordinary atypical humans who 
 
                                                     
9
 For some recent discussions in the literature, see Bernstein (2004), Chappell (2011), Grau (2010), Horta 
(2010b), Lee and George (2008), Liao (2010), McMahan (2005), Nobis (2004) and Tanner (2009). 
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fall outside the scope of those extended and refined criteria. The abovementioned 
criteria are invalid when applied to for example an incurable, seriously mentally 
handicapped young orphan. Such human beings exist (in fact, I happen to be a foster 
parent of such a Vietnamese boy). I am not aware of any proposed set of mental 
capacities plus refinements that allows the inclusion of such humans in the moral 
realm, and at the same time excludes all non-human animals.  
In the many conversations that I have had, my opponents who defended speciesism 
often gave one final response: a simple affirmation that those extraordinary atypical 
humans are still humans and therefore should be protected. Strikingly, people giving 
such a response are often not aware of the circularity in this reasoning. And what is 
more: using the argument from atypical humans in such conversations often triggered 
reactions varying from indignation to overt outrage. 
8.8.1 The heuristics hypothesis 
For animal rights advocates, the above sounds very familiar. The hypothesis that I want 
to put forward is that this common speciesist thinking is based on a heuristic. Heuristics 
are intuitive, efficient rules of thumb applied when facing complex problems 
(Kahneman & Shane, 2002). As will become important in our discussion of speciesism, 
these heuristics work by a process called ‘attribute substitution’: our brains 
(unconsciously) substitute a computationally complex target attribute for a heuristic 
attribute that is easier to calculate or detect. In recent literature, as a spin-off of the 
work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982), the study of moral heuristics has gained some 
influence (Sunstein, 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong, Young & Cushman, 2010). In general, a 
heuristic works pretty well in most cases, but as Sunstein argued, in certain, atypical 
situations, moral heuristics might ‘misfire’ and create erroneous intuitive judgments. I 
am going to argue that this misfiring of the heuristic is exactly the case in situations 
with atypical humans. In fact, speciesism is a very clear example of the mechanism of 
attribute substitution. If the speciesism heuristic hypothesis is true, it can explain why a 
lot of people are ‘blind’ to the argument from atypical humans, why a lot of people do 
not seem to be aware that they deny the rights of mentally disabled humans when 
pointing at some complex mental capacities, and why the speciesism intuition is so 
obstinate.  
A lot of people have the conviction that moral status depends on a complex mental 
capacity, such as rationality. This mental property is the so-called target attribute of a 
being. But the problem of this target attribute is that it is difficult to detect. If we 
encounter a being, how can we quickly decide whether or not she has the relevant 
mental property? Our brains have found a solution: they unconsciously substitute the 
target attribute for a heuristic attribute that is easier to detect. This heuristic attribute 
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is based on something our brains are good at: pattern recognition (Margolis, 1987). For 
example, looking at figures, we can very quickly interpret a figure as the letter A, 
without being able to explain what exactly characterizes a letter A. Computers are not 
(yet) able to detect a letter so quickly. Similarly, looking at objects, we can very quickly 
determine whether it is a human, even if no-one is able to clarify what set of elements, 
conditions and characteristics defines a human being. We look at an individual and 
immediately see the pattern (face, behavior, etc.) that corresponds to a human, because 
our brains are trained that way. Now, looking at the set of objects that have the target 
attribute of rationality on the one hand, and the set of objects that have the heuristic 
attribute of a human being on the other hand, we see a strong overlap between these 
two sets, with a low percentage of exceptions. The exceptions are the atypical humans. 
Most beings that have the ‘human pattern’ also have the target attribute. So our brains 
use the species criterion (our human recognition capacity) as a heuristic. When an 
object looks like a human, when it has the characteristic pattern of a human, intuition 
says that the object has the target attribute mental capacity as well. This ‘speciesism’ or 
‘looks-like-a-human’ heuristic works pretty well in most cases, but not in the atypical 
cases. If speciesism is a heuristic, it explains why antispeciesist people so often refer to 
the argument from atypical cases.  
The speciesism heuristic becomes particularly clear in the recent work of, among 
others, Chappell (2011), who refers to a ‘folk’ notion of human species (which – as I 
interpret it – is based on our pattern recognition skills) to determine who counts as a 
person: “In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we 
start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is 
part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the 
first place. And that pre-identification typically runs on biological lines.” (Chappell, 
2011, p.1). The pre-identification is nothing but the attribute substitution: our brains 
immediately and unconsciously substitute the target attribute (a property of 
personhood – or what Chappell and others might have in mind: a complex pattern of 
mental properties that constitute personhood) for a heuristic attribute (that “runs on 
biological lines”). 
Even though we know that heuristics can sometimes result in erroneous intuitions or 
judgments, it does not imply that we are better off without heuristics. Sunstein (2005) 
and rule utilitarians (see discussion in Shaw, 1999, pp.145-170) argued that without 
those heuristics or rules of thumb we might make more mistakes. The question I address 
in this section is whether using the speciesism heuristic is permissible, useful or 
dangerous. Do we have to keep it, improve it or throw it away because it makes some 
errors in atypical cases?  
In the following sections I discuss the strongest pros and cons of keeping the 
speciesism heuristic in atypical cases. Afterwards, I argue that – even if it is not 
irrational or inconsistent to stick to the speciesist heuristic – it is better (more 
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respectful towards atypical humans) to take another heuristic which uses sentience 
instead of rationality as its target attribute.   
8.8.2 Time and knowledge constraints 
One advantage of heuristics is that these are rules of thumb that can help us make quick 
decisions in situations with time and knowledge constraints. Compare heuristics with 
traffic laws. The target attribute in traffic would be a rule such as: “Always drive as to 
maximize well-being” or “maximize efficiency and minimize accidents.” This target 
attribute rule is too difficult to follow, so it is substituted for simpler heuristic rules, 
such as: “Always stop in front of a red traffic light.” But in atypical cases, when there 
really is no other traffic around; there is no harm in ignoring a red light. Most people 
would say that introducing a new traffic law: “Stop at red lights except when crossroads 
are safe,” would make matters worse, because we cannot be sure enough whether 
crossroads are safe. Perhaps we are not smart or alert enough to judge the safety. 
Perhaps we are tempted to judge safety to our own advantage. Perhaps we are biased 
and we ignore red lights even when the situation is not safe. 
So, it is often conceded that strongly holding on to heuristics is a good strategy. Does 
the same apply for the speciesism heuristic? The difference between traffic situations 
and situations related to treatment of atypical humans is that in the latter we do have 
time and (scientific) knowledge to influence our decisions. True, in emergency 
situations, the analogy with traffic might be valid. If you see some creature drowning, 
and you have to be quick to decide to rescue that being, it would be effortful, time-
consuming and unreliable to look first for the mental capacities of that drowning being. 
If you see it is a human, you will show a direct response and jump in the water to save 
this human. And in most cases, your judgment will be correct: in most cases, the 
drowning human will be a rational self-conscious being who deserves to be saved. 
Weighing the probability that it is a mentally handicapped human against the cost for 
you to rescue the human, would still make you conclude that it is better to stick to the 
speciesism (‘looks-like-a-human’) heuristic.  
But when we have to decide how to treat mentally disabled persons, whether we 
should clothe them, feed them or use them in experiments, we do have time and access 
to information about their mental states. In these cases, other heuristics than the ‘looks 
like a human’ heuristic might be more accurate, in the sense that these new heuristics 
also cover all rational beings, but include fewer non-rational beings. For example, we 
could look at results of communication or IQ-tests, adaptive behavior or neurological 
functioning. And scientists might come up with more accurate and faster techniques to 
see what the mental capacities of a mentally disabled human are. People with average 
intelligence might be vulnerable to bias and erroneous judgments about the mental 
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capacities of beings, but scientists and judges might be able to make sufficiently wise 
judgments. 
So where do we stand? Do we feel comfortable with the idea that having fundamental 
rights would depend on our subjective state of knowledge? It is absurd to claim that 
mentally disabled humans have rights merely because we are at this moment ‘too 
stupid’ to work with more accurate heuristics. We, and at least scientists, philosophers, 
and judges, are intelligent enough to determine which human being is certainly not a 
rational being, and I am not aware of historical or psychological evidence that suggests 
that using the target attribute directly or using more accurate heuristic attributes 
instead of the speciesist heuristic attribute results in real violations of the rights of 
rational beings. So, in most cases we do have time and we have already developed 
efficient ways to detect mental capacities. But one might object: how reliable are those 
scientific tests? And a more fundamental question is how reliable should these tests and 
refined heuristics be? Answering that question eventually becomes a matter of taste, of 
gut-feelings. Although my intuition says that time and knowledge constraints are not 
sufficient reasons to stick to the speciesism heuristic, we should accept that this 
discussion remains unresolved and that it is not yet irrational or inconsistent to stick to 
the speciesism heuristic due to the above concerns about our limitations of knowledge. 
8.8.3 Fear of a slippery slope 
Following Carruthers’s slippery slope argument (Carruthers, 1992), one could argue that 
it might be better to retain the speciesism heuristic. Several philosophers have 
criticized the slippery slope objection of Carruthers (Dombrowski, 1997; Tanner, 2009), 
but we can look at this argument from the heuristics perspective.  
People might worry that not retaining the speciesism heuristic, i.e. using the target 
attribute of rationality directly instead of the heuristic attribute, might result in more 
serious errors overall. More rights of real rights holders (i.e. truly rational people) might 
be violated, because the target attribute is difficult to detect or there is no sharp 
distinction between having and not having the target attribute.  
A first reason that people might give to justify this view is that rationality and other 
mental capacities are a matter of degree. So we have a ‘sorites’ problem of where to 
draw the line. When removing grains from a heap, when does the heap become a non-
heap? When removing mental features, when does a person lose its rationality? If we 
cannot answer this question, we risk making erroneous judgments about the rationality 
of some persons.  
Second, one might point to the fact that our cognitive biases can unconsciously skew 
our judgments. In situations involving possible atypical humans, we might be 
vulnerable to bias and erroneously judge the situation to our own benefit (we might too 
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easily start to think that a specific human is non-rational, and treat him or her as a non-
rational being to our own benefit).  
These two observations combined will put us on a dangerous slippery slope, where 
we will move towards real violations of the rights of rational people. But also two 
objections to this slippery-slope argument can be raised. The first is that, if there is 
indeed an unavoidable spectrum of mental capacities, we might be able to couple this to 
a spectrum of rights. Some people with higher mental capacities could be given more or 
stronger rights claims.  
However, this first objection might not run so smoothly. When it comes to 
fundamental rights, some might prefer to stick to the binary view: either one has an 
absolute claim to this right, or one does not have the right at all. Such a binary view 
cannot be coupled in a non-arbitrary way to the supposed spectrum of mental 
capacities. 
A second counter-argument to the slippery-slope argument is that we are already 
able to deal with such slippery slopes. Consider situations where we have to decide 
whether mentally handicapped humans have a right to vote or a right to marriage. 
Different countries have different ways of dealing with the right to vote for mentally 
handicapped humans. In some countries, a judge or medical practitioner will decide 
whether a mentally handicapped person has this right. In others, the person needs to 
undergo a psychological test or needs to be under a protective measure such as a 
guardianship (for the situation in European countries, consult FRA (2010)). Whatever 
solution a country prefers, there seems to be a general lack of worry that this exclusion 
of mentally handicapped persons from the right to vote would put us on a slippery slope 
towards broad violations of the right of rational humans to vote.  
However, this second counter-argument is based on a presupposed analogy between 
a right to vote and a more fundamental right such as the right not to be harmed or the 
right not to be used as merely means to some else’s ends. One might object that we 
should be more concerned about slipping down a slippery slope when the slope involves 
a fundamental right. A second possible objection to this second counter-argument is 
that the demarcation line between people who can have the right to vote and those who 
do not might be easier to draw than the demarcation line between rational and non-
rational people. It might be easier to check whether someone is able to vote (i.e. by 
doing a communication test), than to check whether someone is able to reason or is self-
conscious. The analogy between spectra of fundamental rights and spectra of political 
rights might be too weak. 
The above discussion indicates that, as with the argument of time and knowledge 
constraints, things are not yet completely resolved. It might come down to a kind of 
uncertainty aversion: if people have a strong fear for slipping down the slope of 
fundamental rights when we are confronted with atypical humans, they have a strong 
uncertainty aversion. They are worried about the question: “What might happen to my 
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rights and the rights of my loved ones, if we stop giving fundamental rights to mentally 
handicapped humans?”  
The major problem that I have with this slippery-slope defense of the speciesism 
heuristic is that it seems disrespectful to claim that the moral status of mentally 
handicapped people merely depends on our uncertainty aversion or our supposed 
inability to put barriers on a slippery slope, instead of it depending for example on the 
real interests and feelings of those mentally handicapped people. Are we so sure that we 
will slip down the slope when we look for more accurate heuristics than the speciesism 
heuristic, say a heuristic based on some psychological tests? This question has no easy 
answer, but at least to me, refinements of the heuristic rule (to make it better fit with 
the target attribute such as rationality) do not seem to be impossible, nor do they seem 
to be so dangerous for the rational people. They are dangerous for a-rational, atypical 
humans. 
Also, I am doubtful that those people who defend the speciesism heuristic due to an 
uncertainty aversion, have a consistently strong uncertainty aversion in other 
situations in their lives. It seems strange to me that merely avoiding a slippery slope is 
the real motivation for people to take such care of mentally disabled orphans. If that 
were the real motivation, we could expect that one would have a very high level of 
uncertainty aversion and fear of slippery slopes. But such a high level of uncertainty 
aversion seems incompatible with the way we deny some atypical humans a right to 
vote (it is unlikely that judges are really unable to make wise decisions about who is able 
to vote), and with the treatment of animals in factory farms. We do not seem to worry at 
all about slippery slopes or the potential negative influence on our rights when we treat 
thousands of sentient animals the way we do in factory farms. But, admittedly, it is 
difficult to test such apparent inconsistencies in people’s uncertainty averse attitudes 
towards slippery slopes. 
8.8.4 The emotional cost of excluding atypical humans 
Moral heuristics are often strongly internalized rules, which means that rule violations 
are often accompanied with strong emotions of indignation, guilt or moral disgust. The 
abovementioned reactions of people (sometimes overt outrage when they are 
confronted with the argument from marginal cases) indicate that the speciesism 
heuristic and the rights of atypical humans are also strongly emotionally charged. 
People have empathic concerns for the mentally disabled. Even if the emotions that 
people feel towards atypical humans would be irrational if all that mattered was a 
property (mental capacity) that those atypical humans lack, we observe that violating 
the heuristic will result in an emotional cost, and this cost is not to be underestimated. 
Sometimes it might be rational to stick to irrational feelings.  
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Compare it with fear of heights. Imagine that most people had a strong fear of 
heights. Do they react irrationally? Not necessarily: these people might claim that, if 
they conquered their fear in situations where they could not fall (e.g. when they are 
safely attached), they might react less fearfully in more dangerous situations where fear 
is required or advantageous. They might know about themselves that they will be 
tempted to make erroneous judgments in dangerous situations. And they also know that 
it takes some effort (e.g. some costly therapy or focussed meditation) to overcome their 
fear of heights. So these people have a heuristic: always avoid tall buildings. The costs of 
overcoming their fear might be greater than the cost of avoiding tall buildings, so even 
when they could not fall from the tall building, they do not necessarily react irrationally 
by keeping the heuristic. These people have weighed all the costs and benefits, 
including the emotional ones. 
The same could be said about the feeling of indignation that one experiences when 
looking at human rights violations, even if the human is mentally handicapped and is 
lacking the relevant mental capacities. The emotional cost of reacting in a more 
detached or neutral way towards those atypical humans might be greater than the 
benefits that one could obtain from violating their rights. 
However, this weighing of the emotional cost against the potential benefits is often 
very difficult. One might object that the benefits for real rights holders of violating the 
rights of atypical humans should not be underestimated either. There might be health 
advantages in using atypical humans in e.g. medical experiments. Atypical humans 
(such as mentally disabled orphans) are often better research models for rational 
humans, compared with non-human animals, because the atypical humans are 
genetically and physiologically closer to the rational persons. So their use in medical 
experiments might give better results than if non-human animals are used as models for 
rational persons. The atypical humans could also be used for organ transplantations and 
blood transfusions, to help rational persons in need. If we do not sacrifice non-rational, 
atypical humans, then rational humans might die. Is that not more serious than the 
abovementioned emotional cost? It is not easy to decide this issue.  
Consider again the traffic laws. Most people feel repugnance when they drive 
through a red light, because they have internalized an important rule. But are we not 
allowed to drive through red lights in emergency situations (e.g. when there is a child in 
the middle of the crossroad, in the distance there is a car coming, and we could only 
bring the child to safety by ignoring the red light)? How stubbornly do we have to stick 
to the heuristic traffic rules (“always stop at red lights”) in such situations? As with 
some of the previous questions that I raised, we have to admit that these questions do 
not have easy answers.  
For me, the ‘emotional cost’ defense of the speciesism heuristic seems to be too weak 
at this moment, but I again have to admit that my judgments might be biased, that the 
emotional cost is not to be underestimated either or that using atypical humans in 
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experiments (instead of using only non-human animals) would not be a sufficient 
improvement for the health of rational beings.   
In summary, the above three defenses for the speciesism heuristic (time and 
knowledge constraints, slippery slope, and emotional cost), remain largely undecided 
and are neither clearly irrational nor inconsistent. In the next and final section, I will 
explore my main objection to the speciesism heuristic, even if this speciesism heuristic 
was not applied in an irrational or inconsistent manner. 
8.8.5 The importance of sentience 
The speciesism heuristic was based on the assumption that the target attribute is some 
higher mental capacity such as rationality. In my view, this seriously underestimates 
the importance of another mental capacity that even most animals have: sentience. The 
importance of sentience can be seen by asking the questions: what is the real reason 
why people help mentally handicapped humans in institutes? What really drives those 
health care workers to take care of atypical humans? I do not believe that they are 
willing to accept that the only reason why they take such great care of the mentally 
disabled is that they fear a slippery slope or the emotional costs of overcoming a 
heuristic.  
The idea that some humans have rights merely because our heuristic misfires seems 
incompatible with the moral intuitions of many people. For example, it is more plausible 
that the persons who take care of handicapped people in fact respond to the needs of 
these people. They are not concerned with a higher mental capacity as the morally 
relevant target attribute. These health care workers have empathy, and they are happy 
when they see that the mentally disabled humans feel pleasure or joy in something. 
They want to avoid their suffering. Therefore, according to these carers, sentience is 
one of the most important target attributes, and sentience is likely to be the most 
important motivator for them to help these mentally handicapped people. If the 
empathy and moral intuitions of a health care worker towards atypical humans are 
clear expressions of an undercurrent in the common morality of our culture, which I 
believe they are, we can say that sentience is important in our common morality. But its 
importance is underestimated due to the dominance of the speciesism heuristic.   
The problem with the speciesism heuristic is that it claims that rights of atypical 
humans are only indirect results of misfiring heuristics and that these humans in fact do 
not deserve rights because they are not rational beings. But it is highly disrespectful 
towards atypical humans to say that they only have an indirect moral status, that they 
in fact do not deserve rights but that we intuitively give them rights merely because our 
speciesism heuristic misfires.  
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Consider the mainstay of the speciesism heuristic: the ability to see a difference 
between humans and non-human animals. Without such a clear observable distinction, 
the heuristic attribute would not be that useful. But as biology now shows, this human-
animal difference is not absolute or essential. In the past, there were human ancestors 
with more and more non-human (non-rational) properties as we look further into the 
past. There is in fact a whole continuum of ancestors, moving down the evolutionary 
branch, till we meet a common ancestor of, say, humans and pigs. Also, it might not be 
genetically impossible for human-chimpanzee hybrids to be born. Such hybrids are 
infertile offspring of a human and a chimpanzee parent, which means that each cell 
contains the DNA of both humans and chimpanzees. Or what about human-animal 
chimeras; beings who consist partly of human body cells, partly of non-human body 
cells? Or what about genetically modified humanlike beings? It is hard to believe that we 
really feel comfortable with the thought that, if the ancestors, hybrids, chimeras or 
genetically modified humanlike beings were alive among us, our speciesism heuristic 
loses its strength and we would drastically alter our ethics and our treatment of atypical 
humans. Although these examples are hypothetical, they should give us some 
discomfort.  
It is awkward to claim that mentally disabled humans are just lucky that we have 
pattern recognition skills and that for us in the current situation it is easier to see 
distinctions between humans and non-humans than to see distinctions between rational 
and non-rational beings. Disabled humans have basic rights, but not because they are 
just lucky that the borderline human/non-humans do not exist yet or do not exist 
anymore. And neither are they just lucky that the borderline rational/non-rational 
beings do exist. If there were no borderline cases of rational/non-rational humans, if we 
were clearly able to make a demarcation between rational and non-rational humans, the 
slippery slope argument would completely fail, because the slope would contain a really 
big gap, and this gap is a good place to stop any further slipping down the slope.10 
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 Mentally disabled humans would only have an indirect or dependent moral status if their moral status 
depends on the existence of human beings with intermediate levels of rationality and the non-existence of 
human-animal hybrid beings. Hence, a dependent moral status violates the intuition of independence. This 
can be compared with the discussion on independence in the prioritarian welfare ethic (see section 4.6.7.1). 
Whereas I could tolerate a violation of independence in the prioritarian welfare ethic (where the level of 
priority for someone’s well-being can depend on the (non)existence of other beings), I do not tolerate a 
violation of independence when it comes to such a fundamental aspect as someone’s moral status. As we have 
seen, the violation of independence in the welfare ethic is justified on the grounds of coherence between two 
strong intuitions: the preferences of an impartial observer behind the veil of ignorance and the avoidance of 
the repugnant conclusion together make a strong case to allow violations of independence. The violation of 
independence in the case of granting moral status cannot be justified because a similar strong coherence is 
lacking.  
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All the above questions and reflections should take us to the conclusion that 
sentience is more important than rationality. Sentience is a better target attribute from 
a moral point of view, for two main reasons. The first reason is based on impartiality. 
Rowlands (1997, 1998) and Van den Berg (2011) derived the sentience criterion through 
a contractarian ‘veil of ignorance’ thought experiment. This thought experiment tests 
our impartiality by forcing us to take the positions of others, as if behind a veil of 
ignorance we do not know whose life we are going to live. The veil needs to be as thick 
as possible in order to respect maximum impartiality. This means that we have to 
include the positions of all non-humans, non-rational beings and non-sentient beings. If 
I put myself in the position of a non-sentient being, things would not matter to me, 
because I would not have any subjective experiences or consciousness. If I were a non-
rational but sentient being, things would matter to me, because I would still have a 
sense of well-being. This reference to preferences and what would matter to the subject 
is also the basis of a utilitarian-consequentialist vindication of sentience (Singer, 1975). 
In summary, when we value our own well-being (what matters to us) and we value 
impartiality as in consequentialist or contractarian ethics, then the well-being of all 
sentient beings should be valued.   
This impartiality argument for the sentience criterion is also coherent with a second 
argument in favor of sentience: the virtue of compassion (Slote, 2001). In almost all 
major religious and philosophical traditions compassion is considered as one of the 
greatest of virtues. It is based on a feeling of empathy for the suffering of others and a 
desire to act on that emotion. Compassion is directly related to sentience because we are 
able to feel empathy with (non-rational) sentient beings, but not with non-sentient 
beings who cannot suffer. Compassion also plays a key role in an ethics of care (Gilligan, 
1982). Compassion is what drives health care workers to help mentally disabled people.  
Impartiality (supported by some interpretations of consequentialist and 
contractarian ethics) and compassion (supported by some interpretations of virtue 
ethics and ethics of care) both point to the importance of sentience. Such a coherent 
justification for sentience is lacking for the higher mental capacities such as rationality. 
From an impartial perspective, having a sense of well-being is not restricted to rational 
beings alone. And from a virtues perspective, there is no moral virtue that restricts 
attention to rational beings alone11. There are two arguments to justify rationality, but 
these arguments can also justify sentience. 
The first argument to justify the criterion of rationality is by pointing out that a 
coupling between rights and rationality is not far-fetched: rationality can be defined as 
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 Although one can argue that virtues like honesty and fair-mindedness indirectly refer to a notion of 
rationality. However, the virtue of compassion directly and strongly refers to suffering and sentience. 
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the ability to understand and respect rights and interests. But neither is the coupling 
between rights and sentience far-fetched: rights protect interests and feelings detect 
interests. For example, pain indicates a violation of bodily integrity and fear detects the 
interest of safety. Sentient beings value their own interests due to their positive and 
negative feelings. Therefore, it is not far-fetched to couple rights to sentience. From a 
rights perspective, both rationality and sentience are equally valid.12  
A second way to justify the criterion of rationality is by referring to intuitions that 
some people have towards rational beings. Some people simply intuit that rational 
beings have a higher moral status than other beings. However, the sentience criterion is 
also coherent with our intuitions about helping mentally disabled humans or pet 
animals such as dogs, and intuitions about preferring animal welfare laws. An exclusive 
focus on rationality in ethics cannot explain those attitudes towards non-rational 
beings.13  
As with other mental capacities, sentience is difficult to detect. Of course, when 
confronted with an individual being, we can always try to do some tests to see whether 
it is sentient. If we take sentience as the most important target attribute, and if 
sentience is difficult to detect, we can look at a suitable heuristic attribute. Heuristics 
might be useful in many cases, so we should not throw away all such rules of thumb. 
Looking at our current scientific knowledge about sentience (see next chapter), we can 
take the biological group of vertebrates as the corresponding heuristic attribute: 
vertebrates are also easy to recognize, and science indicates that there is a strong 
overlap between the group of vertebrates and the group of sentient beings (see e.g. 
Griffin (2001) and EFSA (2009) for sentience in fish).  
I suggest that – in contrast to our rather ‘fixed’ attitude towards the speciesist 
heuristic – we can and should have a more ‘flexible’ attitude towards the vertebrate 
heuristic. When possible (when scientists have accurate ways of determining sentience), 
it might be best to dispense with all heuristics, including the vertebrate heuristic. For 
example, we might also have to include some large crustaceans and molluscs such as 
squid, because they also might be sentient. And presumably some atypical vertebrate 
animals are non-sentient.  
It would not be disrespectful towards those non-sentient animals if we do not stick to 
the vertebrate heuristic, i.e. if we were to give those specific non-sentient individuals a 
lower moral status than sentient vertebrates. The reason why the speciesist heuristic 
was disrespectful towards non-rational humans is exactly because those humans are 
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 The coupling between rights and species is really far-fetched, because we cannot see a connection between 
rights and genes or between rights and the ability to beget fertile offspring. 
13
 In common morality, the attitudes towards different non-rational beings are not consistent. Consistency 
can be improved by uplifting the moral status of non-human vertebrate animals, due to their sentience.  
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sentient: they have a sense of well-being and feelings that express interests. The 
disrespect does not lie in the use of a heuristic, but in the choice of the target attribute. 
Choosing a target attribute that excludes sentient but non-rational humans is 
disrespectful, even when these atypical humans are saved by the ‘misfiring’ of a 
speciesist heuristic.  
To conclude, people give too much credence to the arguments in favor of the 
speciesism heuristic, or to arguments in favor of speciesism in general. The reason why 
they give too much credence to those arguments is perhaps because those people use 
animals on a huge scale. For example, they decide three times a day to eat animal 
products. They have friends and family who use animals in similar ways. They know 
that their parents and grandparents used animals in similar ways. They see TV 
commercials that promote meat, see animal circuses in their hometowns, and see no-
one (or just a few ‘extremists’) complaining, etc. For those who consume animals on a 
daily basis, a lot is at stake (especially for their self-image), so we can expect that this 
creates a real bias towards justifications of speciesism and the use of animals. Those 
people are less willing to accept the moral importance of sentience, and the extension of 
rights to all sentient beings. 
8.9 Summary 
Looking at the above, we now have a fairly strong coherent picture that implies that 
discrimination such as speciesism is a moral illusion. Its vertical and horizontal 
arbitrariness, its artificiality, its violation of impartiality, its cognitive impenetrability, 
its relation to cognitive biases such as essentialism and heuristics, and the fact that 
ideologies such as white-dominant racism, male-dominant sexism or human-dominant 
speciesism are strongly culturally determined, all corroborate the conclusion that 
discrimination is an illusion.  
I presented a set of five arguments why the species boundary is irrelevant, and 
another set of five arguments why sentience is relevant. The first set of arguments 
(against the species boundary and essentialist thinking) is analogous to the principle of 
context-independence in the optical illusion. The second set corresponds with the 
principle of translation invariance in geometry.  
All these arguments cohere with each other: we have a situation of narrow reflective 
equilibrium (Daniels, 1979) where strong intuitions and principles mutually support 
each other, and according to this narrow reflective equilibrium, speciesism is an 
illusion. 
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But there is more: speciesism is also in conflict with a wide reflective equilibrium (see 
Daniels, 1979 for the notion of wide reflective equilibrium). This wide reflective 
equilibrium not only contains moral intuitions and ethical principles, but also contains 
(scientific) background knowledge about e.g. psychology and cultural anthropology. We 
know that not everyone is susceptible to speciesism (it depends on culture and 
education), and more importantly: we do have insights in the psychological mechanisms 
behind speciesism: heuristics (attribute substitution) and essentialist thinking (using 
language with prejudices, stereotyping,…). Compare this with the Müller-Lyer illusion: 
we know that not everyone is susceptible to this illusion (Segall et al. 1963), and we do 
have insights in the optical mechanisms behind this illusion (a heuristic of automatic 
perspective corrections from 3D to 2D). 
In geometry we have a very coherent picture that is much stronger than this one 
optical intuition about the differences in lengths of the Müller-Lyer figure. I therefore 
believe that the whole antispeciesist picture is coherent to such a high degree that it is 
much stronger than that one moral intuition about the moral status gap between 
humans and non-human animals. What else would the speciesist need in order to be 
convinced? That the speciesist intuition is cognitively impenetrable or that essentialist 
thinking happens automatically, are not sufficient reasons to say that the species 
boundary is morally relevant.  
At one point the analogy between the Müller-Lyer illusion and the speciesism illusion 
goes wrong: the huge difference in our treatment of pigs versus mentally disabled 
humans can only mean that there is a huge effect of belonging to the human species. On 
the other hand, the Müller-Lyer illusion is rather subtle; it does not create huge 
differences in length judgments.  
Nevertheless, I expect that this new way of looking towards speciesism can shed a 
light on why the speciesist intuition is so pervasive and difficult to change. As optical 
illusions, the speciesism illusion is cognitively impenetrable. The analogy with optical 
illusions might help us to argue for a more consistent ethical theory based on equality 
between all sentient beings. 
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Chapter 9 The sentience problem 
I already mentioned that there is a gradation in mental capacities. Some beings have a 
richer, more complex emotional life than others. But there is also the scientific 
question: which beings are sentient? It is a scientific question, because being sentient is 
a matter of fact, and science is about discovering facts. Science can determine criteria 
for sentience. The sentience problem then consists in determining those criteria, and 
testing animals to see whether they satisfy those criteria. The latter raises real ethical 
concerns. Below I discuss the scientific and ethical problems of sentience. 
9.1 The scientific problem 
There are four criteria to see whether a living being is sentient. 
1) The adaptive role of feelings. Pain and other feelings can offer an evolutionary 
advantage to living beings. Feelings of pain can result in avoiding some behavior, 
learning, protection or self care. But we have to be aware that the organ that generates 
feelings (the brain), might consume a lot of energy. So not every living being will invest 
in such an organ. For living beings who cannot move in complex ways, having feelings is 
useless. Plants cannot show the fight, flight or freeze responses, so fear is not useful for 
them.   
2) Anatomical basis. We know that pain is related to specific neurons (nociceptors or 
pain receptors) and other anatomical properties (e.g. the central nervous system). Also 
other feelings, such as fear, are related to specific parts in the central nervous system 
(e.g. the limbic system and the amygdala). 
3) Behavior. Feelings are often associated with specific behavior (e.g. the fight, flight 
or freeze response of fear). Healing wounds, scratching, loss of sexual interests, 
vocalizations, body movements, facial expressions and many other things might 
indicate that the living being feels pain. Especially when the behavior persists for a long 
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time, is repeated quite some time after the event, or changes in more complex ways, we 
can exclude the possibility that the behavior is just an automatic, instinctive or reflexive 
response.  
4) Physiology. When there are other changes in the body (e.g. faster respiration rate, 
heartbeat, blood pressure, eye movements,…) then we might expect emotions to be 
present. Also the effect of some chemicals (endomorphines and analgesics) on the 
behavior might indicate sentience.   
With these four indicators, we can test whether an animal is sentient. According to 
the current scientific consensus (Masson, 1995; Griffin, 2001; Bekoff, 2007) most likely 
vertebrate animals with a functioning central nervous system are sentient and can feel 
pain, fear and distress. Perhaps some squids and large crustaceans are also able to 
subjectively feel something.  
Let’s take a concrete group of vertebrate animals: fish. The following citations 
represent the current scientific consensus (EFSA, 2009): 
“There is scientific evidence to support the assumption that some fish species have 
brain structures potentially capable of experiencing pain and fear. The balance of 
evidence indicates that some fish species have the capacity to experience pain. […] 
Responses of fish, of some species and under certain situations, suggest that they are 
able to experience fear. […] From studies of sensory systems, brain structure and 
functionality, pain, fear and distress there is some evidence for the neural components 
of sentience in some species of fish. Our knowledge and understanding of 
manifestations of sentience in fish, however, are limited. […] From studies of sensory 
systems, brain structure and functionality, pain, fear and distress there is some evidence 
for the neural components of sentience in some species of fish. Our knowledge and 
understanding of manifestations of sentience in fish, however, are limited. […] The 
stress physiology in fish is directly comparable to that of higher vertebrates.” 
We see that the statements are very prudent, because there are so many fish species, 
and only a few are studied (the most famous studied species are rainbow trout). The fish 
that were studied indicated signs of sentience. The following is a list of 11 criteria to test 
the presence of a pain system. 
1. There should be pain receptor cells present. 
2. There should be a nociceptive neural pathway from the tissue to a higher 
brain structure. 
3. In this brain structure, there should be specialized processing systems that are 
active when the tissue is damaged. 
4. There should be specialized transmitter substances along the neural pathway. 
5. In the specialized brain part, there should be endogenous opioids and opioid 
receptors. 
6. There should be electrophysiological responses to cuts and bruises. 
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7. There should be a suspension of normal activity associated with noxious 
stimuli. For example eating and sexual activity should stop.   
8. There should be behavioral chance and avoidance in the short term (moving 
body parts, scratching, avoiding the threat). 
9. There should be learned avoidance of places in the long term. 
10. There should be a measurable influence of analgesics in reducing responses.  
11. There can be effects of chronic stress (e.g. a malfunctioning immune system 
after long exposures to pain). 
All these criteria are fulfilled for a rainbow trout. Trout have nociceptors and a 
neural pathway from these pain receptors to their brains. Scientists have injected a bee 
venom in the lip of a trout. The trout stopped eating, and refused to eat for quite some 
time. He started scratching his lip in the sand. The trout showed less avoidance when 
new fearful objects were placed in the water, as if the trout was so concerned with his 
pain that he became less aware of his environment. But after the trout was injected with 
some analgesics, he stopped scratching, became more aware of his environment and 
swam away from fearful objects (Sneddon et al. 2003a; 2003b). 
Consistency in judgments implies that we have to give those fish at least a strong 
benefit of the doubt. If a mentally disabled human (who was not able to talk) showed 
similar reactions in similar experiments, we would judge this human to be sentient. 
Therefore, we should have the same judgments towards those fish. 
When it comes to invertebrates, things get more difficult, because not all of the above 
criteria are satisfied. Some insects simply continue eating after they lose a leg. Sentient 
beings would likely stop eating, no matter how hungry they are. We could give insects 
the benefit of the doubt, by not eating them. 
Plants are even less likely to be sentient, as none of the criteria are fulfilled. Some 
plants are able to react to a threat (e.g. produce poisons to protect themselves against 
herbivores), warn other neighboring plants, and communicate in rather sophisticated 
ways. Some plants might even have a mechanism for self-recognition (Karban, 2009). 
Although this is nothing yet compared to (self)consciousness, those plants have roots 
that can recognize whether other roots belong to the same plant or not. These are 
enough reasons to grant plants also some basic right, as we have seen in the chapter on 
the basic right (section 6.4). But we should not yet conclude that those plants are 
sentient. Our immune system and computers also have very complex patterns of 
communication and self-recognition, but that does not yet make them conscious 
systems. It might be possible that plants have a yet unknown system that makes them 
sentient. But such a system is not yet found, and for the same matter, it might be 
possible that the hairs on my head are sentient beings. Perhaps they also have a special 
system? 
If we would give plants the benefit of the doubt, placing them at the same level as 
real sentient animals, then we have to realize that we have to eat plants in order to 
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survive. Eating plants is a survival end, and if plants become equal to all other sentient 
beings, then we are also allowed to eat beings who are definitely sentient. We cannot 
run that risk based on the current very weak evidence, so we need much more evidence 
before we should say that plants are sentient.  
Although we do not know yet how sentience is generated by the brains, I believe that 
at the most basic level, having an affective feeling is binary: either you have it or you 
don’t. Once a being has at least one affective feeling that reflects a need, it is sentient 
(with respect to that need) and it has a well-being. The above 11 criteria are nothing but 
rules of thumb to determine from the outside whether someone experiences pain.  
The reason why I believe in the binary nature of sentience is that I cannot imagine 
myself to have a half feeling. Either there is light on the stage (even if it is a dim light), 
or there isn’t. This distinguishes sentience from other mental capacities such as 
rationality. Rationality is more difficult to define, and it has less this on or off 
characteristic. There are multiple aspects behind rationality (you need e.g. self-
consciousness, some imagination and a memory), and sometimes not all aspects are 
present.  
Compare it with letters on a paper. Being sentience is like having a stain of ink on a 
paper: either there is a drop of ink on the paper (even if it is a tiny drop), or there isn’t. 
Rationality is like having the letter A on a paper: this requires much more aspects. It is 
not always easy to see whether the ink stains form a letter A or not. From a scientific 
perspective, it is in theory possible to see the presence of ink stains: one only needs a 
tool to see the stains (e.g. a good microscope). If such a tool does not yet exist, it does 
not mean that the presence of ink stains is not a matter of fact. However, determining 
whether the stains form a letter A always involves an element of (subjective) 
interpretation.1   
9.2 The ethical problem 
We have seen criteria to determine whether a being is sentient, whether it can 
experience pain, fear or distress. I mentioned an experiment that caused pain to 
 
                                                     
1
 The analogy between mental states and ink stains can be explored further. For example if ink stains are 
connected, they belong to the same pattern (e.g. the same letter), just as different feelings can be connected to 
belong to a same person. There can be fuzzy boundaries between ink stains, just as there can be fuzzy 
boundaries between mental states, generating the problem of psychological connectedness explored in 
section 4.2.4. 
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rainbow trout. The problem is: animal experiments are often violations of the basic 
right, because the being is used as merely a means (experimental object). So that would 
mean we would not be allowed to do tests to determine whether an animal is able to 
feel. That means we could not so easily determine whether the animal is able to feel. 
Perhaps we might never know, even if it would be scientifically possible to know. 
So, are those tests morally permissible? We can argue that they are, because we could 
say that we do not really violate the basic right of such an animal when our goal is to 
determine whether it has the basic right. In other words: the animal is used as merely a 
means to an end, and the end is determining whether the animal has a basic right. This 
end is not a survival end, neither is it a vital need, a basic need or a luxury need. The end 
is of a totally different moral category.  
Actually, this idea is not farfetched. We already have a similar approach towards 
humans. What do physicians do when they have a patient who does not seem to react to 
certain impulses? Sometimes the physician tests the patient, to see whether she still 
reacts to painful stimuli. This is a test that might cause pain, very similar to the tests 
with the rainbow trout. It is not disrespectful towards the patient. 
 
  
  249 
Chapter 10 The predation problem1 
In this chapter we arrive at the last big problem of animal ethics. It is a very serious one, 
as it might punch a big hole in a consistent animal rights ethics. The problem receives 
some attention from time to time (e.g. Cohen & Regan, 2001; Cowen, 2003; Ebert & 
Machan, 2012; Everett, 2001; Fink, 2005; Horta, 2010; Sapontzis, 1984; Simmons, 2009), 
but the challenge that this problem poses is however underestimated by both animal 
rights ethicists and critics. It is strange why animal rights critics do not toss this 
problem about more regularly in discussions, if their goal is to show that an animal 
ethics is inconsistent. To present the problem as clearly as possible, let’s start with the 
following two scenarios.  
1) The predation dilemma. A lioness is going to attack a zebra in order to feed her two 
hungry whelps. You are sitting in a car, looking at the scene. You can easily save the 
zebra, simply by turning on the engine of your car, chasing the lioness away. Should you 
save the zebra? 
2) The transplantation dilemma. In a hospital two children need new organs, but no 
organs are available. A surgeon is about to kill a visitor against his will, in order to use 
his organs to save the two patients. Is he allowed to do so, or should we interfere and 
stop him? 
A lot of people, including most animal rights activists2, say that we do not have a duty 
to protect zebra from lions, but we do have a duty to protect the visitor from the 
 
                                                     
1
 Sections 10.3, 10.4, 10.6 and 10.7 are based on Overcoming Problems in Consequentialist Welfare Ethics. On 
predation, motion, organ transplantation, medical experimentation and procreation, Bruers & Van den Berg, 
submitted to Utilitas. Sections 10.4 and 10.5 are based on Moral Intuitions and the Intrinsic Value of 
Biodiversity, submitted to Environmental Values.  
2
 This claim is based on a personal (unpublished) survey that I did with more than 30 animal rights activists. 
90% of them would not condone organ (xeno)transplantation, whereas only 7% would not condone animals 
preying on animals and 14% would not condone animals preying on humans. Also, another 24% of respondents 
were undecided in the latter case. The preying on animals and organ (xeno)transplantation dilemmas showed 
only 0-6% undecided responses. This demonstrates that the problem of animals preying on humans is the 
most difficult dilemma for animal rights activists, and that in the two predation dilemmas (preying on animals 
and on humans), animal rights activists are more speciesist than in the two organ (xeno)transplantation 
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surgeon. The killing of the visitor against his will should be prohibited. Now, if we adopt 
an antispeciesist ethic, we have to be able to switch the positions between animals and 
humans. Hence, what if, instead of a zebra, there was a lonely human child being 
attacked? Or what if instead of killing a visitor, the surgeon would kill a non-human 
animal (e.g. a pig) for xenotransplantation (and suppose that xenotransplantation 
works)?  
For an ethic based on animal equality, there are in fact two problems of predation 
and transplantation.  
1) What is the morally relevant difference between predation and transplantation? 
After all, in both cases (meat consumption and organ transplantation) a sentient being 
(lioness and surgeon) kills another sentient being (zebra, human or pig) without 
permission and uses parts of its body (muscle tissue and organ tissue) by taking these 
body parts up in the bodies of vulnerable sentient beings (whelps and child patients) in 
order for them to survive. The analogy could not be clearer. Yet, most people, including 
defenders of animal rights, condone the predation but condemn the transplantation 
(antispeciests also condemn xenotransplantation). The problem arises because our 
moral intuitions say that in one life-and-death-dilemma action is permissible, whereas 
in the other dilemma it is not. 
2) In the predation situation, the animal rights activist would protect the human 
child, but most activists would not protect the zebra. Does this mean they are still 
speciesist?  
These two problems (the morally relevant difference between predation and 
transplantation, and the difference between a zebra and a human as prey) will be called 
the difference problem and the prey problem respectively. In my opinion, these two 
problems combined are the weakest spot in a consistent antispeciesist animal rights 
ethic. They are underestimated by both animal rights advocates and critics.   
The predation problem can be a strong weapon in the hands of a speciesist (such as 
Cohen in Cohen & Regan, 2001, p30), because s/he could easily solve both problems with 
one stroke, by claiming that there is a morally relevant difference between humans and 
non-human animals. According to speciesism, all individuals belonging to the human 
species have a higher moral status than everything else. In that case, everyone is 
allowed to use animals for xenotransplantation and predation. But lions are not allowed 
to use humans. We have a duty to protect humans, but no duty to protect zebras. By 
solving both problems with this one simple criterion, it seems that the speciesist ethic is 
coherent. But is it?  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
dilemmas (using either humans or pigs as organ donors). However, the order of presentation of the dilemmas 
also influences the judgments. 
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As we have seen in a previous chapter, the species boundary cannot be morally 
relevant. The five arguments against this criterion show that the speciesist solution is 
not coherent after all. It is at least as arbitrary and artificial.  
What I will do in this section is present solutions to both the difference and the prey 
problems that are consistent with an antispeciesist theory of animal equality. Doing this 
we can avoid arbitrary elements in our ethic, and the resulting ethic fits with our 
strongest moral intuitions.  
The principle of tolerated choice equality might solve the prey problem, whereas the 
triple-N-principle (referring to three criteria: normal, natural and necessary) and a 
‘fairness’ principle might make a morally relevant distinction between predation and 
transplantation. I demonstrate that the triple-N-principle is in agreement with moral 
intuitions that a lot of people (both speciesists and animal rights activists) have, and 
that it is in correspondence with the moral value of biodiversity. The tolerated choice, 
fairness and triple-N principles might make our antispeciesist ethic much more 
coherent than the speciesist one. 
10.1 Invalid solutions to the prey problem 
Starting with the prey problem, I first briefly mention a few invalid solutions, given by 
some animal rights ethicists.  
Some people claim that humans are not part of the natural diet of lions (e.g. 
Simmons, 2009). So lions are only allowed to eat what is part of their natural diet. One 
problem with this argument is that it poses a strange, arbitrary distinction between 
humans and non-humans. Isn’t it strange that of all species on earth only Homo sapiens 
never are or have been natural prey? More importantly: when is something part of 
someone’s natural diet? If a lion wants to hunt a human, is the human not part of his 
preferences, and hence part of his diet? As rabbits were introduced in Tasmania some 
200 years ago, they can be considered as not being part of the natural diet of a 
Tasmanian devil. So we now have a duty to protect rabbits from Tasmanian devils?  
Another claim is that “Duties of assistance exist only insofar as potential beneficiaries 
require assistance in order to flourish according to their nature” (Everett, 2001 p55) It is 
believed that we don’t have a duty of assistance towards zebra, because they can 
flourish without our assistance. On the other hand, children cannot flourish without our 
assistance, so we have a duty to protect children. The problem with this approach is that 
it seems to make an arbitrary distinction between flourishing according to one’s nature 
or not. What if the zebra is injured? Doesn’t he require assistance then? And what does 
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“flourish according to their nature” really mean? It resembles some kind of essentialist 
thinking that we countered in a previous chapter.  
10.2 A hypothetical solution to the prey problem 
When asking animal rights activists whether they would save the human, they said they 
would, although they would not necessarily save the zebra. They had real difficulties 
with those scenarios and were tempted to be what they thought was speciesist, and 
consequently claimed that true antispeciesism was impossible to achieve. 
The solution to the prey problem that I would propose, is based on tolerated 
partiality (or tolerated choice equality). So the prey problem is a situation where this 
equality comes in handy. It is a principle that helps us make our moral intuitions (at 
least a bit more) compatible with antispeciesism. 
As in the burning house dilemma, we are allowed to save the sentient beings with 
whom we feel a strong connection or empathy. Thus we should tolerate a choice to 
protect the lion instead of the zebra or to protect the child instead of the lion. We have 
the right to be partial, as long as we respect equal partiality from others. If someone 
saves the human, s/he should tolerate the choice of someone else saving the zebra 
instead of the human. The tolerated choice equality allows us to reconcile two 
preferences of the antispeciesist: on the one hand s/he would (in most cases) save a 
human rather than an animal, but on the other hand s/he doesn’t want to be speciesist. 
We are not speciesist if we tolerate the choices of someone who protects the zebra or 
the lion (i.e. someone who did not protect the human). Everyone is free to choose 
whether to protect the zebra, the human or the lion. 
Empathy is crucial in the tolerated choice equality; it is the driving force to help 
vulnerable beings. If someone feels more empathy and connection with one being than 
with another, this justifies his preference for saving the preferred being. We should 
tolerate his/her choice, because empathy is a moral virtue and s/he acted with empathy 
as long as s/he did not hate or disdain the other being.   
For speciesists this tolerance of saving the zebra or the lion instead of the human is 
likely the hardest nut to crack in the whole theory of animal rights. It might be in rather 
strong contradiction with one of their moral intuitions. In practice however, they 
should not be so concerned, because asking what they would do, most animal rights 
activists responded that they would save the human anyway.  
There is one more thing. As we have seen in the chapter about the basic right, we 
could introduce a criterion that refers to a higher moral status related to some mental 
capacities like self-consciousness, moral agency or rationality. So we might have a 
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stronger duty to protect those sentient beings who possess those special mental 
capacities, or who will develop them, or who have close relatives (e.g. parents) with 
such special mental capacities. The only thing a speciesist then has to accept is tolerated 
choice equality between seriously mentally disabled human orphans and non-human 
animals such as zebra. If we say we have a duty to protect those disabled orphans, 
whereas we do not have a duty to protect non-human animals because all humans have 
a higher moral status than non-humans, then we become too partial. It is a kind of 
speciesism, and like racism or sexism it is a kind of partiality that we cannot tolerate. 
In summary, we do not have a duty to defend the prey from predators, but we are 
allowed to defend the prey if we feel an emotional need to do so. (We can add that we 
are only allowed to defend the prey if this does not result in severe ecological damage.) 
In this permission to defend the prey, we have a right to be partial to some degree (not 
too much), as long as we respect similar levels of partiality of others. And if the prey has 
some special mental capacities, we might have a stronger duty to protect it.  
10.3 Invalid solutions to the difference problem 
Next, we move to the difference problem. Again, I first briefly discuss a few invalid 
proposals encountered in the literature to solve the problem of the difference between 
predation and organ transplantation.  
1) Feasibility: stopping transplantations is feasible, stopping predation is not. Peter 
Singer gave a practical argument: It is impossible to intervene in nature to protect all 
prey animals (Singer, 1990, p226). However, a single intervention, such as saving a zebra 
in front of you, is feasible. The feasibility argument is related to the demandingness 
objection against consequentialist welfare ethics, which can be shown to be impotent in 
some way (Sobel, 2007). 
2) Moral agency: surgeons are moral agents, lions are not. Regan’s answer (Regan, 
1983) is that carnivorous animals (e.g. lions) don’t have moral reasoning capacities; they 
are not moral agents. As amoral beings, they don’t have duties of non-maleficence and 
beneficence. Furthermore, according to this view, we as moral beings do not have a duty 
of beneficence towards a victim when the agent (aggressor) is an amoral being.  
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The next table presents the duties of interference that we have when a moral or 
amoral agent (aggressor) attacks a moral or amoral victim.3    
 
  
 Victim 
  
 Moral being Amoral being 
Agent 
Moral being Obligation Obligation  
Amoral being No obligation No obligation 
 
The table shows that we only have obligations of beneficence towards the victim 
when the aggressor is a moral being. But this moral agency account faces some counter-
intuitive problems. First, what if amoral predators attack moral humans? Regan is not 
clear about our duties of saving those humans, but even he points at an intuition that at 
least it cannot be wrong to interfere and save the human.4 Second, a lot of animal rights 
ethicists believe that we do have a duty to protect sentient beings from amoral threats 
such as falling rocks. Third, what if some animals were moral or gain moral 
consciousness? At this moment no non-human animals are real moral agents, although 
dolphins and great apes might come close: they have a self-consciousness, a high (social) 
intelligence and premoral sentiments (Shermer, 2004, p. 16). And dolphins kill and eat 
sentient fish. A strong ethical theory should be able to deal with counterfactual 
situations: what if dolphins gained moral agency? Do we then have a duty to interfere 
and save the fish? Fourth, what if some humans needed meat to survive? My intuition 
tells me that we do not have a duty to stop moral humans or moral dolphins from 
hunting if those humans and dolphins need meat in order to survive. After all, it seems 
strange why non-rational (amoral) predators should have an unfair advantage against 
rational (moral) predators: the former can hunt, the latter can’t. (For further criticism 
of Regan’s argument, see also Jamieson, 1990 and Fox, 1999 p.163.)  
3) Libertarianism. Related to the moral agency account, is the theory of 
libertarianism (Ebert & Machan, 2012). This theory says that moral agents have a duty 
not to harm others, but they do not have a duty to protect others (e.g. protect prey). In 
 
                                                     
3
 Suppose that interference (beneficence towards the victim) always harms the agent. For example interfering 
in predation harms the predator by limiting its food supply. 
4
 As discussed in Ebert & Machan (2012), Regan’s theory would imply that it is prohibited to save the human 
prey. But elsewhere, Regan claimed that ‘it cannot be wrong to do what will harm the child [who has come 
into possession of a loaded revolver and has begun to fire it at us], even though the child is innocent and so 
does no wrong.’ (Regan 1983 p. 293). It is not clear why our obligation to interfere in this situation with the 
armed child would not extend to the situation of the predator.  
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other words: amoral beings do not have rights of beneficence, a right to be protected 
from harm. So libertarians say that we do not have a duty of beneficence towards a 
victim when the victim is an amoral being. But all moral agents still have a duty of non-
maleficence towards moral and amoral sentient beings. The next table presents our 
duties of interference to help victims from aggressors (agents). This libertarian theory is 
in some way a ‘transposition’ of Regan’s account. 
 
  
 Victim 
  
 Moral being Amoral being 
Agent 
Moral being Obligation No obligation  
Amoral being Obligation No obligation 
 
This libertarian theory is also plagued with some problems. First, mentally disabled 
humans are amoral beings and hence have no right to be protected.5 This seems 
counter-intuitive to me. Second, hypothetical carnivorous moral agents (e.g. moral 
dolphins) would have a duty of non-maleficence, so they should not hunt. Although we 
do not have an obligation to stop the dolphins from hunting, the moral dolphins 
themselves should now abide the rights of sentient fish. Similarly, moral humans have a 
duty not to move when insects are sentient (because moving around harms those 
sentient insects and animal rights libertarians say that moral agents have a duty of non-
maleficence towards all sentient beings).  
4) Group protection: lions form a group, patients in the hospital don’t. Extinction of a 
group is worse than the death of a number of single individuals. But first, a group (e.g. a 
species) is an abstract set of individuals. Does an abstract set in itself have interests? 
Why give moral status to this abstract set? Second, a group is an arbitrary set. What 
group should we take?  Should we consider the species of lions (Panthera leo) as a 
group? Why not take a specific population of lions as a group? Or for that matter the 
genus of Panthera, the family of felidae, the order of carnivora, the class of mammalian 
 
                                                     
5
 Ebert & Machan discussed an extension of this strict libertarian ethic, where we have special duties towards 
some amoral beings, based on special relationships we have with them (e.g. parental relationships). But is the 
relationship that I have with a mentally disabled orphan more special than the relations that I have with 
amoral animals? The problems with this extension is: 1) what counts as a sufficiently special relationship in 
order for us to have a special duty? And 2) how to avoid arbitrariness (e.g. reference to arbitrary biological 
classifications such as species) in this extended libertarian theory? A non-arbitrary extension that includes 
the rights of mentally disabled orphans to be saved from harm, results in a complete animal rights ethic, 
where we have a duty to help amoral animals as well.  
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or the phylum of chordata? And if we have siblings (or twins) in the hospital who both 
need organs, aren’t these siblings a group in some sense? They have some unique 
properties in common. Third, the group argument is artificial. Consider the lonely lion 
problem: what if there is only one lion left in nature? Is this one lion still a group, or a 
single individual? Is he allowed to hunt? Does the right to hunt depend on the presence 
of other similar individuals?  
5) Illness: the patients in the hospital are ill, the zebras aren’t. But what does ‘being 
ill’ mean? Both the patients and the whelps are feeling very sick when they don’t get 
something. The symptoms might be quite similar. Both will die eventually. For a 
predator, meat can be considered as a medicine to stay healthy. Second, this criterion 
doesn’t seem to be quite empathic towards the ill persons. Why should you lose the 
right to use someone (violate his rights) if you are ill, and are you allowed to use 
someone if you are not ill? 
6) Existence: lions would not even exist if they were not allowed to hunt; surgeons 
and patients in the hospital were born, even if forced transplantation was not allowed. 
But suppose that we have a boy who has a genetic defect, and this boy needs a new 
organ in order to survive. Also, the mother of this boy had the same genetic defect, and 
30 years ago they did a successful organ transplantation to save this woman. The woman 
survived, and gave birth to a son with a similar genetic defect and thus a similar disease. 
In this case the boy’s very existence depends on the transplantation for his mother. 
Should we now make an exception and tolerate the coerced sacrifice of someone for 
organ transplantation to save this boy?  
7) Ecological disasters: preventing predation would result in ecological catastrophes, 
whereas prohibiting transplantation would not. This argument actually makes some 
sense.6 If we would consistently intervene in nature to prevent predation, then a lot of 
predator populations might die of starvation, which would have ecological effects on 
prey species (e.g. overpopulation, increased competition and spread of diseases). It is 
very difficult to calculate the overall effects on animal death and suffering, because 
ecological interactions can be very complex. From a precautionary principle we might 
say that at this moment it is better not to consistently intervene in predator-prey 
interactions in nature. This means we do not have a duty to intervene. Of course, once 
(in a far-away future) ecologists would be able to calculate that the extinction of 
predator species would be good on the whole, then we should go for predator 
extinction.  
 
                                                     
6
 This point was already made by Singer in 1973: “Lions play a role in the ecology of their habitat, and we 
cannot be sure what the long-term consequences would be if we were to prevent them from killing gazelles”. 
Many other philosophers made this point (e.g. Simmons, 2009). 
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8) Uncertainty aversion. This is related to the previous proposal of ecological 
disasters. It can be derived from the thought experiment of impartiality (Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance), as described in the section about prioritarian ethics. We have seen that from 
behind the veil of ignorance, one’s level of risk aversion was important, resulting in a 
theory of quasi-maximin prioritarianism. I also mentioned that next to risk aversion, 
uncertainty (or ambiguity) aversion is important as well. We have seen that the solution 
of the trolley problem (pushing a heavy man from a bridge) could depend on one’s 
uncertainty aversion behind the veil of ignorance. To explain uncertainty aversion, I 
presented Ellsberg’s paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), and made a connection between this 
paradox and the trolley problem. What I will demonstrate now, is that the very same 
idea of Ellsberg’s paradox might solve the difference problem.  
The following version of Ellsberg’s paradox will be useful in this discussion. An urn 
contains three balls of two different colors: green and red. You win the game when you 
draw the green ball. You can choose between two games of chance. In the first game, 
you know that one ball is green and the others are red. Hence, your probability to win is 
exactly 1/3. In the second game, you only know that at least one ball is red. Now your 
probability to win is between 0 (when all balls happen to be red) and 2/3 (when the two 
unknown balls happen to be green). Which of these two games do you prefer to play? If 
you have – like many people – uncertainty aversion, you’d prefer to play the first game, 
because in that game you at least know your chances to win.  
We can simplify the predation problem to see the analogy with the above Ellsberg 
paradox. Suppose from behind the veil of ignorance you know that you will be born as 
one of three sentient beings: one predator or two prey animals. You now that the 
predator needs two prey in order to survive. You can now decide whether predation is 
allowed or not. You have to choose between two games of chance. In the first game, a 
world with predation, you know that the predator is going to kill and eat the two prey. 
These two prey lose, they are the red balls, and red means dead. You have 1/3 chance to 
be born as this predator and survive. So your chance to win is 1/3. In the second game, a 
world without predation, you know that the predator will die from starvation (he is the 
red ball). But what happens with the two prey? If there are enough resources, they can 
both survive (they are both green balls). But likely there are not enough resources for 
both. So they might start to fight until one or both of them die. Or they might 
overexploit the resources so that one or both of them eventually die from starvation. 
You don’t know what will happen, and most of all: you don’t know the probabilities for 
them to survive. Your chance to win is something between 2/3 (if there are enough 
resources for both prey) and 0 (if everyone dies). Uncertainty aversion implies that you 
would prefer the world with predation. 
The difference with the organ transplantation goes as follows. There are two patients 
and one visitor. You can be one of them. If you choose a world where forced organ 
transplantation is not allowed, you will win when you are the visitor, because he will 
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survive (he is the green ball). However, if you choose a world with transplantation, the 
visitor is sacrificed against his will, so he will be the red ball.  
If the bodies of both patients accept the organs, they can both survive. But if one or 
two of the transplantations are not successful, one or two of the patients die. You do not 
know the success rate, so your probability to win will be between 0 (everyone dies) and 
2/3 (both patients survive). Uncertainty aversion implies that you would prefer the 
world without transplantation. 
A lot of people have uncertainty aversion, and this might already justify the choice of 
a world with predation and without transplantation. Uncertainty aversion is able to 
make a difference between predation and transplantation. But even if we respect 
uncertainty aversion as a cognitive bias, this uncertainty aversion account still faces 
some problems. First, it implies that moral duties depend on our current, contingent, 
subjective state of knowledge. If knowledge about ecosystem functioning increases, we 
might need to change our judgments about predation, and our duties towards prey.  
Second, in a lot of situations, the uncertainty aversion gets ‘skewed’. Consider a more 
realistic predation problem behind a veil of ignorance. Suppose one lion eats hundred 
zebras in order to stay alive. So there are 101 individuals: one lion and hundred zebras. 
You can be born as any of those animals. You can again choose between two worlds. In a 
world with predation, the lion eats all the zebras, so you have probability 1/101 to be 
born as the lion and survive. In the world without predation, the lion definitely dies, but 
as a consequence of increased competition and ecological overshoot, some of the 
hundred zebras might die or start fighting for scarce resources and kill each other. You 
now have an uncertain probability between 0 and 100/101 to be born as a zebra that is 
able to stay alive. It’s a game of chance, and you have to choose between a certain 
probability 1/101 versus an uncertain probability between 0 and 100/101 to win (to 
survive). Even if the second game has uncertainty, a lot of people would still prefer to 
play that game, because 1/101 is close to 0 and hence the uncertainty is ‘skewed’. 
Third, there might be people who think that even without uncertainty, we still do not 
have a duty to interfere in predation. If it seems counter-intuitive that our attitude 
towards predation, and the fate of predators, depends on our subjective state of 
knowledge, we have to look for a more principle-based ethic that allows predation. So in 
the next section I want to explore a justification of predation that might satisfy the 
needs of those people. The principle that I propose can be expressed as a 3-N-principle, 
related to the intrinsic value of biodiversity.  
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10.4 A first hypothetical solution to the difference problem: 
the 3-N-principle 
When it comes to justification for predation, a lot of people also give answers that are 
typically used by meat eaters: they say it is ‘necessary’, ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ for the lion 
to hunt. Note that these are the three N's that Melanie Joy pointed at in her discussion 
of carnism, the often hidden ideology of most meat eaters in our culture (Joy, 2001; 
2009). So even some animal rights activists are still tempted to use the same ‘naturalistic 
arguments’ that meat eaters (carnists) use. 
What I am going to do now is 1) clarify the criteria ‘necessary’, ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ 
to make the principle more accurate, 2) demonstrate that none of those three criteria 
are separately valid (none are sufficient to violate rights), 3) show that the combination 
of all three criteria might be in line with our moral intuition (predation is natural, 
normal and necessary and therefore allowed; transplantation is not), 4) argue that there 
is a connection between the three N-conditions and biodiversity, and 5) argue why 
biodiversity can be morally relevant to allow rights to be violated. If this strategy works, 
we not only have a consistent animal ethic that is compatible with the moral intuitions 
of most activists and other people (e.g. with the intuition that we should not intervene 
in predation), we also have a principle which is in essence based on criteria that carnists 
already use. So the speciesist/carnist would have more difficulties in replying that this 
3-N-principle is not a good solution.  
First, we have to clarify the three criteria. The condition ‘necessary’ indicates a 
sufficiently strong vital need for an individual (e.g. food) or a group of individuals (e.g. 
procreation). ‘Normal’ means for simplicity that something occurs often. If apples often 
fall from trees, it is normal. The criterion ‘natural’ points at everything that is created 
by evolution. Evolution is the aimless process of genetic mutation and natural selection. 
Conscious, intentional inventions by intelligent beings are not considered natural, 
although the intelligence of those beings is natural (arose by evolution). A process is 
natural if it originates from natural evolution instead of being created by artificial 
means (such as conscious inventions). 
Second, I argue that none of the three N criteria separately are sufficient conditions. 
Necessity is not a sufficient criterion: for the patient in the hospital it is necessary to get 
a new organ in order to survive. So necessity alone does not distinguish between 
predation and transplantation. Yet, in ethics, it seems intuitively clear that necessity 
has some moral significance.  
What about natural? Quite often a carnist argues that eating meat is natural for 
humans, and therefore it is allowed. But there is some danger in applying the criterion 
of naturalness. Is rape natural? After all: by natural processes (evolution) men have 
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developed an body part that makes them capable of raping women, quite a lot of male 
animals (e.g. cats) rape female animals in nature, also humans rape each other, our 
ancestors most likely raped each other for thousands of years, and it is even very likely 
that we owe our very existence to the fact that some of our ancestors once raped a 
woman. So what else do we need to say that something is natural? Simply put: rape is 
natural (and normal in the animal world), but not necessary for men. Therefore it is an 
unnecessary violation of rights, and hence immoral, even if rape was as natural as one 
could think of.  
One could say that the patients in the hospital got ill by natural processes. But this 
does not make organ transplantations natural. Transplantation was a conscious 
invention. It did not evolve by a blind process of mutation and natural selection, it is 
definitely not instinctive behavior.  
The ancestors of carnivores on the other hand did not consciously think about a 
problem of nutrient shortage, intentionally look for a solution, experiment a bit, 
discover meat as a solution, whereupon they adapted and suddenly became dependent 
on meat. Predation is therefore natural because it originated by a process of evolution 
(mutation and natural selection). 
For carnivores and omnivores (like humans), we could say that meat consumption is 
natural, because we have developed - by blind evolution - a digestive system that makes 
it possible to eat meat. Eating meat also often happens instinctively, which is not the 
case for transplantations. But for humans, meat consumption is, just like rape, not 
necessary (ADA, 2009). As it is an unnecessary violation of rights, it should not be 
allowed, even if it was as natural as one could think of. We should eat vegan instead. 
And finally, note that intensive livestock farming is a far cry from naturalness. So 
animal products from farming are neither necessary nor natural. 
And what about normality? If rape happens a lot, that does not yet justify rape. If 
killing happens a lot in wartime, it does not justify murder. 
All three criteria considered separately are not valid as moral arguments. Also 
combinations of two of the three criteria are not sufficient. If rape is natural and 
happens quite a lot, it is still immoral because it is not necessary. If organ 
transplantation is necessary and happens quite a lot in some distant country, it is still 
immoral because it is not natural. And if predation is natural and necessary for the 
predator, but not normal, then I guess we are tempted to stop this predation. If every 
being on earth was vegan and then suddenly by a process of natural selection a small 
group of animals appeared who needed to kill and eat other animals in order to survive, 
animal rights activists would likely intervene (if they could). They would not allow 
those predators to kill others.  
So let’s put all three criteria together: suppose something is normal, natural and 
necessary. What if rape was not only natural, but also normal and necessary for 
humans? In other words: what if all human populations would go extinct if they were 
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not allowed to rape? Extinction on a massive scale. Then that’s some argument. 
Although I don’t know what most people would say, we might tolerate rape in that case. 
I believe that predation by natural predators is allowed because it is normal, natural 
and necessary, and transplantation is not allowed because it is not normal and will 
never be natural. The 3-N-conditions put together might solve the difference problem. 
So let’s now try to formulate the above normal+natural+necessary criterion in a more 
exact and complete 3-N-principle:  
The 3-N-principle. If (a) a sufficiently large group of sentient beings became by (b) 
an evolutionary process (c) dependent on the violations of rights of other sentient 
beings for their survival, they are allowed to violate those rights for that purpose. 
(But we are also allowed to protect ourselves and to protect prey if we are inclined 
to do so, and we have a duty to intervene in predation once feasible alternatives 
such as healthy non-animal food for the predators are found. In practice, we 
should give dogs vegan food.) 
This principle clearly refers to (a) normality, (b) naturalness and (c) necessity. Of 
course there can be fuzzy boundaries between normal and not-normal, natural and not-
natural, necessary and not-necessary. Some things can be very normal, natural and 
necessary, others less so. The idea is that these fuzzy boundaries create a gradation and 
that this gradation can be coupled with the gradation of rights violations: some actions 
are strong violations, others less so. An example of such a coupling of gradations was 
presented in Figure 9, section 6.4). 
10.5 The value of biodiversity 
The above 3-N-principle makes a distinction between predation and transplantation, 
and this is in line with the moral intuitions. But what is the moral relevance of those 
three criteria? Consider the no-harm principle. This principle corresponds with our 
moral intuitions, but there is more: there exists a natural property called well-being. If 
we give intrinsic value to this natural property, then the intuitions behind the no-harm 
principle are coherent with this value of well-being. 
Could we do the same for the 3-N-principle? Does there exist a natural property that 
we can value and that is coherent with the 3-N-principle? The answer is affirmative: I 
suggest that the 3-N- principle is connected to the moral relevance of biodiversity. Let’s 
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define biodiversity as everything that directly originated from evolution. If now we 
would suppose that biodiversity is morally very important, then naturalness is 
relevant.7 Or in other words: if a process (behavior or property) is natural, it contributes 
to biodiversity by definition. If a process is natural and normal, it contributes a lot to 
biodiversity. And if a process is natural, normal and necessary, biodiversity would 
drastically decrease if that process no longer exists. A drastic decrease of biodiversity 
can be considered worse than violations of rights, and this makes the connection 
between the 3-N-principle and the value of biodiversity. The connection is only valid if 
all three N-criteria are present.  Applied to predation: the existence of all predators in 
the world strongly contributes to biodiversity, and this biodiversity from predation has 
a moral value that strongly trumps the basic rights of individuals (e.g. the right not to 
be used as merely means), and also trumps utilitarian calculations of well-being.8 
There is one more assumption required to make the above connection tight: duties 
and moral principles should be universalized (compare with the universal law 
 
                                                     
7
 This is similar to Goodin’s “green theory of value” (Goodin, 1992). Goodin claimed that things created by 
natural processes possess a higher value than things created by artificial processes. The intrinsic value of 
biodiversity plays a central role in many holistic environmental ethics (Benson, 2001; Rolston, 1988).  
8
 There is a subtle issue relating the three N criteria to biodiversity. Do acts (such as the behavior of predation) 
itself contribute to biodiversity? Or is it rather the existence of predators that contributes to biodiversity 
(even if the predators manage to survive on vegan food and stop predation)? In other words: is biodiversity 
the variation in different entities (life forms, genes,…) or does it include variation in processes? If processes 
are not included, the 3-N-principle and biodiversity principle are slightly divergent, because the 3-N-principle 
refers to processes (types of behavior). I tend to think if processes contribute to biodiversity, they only do so 
slightly. As a result, a world where lions live but survive on vegan food is better than a world where they live 
and hunt prey. The suffering of the prey is worse than the loss of process-biodiversity (the loss of the behavior 
of predation).  
Another potential difference between the 3-N-principle and the biodiversity principle is that the necessity 
condition in the 3-N-principle might be extended to include not only a vital need but also a need for sufficient 
health. Imagine that we do not need meat for our survival, but that meat would positively contribute to our 
health (i.e. a vegan diet would be less healthy). If that were the case, eating some meat might be permissible 
according to the 3-N-principle if necessity includes health, but it might be impermissible according to the 
biodiversity principle, as refraining from consuming meat does not result in the extinction of humans. If we 
want a consistent ethical system where eating meat would be permissible when veganism were unhealthy (but 
not deadly), we should stick to the 3-N-principle instead of the biodiversity principle. Some animal rights 
activists would eat vegan, even if it had some costs to their health. A related difference between the necessity 
and biodiversity criteria lies in the answer to the question: should predators stop eating once they have 
procreated? As soon as predators have procreated and have viable offspring, the predator population can 
survive. One could say that biodiversity does not decrease when all predator parents die. Hence, when a 
predator has offspring, meat is still necessary for the live of this individual, but not for the conservation of 
biodiversity. One the other hand, one could say that the existence of predator parents does contribute to 
biodiversity, as if the group of predator parents form a separate population. The number of predators will 
drastically increase when all predator parents die. And this decrease can be counted as a drastic decrease of 
biodiversity. 
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formulation of the categorical imperative of Kant). We do not have a duty to protect the 
prey, even if we could in a particular situation, because if we did say we have a duty in 
this situation, then we should want this rule to be universalized to all predators. Then 
we should want predation to be prohibited at all times, anywhere.9 But predation is 
necessary for predators, so this universalization implies that we should want all 
predators to go extinct. Predation is also normal, so a lot of predators would go extinct 
after universal prohibition. And that would be a tremendous loss of biodiversity. This 
excludes (excuses) us from an intervention duty.  
One final question remains: Why is biodiversity important? Of course biodiversity 
could have instrumental value in the sense that it could contribute to the well-being of 
sentient beings. But if a world without predators and with a lower biodiversity would 
have a higher overall well-being, an instrumental value of biodiversity is not sufficient 
to allow predation. Hence, a mere instrumental value would violate our moral intuition 
in the predation case. Therefore the biodiversity solution only works if biodiversity has 
intrinsic value (here meant as being the opposite of instrumental value).  
So in what sense can biodiversity (everything that is the direct product of 
evolutionary processes) be understood to have intrinsic value? The intrinsic value of 
biodiversity could be compared with the intrinsic value of well-being. A person or 
sentient being has two moral values: he/she is irreplaceable and he/she has a well-being 
which has intrinsic value. We could say that ecosystems, too, are irreplaceable and have 
a biodiversity that has intrinsic value.10 Let’s explore this analogy between well-being 
and biodiversity a bit further. 
1) Looking at sentient beings, we see that they tend to increase their well-being. That 
is because these beings have multiple needs, and they are looking for strategies to 
satisfy their needs as much as possible (trade-offs, resource scarcity and incompatible 
strategies limit their growth of well-being, though). Now, looking at ecosystems, we see 
that they tend to increase their biodiversity. That is because these ecosystems consist of 
procreating living beings, and they are subject to genetic variation (natural selection by 
resource scarcity limits the growth of biodiversity, though). 
 
                                                     
9
 Universalization does not mean that only the actually living moral beings have the duty. The current 
number of moral beings might be too low and their skills too limited to stop all predation everywhere. Hence, 
intervention by the current moral agents might not endanger biodiversity. However, a duty should not 
depend on an arbitrary state of the world (e.g. the current state with the current number of moral agents). A 
duty should also be universalized in all hypothetical situations, including situations where there are enough 
moral agents with enough skills to prevent predation everywhere. 
10
 Note that – in contrast with persons – ecosystems do not have clear boundaries, so it might be problematic 
to speak of the irreplaceability of ecosystems. Only the whole Earth has a clear boundary as an ecosystem. 
Furthermore, as we have seen in section 4.6.4.3, the problem of irreplaceability of sentient beings can be 
solved without a need to introduce an ‘irreplaceability value’.  
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2) Both well-being and biodiversity are a collection of different things: pleasure, 
friendship, absence of pain and reading a good book all contribute to well-being, just 
like genes, biotic landscapes, ecological processes, species and genera all contribute to 
biodiversity. Both well-being and biodiversity are natural properties that are difficult to 
calculate and express in one number, but we are able to see increases and decreases.  
Note that the intrinsic value of biodiversity should be distinguished from a 
problematic intrinsic value of species. As species are abstract biological categories, the 
notion of species value faces serious problems. First, the definition of a species is 
complex and the moral relevance of a definition based on fertility of offspring is not 
clear. Second, looking at ring species and hybrids, species can have fuzzy boundaries. 
Giving intrinsic value to species might be as bizarre as giving value to cheeks: hitting 
your left cheek lowers your well-being, just as killing a species lowers biodiversity, but 
that does not mean that cheeks have intrinsic value.  
3) It is good to increase well-being. Is it possible to increase biodiversity in nature by 
introducing new species through e.g. genetic engineering? The answer is no: genetic 
engineering contributes to the variation of life forms (as long as it does not result in 
increased competition and extinction of species), but it is not a direct11 result of 
evolution. Genetically modified species are consciously created by intelligent beings. 
They are not the product of a blind process of genetic mutation and natural selection. 
Only the variation that is the direct consequence of natural evolution counts as 
biodiversity. 
We can compare this with a problem in welfare ethics: the ‘experience machine’ 
(Nozick, 1974). Imagine a virtual reality machine that gives a lot of pleasure when your 
brains are plugged into the machine. Even if pleasure experiences (all positive feelings) 
increase, most people feel reluctant to plug into the machine, because they might have a 
need for authenticity (being in the real world instead of a virtual reality), or they might 
have a need to actually do something (getting pleasure through activity instead of 
through merely experiencing things). 
Just as biodiversity is composed of the variation of all life forms and processes that 
are the direct result of natural evolution, we can say that well-being is composed of the 
variation of all positive feelings and emotions that are the result of preference (need) 
satisfaction. In this sense, the pleasures experienced in the experience machine do not 
contribute to well-being, unless the individual wants these pleasure experiences (i.e. if 
the individual has preferences for these experiences in the machine).12  
 
                                                     
11
 It is an indirect result, because the intelligence of the scientists is a result of evolution. 
12
 As we have seen in section 4.2.2, this combines mental state accounts with preference satisfaction accounts 
of well-being (see Shaw 1999, chapter 2). 
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The only possible strategy to increase someone’s well-being, is by eliminating 
obstacles that prevent preference satisfaction (i.e. eliminating barriers that enforce 
trade-offs, or eliminating scarcities). Similarly, the only possible strategy to increase 
biodiversity is by eliminating ecosystem pressures that increase competition over 
scarce resources. Introducing drugs (or an experience machine) to increase happy 
feelings is similar to introducing new species (or genetic engineering) to increase 
variation in life forms: they do not contribute to valuable well-being and valuable 
biodiversity. 
All in all: well-being is for a sentient being what biodiversity is for a natural 
ecosystem. We should not lower someone’s well-being without good reason, and we also 
should not lower biodiversity without good reason. Neither should we be willing to have 
a much lower biodiversity. The following table summarizes the analogy between 
biodiversity and well-being. 
 
Well-being Biodiversity 
Natural property of sentient beings Natural property of ecosystems 
Tendency to increase Tendency to increase 
Constraints: trade-offs and (resource) 
scarcity limit growth of well-being 
Natural selection: competition and 
(resource) scarcity limit growth of 
biodiversity 
Variation of (positive minus negative) 
feelings and emotions 
Variation of living organisms and 
processes 
Result of preference satisfaction Direct result of evolution 
No ‘artificial means’ to increase well-
being using an experience machine 
No artificial means to increase 
biodiversity using genetic engineering 
 
In summary, the above discussion allows us to introduce the following principle: 
The intrinsic value of biodiversity. Biodiversity is composed of all variation in life 
forms and processes that are the direct result of natural evolution, where natural 
evolution is generated by random genetic mutations. We should protect 
biodiversity, because the biodiversity for ecosystems is analogous to well-being 
for sentient beings: both are intrinsically valuable properties of an entity 
(ecosystem, sentient being) that is unique and irreplaceable. 
The above ‘biodiversity principle’ or ‘triple-N-principle’ has some resemblance with 
Regan’s amorality criterion. But it is not about the amorality of the lion, but the 
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amorality of nature and evolution. This amoral nature/biodiversity criterion is a new 
articulation of some shared moral intuitions and attitudes of animal rights activists. 
They are often worried that interfering in nature is a kind of human arrogance. Perhaps 
this might be a bit similar to the cultural relativists who claim that imposing our human 
rights on other cultures is arrogant.13 It is not the fact that the lion is an amoral agent, 
which grants him the right to kill and eat others. The point is that the lion is part of a 
big thing, which we will call nature or the ‘Other’. This ‘Other’, however, has a 
completely different morality than ours. It is ‘amoral’, which means: beyond the 
morality of our moral world. Condoning predation is a kind of respect for this Other. We 
are not responsible for the cruelty that evolved within the world of the Other.  
If a lion decides to hunt a zebra, that is part of the amoral world. But if I decide to use 
sentient beings for transplantations, it is part of our moral world. As predation 
contributes to biodiversity whereas transplantation doesn’t, this makes a distinction 
between predation and transplantation. Having said all this, I do believe that predation 
is a very serious moral problem, and perhaps some (utilitarian inclined) ethicists are 
right that in the end we should look for ways to intervene and decrease the vast 
amounts of suffering in the wild, including the suffering caused by predators. We should 
not be afraid of intervening, we should not be afraid of being too arrogant, because wild 
nature is really arrogantly cruel. At least we should not underestimate the cruelty of 
nature, and at least we should openly discuss this issue of decreasing wild animal 
suffering. 
10.6 Some further tests for the 3-N principle 
Let us test this biodiversity principle (or triple N principle) with some examples. Let us 
check whether the above hypothesis is compatible with our moral intuitions. If it is 
compatible with our intuitions, the animal rights ethic extended with the above 
principle becomes more coherent.  
As a first example, suppose someone becomes ill and needs new medicines that have 
to be tested on sentient beings. The experimentation did not originate from an amoral 
process of blind evolution; it originated from moral agents. Therefore, an animal rights 
activist should be against experimentations on sentient beings (without their consent). 
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 This is not an argument pro cultural relativism. Many animal rights activists are not cultural relativists. 
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A second example is the killing of insects by accident. Suppose that we discover that 
ants are sentient beings. What will happen to our ethics? Do we have a duty not to 
move, in order to save the ants? In other words, does the ant not only have a right not 
to be used as merely a means, but also a right not to be killed by us walking around? It is 
clear that the behavior of walking around originated by a blind evolutionary process, 
and that walking around is very vital for large animals like us. If we did not walk around, 
we would not even be here alive today. According to the hypothesis, we are then still 
allowed to walk around and accidentally kill ants. This conforms to our moral intuitions. 
On the other hand, road kill, the killing of sentient beings by cars, is morally wrong, 
because cars are not natural and driving a car does not contribute to biodiversity. 
What about killing an annoying fly on purpose? If we would discover that flies are 
really sentient beings, then our hypothesis says that we should not kill the fly, because 
we, as aggressors, did not have a vital need that was in danger. Even if killing flies is 
natural and normal. And we should definitely not use flies as merely a means to our 
ends. So the fly would have a right not to be used as merely a means, and also the right 
not to be killed on purpose for non-vital needs. 
Another example is the birth of animals which will have a lower value of life than 
ours. Imagine that all animals have a lower life expectancy and lower capacities for 
well-being (lower emotional richness) than humans. Those animals are like (mentally) 
disabled humans. From behind a veil of ignorance, you can choose between two worlds. 
In the first world, animals are born with a lower (but still positive) value of life. In the 
second world, there are only humans with a high value of life. You might prefer the 
second world, because in that world you have probability 1 of being a human with a 
high value of life. In the first world you risk being born as an animal with a lower value 
of life. This thought experiment would imply that it is good to make all non-human 
animals infertile, so that those animals go extinct.  
A similar problem arises with the birth of animals that will have a high critical 
resource consumption level (i.e. the positive, non-zero level of resource consumption at 
which well-being of that individual equals zero). Total well-being would be maximized if 
only the beings with lowest critical resource consumption levels would procreate. The 
resources needed for one individual with a high critical resource consumption level can 
better be spent on more individuals who have the lowest critical consumption levels. 
The latter individuals can generate more welfare with the same amount of resources 
(see Shiell, 2005). 
The conclusion that those animal species that do not contribute enough to the 
welfare function (as described in section 4.6.7.1) are no longer allowed to procreate, 
goes against our moral intuitions. If we say that biodiversity has moral value and that 
procreation is normal, natural and necessary, those animals are still allowed to 
procreate. As with predation, we do not have a duty to stop procreation. But we are 
allowed to intervene in procreation to some degree. For example if parents know that 
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their future child will be disabled (if the potential child would not contribute to the 
welfare function), then (early) abortion would be allowed.  
Related to the above problem is the issue of genetic enhancement. Do we have a duty 
to genetically enhance species who would otherwise not contribute enough to the 
welfare function? Should we genetically modify frogs to increase their potential levels 
of lifetime well-being? Or genetically modify lions such that they no longer need meat? 
Changing genes on purpose is not a natural behavior. Hence, those new genes do not 
contribute to biodiversity. If we would replace all frogs with enhanced frogs, some 
biodiversity will get lost because the genes that characterize the unenhanced frogs will 
disappear from the gene pool and the new genes do not contribute to biodiversity. The 
question is whether this loss of biodiversity (the loss of some specific genes) trumps the 
increase of the welfare function. This becomes an intuitive balancing of two competing 
values which can be approached in a democratic way (see section 4.6.11).  
A final example is the situation where a child holding a gun is about to kill another 
child. This child has no moral agency, but still we have the duty to intervene and 
protect the second child. That is because the first child does not have a vital need to kill 
the other child. Also, killing with a gun did not evolve by an evolutionary process, so it 
is not natural. 
The above examples indicate that our triple-N-principle is coherent with a lot of our 
moral intuitions. As a summary, the following table gives an overview of solutions for 
five of the abovementioned challenges to a consequentialist welfare ethic. 
1. Predation: carnivores are allowed14 to hunt, kill and eat many prey animals, 
even if they harm sentient prey. 
2. Motion: a human (or another big animal) is allowed to move around and kill 
(by accident) many insects, even if insects were sentient. 
3. Organ transplantation: a surgeon is not allowed to sacrifice a victim without 
informed consent, even if patients are dying when they do not receive new 
organs.  
4. Medical experimentation: a researcher is not allowed to sacrifice someone 
without informed consent, even if the developed medicines could save many 
patients in the future. 
5. Procreation: all animals are allowed to procreate15, even if those animal 
species do not contribute enough to welfare function.  
 
 
                                                     
14
 In the sense that we (moral agents) do not have a duty to interfere in predation to save the prey. 
15
 This does not imply that they are allowed to have as many offspring as they want, because we have to avoid 
overpopulation. For example having more than 3 children would be problematic if this rule would be 
universalized: the resulting exponential population growth will hit the boundaries of the planet. 
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 Intuitive 
moral 
judgments 
Consequentialist 
welfare ethics 
Mere means 
principle 
Principle X 
 
1. Predation Allowed Not allowed Not allowed Allowed 
2. Motion Allowed Not allowed - (undecided) Allowed 
3. Organ 
transplantation 
Not 
allowed 
Required Not allowed - 
(undecided) 
4. Medical 
Experimentation 
Not 
allowed 
Required Not allowed - 
(undecided) 
5. Procreation  Allowed Not allowed - (undecided) Allowed 
 
A common property of the above problems is the necessity of a serious welfare loss. 
The behavior (predation, transplantation,…) is necessary for: 
1. existing beings to stay alive (the predators, patients and big animals in 
problems 1 to 4),  
2. potential beings to have a life16 (problem 5), or 
3. populations to survive (problem 5). 
The second column in the above table presents the intuitive moral judgments about 
the allowance of the five types of behavior. This column is the opposite of the third 
column, which gives the results according to consequentialist welfare ethics. To 
reconcile the welfare ethics with the moral intuitions, we can develop a two-step 
approach.  
The first step (column four) introduces the deontological Mere Means Principle 
(discussed in section 6.2), which changes a few consequentialist judgments (organ 
transplantation and medical experimentation). This principle adds some 
impermissibilities that trump the consequentialist principle, so after this step, none of 
the five behaviors is allowed. But that is not sufficient to match all judgments with the 
second column in the table.  
Therefore, in a second step, a new principle X has to be introduced (column five). 
This principle X trumps both the mere means and the consequentialist principles. After 
this second step, the (im)permissibility of the five behaviors matches the intuitions. We 
have seen that the 3-N-principle, which corresponds with the value of biodiversity, 
serves as a good principle X, because it changes the judgments in the three remaining 
problems: predation, motion and procreation. There are different ways to measure 
biodiversity. Scientists can propose different biodiversity metrics. But each metric 
shows a drastic decrease when predation, motion and procreation stops. Hence, 
 
                                                     
16
 Procreation is necessary for a potential being to get a life, in the sense that without procreation, the 
potential being could never come into existence. 
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whatever biodiversity metric one chooses, it is compatible with the moral intuitions of a 
deontological naturalistic ethic that permits those types of behavior.  
The intrinsic value and the resulting 3-N-principle fit in a wide reflective equilibrium 
(Daniels, 1979): they are coherent with strong moral intuitions in three different cases 
(predation, motion and procreation), they are coherent with a notion of naturalness 
(which a lot of people care about), and they are coherent with some background 
theories of biodiversity (some properties of biodiversity make the above mentioned 
analogy between biodiversity and well-being sensible, the latter having intrinsic value 
in consequentialist welfare ethics). 
The next section introduces a second possible principle X. Also this principle fits in a 
wide reflective equilibrium: it is coherent with the same three moral intuitions, and 
coherent with a notion of fairness. 
10.7 A second hypothetical solution to the difference problem: 
behavioral fairness 
The above 3-N-principle refers to some seemingly arbitrary criteria of naturalness and 
normality, and to some seemingly mysterious intrinsic value of biodiversity (it is an 
intrinsic value that a moral agent gives to a property of a non-sentient entity). For those 
who feel uncomfortable with the above solution, there is a second promising solution to 
the difference problem that avoids these references to nature and biodiversity. This 
second solution is based on a notion of fairness. If the lion is not allowed to eat the 
zebra, then the lion could say that as a matter of fairness, the zebra is not allowed to eat 
either. So the principle claims that A is allowed to do X with B, if B also does X and is 
allowed to do X. If the zebra (B) is allowed to eat (do X), then the lion (A) is allowed to 
eat as well. So if the zebra eats something, and if the zebra would say that she is allowed 
to eat, then the lion is allowed to eat as well, even when the zebra is the food. Similarly: 
if a (sentient) insect is moving around and is allowed to move around, then I am allowed 
to move around as well, even if that harms the insect by accident.  
This is in contrast with organ transplantations and medical experiments. I cannot use 
you as merely means for organ transplantation or medical experiments, because you 
don’t perform medical experiments and transplantations yourself. So my claim that I am 
allowed to use you becomes invalid, because you are innocent when it comes to medical 
experiments. The zebra and the insect, on the other hand, were not innocent when it 
comes to respectively eating and moving. 
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The tricky point is: what is the behavior X exactly? The zebra could say to the lion: 
“You are not allowed to eat me.” Then X could refer to ‘eat this zebra’. Fairness requires 
that the lion could say to the zebra: “Then you are not allowed to eat yourself either.” 
But that’s fine for the zebra: she was already following the rule not to eat herself. 
Similarly, if X meant ‘eat zebra’, the zebra could life with the rule that it is not allowed 
to eat zebras. The same goes for X equal to ‘eat animals’. The idea is that the behavior X 
should not refer to specific individuals or groups of individuals. X should only refer to a 
behavior, such as ‘eat’ or ‘do medical experiments’. If the lion is not allowed to eat, then 
neither is the zebra, and the zebra could not live with that rule.  
But then another problem lurks. To what kind of behavior should X refer? You could 
say: “You are not allowed to use me in experiments, because I’m innocent: I don’t use 
anyone in experiments.” My reply could be: “Sure, but you do use plants for food, so the 
true X means ‘use someone or something’”, and according to that view, you are guilty. 
But that X would be too general: it would imply that all kinds of uses are not allowed. 
Therefore, X should be the most accurate and specific description of a behavior.  
The most accurate description of the behavior of the lion would be: ‘eat’. But if you 
are allowed to eat (e.g. eat plants), then I would be allowed to eat you. In particular, 
sometimes you do eat plants just for taste. If a being is allowed to eat something for 
taste (instead of survival), then so do I, and if that being happens to taste good, I am 
allowed to eat her? I am allowed to eat you if you taste good and if you eat something 
for taste?  
To avoid this conclusion, we have to refer to the intention or the purpose of the 
behavior. In particular, we can keep the necessity criterion of the above 3-N-principle. 
Therefore, X should be more specific, such as ‘eat for survival’. I can survive without 
eating you, so eating you would not be for survival. 
It is not always clear to see whether someone eats for survival or pleasure, but if 
someone eats a sentient being, causing harm to the sentient being, and if there are 
healthy alternatives available, the intention to eat for survival will be flawed. 
So far, we have a promising fairness principle which roughly sounds as: “If you are 
allowed to do a specific behavior for survival, then so am I allowed to do the same type 
of behavior for survival.” But this principle still needs some further refinements and 
clarifications when we look at more hypothetical cases.  
First: what if plants were sentient beings? Plants don’t kill and eat other living 
beings. Does this mean that plants are innocent and that herbivores (including we) 
should not eat them? Of course, plants do consume chemical resources and energy. So 
we have to state that “consuming chemical resources and energy” is the same type of 
behavior as “eating”.  
Second, what if a sentient being consciously decided: “In consuming chemical 
resources, I will only consume non-sentient beings.”? Is it fair to eat this sentient being? 
This sentient being is in a sense lucky that she can survive on consuming non-sentient 
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beings. A lion, on the other hand, is not that lucky: he needs sentient beings. So the lion 
is allowed to eat this sentient being. However, if the lion was lucky in the same way (if 
he could survive by eating non-sentient beings), then he should restrict his 
consumption to non-sentient beings as well.    
A third objection is based on the common-sense judgment that doing experiments on 
(non-sentient) plants is allowed. But now a mad scientist could say: “If you are allowed 
to do experiments, on plants, I am allowed to do experiments as well, on you!” To avoid 
this, we make a distinction between moral and amoral beings. The fairness claim cannot 
be put forward against the victim, when the victim is a moral being. Note that amoral 
humans (babies and mentally handicapped humans) and non-human animals do not 
perform experiments on plants, so they should not be used by the mad scientist either. 
In summary, we get the following principle. 
The principle of behavioral fairness. An agent is allowed to do a specific type of 
behavior that causes harm to victims17, if (1) the behavior is necessary, (2) the 
harm is minimal (the agent does not have an alternative that causes less harm), (3) 
the victims are amoral agents, (4) the victims perform the same type of behavior 
and (5) the victims are allowed to do that behavior. If the agent has a better option 
(that causes less harm), then s/he should choose that option. 
This fairness principle means that if A is allowed to do something, then so is B, under 
certain conditions. The reader can verify that this fairness principle is able to withstand 
the tests mentioned in the previous section: impermissibly using sentient beings against 
their will in experiments, permissibly getting offspring who insufficiently contribute to 
the welfare function18, permissibly killing insects by accident when making a 
movement, impermissibly killing an annoying fly on purpose, and permissibly eating 
plants even if plants are sentient.  
  
 
                                                     
17
 Here, causing harm should be understood in a broad sense. E.g. lowering the total welfare function is a cause 
of non-personal harm where the victims can be considered as the total population. Also using someone as 
merely a means is a cause of harm.   
18
 Procreation is not a necessary need for an existing individual: no-one will die without procreation. But it 
can be considered necessary for potential future beings.  
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10.8 Summary 
We have seen three principles, the fairness principle, the triple-N-principle (or 
biodiversity principle) and the tolerated choice equality that solve the prey problem 
and the difference problem, the two components of the predation problem. Those 
principles can help us derive a consistent and coherent animal rights ethics that can be 
reconciled with moral intuitions shared by a lot of people. 
Regarding the 3-N-principle, I first clarified the meaning of normal, natural and 
necessity. Second, I demonstrated that none of the three criteria separately are 
sufficient. Third, I showed that the combination of all three criteria can make a 
distinction between predation and transplantation. Next, I made a connection between 
the three N-criteria (as we have defined them) and biodiversity. Fifth, I explained in 
what sense biodiversity can be said to have moral value. And finally I tested the 3-N-
principle in other situations, indicating that it corresponds with our moral intuitions. 
The result is a principle that says that basic right violations are only allowed when all 
three N-criteria are met. 
The three N justifications (normality, naturalness and necessity) that animal rights 
activists seem to hold are specific interpretations of the same three justifications in the 
ideology of carnism (Joy, 2009) and might give us a further clues about the question why 
it is so difficult to convince people to become vegetarians or vegans. Becoming vegan 
should be easy in principle, because eating animal products is not necessary for survival. 
Yet, carnist people appear to have strong emotional objections, and they use a lot of 
naturalistic fallacies to justify their behavior. For example, in the US there are more 
people in favor of hunting for pleasure, than there are in favor of medical experiments 
with animals (Herzog, 2010). And in contrast to hunting, medical experiments are 
believed to save lives. It becomes clear that there are some hidden sensitivities that 
people – including animal activists – might have. We mentioned the fear for human 
arrogance and the apparent similarities with cultural relativism and respect for the 
Other. But a belief in naturalness might be an important moral intuition of a lot of 
people. 
The 3-N-principle can be justified with a reference to an intrinsic value of 
biodiversity. However, those who dislike such a mysterious intrinsic value could rather 
adopt another principle to solve the predation problem: the behavioral fairness 
principle. This principle says that a specific behavior that harms a victim (e.g. killing 
and eating a living being) is allowed only if the action is necessary for survival, if the 
victim (e.g. the prey) is an amoral being, if the victim is also guilty of a similar type of 
action and if s/he is allowed to do that action. If the zebra eats for survival and is 
allowed to do so, then so also is the lion. But if a harm (a loss of well-being) occurs to a 
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sentient victim, and if there are healthy alternatives that do not involve such harm, 
then of course those alternatives should be chosen. 
Finally, we can combine the 3-N-principle and the principle of behavioral fairness 
into a new equality principle: everyone has an equal right to a behavior that is both 
natural, normal and necessary (i.e. a behavior that strongly contributes to biodiversity).  
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Chapter 11 The property problem and the harvest 
problem 
As animal products are not necessary for us, we (humans) should become vegans. But 
veganism is not good enough. There is another issue: what about property rights for 
animals? In particular: are we allowed chasing away animals to clear a forest in order to 
built a house or extend a crop field? What about the birds and the squirrels who built 
nests in those trees? We destroy their houses and habitats by cutting down the trees. 
From an antispeciesist point of view, this is similar to the destruction of someone’s 
property or stealing someone’s land.    
And what if we use a crop field (to produce vegan food)? The crop field is our 
property, but some other animals invade the field and start eating our grains, fruits and 
vegetables. Are we allowed to chase them away, even if this results in more suffering by 
those animals due to an increased competition between those animals for scarce food 
resources? Are we allowed to kill them if they keep returning to our crop fields?  
And third, what if we kill those small animals by accident when we use machines to 
harvest our crops or drive with big trucks? Some animals (small rodents, birds,…) die, 
even when vegan food is produced. At www.animalvisuals.org, an estimate is given of 
the number of animals killed due to harvesting. For a vegan it comes down to roughly 2 
animals killed per year. This is still much less than the number of animals killed on 
purpose and by accident in the production of animal products (meat requires 
slaughtering an animal but also harvesting crops for livestck feed), but it is not 
something we can dismiss so easily. 
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11.1 Habitat destruction 
Let us consider the first problem: the destruction of wild animal habitats. Indeed, we are 
not allowed to invade a foreign country, destroy the houses and chase the local people 
away. Isn’t it speciesist to allow the destruction of animal habitats, destroying the nests 
of the birds and squirrels? Or do animals have habitat rights? 
A consistent ethical theory of animal equality indeed implies that animals have 
habitat rights similar to our property rights. But this does not mean that we are not 
allowed to use natural resources even when using those resources requires invading 
someone’s habitat. We are allowed to use habitat of animals to some degree, because if 
we are not allowed to use natural resources, then neither is no-one allowed. If an animal 
uses natural resources and a habitat, it means that another animal is no longer able to 
use those resources. But animals are allowed to use natural resources, and hence so are 
humans. As habitat and natural resources are scarce, there is always competition 
between different sentient beings. 
To demonstrate that using an animal’s habitat is not necessarily speciesist, imagine 
that a mentally disabled human escaped from a care institution. This human is as 
intelligent as a bird, and he decides to climb into a tree and build a nest. As a tree is a 
bird’s habitat, this tree becomes the habitat of the disabled human. Unfortunately, we 
want to cut down that tree, to produce paper for important books, or to extend our 
cropland, or to build a house for ourselves. Chasing away the disabled human can be 
considered as a harm to that human. The mentally disabled human might get injured, or 
he might run to another tree that is already occupied by another sentient being (say 
another escaped mentally disabled human), increasing their competition for scarce 
trees. This harm done to the mentally disabled human is not a use as merely a means. 
Chasing away the human does not violate his basic right. 
We are allowed to cause harm to someone, as long as the victim is not used as merely 
a means, and as long as the quasi-maximin prioritarian principle of justice is not 
violated. In practice, this latter condition means that 1) we should be very careful in 
cutting down trees and harvesting crops, 2) we should strongly decrease our 
consumption of natural resources in order not to invade too much in someone else’s 
habitat, 3) we should stop the further destruction of wild animal habitat (increase the 
area of nature reserves and stop the expansion of human settlements) and 4) we have a 
strong responsibility to help potential victims (taking care of wild animals by strongly 
increasing our support for wildlife rescue centers, giving food aid to animals in need, 
protecting wild ecosystems). Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) developed a political 
theory of animal rights, whereby the habitat of wild animals should be considered as 
sovereign nations or sovereign animal territory. We do not have the right to colonize 
and displace the citizens (wild animals) of these spaces. If we move into animal 
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territory, we should compensate any harm done to wild animals, by helping wild 
animals in need. Risks to wild animals can be compensated with benefits for them. 
Therefore, merely veganism (abstaining from consuming animal products) is not good 
enough. A vegan does not violate the basic right not to be used as merely a means, but 
s/he might still violate the quasi-maximin principle if s/he is not careful. It can be 
compared with invading another country: even if you are not killing humans for food 
(you are anticannibalistic), you do cause harm when you steal someone’s land. 
If we are allowed to carefully chase away wildlife animals to some degree, and if we 
want to avoid speciesism, we are also allowed to chase away those escaped tree sitting 
mentally disabled humans. In a sense, this means that mentally disabled humans and 
wildlife animals have weaker property rights than rational beings like you and me (i.e. 
mentally capable humans). It can be argued that this difference in the strength of 
property rights can be derived from the quasi-maximin principle, if we keep in mind 
that differences in mental capacities generate differences in how property rights 
influence well-being. In other words: some sentient beings have special mental 
capacities, which means that their well-being is more strongly influenced by how 
properties are distributed. This happens especially when a sentient being has the 
capacity to understand the notion of a property, to invest in his/her property (making 
him/her feel more emotionally attached to his/her property) and is able to cooperate 
with others in the search for a fair distribution of property. Those people (e.g. rational 
beings) might have stronger property rights compared to other sentient beings, because 
their well-being is more strongly dependent on the distribution and treatment of 
properties.  
Therefore, there is a difference between destroying the house of a rational being and 
destroying the nest of a bird by accident in the case of cutting down a tree. First, a more 
rational being might have a stronger emotional connection and understanding of 
property, and second, a house is different from a nest in terms of effort to construct it 
and in terms of replaceability. Therefore, it may be worse to violate (mentally healthy) 
human property rights than (non-human) animal habitat rights.   
This stronger property right for rational beings can also justify why rational beings 
are more strongly permitted to defend their own properties (e.g. defend their crop 
fields against invaders). Yet, we should look for animal friendly, non-lethal methods to 
avoid animals eating our crops, just as we have to look for human friendly solutions 
when a group of humans invade our cropland to steal our food. Killing them or 
poisoning them can only be a very last resort. And some solidarity with animals might 
also be required to compensate for some harm done to wild animals: we should be 
willing to produce food to help hungry (wild) animals. Again, this means we should 
more strongly support wildlife rescue centers.    
In this context, we can also refer to a principle of tolerated partiality. We might feel 
more concern to respect the property rights of mentally disabled humans compared to 
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the property rights of birds, but we should tolerate someone who takes more effort to 
respect bird habitat above the property of a mentally disabled human. 
11.2 Animals killed in harvest 
Imagine there are two animals (e.g. small rodents) that are killed in agriculture to 
produce vegan food for one human for one year. Are we allowed to farm some land if we 
know that per vegan person every year on average two vertebrate animals are killed? Or 
is vegan agriculture a violation of the quasi-maximin prioritarian principle?  
To shed some light on this issue, remember first of all that in section 4.2 we saw two 
factors that influence someone’s lifetime well-being: 1) the richness of emotions (some 
sentient beings have more and stronger preferences and can experience higher levels of 
momentaneous well-being if those preferences are satisfied) and 2) psychological 
connectedness with someone’s past and future (some sentient beings have richer and 
stronger autobiographical selves as well as stronger preference towards the future).  
Imagine we have four beings: a human person (with high mental capacities and a 
strong psychological connectedness), a big animal (e.g. a cow) and two small animals 
(e.g. rodents). There are three situations: 1) the human produces vegan food, at the cost 
of endangering the two rodents (those two rodents might get killed if they happen to be 
in the crop field at the wrong time), 2) the human does not produce vegan food nor kills 
the cow, which means the human cannot eat and the rodents and cow survive, and 3) 
the human eats the cow, the rodents are not in danger because the cropland is not 
harvested. Which of these situations is the best from the point of view of prioritarian 
justice?  
As the rodents likely have lower potential levels of momentaneous well-being and 
also have a weaker psychological connectedness with their past and future selves, they 
likely have lower levels of integrated lifetime well-being. Looking at the welfare 
function equation in section 4.6.8, it is far from obvious that situation 2 is better than 
situation 1. After all, the lifetime well-being of the vegan is strongly reduced when s/he 
is no longer allowed to farm some land, and the early death of the rodents does not 
strongly decrease their integrated lifetime well-being if those rodents have less 
psychological connectedness.    
What about situation 3? This situation is definitely the worst with respect to the basic 
right principle (the basic right of the cow is violated in situation 3), but is it also the 
worst with respect to lifetime well-being? The welfare function does not give a clear 
answer, except that one might think that the death of one animal (the cow in situation 
3) is better than the death of two animals (the rodents in situation 1).  
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The principle of prioritarian justice says that we should not cause more harm in such 
a way that the welfare function decreases. But it is far from obvious which of the above 
three choices is the best from the point of view of prioritarian justice. In that case, we 
can do two things.  
First, we can refer to the principle of tolerated partiality. That principle was first 
derived in situations where we help others, and the choice is between helping A versus 
helping B. Now we are facing a situation where we are harming others, and the choice is 
between harming A versus harming B. The principle of prioritarianism says that we 
should minimize harm, where harm is now defined as a decrease of the welfare 
function. But if it becomes difficult to calculate whether the welfare function decreases, 
we can say that we are allowed to be partial to some degree, to prefer the choice that is 
in our own best interest, i.e. situation 1.  
Second, we can introduce a heuristic rule of thumb: harming an identifiable victim is 
worse than harming a non-identifiable victim. The animals that die by accident in 
agriculture (e.g. the two rodents) are non-identifiable victims. If I eat a vegan product, I 
cannot identify the rodents that died due to harvest. It might be possible that no animal 
was harmed when a vegan meal was produced. On the other hand, if I consume an 
animal product (e.g. the meat of the cow), I do know that this product comes from an 
identifiable victim. A piece of meat, an egg or a drop of milk comes from someone’s 
body, so at least someone is harmed, and we know who. In that sense, situation 3 is 
worse than situations 1, because the cow is an identifiable victim that is killed whereas 
in situation 1 there is no identifiable harm (it is not clear that the two rodents are 
actually killed). Also in situation 2, there is an identifiable harm to the vegan human 
who has nothing to eat. Therefore, situations 2 and 3 are worse than situation 1, 
according to this heuristic rule of identifiable harm, because situations 2 and 3 involve 
identifiable victims.  
Furthermore, we can add that the harm done to non-identifiable victims can be 
compensated by helping animals who need help. If my behavior results in the death of 
one non-identifiable animal (i.e. I don’t know who dies, I only know that someone dies), 
I can compensate this harm by saving the life of an identifiable animal (i.e. a specific 
animal who needs help). Even if harming identifiable victims is not worse than harming 
a non-identifiable victims, there is still a difference: the second harm can be 
compensated by helping others who we did not harm, whereas the first harm can only 
be compensated by helping the harmed identifiable victims themselves. As using 
resources (e.g. doing agriculture) and emitting waste harms non-identifiable animals, 
we can compensate for this harm by sufficiently helping other animals. 
In summary: vegan agriculture might be permissible, even if non-human animals die 
by harvesting the crops. What it means is that we should first of all be much more 
careful in agriculture, mining and forestry, trying to avoid harming and killing animals 
(e.g. permaculture and zero tilling agriculture). Second, we should lower our ecological 
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footprint and lower our use of natural resources such as cropland. And third, we should 
compensate harm done to wild animals by strongly supporting wildlife rescue centers 
that help all kinds of wild animals (including small rodents and birds). Merely eating 
vegan food is not good enough according to a consistent ethic of animal equality. 
  
  
 Part 4  Epilogue  
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Chapter 12 The moral hands 
12.1 The moral hand of normative ethics: five principles of a 
complete and coherent ethic 
The previous chapters discussed a lot of ethical principles. As a summary, and to 
demonstrate the compactness, completeness and coherence of the ethic, let me use a 
metaphor: the moral hand. Each of the five fingers represents an ethical principle.  
-The thumb: rule universalism (see section 1.2). You must follow the rules that 
everyone (who is capable, rational and informed) must follow in all morally similar 
situations. You may only follow the rules that everyone (who is capable, rational and 
informed) may follow in all morally similar situations. Prejudicial discrimination is 
immoral. We should give the good example, even if others don’t. Just like we have to 
place the thumb against the other fingers in order to grasp an object, we have to apply 
the principle of universalism to the other four basic principles.  
-The forefinger: justice and the value of lifetime well-being (see section 4.4). Increase 
the well-being (over a complete life) of all sentient beings alive in the present and the 
future, whereby improvements for the worst-off positions (the worst sufferers, the 
beings who have the worst lives) have a strong priority. Lifetime well-being is the value 
you would ascribe when you would live the complete life of a sentient being, and is a 
function of all positive and negative feelings that are the result of (dis)satisfaction of 
preferences (everything wanted by the being).   
-The middle finger: the mere means principle and the basic right to bodily autonomy 
(see section 6.2). Never use (or consider) the body of a sentient being as merely a means 
to someone else’s ends, because that violates the right to bodily autonomy. The two 
words ‘mere means’ refer to two conditions, respectively: 1) if in order to reach an end 
(e.g. saving someone) you force a sentient being to do or undergo something that the 
being does not want, and 2) if the body of that sentient being is necessary as a means for 
that end, then you are not allowed to treat that being in that way. A sentient being is a 
being who has developed the capacity to want something by having positive and 
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negative feelings, and who has not yet permanently lost this capacity. They have the 
experience of having preferences. The middle finger is a bit longer than the forefinger, 
and so the basic right is a bit stronger than the lifetime well-being (e.g. the right to live). 
The basic right can only be violated when the forefinger principle of well-being is 
seriously threatened.  
-The ring finger: naturalness and the value of biodiversity (see section 10.4). If a 
behavior violates the forefinger or middle finger principles, the behavior is still allowed 
(but not obligatory) only if that behavior is both natural (a direct consequence of 
spontaneous evolution), normal (frequent) and necessary (important for the survival of 
sentient beings). Just as lifetime well-being is the value of a sentient being, biodiversity 
is the value of an ecosystem and is a function of the variation of life forms and processes 
that are a direct consequence of natural evolution. The valuable biodiversity would 
drastically decrease if a behavior that is natural, normal and necessary was universally 
prohibited (universally, because you have to put the thumb against the ring finger). 
-The little finger: tolerated partiality and the value of personal relationships (see 
section 5.1). Just as the little finger can deviate a little bit from the other fingers, a small 
level of partiality is allowed. When helping others, you are allowed to be a bit partial in 
favor of your loved ones, as long as you are prepared to tolerate similar levels of 
partiality of everyone else (everyone, because you have to put the thumb against the 
little finger). 
 
These five fingers might look like post hoc rationalizations of moral intuitions (see 
e.g. Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2008), and in fact they are. Except that each of the five 
principles is backed up by a coherent set of arguments, which makes it less of an 
arbitrary system.   
The thumb principle allows us to satisfy a need for consistency and impartiality (non-
arbitrariness), it allows us to deal with game-theoretic ideal and non-ideal situations 
(with or without universal compliance, see section 7.2), it allows us to tackle moral 
illusions, it fits with our intuition that one should give the good example, and it helps to 
generate principles (other principles such as the ring finger and little finger only work 
when the thumb principle is applied).  
The forefinger can be derived by either a veil of ignorance thought experiment 
(assuming some levels of risk aversion, loss aversion and uncertainty aversion, as well as 
some aspects of prospect theory, see section 4.6) or by the moral virtue of compassion 
(assuming a need for a certain level of well-being efficiency, as well as some moral 
intuitions about variable populations and personal identity). The lifetime perspective is 
justified by two coherent reasons: the intuition that persons are not replaceable, and 
the intuition that there is a difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal harm, 
i.e. a difference between imprudent behavior (harming your future self) and immoral 
behavior (harming another person). 
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The middle finger is consistent with moral intuitions in many (at least ten) dilemmas, 
with notions of respect and intrinsic value, and with a propertarian libertarian ethic of 
bodily autonomy.  
The ring finger fits with moral intuitions in situations of predation, procreation and 
motion, and is compatible with moral intuitions about naturalness (as used in e.g. a 
carnist ideology) and the value of biodiversity in environmental ethics.  
The little finger is compatible with our intuitions about partiality in situations of 
imperfect, positive and procreational duties, and it fits in an extended mere means 
principle of the middle finger (section 6.6).  
Furthermore, the principles are also made compatible with scientific background 
theories of biology (e.g. gradual evolution) and psychology (e.g. personal identity and 
mental capacities). These background theories challenge some common sense 
assumptions on e.g. boundaries between species, boundaries between persons and 
boundaries between levels of mental capacities. Our moral hand is perfectly able to deal 
with non-sharp boundaries between species, persons and mental capacities. For 
example the mathematical expression of the forefinger principle includes a connectivity 
function to deal with complex issues of psychological connectedness and personal 
identities (section 4.6.8), the basic right of the middle finger couples gradations of 
mental capacities with gradations of needs (section 6.4), and the biodiversity principle 
of the ring finger works well even when there are no clear boundaries between species. 
These considerations challenge the objection that the ethic of the five fingers is 
merely a post hoc rationalization of intuitions. It may be a rationalization, but it is also a 
coherent system in wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1979). It is a mystery why a 
rationalization of moral intuitions and emotions (Greene, 2008) can have such a level of 
coherence.  
12.1.1 Five principles of equality 
The five fingers of the moral hand of normative ethics produce five principles of 
equality. 
-The thumb: the formal principle of impartiality and antidiscrimination. We should 
treat all equals equally in all equal situations. We should not look at arbitrary 
characteristics linked to individuals. This is a formal principle, because it does not say 
how we should treat someone.  
The other four principles are material principles of equality. They have specific 
content and are generated when the thumb is applied to the four fingers. 
-The forefinger: prioritarian equality of lifetime well-being (the principle of priority 
for the worst-off). As a result of this priority, we have an egalitarian principle: if total 
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lifetime well-being is constant between different situations, then the situation which 
has the most equal distribution of well-being is the best.  
-The middle finger: basic right equality. All sentient beings (with equal levels of 
morally relevant mental capacities for well-being) get an equal claim to the basic right 
not to be used as merely a means to someone else’s ends.  
-The ring finger: naturalistic behavioral fairness. All natural beings (who contribute 
equally to biodiversity) have an equal right to a behavior that is both natural, normal 
and necessary (i.e. a behavior that contributes to biodiversity). Natural beings are 
beings evolved by evolution. E.g. if a prey is allowed to eat in order to survive, a 
predator is allowed to do so as well (even if it means eating the prey). If the natural, 
normal and necessary behavior involves several options, the option that causes the least 
harm (the least loss of well-being, the least violations of basic rights and the least loss of 
biodiversity) should be chosen (e.g. if an omnivore can survive by eating sentient 
animals as well as by eating non-sentient beings, s/he should not eat the sentient 
beings).  
-The little finger: tolerated choice equality. Everyone is allowed to be partial to an 
equal degree that we can tolerate. If you choose to help individual X instead of 
individual Y, and if you tolerate that someone else would choose to help Y instead of X, 
then X and Y have a tolerated choice equality (even if X is emotionally more important 
for you than Y). 
The forefinger, middle finger, ring finger and little finger correspond with resp. a 
welfare ethic, a rights ethic, an environmental ethic and an ethic of care. 
12.1.2 Applications of the five fingers  
12.1.2.1 The fingers applied to the consumption of animal products 
The five moral fingers can be applied to the production and consumption of animal 
products (meat, fish, eggs, dairy, leather, fur,…). 
-The forefinger: compared to humans, livestock animals are in the worst-off position 
due to suffering and early death. The loss of lifetime well-being of the livestock animals 
is worse than the loss of well-being that humans would experience when they are no 
longer allowed to consume animal products. Livestock and fisheries violate the 
forefinger principle of well-being.   
-The middle finger: the consumption of animal products almost always involves the 
use of animals as merely a means, hence violating the mere means principle of the 
middle finger.  
-The ring finger: animal products are not necessary for humans, because well-
planned vegan diets are not unhealthy (according to the Academy of Nutrition & 
Dietetics, ADA, 2009). Biodiversity will not decrease when we would stop consuming 
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animal products (on the contrary, according to UN FAO the livestock sector is likely the 
most important cause of biodiversity loss). Hence, the value of biodiversity cannot be 
invoked to justify the consumption of animal products. 
-The little finger: we would never tolerate the degree of partiality that is required to 
justify livestock farming and fishing. Hence, tolerated partiality cannot be invoked to 
justify the consumption of animal products.  
It follows that veganism is ethically consistent, and the production and consumption 
of animal products are ethically inconsistent.  
-The thumb: give the good example, even when other people continue consuming 
animal products. From this principle, it follows that veganism is a moral duty. 
12.1.2.2 The fingers applied to the problem of abortion 
The above section nicely demonstrated that all the five fingers are relevant in the 
problem of consumption of animal products. Most other ethical issues only require one 
or two of the five principles (e.g. only the thumb and forefinger are sufficient to argue 
for gay marriage). But there is another ethical issue that can only be grasped with all 
five fingers: the problem of abortion. This problem nicely illustrates how the five fingers 
work, so as an illustration let us apply the different fingers to the problem of abortion. 
-The forefinger: early abortion is allowed, when the fetus is not yet sentient. Once a 
fetus has developed the capacity to feel, it becomes a sentient being. Aborting this 
sentient being will result in a very low lifetime well-being (value of life) due to the short 
lifespan of the aborted fetus. The fetus is in the worst-off position, so should get a strong 
priority for an increase of lifetime well-being. That means that late abortion (when the 
fetus is sentient) is not allowed.1  
 
                                                     
1
 There are exceptional cases, e.g. when the future child will be seriously disabled, or when the pregnancy 
involves serious health risks. These have to be taken into account in the prioritarian weighing of well-being. 
Also, a fetus has a very low psychological connectedness with his/her future (see section 4.2.5). Some 
impartial observers behind a veil of ignorance might therefore have different estimates of his/her lifetime 
well-being (value of life) or ascribe a low connectivity function between the fetus and his/her future 
momentaneous minds. This means that extending the life of the fetus should not get such a strong priority. 
(See also McMahan, 2002.) Yet, abortion not only shortens the life of the fetus, but also prevents the existence 
of all future momentaneous minds and persons that the fetus could become. When these possible future 
persons can no longer contribute to the welfare function, the welfare function might decrease too strong. 
More mathematically: when a fetus is aborted at time t, its integrated well-being  ̂ (   is a little bit lower than 
without abortion (it is only a little bit, due to low connectivity). As a result, this decrease of integrated well-
being due to abortion decreases the welfare function a little. But with abortion, something else happens that 
more strongly decreases the welfare function. Without abortion, the fetus will become future persons, and 
hence the welfare function also includes an integral over all those future integrated levels of well-being  ̂ (    
for t’>t. When abortion is performed, those future integrated levels of well-being no longer count, and this 
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-The middle finger: if a woman does not want the pregnancy, and as her body is 
necessary for the fetus to survive (and if the woman is not responsible for this 
dependency, e.g. when she was raped), we can say that the fetus (unconsciously) uses 
the pregnant mother as merely a means. If the woman aborts her fetus, we cannot 
condemn her without considering her as merely a means for the ends of the fetus. This 
violates the extended mere means principle. So we should at least tolerate abortion, 
even if the fetus is already sentient (and even if the fetus would have higher mental 
capacities such as rationality). This line of reasoning is also reflected in Thomson’s 
argument of the famous violinist to defend abortion (Thomson, 1971). Imagine that you 
are kidnapped by music lovers who connected your body to an unconscious very famous 
violinist. The violinist has a special disease that takes nine months to cure, and you are 
the only person who can save him. If you unplug yourself from the violinist, he will die. 
Most people have the intuition that unplugging is permissible. 
-The ring finger: procreation is natural. One reply to Thomson’s defense of abortion 
(the example of the famous violinist) is based on the natural-artificial distinction. 
According to Parks (2006), pregnancy and procreation are natural, and this is different 
from the artificial treatment to save the famous violinist. As procreation is natural, 
normal and necessary, one might say that the fetus is allowed to use the mother as 
merely a means. 
-The little finger: some level of partiality is allowed. As prey are allowed to defend 
themselves against being used by predators (even if that implies the death of the 
predator), we can state that also pregnant women are allowed to defend themselves 
against being used by fetuses. A doctor is allowed to be partial and to choose for the 
woman (i.e. help to perform abortion) as well as for the fetus (i.e. refuse abortion).  
The result of balancing the above four principles (the four fingers) is that early 
abortions are permissible (and the doctor is allowed to refuse to help). When the 
pregnancy is already very advanced, abortion might not be permitted. If e.g. the 
pregnancy takes only a few more days, the extra use as merely a means during those few 
days will be low. It will be the case that the violation of the mere means principle (the 
middle finger) becomes so low, that it will be canceled by the naturalness principle (the 
ring finger) which permits the use as merely a means for the ends of the fetus. After this 
cancelation, what is left are the forefinger and little finger principles. The priority for 
the lifetime well-being of the fetus (the forefinger) will be very high, so it might become 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
results in a much stronger decrease of the welfare function. In other words: an abortion does not strongly 
harm the fetus (lowering its integrated well-being  ̂ (   a little bit), but it can still strongly harm (decrease) 
the welfare function as a whole. This strong decrease of the welfare function counts as an impersonal harm 
(McMahan, 2009). 
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too partial to choose for abortion (the little finger principle might be too weak to justify 
abortion).  
12.1.2.3 The fingers applied to the environmental problem 
As a third example, we can look at what the moral hand says about the twin 
environmental problem of overconsumption and overpopulation. Imagine there is a 
planet, the Earth, that contains both moral agents and amoral sentient beings. The 
moral agents are the people who can reflect on their own behavior and can have a 
strong influence on their own consumption and reproduction levels. On this planet 
Earth, the moral agents appear to have very high potential levels of lifetime well-being, 
because they have a rich emotional life, a long lifespan and a high psychological 
connectedness. Those moral agents also typically use a lot of resources (not only the use 
of material resources, but also the use of the ecosystem’s absorption and processing 
capacities for emitted substances).  
We can write an equation for the environmental impact generated by a group of 
moral agents. The impact (Im) is the product of four factors: Im=P.A.C.T, where P equals 
the population size (the number of moral agents in the population), A equals the 
average affluence (or average lifetime well-being of those moral agents), C equals the 
average consumption level of resources per unit of affluence and T is a technology 
factor which equals the average environmental impact per unit of resource 
consumption (this factor is determined by the choice of technology).2 
Ecosystems are very complex, but scientists have derived some rules of thumb to 
determine the effects of a high environmental impact generated by resource 
consumption. Some useful rules of thumb are the footprint indicators. For example the 
ecological footprint measures the use of bioproductive area (GFN, 2010), and the carbon 
footprint measures the emissions of greenhouse gases. Those footprint indicators each 
have a corresponding Earth’s carrying capacity E. These carrying capacities, for example 
the total available bioproductive area or the Earth’s capacity to absorb greenhouse 
gases, are finite. If the footprint is higher than the corresponding carrying capacity (i.e. 
if Im>E), then we can expect that the current population of moral agents has a negative 
influence on the lifetime well-being of future populations of moral agents, as well as on 
current and future living amoral sentient beings. 
-The forefinger: a lot of current moral agents should decrease their consumption and 
reproduction levels. Looking at the welfare function, we see that there is a current 
living population of moral agents who have a high level of lifetime well-being, but this 
population also generates an environmental impact that is higher than the carrying 
 
                                                     
2
 This equation is inspired by the famous IPAT equation of Ehrlich and Holdren (1971). 
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capacity (Im>E, see GFN, 2010) and hence decreases the levels of lifetime well-being of 
other current and future individuals. Also, the number of sentient beings on Earth is 
very high, so the welfare function reduces to the average of priority weighted levels of 
lifetime well-being (the population factor in the welfare function is close to 1, see 
section 4.6.3). If the environmental impact of the current moral agents decreases the 
lifetime well-being of other individuals, this average decreases and hence the welfare 
function decreases.   
To reduce the environmental impact, the current population of moral agents has four 
options, referring to the four factors in the impact equation3: 1) decrease population 
size, 2) decrease lifetime well-being, 3) decrease consumption levels and 4) decrease the 
impact of resource consumption.  
The most ethical approach for the first option consists in creating fair opportunities 
for a voluntary pregnancy restriction (by e.g. education for women and a good access to 
contraceptives and services for sexual and reproductive health). The second and third 
options refer to a lifestyle of voluntary simplicity. These two options imply that the 
moral agents should first cut on their resource use that does not strongly contribute to 
their lifetime well-being. Decreasing the consumption for luxury needs is a good 
starting point, because luxury needs (such as resource intensive social status symbols) 
are defined by the fact that society can create new circumstances where those needs no 
longer need to be satisfied in order to have an increase in well-being (see section 6.5). 
The fourth option can be done by technological innovations and scientific research. 
We also observe that on planet Earth, the current population of moral agents has a 
fertility rate higher than the replacement level of roughly 2,1 children per female 
human. If the fertility rate remains that high, the future populations of moral agents 
will show an exponential growth. That is again unsustainable. As a consequence, future 
populations of moral agents and amoral sentient beings will receive much lower levels 
 
                                                     
3
 Note that lowering the well-being of future people is a kind of impersonal harm. The current moral agents 
have two options: reduce or not reduce their environmental impact. If they do not reduce the impact, the 
future will contain a population A that will have low levels of well-being. If on the other hand the current 
moral agents reduce their impact, the future will contain a different population B, where the individuals have 
a higher lifetime well-being compared to the individuals in population A. Population B is different (the people 
in B are not the same people as in A), because the choices that the current moral agents make influence who 
will be born in the future. Suppose that the lifetime well-being in population A is still higher than 0, i.e. the 
lives in this population are still worth living. Nevertheless, population A suffers a harm, but this harm is 
impersonal because the alternative (when the current moral agents reduce their impact) would be that the 
future population A would not even exist. The harm consists in the lowering of the welfare function. The 
forefinger uses the welfare function, and hence looks at impersonal harms.  
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of lifetime well-being. That lowers the welfare function.4 In the end, the fertility rate of 
the population of moral agents should drop to the replacement level. 
-The middle finger: stop the consumption for luxury needs. Luxury needs not only 
generate a high environmental impact, but they also result in a violation of the basic 
right (as was discussed in section 6.5): we have to avoid the use of non-sentient living 
beings for luxury needs.  
-The ring finger: a decrease in environmental impact decreases the loss of 
biodiversity. This is another important reason why current moral agents should avoid 
overconsumption and overpopulation. The ring finger also says that even if the current 
planet Earth is overpopulated by overconsuming moral agents, everyone is allowed to 
procreate.   
-The little finger: moral agents are allowed to be a bit partial, but should refrain from 
causing more harm by overconsuming resources. The little finger cannot justify the 
current levels of resource consumption.  
-The thumb: every moral agent should give the good example by following a 
universalizable rule. For example having more than two children should be avoided as 
long as the fertility rate of the population of moral agents is higher than the 
replacement level. A moral agent cannot find a universalizable rule that allows for 
having more than two children in the current situation where the fertility rate is too 
high.5 The moral agent is allowed to follow a rule like “Everyone may have as many 
children as one likes, as long as the fertility rate is not above replacement level.” This is 
comparable to the universalizable rule “Everyone may take a train that one prefers, as 
long as there is some place available on the train.”  
12.1.3 Intermezzo: maps of the moral landscape 
Four of the five fingers can be expressed in a mathematical equation of the moral 
weight: M=W+R+B. The first term W is the welfare function of the forefinger (see section 
4.6.3). The second term R represents the violations of the basic right of the middle 
finger, as well as the tolerated partiality principle of the little finger (see sections 6.5 
and 6.6.2). The third term B corresponds with the value of biodiversity. This moral 
 
                                                     
4
 Note that – for large populations – the population factor in the welfare function is close to 1 (see section 
4.6.3). If – for smaller populations – this factor would be close to N/NR, an increase in the population size 
might increase the welfare function.   
5
 To decrease the environmental impact, I suggest that for a period of time the fertility rate of the population 
of moral agents should drop below the fertility rate, such that the population size can decrease to a sufficienty 
low level. After that, the fertility rate should increase to the replacement level to reach a sustainable steady 
state.  
Ethical Consistency and Animal Equality 
292 
weight combines different moral forces into a quantity that should be maximized, just 
as the standard model of physics combines different physical forces into a quantity that 
is extremized (a Lagrangian, see Weinberg, 1996).  
The thumb principle should be applied to this moral weight: derive those 
universalized guiding rules that result in a best situation under universal compliance. 
We should not try to maximize the moral weight directly by our actions. Instead, we 
should follow those rules that, when those rules are followed by everyone who is 
capable of following them, maximize the moral weight.   
The moral weight is a multidimensional function of controllable variables that can be 
influenced by moral agents when those moral agents select rules. The controllable 
variables are e.g. distributable goods and liberties. These controllable variables and 
universalized rules are embedded in the moral weight as follows. The moral weight can 
be written as M=M(x(h(v(r)))), i.e. the moral weight is a function of values x which 
represent e.g. the levels of lifetime well-being, the strength of basic rights violations 
and the amount of biodiversity. The values x are functions of the world histories h (as 
seen in section 4.6). These world histories are dependent on the controllable variables v. 
Finally, these controllable variables are functions of the universalized rules r.  
It is the rules that we (moral agents) have to select. So we first start with selecting a 
rule. Then we derive what distribution of controllable variables we would get if the rule 
is universalized. Hence, these universalized rules determine the distribution of the 
controllable variables. Next, a chosen distribution of controllable variables generates a 
number of possible world histories (there can be more than one world history for a 
unique choice of controllable variables, because the world can contain probabilistic 
uncertainties). Taking expectation values over those possible world histories gives us 
the values lifetime well-being, basic rights violations and biodiversity.  
This moral weight function can be represented as a moral landscape, with peaks and 
valleys6. The peaks correspond with the best situations (e.g. the best distribution of 
goods and liberties).  
As an example, take the controllable variable v that corresponds with a behavior that 
is natural, normal and necessary. This variable might represent e.g. the level of 
predation or the level of procreation that moral agents can control. If predation is 
universally prohibited, if the selected universalized rule r is “stop predation always and 
everywhere”, then we move to one end in the moral landscape as the variable v goes to 
zero. Then the B-term becomes very low because a lot of biodiversity gets lost. This 
 
                                                     
6
 The concept of “moral landscape” introduced by Harris (2010) might correspond with a moral weight that 
only contains the welfare function W in a simplified form that represents sum-utilitarianism instead of quasi-
maximin prioritarianism.  
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decrease of the B-term outweighs the increase of the W- and R-terms, and hence the 
moral weight decreases under universal compliance of a predation prohibition rule. A 
duty to stop predation moves us to a valley on the moral landscape. 
Also, the B-term might have another very special property to flatten the moral 
weight function in some areas, such that e.g. M(v)=M(v’) for two levels of predation v 
and v’ within an interval Δv. This means that we do not have a duty to (but we are 
allowed to) decrease the level of predation from v’ to v. The more natural, necessary and 
normal a behavior is, the wider the range might be of the interval Δv that corresponds 
with the level of that behavior. This means that these types of behavior have a wide 
range of permissibility: we are allowed to increase or decrease those levels within that 
range. 
The moral landscape allows us to visualize what kinds of actions are obligatory, 
permissible and impermissible. Suppose that if you do not do something (e.g. you do not 
help or harm anyone), we are at a specific point in the moral landscape, on a 
mountainside. If you harm others, you push location downwards to the valley on the 
moral landscape. If you help others, the location moves upwards and climbs the 
mountain. My intuition says that no-one should move the location downwards. Moving 
downwards is impermissible. My intuition also says that in moving upwards, we are 
allowed to choose in what direction the location can move upwards. This is the little 
finger principle of tolerated partiality (section 5.1). Any upward moving direction is 
permissible.  
But sometimes some upward moving direction might be obligatory instead of merely 
permissible. Sometimes we should take a certain preferred path to climb up the 
mountain. Sometimes we have a duty to help others in a preferable way. When are you 
obligated to help in a specific way, even when you do not want to help in that way? This 
question can be answered by the following procedure. If someone forces you to help in 
that way, s/he uses you as merely a means (you have to do something that you do not 
want, and your presence is required to help others), and that means that the R–term 
adds a negative amount to the total moral weight. All else equal, this would result in a 
downward movement on the moral landscape. But by helping others, the W–term adds a 
positive amount, which means an increase of the total moral weight and an upward 
movement. If this W–term outcompetes the R–term (if the increase in the W–term is 
larger than the absolute value of the change in the R–term), it means that the increase 
in welfare trumps the violation of your basic right not to be used as merely a means. If 
that would be the case when you are forced to help, it implies that you have an 
obligation to help in that way. 
We also have to consider the problem that the moral landscape is not unique and 
objective (impersonal): each moral agent might have his/her own preference for the 
parameters in the moral weight. These parameters correspond with e.g. the level of risk 
aversion or the relative strength of the R-term. Not everyone needs to have the same 
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levels of risk aversion, need for efficiency, estimates of well-being, or intuitive balancing 
choices between the strengths of different principles. Also the choice of welfare 
function can be different among moral agents. Therefore, each moral agent might look 
at his/her own map of the moral landscape. Those different maps might indicate 
different locations of the peaks and valleys. The highest peak on moral agent a’s map 
might also be much higher than the highest peak on b’s map. No map is the unique and 
objective one. No moral agent can be a dictator about e.g. the level of risk aversion that 
one should have.  
There is a procedure that allows for democratic assessments between the preferences 
of all moral agents (section 4.6.11). First, all moral agents calculate their own moral 
weights and generate their own maps of the moral landscape. Second, for each moral 
agent a weighted moral weight is calculated: the welfare function   of moral agent a is 
divided by its maximum value     
 . If we now look at the moral landscapes 
representing the weighted moral weights according to moral agents a and b, we see that 
the highest peak on a’s map is as high as the highest peak on b’s map. In other words, 
the optimal situation according to moral agent a is as valuable as the optimal situation 
according to b. In the third and final step, a democratic average of all weighted welfare 
functions of all moral agents is taken:  
 ̅  
 
  
∑
  
    
 
  
   
  
All preferences of all moral agents (i.e. all persons who are able to do the exercise to 
derive what should be done) can and should be taken into account equally 
(democratically), making the theory more objective (impersonal).  
This democratic procedure removes an important arbitrariness of the theory: one 
could object that my selection of parameters (e.g. the parameters that measures my risk 
aversion or my estimate of the strength of the basic right) is arbitrary. Why not take 
another level of risk aversion? The democratic procedure implies that everyone’s 
preferences should be taken into account. This also means that e.g. the preferences of a 
utilitarian (i.e. no risk, loss and uncertainty aversion behind a veil of ignorance, no 
strengths for the mere means principle and the tolerated choice principle, and no value 
of biodiversity) can be included. Hence, it is possible to include the moral choices of 
someone who wants to delete some fingers (e.g. delete the deontological principle of the 
middle finger) and simplify the remaining fingers (e.g. simplify the forefinger 
principle).7 
 
                                                     
7
 Deleting the thumb principle without opening the door for huge levels of arbitrariness, might be impossible. 
At least some version of a universalization principle should be preserved.  
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Constructing a huge number of maps (generated by weighted moral weights of all 
moral agents), each map representing a vast, multidimensional moral landscape, and 
taking the democratic average of those maps, will be very complicated in real life. 
Therefore, in daily life it is better to work with simpler rules of thumb to roughly 
approximate the location of mountainous areas.8 And we should set priorities to act 
against the greatest forms of injustice, such as poverty and animal abuse. It is clear that 
those forms of injustice are really far away from any peak. Even if we can’t determine 
the location of the highest peak on the moral landscape, we do know that we better 
move to a mountainous area instead of remaining in a low area. 
12.2 A second moral hand of meta-ethics 
After removing the arbitrariness of the choice of parameters, only one important 
arbitrariness remains: why not take other moral fingers, why not include more 
principles, why not add more terms to the moral weight?  
Perhaps such inclusions are possible and are allowed, under one important condition: 
they should be based on a coherent set of strong, shared moral intuitions which are 
translated in clear, universalized ethical principles. And that is not easy. Including a 
sixth principle to the moral hand might be incoherent with background theories (e.g. 
some scientific facts), moving the new theory away from a wide reflective equilibrium 
and turning this sixth principle into a moral illusion. 
In other words: the thumb principle of universalization does not only apply to the 
choice of actions or behavioral rules (“If I am allowed to do something or follow a rule, 
then so are you.”), but also to the choice of ethical systems (“If I am allowed to construct 
and follow an ethical system, then so are you.”). The other four fingers of the moral 
hand strongly restrict what kind of action or rule we are allowed to follow. Similarly, 
there are four requirements that place strong constraints on the kind of ethical system 
we are allowed to construct: 1) internal (logical) consistency, 2) non-arbitrariness 
(simplicity), 3) clarity of formulations and 4) coherence with multiple strong intuitions. 
Hence, there are two moral hands: the above mentioned moral hand with five moral 
principles of normative ethics, and a second moral hand of meta-ethics. 
 
                                                     
8
 Again, we can compare this with physics. Solving the complete Lagrangian of the universe will be very 
difficult. This impractical difficulty does not imply that the standard model is wrong. Instead, physicists use 
approximations (e.g. mean field theory) to simplify things.  
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-The thumb: the principle of universalism. You must construct and follow the kind of 
ethical system that everyone who is capable must construct and follow in all similar 
ways. You may construct and follow the kind of ethical system that everyone who is 
capable may construct and follow in similar ways. An ethical system is a set of 
universalized ethical principles, applicable to all (real and hypothetical) situations.  
-The forefinger: compatibility with the most important input data (the strongest and 
most shared moral intuitions) is important. These input data include intuitions derived 
from thought experiments and analogies of hypothetical situations. The input data also 
includes background theories such as reliable scientific knowledge (for example about 
biological species and evolution9, well-being and consciousness10,…). Non-scientific (e.g. 
pseudoscientific or religious) ideas should be excluded from the input data. With this 
condition, the ethical system will be in line with science.  
-The middle finger: internal (logical) consistency is important. 
-The ring finger: clarity (accuracy) of concepts and principles is important. 
-The little finger: simplicity (parsimony, no artificial, ad hoc constructions, no 
arbitrariness) is important (cfr. Occam’s razor). 
Note that the fingers of the second moral hand correspond with epistemic virtues of 
scientific research (Kuhn, 1970).  
We can compare this second moral hand with solving a crossword puzzle, where 
words correspond with universalized ethical principles.  
The thumb says that one should always follow certain rules of the game to solve a 
crossword puzzle. For example the words should be existing words (i.e. the ethical 
principle should be correctly universalized to all similar situations). 
The forefinger says that the words that one has to fill in should match the given 
descriptions of the words and the lengths of the words as good as possible. This implies 
that there should be no empty white boxes left: each white box should contain a letter. 
This also implies that a large crossword puzzle can be more coherent than a small 
puzzle. Hence, extending a ‘moral crossword puzzle’ by introducing new moral thought 
experiments and testing moral intuitions in exotic cases might increase coherence if 
these tests are successful.  
The middle finger says that a white box cannot contain more than one letter. There 
should be no ‘true’ or ‘hard’ dilemmas in an ethical system, i.e. no judgment that 
something is both permissible and impermissible, all things considered.  
The ring finger says that the words should be familiar words, not some strange, 
farfetched, incorrectly written or newly invented words.  
 
                                                     
9
 The ethical system should respect the Darwinian fact that species do not have essences. 
10
 The ethical system should respect the scientific facts about personal identity, degrees of consciousness,… 
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The little finger says that a series of adjacent white spaces should preferably contain 
one word instead of more than one. E.g. if description “fruit” with ten letters can be 
either “strawberry” or “apple lemon”, the former solution is preferred. In general, we 
should avoid splitting rows and columns into smaller words (we should avoid 
introducing more ethical principles ad hoc). This principle also says that we should try 
to avoid making artificial (ad hoc) changes to a description in order to save a preferred 
word (e.g. if the description is “vegetable” and we want the word to be “apple”, we 
should avoid changing the description to “vegetable or fruit”).  
Let us look at some examples how to apply the five fingers. As a first example, we can 
apply the thumb to the little finger: If you are allowed to define discrimination in a way 
that it refers to an arbitrary group (e.g. humans), then I may also pick an arbitrary 
group for my ethical rules, principles and definitions. My preferred group might 
exclude you, which you cannot want. Therefore, referring to arbitrary groups in rules, 
principles and definitions is not allowed. 
Similarly, introducing a principle that prohibits gay sex and marriage violates the 
little finger, because we can all too easy ask the question: why gay sex? One could try to 
justify a prohibition on gay sex and marriage by referring to a principle of (sexual) 
purity. But then we get into trouble with the ring finger, because this concept of purity 
needs clarification (as I clarified the concept of e.g. naturalness). And then this clarified 
principle needs to be universally tested to see whether it is compatible with other 
important principles and intuitions. I doubt whether the notion of purity can be 
clarified and universalized to make it as clear and coherent as the five principles that I 
derived. The new anti-gay principle might easily get into conflict with scientific facts 
about gay people. Therefore it is unlikely that someone could simply include a principle 
(a sixth moral finger) that prohibits gay sex and marriage, because inconsistencies or 
strong levels of arbitrariness might appear after critical reflection and attempts to 
universalize this new principle.  
The little finger (together with the forefinger) also has as a result that scientific facts 
can influence the ethical principles. Suppose for example that an ethical principle states 
that there is a sharp difference between individuals with moral status and those beings 
lacking moral status. This binary property of moral status cannot be matched non-
arbitrarily to a natural property that comes in degrees. For example biological science 
can come to the conclusion that being human is a matter of degree (look at human 
ancestors and the possibility of hybrids, chimeras and genetically modified humans). As 
a result, matching an all-or-nothing interpretation of moral status with the natural 
property of being human cannot be done, except when one introduces an artificial or 
arbitrary cut-off point for being human. In the ethical system that I constructed in this 
dissertation, I always avoided matching a discrete (e.g. binary) property to a gradual 
property. In that sense, scientific facts (e.g. about gradual evolution, personal identity 
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or levels of complexity and mental capacities) had some influence in the construction of 
the ethical system. 
As another example, we can apply the thumb to the forefinger, from which we can 
derive that an ethical system cannot be based on e.g. the Ten Commandments. If you are 
allowed to base your ethical system on ideas (e.g. the existence of a Christian God) that 
lack evidence, I am allowed to do so as well. So I am allowed to invent things that 
equally lack evidence. For example I can introduce another God with other 
commandments that will harm you, and you cannot want that. The belief in e.g. a 
Christian God is too arbitrary (it violates the little finger): the evidence for the existence 
of Krishna, Apollo or Zeus is as high as the evidence for the existence of God. In this 
sense, all theistic believers are in fact inconsistent atheists: they do not believe in all the 
other gods, they are not willing to have blind faith in another god, they are not open-
minded towards another god. Such levels of arbitrariness and inconsistency are not 
tolerable in ethics. Therefore, there is no room for religious faith-based ethical 
principles in the construction of an ethical system. 
 
The first moral hand of normative ethics required some intuitive balancing. For 
example the mere means principle of the long middle finger is stronger than the 
tolerated partiality principle of the small little finger. Similarly, the moral hand of meta-
ethics requires an intuitive balancing between the different criteria for a good ethical 
theory. For example the consistency requirement of the middle finger is stronger than 
the simplicity requirement of the little finger.  
The most important point is that the meta-ethical moral hand should set very high 
standards for a good ethical system. High standards are required to restrict the number 
of possible ethical systems, to avoid an ‘anything goes’ attitude towards ethics and to 
limit moral relativism. For example applying the meta-ethical thumb principle to the 
forefinger results in a completeness requirement: we should use analogies or thought 
experiments involving all possible situations. A good ethical theory has to be able to 
deal with all realistic as well as hypothetical situations. Even very hypothetical 
situations count: the better an ethical system is able to deal with all kinds of 
hypothetical situations, the better the system is. 
Setting high standards is what I did in my derivation of a system of animal equality. I 
dealt with very hypothetical situations: what if insects or plants were sentient? What if 
a predator (a lion) acquired full blown moral agency? What if we bred and used mentally 
disabled humans as slaves? What if we could teleport and make (inexact) copies of 
persons? What if the side track in the trolley dilemma loops back to the main track? 
What if human-animal hybrids or chimeras would exist?  
Using the ring finger of the meta-ethical hand, I tried to clarify concepts such as well-
being, biodiversity, naturalness, the body and use as merely a means. In these 
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clarifications, I tried to avoid arbitrariness and artificiality in definitions. Also the use of 
mathematical expressions should be understood as an attempt to clarify principles.  
By restricting the complete normative ethic to five principles, I also tried to make the 
theory as simple and parsimonious as possible, respecting the little finger of the meta-
ethical hand. Utilitarians might complain that my theory remains too complex. Their 
theory is more economical, but it goes at the cost of violating the meta-ethical 
forefinger (it has a lower match with moral intuitions that many people share). So here 
we end up with an important trade-off between the forefinger and the little finger. As 
the forefinger is a little bit longer, my constructed ethical system tends to lean a bit 
more towards compatibility (with intuitions) than simplicity.  
12.3 The impossible triangle of the meat eater 
Meat eaters are often not aware of the inconsistency of their meat consumption. In fact, 
with the antidiscrimination principle of the thumb and the mere means principle of the 
middle finger (applied to humans), we can construct an instructive analogy between 
this inconsistency of meat consumption and the optical illusion of the impossible 
triangle.  
 
Figure 14: the impossible triangle of the meat eater 
 
Most meat eaters share the same moral intuitions, that discrimination (partiality 
based on arbitrary, morally irrelevant criteria) is not allowed, that killing and eating 
humans is not allowed because all humans have the basic right not to be used as merely 
a means, and that eating animals is allowed, because we should respect our freedom of 
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choice (it’s not nice to prohibit something to someone). Each of these principles can be 
represented by the corners of a triangle.  
Now, all I’m asking from the meat eater is to zoom out. If you look at the above figure, 
and you only focus at one or two corners at a time, you will not see the contradiction. 
Antidiscrimination is compatible with not eating humans. But introducing the third 
principle turns the whole into a contradiction. The impossible triangle is an optical 
illusion: it cannot exist in reality. I have confidence that the meat eater is capable of 
noticing the contradiction when s/he zooms out and looks at the whole picture at once. 
Especially after presenting ten arguments about the moral (ir)relevance of species and 
sentience, as I have done in a previous chapter 8.4), it is clear that speciesism is 
discrimination.  
So what can we do now, after we have accepted that the picture is an optical illusion? 
We can do one of two things. First, we can simply delete one of the principles; simply 
erase one of the three corners. Then we end up with a bar with two endpoints (two 
principles). This bar can exist in reality. Another possibility is to redraw the picture, 
turning one of the corners in the other direction.  
The question I want to ask to the meat eater is: which corner do you want to turn? Do 
you want to allow cannibalism? Do you want to allow racism, sexism or other forms of 
discrimination? Or do you want to prohibit eating animals? I am convinced that most 
meat eaters would prefer the third option, simply because the other two are much less 
attractive. First, the intuition that we are allowed to eat meat is much less strong than 
the intuition that cannibalism or discrimination are not allowed. Adopting the third 
principle of freedom of choice is not so difficult. We could simply state that we should 
respect freedom of choice, except when the basic right is violated. So we are still 
allowed to eat and choose what we like, but we have to restrict our choices a little bit.  
Second, from behind a veil of ignorance, we would not like to live in a world where 
cannibalism or discrimination is allowed. If the meat eater is rational and cares for 
his/her well-being, s/he would prefer a world where s/he could not enjoy the taste of 
meat above a world where s/he might be the victim of cannibalism or discrimination. 
So we have two coherent arguments that indicate that it is best to turn the lower 
right corner of the impossible triangle. Or stated in another way: if we (I and a meat 
eater) put all our intuitions on the table, we restrict ourselves to those intuitions that 
we both share, we give those intuitions a ranking according to their strength, we 
translate those intuitions into universalized ethical principles, we construct a consistent 
ethical system with those principles whereby we systematically give priority to the 
strongest principles, then we end up with a system of animal equality. That system 
implies veganism.  
Veganism is a very simple rule of thumb: do not use animal products. From a political 
perspective, the technical implementation of veganism might be rather easy. Already 
today, a lot of animals are subject to welfare laws. These are the animals that are 
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sentient, according to scientists. So we already deal with sentience in the law. We do not 
have to change the set of beings that are subject to welfare laws, we only need to change 
the content of the rights that those beings have. Everyone who is now already subject to 
welfare laws (everyone who already has some welfare rights), should get the same rights 
as mentally disabed humans already have. Use your wildest imagination: what if we 
treat mentally disabled humans in the same way that we treat some animals in e.g. 
medical experiments or factory farms? If we should not treat those humans in those 
ways, then we should also abstain from treating in those ways everyone else who is 
subject to current welfare laws.  
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12.4 Argumentation scheme for veganism 
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Where to go from here? Questions for future 
research 
Of course not all problems related to ethical consistency and animal equality are solved. 
How can we refine the argument about speciesism? How can we strengthen the method 
to detect moral illusions? How can we further clarify the basic ethical principles? These 
are the rather obvious questions for future research. So let us have a brief look at the 
less obvious but more intriguing questions.   
In have constructed a pluralist, principlist ethical system of the moral hand, which 
contains five ethical principles.  
1) Why this set of principles instead of another pluralist principlist system such the 
four principles of Beauchamp & Childress (2001), or the seven principles of Ross (1930)? 
I think that the five principles of the moral hand are in fact some reshuffling of the 
principles of Beauchamp, Childress and Ross, where the reshuffling is done such that 
the resulting five principles can be expressed in a more compact and yet clear way. I will 
not further elaborate on this issue here.  
2) Is five too much or not enough? Consequentialist welfare ethicists would favor a 
simplified system with only one finger: the forefinger. Sum-utilitarians would 
furthermore simplify the forefinger, deleting the priority for the worst-off. Rule 
consequentialists might prefer two fingers: the thumb (which refers to the universalized 
rules) and the forefinger. On the other hand (no pun intended), some deontological 
libertarians might restrict their ethical system to the basic right principle of the middle 
finger. But perhaps – moral particularists might argue – five is not enough? Perhaps 
moral particularists are right: maybe moral judgments are like esthetical judgments of 
music. When you hear a piece of music, you automatically judge it to be good or bad, but 
can you capture all of your musical taste preferences and judgments in a small set of 
principles? Doing that would seem to be a miracle, discovering the magic potion of 
music. Perhaps ethics, like music, is far too rich to be expressed in five principles. 
Perhaps not even hundred principles will do.  
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3) What is the strength of the different principles? In other words: how long and 
strong are the five fingers? A sum-utilitarian is a pluralist who gives absolute strength 
to only one principle: the forefinger. The other fingers have zero length, they have zero 
value. A deontological libertarian gives absolute strength to the middle finger principle. 
But most of us are real pluralists: different principles have some non-zero strengths and 
fingers have some non-zero lengths. How do we balance the strengths of the different 
principles? In previous sections I have suggested a kind of democratic procedure to 
solve this problem: every moral agent has an equal vote to put forward his/her intuitive 
judgments about the relative strengths of the different principles. If most of us put 
greater weight to the mere means principle of the middle finger, we have to accept this 
outcome; we have to accept that the average middle finger is longer than the average 
forefinger. So, everyone has his or her moral hand, and we measure the average lengths 
of everyone’s thumb, forefinger and so on to derive the ‘average’ or ‘platonic’ moral 
hand.  
But there are two problems with this procedure.  
First, how could we follow the democratic procedure in practice?  Taking the 
intuitive judgments of all moral agents into account becomes as complicated as 
constructing a combustion engine using the standard model of elementary particle 
physics. But at least we can try to find some rough moral rules of thumb to guide us, just 
as we use the laws of thermodynamics. 
A second, more intriguing problem is that studies in moral psychology clearly 
demonstrated that the intuitive strength of a moral principle depends on external 
circumstances. For example induced feelings of disgust (Schnall et al., 2008) and 
happiness (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) can influence moral intuitions in the trolley 
dilemmas, making us more or less reluctant to sacrifice someone in order to save others. 
So the lengths of the fingers of the moral hand depend on whether or not we are 
disgusted, happy, tired, sniffed some oxytocine, saw a good movie,… It is like fingers can 
grow and change lengths at different speeds. Imagine that we could ‘nudge’ someone’s 
moral intuitions, such that we can turn a utilitarian into a libertarian by tweaking 
his/her intuitions. What would this imply for our procedure to derive the strengths of 
the principles? Is there a ‘neutral state’ where our moral intuitions are not influenced 
by feelings of disgust or happiness?   
4) Finally, let me pose the most intriguing question: where did it come from? I have 
constructed an ethical system, but what exactly did I do? Did I discover it or invented it? 
It is like the question what mathematicians do: are they discovering mathematical facts 
in a platonic world of mathematics, or are they rather inventing and constructing 
theories like engineers do? Are the moral fingers just some clever confabulations and 
rationalizations of a bunch of mysterious intuitions? Where do these intuitions come 
from in the first place? Do they have an evolutionary psychological explanation? Did 
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evolution really have some influence in how I defined the mere means principle or the 
notions of well-being and biodiversity?  
The more I think about this, the more mysterious it all seems. And yet, I hope that I 
have made some progress. 
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting: dieren, dilemma’s 
en discriminatie1 
Inleiding 
De discussie over de morele status van niet-menselijke dieren2, en het gebruik ervan 
voor voeding, kleding, amusement of onderzoek, heeft een lange geschiedenis die 
teruggaat tot de Griekse oudheid (Pythagoras, Plutarchus). Doorheen de eeuwen stak de 
problematiek af en toe opnieuw de kop op (Leonardo Da Vinci; Jeremy Bentham; Oswald, 
1791; Ritson, 1802; Salt, 1892), maar een echte doorbraak voor de academische 
dierenethiek kwam er in 1971, toen Richard Ryder de term speciesisme (of soortisme) 
lanceerde: een discriminatie van dieren ten opzichte van mensen, naar analogie van 
racisme en seksisme (Godlovitch & Harris, 1971; Ryder, 1975). De jaren ’70 en ’80 werden 
gekenmerkt door toepassing van verscheidene rationele theorieën in de normatieve 
ethiek (voornamelijk utilitarisme en deontologische ethiek) op het dierenvraagstuk 
(Singer, 1975; Clark, 1977; Regan, 1983). In de jaren ’90 kwam er, vanuit 
postmodernistische en feministische hoek, kritiek op deze ‘kille’ rationele aanpak 
(Adams, 1995). Een nieuw pleidooi voor vegetarisme steunde op bv. een zorgethiek 
(Adams & Donovan, 1996) of een deugdenethiek (Hursthouse, 2000). Rond de 
eeuwwisseling nam de discussie een nieuwe wending, naar de (sociale) psychologie. 
Vele dierenethici beschouwen de argumentatie voor dierenrechten en veganisme als 
afgerond, maar stellen vast dat er meer psychologie dan ethiek schuilt achter ons 
gebruik van dieren (Serpell, 1996; Allen et al. 2000; Joy 2002, 2009; Herzog 2010). De 
 
                                                     
1
 Deze samenvatting is gebaseerd op Bruers (2013b) 
2
 Ik zal “niet-menselijk dier” meestal afkorten tot “dier”. Met “vleeseter” bedoel ik een mens die minstens af 
en toe vlees eet. “Vegetarisme” en “veganisme” zal ik vaak gebruiken als synoniemen, hoewel de implicaties 
van mijn dierenethiek veganisme zijn.  
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vraag dient gesteld: Waarom zijn zo weinig mensen overtuigd door logisch consistente, 
rationele argumentaties?  
Met dit onderzoek keer ik terug naar de filosofie van de jaren ’70 en ’80, en diens 
zoektocht naar een consistente dierenethiek. Na grondige beschouwing van  40 jaar 
dierenrechtenethiek zet ik hier een argumentatie neer op basis van morele intuïties die 
velen onder ons delen. Ik presenteer een uitgewerkte dierenethiek aan de hand van een 
metafoor: de morele hand. Vijf vingers staan symbool voor vijf ethische basisprincipes 
waarop deze ethiek stoelt. De volgende vijf onderdelen van deze Nederlandstalige 
samenvatting van het doctoraatsonderzoek gaan over universalisme (de duim), het 
belang van welzijn (de wijsvinger), het basisrecht om niet als louter middel te dienen 
(de middelvinger), de waarde van biodiversiteit (de ringvinger), en een toelaatbare 
vorm van partijdigheid (de pink). Zoals men de duim moet plaatsen tegenover de 
overige vingers om een voorwerp te kunnen grijpen, zo ook moet men de 
universalistische duimregel toepassen op de vier andere ethische principes om een 
ethisch probleem te kunnen vatten. Een ethisch systeem wordt coherent (intern 
samenhangend) wanneer de universalistische principes consistent zijn. Het opbouwen 
van een coherent ethisch systeem is een methode om morele illusies te onderzoeken. 
Dergelijke illusies zijn – naar analogie van optische illusies – hardnekkige intuïtieve 
oordelen die ‘fout’ zijn in de zin dat ze in tegenstrijd zijn met een coherent systeem van 
universalistische ethische principes die gebaseerd zijn op andere, sterkere morele 
intuïties. 
Het eerste deel (het universalismeprincipe - de duim) bespreekt de methode van 
coherentie en toont aan dat speciesisme een morele illusie is. Uit het 
universalismeprincipe volgt een formeel principe van gelijkwaardigheid in termen van 
onpartijdigheid en antidiscriminatie: behandel gelijken gelijk in gelijkaardige situaties.  
De twee daaropvolgende hoofdstukken kaarten de twee grootste stromingen binnen 
de dierenethiek aan: een consequentialistische ethiek (de wijsvinger), die kijkt naar de 
gevolgen voor het welzijn van alle voelende wezens; en een deontologische ethiek (de 
middelvinger), die vertrekt van de plicht om een basisrecht te respecteren. De 
wijsvinger- en middelvingerprincipes genereren zo twee verschillende vormen van 
gelijkwaardigheid.  
Maar deze twee stromingen kampen met een ernstig onderschat probleem binnen de 
dierenethiek: het predatieprobleem. Uit persoonlijke contacten met dierenactivisten en 
–ethici vermoed ik dat de morele intuïties met betrekking tot dit probleem een sterke 
consensus vertonen: de meeste dierenethici zijn erg tolerant tegenover het gedrag van 
roofdieren. Daar tegenover staat de intuïtie dat iemand doden voor een gedwongen 
orgaantransplantatie niet mag. Nochtans wordt in beide gevallen (predatie en 
transplantatie) een voelend wezen (prooidier, orgaanslachtoffer) zonder diens 
toestemming gedood en wordt diens lichaamsweefsel (spieren, organen) opgenomen in 
een ander voelend wezen (roofdier, ziekenhuispatiënt) met als doel te blijven leven. 
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Gedwongen predatie mag wel, gedwongen orgaantransplantatie niet. Is dit intuïtieve 
onderscheid tussen predatie en transplantatie een morele illusie? Als we die intuïtie 
willen respecteren en niet afdoen als morele illusie, zijn we genoodzaakt om een nieuw 
universalistisch ethisch principe in te voeren. Dit is wat de ringvinger biedt. Het vierde 
hoofdstuk presenteert een drietal mogelijke oplossingen voor het predatieprobleem, 
waarbij het ringvingerprincipe, gebaseerd op de waarde van biodiversiteit, mijn 
persoonlijke voorkeur geniet. Uit het ringvingerprincipe volgt een nieuw 
gelijkwaardigheidsprincipe: iedereen heeft een gelijk recht op een gedrag dat tegelijk 
natuurlijk, normaal en noodzakelijk is (gedrag dat sterk bijdraagt aan de biodiversiteit). 
Als een zebra mag eten om te overleven, mag een leeuw dat ook. 
Bij predatie komt er nog een probleem kijken dat in het laatste hoofdstuk besproken 
wordt: hoewel we prooien niet moeten beschermen, voelen we toch een sterke plicht 
om mensen te redden van roofdieren. Is het redden van een mens, en niet een zebra, 
een vorm van discriminatie, of is een partijdigheid voor een mens in dergelijke situaties 
toch nog verzoenbaar met antispeciesisme? In hoeverre mogen we nog partijdig zijn 
tegenover onze dierbaren? Om een te veeleisende ethiek te voorkomen, zal de vijfde 
vinger – de kleine pink die een klein beetje kan afwijken van de richting van de andere 
vingers – aangeven welke kleine vorm van partijdigheid en afwijking van de andere 
principes nog aanvaardbaar zijn. Uit dit partijdigheidsprincipe van de pink kunnen we 
een subtiele vorm van gelijkwaardigheid afleiden. Samen met de vier vormen van 
gelijkwaardigheid die volgen uit de andere vingers, schets dit een genuanceerd beeld 
van de precieze betekenis van dierengelijkheid. Werken de vijf morele vingers als 
morele hand samen, dan komen we zo tot een consistente ethiek van dierengelijkheid. 
Op basis van de vijf principes van de morele hand kunnen we concluderen dat 
veganisme een morele plicht is. 
1. De duim: het universalismeprincipe, coherentie en morele 
illusies 
Universalisme is belangrijk omwille van twee redenen. Ten eerste vormt universalisme 
samen met consistentie de basis van coherentie waarbij verschillende principes of 
intuïties elkaar wederzijds ondersteunen. Deze coherentie ligt ten grondslag aan de 
methode om morele illusies op te sporen. Ten tweede kent universalisme ook een 
specifieke vorm: het antidiscriminatieprincipe, waarbij men alle gelijkwaardige 
individuen gelijk moet behandelen. Met vijf coherente argumenten zal ik trachten aan 
te tonen dat het mens-dier waardeonderscheid (speciesisme) een vorm van 
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discriminatie is, en met nog extra coherente argumenten zal ik nog een stap verder 
gaan en trachten aan te tonen dat dit speciesisme gebaseerd is op een morele illusie. Net 
zoals bij optische illusies kan dat illusoire karakter van speciesisme de hardnekkigheid 
van speciesistische oordelen in onze cultuur verklaren. Net zoals bij optische illusies 
genereren morele illusies hardnekkige oordelen (bv. racistische of speciesistische 
oordelen) die niet compatibel zijn met andere sterke oordelen (bv. oordelen over 
rechtvaardigheid en onpartijdigheid).  
 
1.1. Coherentie als universalisme plus consistentie 
De coherentie van een ethische theorie werkt zoals de samenhang van een 
kruiswoordraadsel, waarin kruisende woorden elkaars geldigheid bevestigen. De witte 
vakjes in een kruiswoordraadsel komen overeen met verschillende specifieke situaties 
of gezichtspunten. Een letter in een vakje is dan het analogon van een moreel oordeel 
over die specifieke situatie vanuit dat specifieke gezichtspunt. Het construeren van een 
coherent ethisch systeem is dan analoog aan het invullen van een kruiswoordraadsel. 
Om een coherent systeem te bekomen, zijn twee elementen belangrijk: universalisme en 
consistentie.  
Universalisme wil zeggen dat de letters in rijen en kolommen van aangrenzende 
witte vakjes van het kruiswoordraadsel een onderling verband moeten hebben. Het zijn 
niet zomaar willekeurige, onafhankelijke letters: ze vormen samen een woord. Zo 
moeten morele oordelen in alle gelijkaardige situaties (alle aangrenzende vakjes) 
worden verklaard volgens een onwillekeurig universeel ethisch principe. Ethisch 
universalisme is het vertalen van sterke morele intuïties naar universalistische ethische 
principes, universeel geldend voor alle gelijkaardige situaties. Dit universalisme legt dus 
een eerste strenge voorwaarde op bij de constructie van een ethisch systeem, net zoals 
er een strenge voorwaarde opgelegd wordt bij het oplossen van een kruiswoordraadsel.  
Universalisme is echter niet voldoende, ook consistentie is belangrijk. Zoals men 
geen  verschillende letters mag invullen in éénzelfde witte vakje van een 
kruiswoordraadsel, mag men geen twee, of meer, tegenstrijdige morele oordelen of 
ethische principes hebben. Consistentie  levert een tweede strenge voorwaarde, en 
enkel door het samengaan van beide voorwaarden zullen de verschillende woorden in 
een kruiswoordraadsel elkaar wederzijds ondersteunen en bevestigen. Als er tot slot 
geen lege witte vakjes meer zijn, en als er geen situaties zijn met onbesliste morele 
oordelen, dan is het coherente systeem volledig.  
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1.2. Morele illusies 
Morele illusies (hardnekkige, incoherente morele intuïties) kunnen nu worden 
onderzocht aan de hand van coherentie. We kunnen hierbij gebruik maken van de 
analogie met optische illusies, in het bijzonder de Müller-Lyer-illusie. De meeste mensen 
die naar de Müller-Lyer-figuur kijken, hebben een spontaan oordeel dat de lengte van 
één lijnstuk langer is dan dat van een ander. En zelfs als ze inzien dat de lijnstukken 
toch even lang zijn, blijft de illusie hardnekkig aanwezig. De volgende tekening van een 
trap bevat een Müller-Lyer-illusie: de onderste dikke horizontale lijn lijkt korter dan de 
dikke lijn erboven, maar op papier zijn ze even lang. 
 
Figuur 15: de Müller-Lyer-illusie in de tekening van een trap. Let op de lengte van de 
dikke horizontale lijnen. 
 
Hoe tonen we aan dat de Müller-Lyer-illusie daadwerkelijk een illusie is? Ik wil in de 
ethiek niet verwijzen naar een objectieve morele realiteit, want het bestaan van zulke 
realiteit kent veel filosofische onenigheid. Zo ook wil ik de optische illusie kunnen 
aantonen zonder een beroep te doen op een objectieve fysische realiteit. Door de 
methode van het coherentisme kunnen we met enkel onze eigen intuïties reeds 
aantonen dat sommige van die intuïties onbetrouwbare illusies zijn. Net zoals we onze 
meetkundige intuïties kunnen vertalen naar universalistische axioma’s, zo kunnen we 
ook in de ethiek morele intuïties vertalen naar universalistische basisprincipes. Om de 
Müller-Lyer-illusie aan te tonen, maak ik gebruik van meetkundige intuïties die vertaald 
naar universalistische basisprincipes luiden als: 
1. Translatie-invariantie: de lengte van een meetlat blijft altijd dezelfde als men de 
meetlat verschuift in alle mogelijke richtingen. 
2. Contextonafhankelijkheid: de lengte van een lijnstuk wordt nooit bepaald door de 
aanwezigheid van eender welke andere geometrische figuren rondom het lijnstuk. 
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Deze basisprincipes zijn gebaseerd op onze intuïties: spontane oordelen die we niet 
verder kunnen bewijzen. Zo bekomen we twee, op intuïties gebaseerde, argumenten om 
de optische illusie aan te tonen; het verschuiven van een meetlat, en het afdekken van 
de kleine schuine streepjes op de uiteinden van de horizontale lijnstukken. De twee 
meetkundige intuïties van translatie-invariantie en contextonafhankelijkheid wegen 
sterker door dan de ene intuïtie die zegt dat de horizontale lijnstukken niet even lang 
lijken. Het eenvoudigste wat we nu kunnen doen, is erkennen dat deze laatste intuïtie 
fout is: het is een optische illusie. Dat aanvaarden is eenvoudiger dan een meetkundig 
systeem creëren zonder translatie-invariantie of contextonafhankelijkheid.  
Om het plaatje nog coherenter te maken, kunnen we kijken naar een psychologische 
verklaring van de Müller-Lyer-illusie. Zoals de tekening van de trap reeds doet 
vermoeden, ontstaat de illusie doordat onze hersenen tweedimensionale beelden 
interpreteren als driedimensionale objecten. Onze hersenen zijn getraind om lengtes in 
drie dimensies in te schatten, en daardoor maken ze een perspectiefaanpassing als we 
naar een tweedimensionale figuur kijken. Deze aanpassing werkt zoals een intuïtieve 
vuistregel of heuristiek (Kahneman, 2003) die meestal goed werkt, maar soms een 
foutief oordeel genereert: de optische illusie. De heuristiek waarmee we dit oordeel 
vormen, ontstaat pas na een leerproces, nadat de hersenen hebben leren omgaan met 
dieptezicht en perspectief. In gebieden waar geen trappen of andere rechthoekige 
objecten voorkomen, zijn inheemse mensen minder vatbaar voor de illusie. De Müller-
Lyer-illusie blijkt zowaar aangeleerd (Ahluwalia, 1978).   
1.3. De universalistische duimregel en antidiscriminatie 
De ‘morele duim’ die het universalisme symboliseert, is cruciaal in een ethiek, want 
zonder een opponeerbare duim kunnen we moeilijk een probleem aanpakken. Een 
versie van de universalistische regel luidt: je moet de regels volgen die alle moreel 
bewuste wezens die ertoe in staat zijn zouden moeten volgen in alle gelijkaardige 
situaties; je mag enkel de regels volgen die alle moreel bewuste wezens die ertoe in staat 
zijn mogen volgen in alle gelijkaardige situaties. ‘Alle gelijkaardige situaties’ betekent 
ook: tegenover alle gelijkaardige individuen. Als men gelijkwaardige individuen ongelijk 
behandelt, kan er sprake zijn van schadelijke discriminatie. De universalistische 
duimregel genereert dus een formeel principe van gelijkwaardigheid in termen van 
onpartijdigheid en antidiscriminatie. Dat is een formeel principe, omdat het nog niet 
zegt hoe we individuen moeten behandelen.  
Er is al zeker sprake van schadelijke discriminatie tussen twee partijen A en B (bv. 
man en vrouw, blanke en zwarte) indien er aan de volgende vier voorwaarden voldaan 
is: 
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1) A en B worden verschillend moreel gewaardeerd (bv. het toekennen van een 
hogere morele status aan A dan aan B), én  
2) A en B worden systematisch verschillend behandeld (bv. het ontzeggen van 
rechten van B ten opzichte van A) , én  
3) A en B voldoen beide aan dezelfde moreel relevante criteria om ze gelijk te 
waarderen en te behandelen, én 
4) men tracht het verschil in behandeling te rechtvaardigen door te verwijzen naar 
eigenschappen die eigenlijk moreel irrelevant zijn en geen aanvaardbaar motief 
vormen om A en B in die situatie verschillend te behandelen. 
Dierenethici (Ryder, 1975; Singer, 1975) argumenteren dat speciesisme voldoet aan deze 
vier voorwaarden, en dus een vorm van schadelijke discriminatie is: de soortgrens is 
geen moreel relevant criterium, het hebben van gevoelens is dat wel. Maar mijn 
argumentatie gaat nog een stap verder.  Speciesisme vertoont, bij nader onderzoek, 
immers een zeer sterke gelijkenis met de Müller-Lyer-illusie.  
1.4. Speciesisme als morele illusie 
De analogie tussen de meetkunde als axiomatisch systeem gebaseerd op geometrische 
intuïties en de ethiek als axiomatisch systeem gebaseerd op morele intuïties, kunnen we 
doortrekken naar de dierenethiek. De meeste mensen hebben een intuïtief oordeel dat 
één lijnstuk in de Müller-Lyer-figuur langer is dan het andere, maar deze intuïtie is in 
strijd met een coherent systeem van andere, sterkere intuïties. De meeste mensen 
hebben ook de intuïtie dat mensen meer morele waarde hebben dan dieren. Wat ik zal 
trachten aan te tonen, is dat deze intuïtie (het dier-mens waardeonderscheid) in strijd is 
met een coherent systeem van andere, sterkere morele intuïties. De Müller-Lyer-illusie 
is dus analoog aan de morele illusie die speciesisme veroorzaakt. We zouden kunnen 
stellen dat het onderste dikke horizontale lijnstuk in de Müller-Lyer-illusie symbool 
staat voor de intrinsieke waarde of morele status van een dier, en het bovenste dikke 
lijnstuk symbool staat voor de waarde van een mens. Des te langer het lijnstuk is, des te 
hoger de morele status. De schuine streepjes staan dan symbool voor de moreel 
irrelevante eigenschappen (cfr. het vierde van bovenstaande criteria voor 
discriminatie). Die eigenschappen creëren de illusie waardoor het lijkt alsof mensen 
meer waard zijn (een ‘langer lijnstuk’ hebben). 
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Ik zal eerst vijf argumenten geven die suggereren dat het criterium Homo sapiens 
moreel irrelevant is.3 Deze argumenten zijn analoog aan de contextonafhankelijkheid in 
de Müller-Lyer-illusie. De invloed van de schuine streepjes op de lengte van de dikke 
horizontale lijnstukken zou zeer arbitrair, gecompliceerd en vergezocht zijn. Waarom 
zou het lijnstuk inkrimpen als de streepjes precies op de uiteinden staan en pijlpunten 
vormen die naar buiten wijzen? Hoe zou de lengte beïnvloed kunnen worden door de 
hoek tussen de kleine streepjes? Ook het criterium ‘mens zijn’ is een dergelijke 
arbitraire, gecompliceerde en vergezochte regel, zoals blijkt uit volgende vijf 
argumenten. 
1) Wie ben ik? Ikzelf behoor tot de populatie van blanken, de ondersoort Homo 
sapiens sapiens, de soort Homo sapiens, het genus Homo, de familie van mensachtigen, 
de superfamilie van mensapen, de infraorde van smalneusapen, de orde van primaten, 
de klasse van zoogdieren, de onderstam van gewervelden, de stam van chordadieren, en 
het rijk van de dieren. Het is arbitrair om zonder rechtvaardiging de derde rangorde (de 
soort) te nemen als ‘ingroup’, als morele gemeenschap. Waarom de derde en niet 
bijvoorbeeld de vierde? 
2) Veel mensen trachten het waardeonderscheid tussen mens en dier te 
rechtvaardigen door te verwijzen naar hogere mentale vermogens (bv. rationaliteit). 
Maar als ze dan geconfronteerd worden met het argument van de mentaal 
gehandicapten (mensen die behoren tot de morele gemeenschap maar nooit die hogere 
mentale vermogens hadden of zullen hebben), antwoorden ze dat die gehandicapten 
nog wel tot dezelfde soort behoren als rationele mensen. Maar het biologische 
soortbegrip is erg abstract en gecompliceerd. Eén van de vele definities van het begrip 
soort verwijst naar het kunnen krijgen van vruchtbare nakomelingen. Uiteindelijk lijkt 
het wel alsof men de morele status van mentaal gehandicapten tracht te funderen aan 
de hand van een regel die zegt dat als een wezen (bv. een mentaal gehandicapte) naaste 
familieleden (bv. ouders) heeft die vruchtbare nakomelingen (hadden) kunnen krijgen 
met een verzameling van wezens die bepaalde mentale vermogens (bv. rationaliteit) 
hebben, dat dan dat wezen zelf ook behoort tot de morele gemeenschap. (De verwijzing 
naar naaste familieleden is om rekening te houden met de mogelijkheid dat het wezen 
zelf door bv. een ziekte onvruchtbaar is.) Maar zulke regel is bijzonder vergezocht en 
artificieel. En het is oneerlijk om te zeggen dat een individu rechten heeft omdat diens 
ouders reproductief succesvol waren en in staat waren iets te doen met anderen. Het is 
 
                                                     
3
 Voor alle duidelijkheid: dit criterium verwijst naar een biologische eigenschap. Verwijzingen naar mentale 
vermogens (rationeel denkvermogen,…), potenties (het kunnen ontwikkelen van mentale vermogens), 
familiebanden of sociale relaties zijn irrelevant indien men bv. aan ongeneesbaar diep mentaal gehandicapte 
weeskinderen een hoge morele status wil toekennen. Dit is het ‘argument van de randgevallen’ (‘argument of 
marginal cases’; Dombrowski, 1997). 
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onrechtvaardig om het geven van rechten op een dergelijke manier af te laten hangen 
van iemands familieleden. Dat bepaalde wezens “pech hebben de verkeerde 
familieleden te hebben”, mag geen rol spelen bij de keuze om die wezens al dan niet 
rechten te geven. 
In verband met deze soortdefinitie kunnen we ook kijken naar zogenaamde 
ringsoorten, zoals de Larus meeuwen of de Ensatina salamanders. Dergelijke ringsoorten 
bestaan uit een reeks populaties, waarbij iemand van populatie A vruchtbare 
nakomelingen kan krijgen met iemand van populatie B, en hetzelfde voor B met C, en C 
met D, maar tussen populaties D en A lukt het niet meer. Net zoals ringpopulaties een 
verwantschap hebben volgens een ruimtelijke spreiding, hebben alle soorten een 
gelijkaardige relatie doorheen de tijd. Kijken we naar de fylogenetische stamboom, dan 
zien we dat een moderne Homo sapiens biologisch in staat is om vruchtbare 
nakomelingen te krijgen met voorouders. En die voorouders met nog vroegere 
voorouders. Zo gaan we een tak in de stamboom op tot we een gemeenschappelijke 
voorouder hebben van mensen en bv. varkens. Die tak gaan we dan afdalen tot de 
huidige varkens. Er is dus een keten van populaties in de geschiedenis die onze soort 
verbindt met eender welke andere soort. Het punt is dat de hoge morele status van A 
(Homo sapiens) vergeleken met D (een andere soort) afhangt van het toevallige feit dat 
tussenvormen B en C dood zijn. Het is bizar dat een criterium moreel relevant kan zijn 
ten gevolge van de toevallige dood van tussenvormen.    
3) Ten derde is er het probleem van potentieel vage grenzen. Vele zoogdiersoorten 
kunnen onderling hybriden krijgen: kruisingen tussen twee soorten die vaak zelf 
onvruchtbaar zijn. Denk aan paard en ezel, paard en zebra, lama en kameel, leeuw en 
tijger, leeuw en luipaard, dolfijn en orka, schaap en geit, grizzly en ijsbeer,… Gezien de 
kleine genetische afstand tussen mens en chimpansee is het misschien mogelijk dat ook 
een mens-chimpansee hybride kan geboren worden. De vraag is dan wat de morele 
status van die kruising zou zijn.  
En wat is de status van voorouders (de Homo habilis, Australopithecus,…)? Of van 
genetisch gemanipuleerde mens-dieren? Of van mens-dier chimeras? Een chimera is een 
individu dat bestaat uit genetisch verschillende cellen, afkomstig van zowel menselijke 
als dierlijke stamcellen. De lichaamscellen van chimeras kunnen variëren van 100% 
menselijk tot 100% dierlijk, en alles tussenin.   
Deze vage grenzen zijn onvermijdelijk: wetenschappers zullen nooit een objectief 
criterium hebben om te bepalen of een wezen een mens is.4 Een ethiek die gevoelig is 
 
                                                     
4
 Men zou kunnen tegenwerpen dat een criterium zoals voelen ook een vage grens kent tussen voelend en 
niet-voelend. Maar ten eerste is het een feitelijke (wetenschappelijke) kwestie of een wezen kan voelen: 
wetenschappers hebben reeds een aantal coherente en objectieve indicatoren (op basis van anatomie, 
fysiologie, gedrag en evolutionaire origine) om na te gaan of een wezen kan voelen. Ten tweede kunnen we 
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voor inherent arbitraire elementen, staat kwetsbaarder dan een ethisch systeem met 
minder arbitraire elementen. Want het risico op opportunisme wordt groter door extra 
arbitraire elementen in een ethiek. En een ethiek die geen raad weet met potentiële 
gevallen, zoals de mogelijkheid van mens-dier tussenvormen, is minder sterk dan een 
ethisch systeem dat bestand is tegen alle denkbare situaties.  
4) De soortgrens verwijst naar genen of uiterlijk, en deze criteria zijn niet moreel 
relevant als het gaat over bv. huidskleur, geslacht of bepaalde lichamelijke afwijkingen. 
Het universalisme zegt dat we deze irrelevante moeten doortrekken naar alle genen en 
alle uiterlijke vormen (alle lichamelijke afwijkingen). Het is arbitrair om zonder verdere 
rechtvaardiging bepaalde genen of uiterlijkheden wel als criterium te nemen en andere 
niet. Er is bv. geen ‘belangen-gen’ dat ervoor zorgt dat enkel de wezens met dat gen 
complexe belangen hebben.   
5) Het behoren tot de ene soort, en niet tot een andere, was niet iets wat we konden 
kiezen. We hebben er niet voor gekozen om als mens geboren te worden, we hebben er 
geen verantwoordelijkheid in, dus mogen we er ook niet voor beloond worden. Het is 
een schending van het verdienstenprincipe om een voorkeursbehandeling te krijgen op 
basis van het hebben van bepaalde genen. Als we een aparte behandeling krijgen, zou 
het moeten zijn omdat we bv. een inspanning hebben geleverd of een bepaalde behoefte 
of preferentie hebben (maar dat heeft uiteindelijk met welzijn te maken, zie volgend 
hoofdstuk). 
De eerste vier argumenten wijzen erop dat er geen ‘essentie’ verbonden is aan een 
soort. Essentialisme wil zeggen dat er een eigenschap is die alle elementen en alleen 
elementen van een bepaalde verzameling (bv. een soort) hebben. Die eigenschap kan 
dan de verzameling definiëren. Biologisch essentialisme vinden we terug in bv. het 
Platonisme en bepaalde religies (bv. de idee dat alle, en alleen, mensen een ziel hebben), 
maar sinds Darwin is dergelijk essentialisme achterhaald. Het soortbegrip is slechts één 
van de vele abstracte classificaties.  
Mensen zijn snel geneigd om te denken in termen van essenties (Gelman, 2003). Het 
essentialistisch denken wordt gebruikt in het maken van een ingroup-outgroup 
onderscheid (Tajfel, 1981). Psychologisch onderzoek naar racisme onthult dit fenomeen 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
kijken naar de neurologische basis van het bewustzijn: wetenschappers zouden er mogelijks ooit kunnen 
achterkomen of het ‘bewustzijnsprogramma’ aan- of afstaat. Ten derde tonen dierenwelzijnswetten aan dat 
we belang hechten aan gevoel bij dieren, zelfs al zou er een vage grens zijn en twijfelen we nog over bv. 
gevoelens bij insecten. Ten vierde tonen abortus, stamcelonderzoek en -therapie aan dat bv. een pasbevruchte 
embryo een lagere morele status heeft, en zouden we ook hier een eventueel vage grens van voelen (de 
overgang van niet-voelend embryo tot voelende foetus) aanvaarden. Waarom dan nog de soortgrens als 
tweede vage grens toevoegen? Een eventuele gradatie in voelen kan men nog koppelen aan een gradatie in 
morele status. Maar een gradatie in mens-zijn koppelen aan een gradatie in morele status wordt weer een 
arbitraire en vergezochte constructie. Men kan immers ook een gradatie in bv. primaat-zijn nemen. 
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(Gil-White, 2001). Racisten zien rassen of etnische groepen onterecht voor 
essentialistische natuurlijke groepen, om zo de ingroup te kunnen afbakenen. Het is niet 
onwaarschijnlijk dat hetzelfde mechanisme aan het werk is bij soortisme. In discussies 
over dierenrechten hoort men vaak een uitspraak zoals: “De mens is de enige soort die 
rationeel kan denken”. Het is filosofisch gezien gevaarlijk (uiterst misleidend) om een 
verzameling met diverse elementen (waarvan sommigen niet aan het criterium 
voldoen), aan te duiden met een term in het enkelvoud. Niet alle mensen kunnen 
rationeel denken, een soort (als abstracte verzameling) kan al helemaal niet denken, en 
“dé mens” bestaat niet. Een uitspraak die verwijst naar “de mens”, blijft even waar of 
onwaar, even zinvol of zinloos, als we “de mens” vervangen door “de blanke” of “de 
primaat”. De primaat is immers ook een rationeel denkend wezen, in die zin dat de 
meeste primaten (bijna 7 miljard) een rationeel denkvermogen hebben. Maar niet alle 
primaten en niet alle mensen zijn rationeel denkend. Het automatisch mens-denken of 
soort-denken verhult soortisme.  
Het essentialisme is een intuïtieve vuistregel, een heuristiek die vaak goed werkt, 
maar soms niet. En het wordt cultureel beïnvloed: het toekennen van essenties aan 
bepaalde groepen, evenals het bepalen wie er tot de ingroup behoort, zijn 
cultuurgebonden (Kurzban, 2001). Onze keuze van ingroup of morele gemeenschap zit 
niet in onze hersenen ingebakken, ze is niet aangeboren, maar is relatief sterk cultureel-
sociologisch beïnvloedbaar. Ook hier is de analogie van de Müller-Lyer-illusie treffend: 
die illusie ontstond ook door een intuïtieve vuistregel (3D-perspectiefaanpassing) die 
niet altijd goed aangepast is voor tweedimensionale figuren, en niet alle culturen zijn 
vatbaar voor deze illusie. Net zoals er geen essentie is die alle en alleen lijnstukken met 
naar binnen gerichte pijlpunten kenmerken, zo is er geen essentie verbonden aan een 
soort. Er is geen kenmerk dat alle, en alleen, mensen bezitten. 
Naast contextonafhankelijkheid, culturele afhankelijkheid en de psychologische 
verklaring in termen van heuristieken, was er nog een beslissend argument dat 
aantoonde dat de Müller-Lyer-figuur een illusie is: translatie-invariantie. De analogie 
van translatie-invariantie in een dierenethiek komt in het volgende deel over het 
welzijnsprincipe (de wijsvinger) aan bod. Uiteindelijk bekomen we zo een reeks van 
coherente argumenten die aantonen dat de soortgrens niet moreel relevant is en dat 
speciesisme een morele illusie is.  
Waarschijnlijk blijven vele mensen nog vasthouden aan het intuïtieve mens-dier 
waardeonderscheid, zelfs nadat ze al deze argumenten hebben gehoord. Maar dergelijke 
hardnekkigheid hadden we ook bij de optische illusie: zelfs al meten we de lengtes, dan 
nog lijken de horizontale lijnstukken niet even lang te zijn telkens we een blik werpen 
op de Müller-Lyer-figuur. Hardnekkigheid biedt geen garantie voor waarheid of 
consistentie.  
Het punt is dat als we blijven vasthouden aan dat mens-dier waardeonderscheid, we 
in conflict komen met een coherent systeem van andere morele intuïties en ethische 
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principes (bv. het antidiscriminatieprincipe) die sterker staan. Die argumenten 
verwijzen naar het arbitraire of vergezochte karakter van de soortgrens. En ons 
intuïtieve gevoel van morele verontwaardiging zegt dat individuen niet benadeeld 
mogen worden op basis van arbitraire of vergezochte criteria, want dan riskeren we te 
veel opportunisme. In het licht van onze geschiedenis van discriminatie (slavernij, 
genocides,…) is dat extreem gevaarlijk. 
2. De wijsvinger: het welzijnsprincipe, onpartijdigheid en 
empathie 
Om aan te tonen dat speciesisme een vorm van discriminatie is, is het onvoldoende om 
argumenten te geven voor de irrelevantie van de soortgrens. Er is een criterium nodig 
dat wel moreel relevant is. In dit hoofdstuk bespreek ik twee argumenten voor het 
criterium voelen (welzijn).5 Hoofdstuk drie voegt daar nog twee extra argumenten aan 
toe.  
2.1. Onpartijdigheid 
Het Rawlsiaanse gedachtenexperiment van de sluier der onwetendheid (Rawls, 1971) is 
een handige vuistregel om onpartijdigheid na te gaan. Stel dat je achter een sluier der 
onwetendheid zit, je weet dat je straks zult geboren worden in de echte wereld, maar je 
weet niet wie of wat je zult worden.  In de originele versie van Rawls weet je dat je het 
leven zult leiden van een rationeel denkend wezen, maar daardoor vallen bv. mentaal 
gehandicapten uit de boot. Zoals Rowlands (1997) beargumenteerde, moeten we – om 
maximaal onpartijdig te zijn – dit gedachtenexperiment verbreden: je moet jezelf 
voorstellen dat je kan incarneren tot elke entiteit in het heelal. Waarom niet een 
planeet, elektron, inktvlek of varken in het jaar 3000? Het enige wat je achter de sluier 
der onwetendheid wel weet, zijn de wetten van de natuur (althans volgens de huidige 
wetenschappelijke kennis). Je mag nu zelf de morele wetten kiezen waarmee de 
 
                                                     
5
 Gevoelens zijn lichamelijke of emotionele subjectieve, bewuste gewaarwordingen (qualia) die positief of 
negatief geëvalueerd worden, zodat ze een invloed hebben op het welzijn. Bv. het boek in mijn hand voel ik 
niet, tenzij ik mijn bewuste aandacht richt op mijn vingers. Dan voel ik het boek wel, maar er is niet 
noodzakelijk een evaluatie. Bij een pijnprikkel in mijn vinger heb ik wel een gevoel dat negatief bijdraagt aan 
mijn welzijn.  
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samenleving geordend moet worden. Iets concreter: stel dat je geboren zal worden als 
ofwel een mens (bv. een mentaal gehandicapte), ofwel een varken, ofwel een plant. Je 
weet dat ik straks één van die drie ga opeten. Je mag nu kiezen wie ik zeker niet mag 
opeten. Je weet ook dat volgens de huidige wetenschappelijke kennis een plant 
waarschijnlijk geen gevoelens heeft en dus niet vatbaar is voor welzijn. Indien je 
rationeel bent en bezorgd bent om je welzijn, zou je moeten beslissen dat ik noch de 
mens noch het varken mag eten. Want als jij de plant wordt, en als ik de plant kwets, zul 
jij daar niets van voelen. Je welzijn zal niet beïnvloed worden (want je zult geen welzijn 
hebben). 
Het resultaat van dit gedachtenexperiment, is dat het criterium voelen (welzijn) 
moreel relevant is, omdat jij nu je welzijn waardeert. Niet-voelende entiteiten worden 
uitgesloten, maar je bent wel maximaal onpartijdig geweest. Dit resulteert in een 
consequentialistische welzijnsethiek, waarbij de gevolgen voor ieders welzijn moreel 
relevant zijn. Onpartijdigheid zegt dat al het welzijn van alle voelende wezens meetelt6. 
De vraag is hoeveel het meetelt. Wat is een onpartijdige verdeling van welzijn? Als je 
achter de sluier weet dat je het volledige leven gaat leiden van een voelend wezen, ga je 
belang hechten aan diens levenswelzijn. Dat is de waarde die je zou geven aan het leiden 
van het volledige leven van dat individu. Des te hoger het levenswelzijn, des te liever je 
dat leven zou leiden.   
Als je achter de sluier een zekere risicoaversie hebt (een hogere schrik om het wezen 
in de laagste positie te worden), dan zou je uitkomen op een prioriteitsethiek qua 
verdeling van levenswelzijn, waarbij de laagste posities (met het minste levenswelzijn) 
een hoge prioriteit krijgen.7 We moeten het levenswelzijn van alle voelende wezens 
maximaliseren, waarbij we een sterke prioriteit geven aan het verhogen van het 
levenswelzijn van de wezens in de laagste posities.8 Met andere woorden: maximaliseer 
 
                                                     
6
 Een voelend wezen is een wezen dat de mogelijkheid heeft ontwikkeld om te kunnen voelen, en die 
mogelijkheid nog niet definitief verloren heeft. Tijdens de diepe slaap is men dus nog een voelend wezen. 
Gewervelde dieren (en misschien ook kreeftachtigen en inktvissen) zijn volgens de wetenschap waarschijnlijk 
voelende wezens, omdat die een functioneel voldoende complex centraal zenuwstelsel hebben ontwikkeld. 
7
 Met maximale risico-aversie zou je absolute prioriteit geven aan het maximaliseren van het minste 
levenswelzijn: de maximin-regel (Rawls, 1971). Zonder risico-aversie zou je geen prioriteit geven, en zou je de 
totale som van ieders levenswelzijn maximaliseren: het som-utilitarisme. De prioriteitsethiek ligt tussen 
maximin en som-utilitarisme in. Zie ook Bruers, 2010, p291. 
8
 Wiskundig uitgedrukt zegt dit principe dat we de verwachtingswaarde van een veralgemeend (Kolmogorov) 
gemiddelde met concave functies van levenswelzijn van alle voelende wezens moeten maximaliseren. De 
maximalisatie loopt over alle beschikbare keuzes. Elke keuze die we kunnen stellen resulteert in een andere 
wereldgeschiedenis. In elke keuze nemen we enkel die voelende wezens in rekening die effectief bestaan of 
zullen bestaan in de overeenkomende wereldgeschiedenis en wiens welzijn beïnvloedbaar is door onze keuzes. 
De concaviteit van de concave functies in het veralgemeend gemiddelde komt overeen met de mate van risico-
aversie achter de sluier der onwetendheid. Bij zeer hoge risico-aversie wordt het maximinprincipe benaderd. 
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het levenswelzijn van de individuen die het slechtst af zijn, tenzij dat ten koste gaat van 
veel meer levenswelzijn van anderen. We mogen niet te veel welzijn opofferen voor een 
verwaarloosbare stijging van de laagste posities, want dat zou niet efficiënt zijn. We 
mogen bv. niet iemand in quasi-extreme armoede drijven, om een extreme arme 
persoon een verwaarloosbare hoeveelheid extra welvaart te geven. We mogen ook niet 
iemand in armoede nog armer maken en zijn welzijn met een bepaalde hoeveelheid 
verlagen om zo het welzijn van welvarende personen te doen stijgen met eenzelfde 
hoeveelheid, want dat toont een gebrek aan prioriteit voor de personen die het ergst af 
zijn. 
2.2. Empathie 
Een tweede reden waarom het vermogen tot voelen belangrijk is, is empathie. Vanuit 
een deugdenethiek (en een zorgethiek) weten we dat het ontwikkelen van empathie 
deugdzaam is. We kunnen (op een zinnige wijze) empathie voelen met alle en alleen 
voelende wezens. Empathie maximaal uitbreiden kan door niet enkel mensen, maar alle 
voelende wezens mee te tellen. 
Empathie is meestal het sterkst gericht op de ergste lijder. Diens welzijn willen we 
dus maximaliseren, maar niet ten koste van veel meer welzijn van anderen, want dat 
botst met onze behoefte aan efficiëntie. Met andere woorden, een empathische houding 
met een lage (maar niet afwezige) behoefte aan efficiëntie komt overeen met een 
onpartijdige houding (achter een sluier der onwetendheid) met een hoge (maar niet 
maximale) risicoaversie. We hebben dus twee verschillende gezichtspunten om naar een 
situatie te kijken: de rationale benadering kijkt vanuit een uitwendig, onpartijdig 
standpunt achter een sluier der onwetendheid waar rationele afweging belangrijk is, de 
emotionele benadering kijkt vanuit een inwendig, subjectief standpunt waar empathie 
belangrijk is. 
Een deugdenethiek en een consequentialistische ethiek geven dus twee coherente 
argumenten voor welzijn als relevant criterium, en voor het geven van een hoge 
prioriteit aan het welzijn van de laagste posities. Dergelijk prioriteitsprincipe, toegepast 
op een dierenethiek, ligt tussen twee uitersten in: het som-utilitarisme van Singer 
(1975), waarbij de som van ieders welzijn moet worden gemaximaliseerd; en een vorm 
van  pijnisme van Ryder (2001), waarbij het welzijn van de ergste lijder moet worden 
gemaximaliseerd. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Een hogere prioriteit wordt dus gegeven aan de laagste posities. Tot slot wordt de verwachtingswaarde 
genomen in geval dat de uitkomsten van de levenswelzijnswaarden onzeker zijn. 
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We komen zo tot ons eerste ‘materiële’ principe van gelijkwaardigheid. Volgens het 
formele gelijkwaardigheidsprincipe van de duim moeten we ieders welzijn een 
onpartijdige wijze in rekening brengen, onafhankelijk van de identiteit van individuen. 
Door de risico-aversie achter de sluier der onwetendheid, of door empathie, komen we 
tot een invulling van dit formele principe: we moeten een voorkeur geven aan het 
levenswelzijn van de minst bedeelden. Daaruit volgt dat, als het totale levenswelzijn van 
alle individuen constant is tussen verschillende situaties, de situatie met de meest 
gelijke verdeling van levenswelzijn de beste is. De prioriteitsethiek zit zo tussen een 
som-utilitarisme (dat enkel het totaal wil maximaliseren) en een egalitarisme (dat ieders 
levenswelzijn gelijk wil schakelen).  
De sluier der onwetendheid en empathie zijn een rationeel en een emotioneel 
instrument om de intrinsieke waarde van een wezen (het levenswelzijn) na te gaan, 
door ons te verplaatsen in de positie van de ander en diens welzijn en belangen over te 
nemen. Het is zoals een meetlat die men verschuift van één lijnstuk naar een ander. De 
meetlat is een objectief (onpartijdig) instrument om een intrinsieke eigenschap van een 
lijnstuk (de lengte) na te gaan. En zo komen we uit bij een translatie-invariantie die we 
tegenkwamen bij de Müller-Lyer-illusie. Ons inlevingsvermogen (door empathie en 
onpartijdigheid) is een morele meetlat die we kunnen verschuiven, bv. van een mens 
naar een dier. Deze analogie met de Müller-Lyer-illusie maakt het plaatje nog sterker 
samenhangend, en is een extra reden om te geloven dat speciesisme een morele illusie 
is. Maar in het volgende deel over het middelprincipe geef ik nog extra argumenten 
waarom gevoelens moreel belangrijk zijn.   
3. De middelvinger: het middelprincipe, respect en 
waardigheid 
De consequentialistische welzijnsethiek, besproken in het vorige hoofdstuk, kan in een 
aantal situaties contra-intuïtieve oordelen genereren. Beschouw de volgende twee 
dilemma's. 
1) Een vrachtwagen rijdt over een smalle weg. De remmen begeven het, en recht voor 
de vrachtwagen zijn vijf voetgangers. Doet de chauffeur niets of draait hij naar rechts, 
dan zullen de vijf voetgangers sterven. Hij kan naar links uitwijken, maar daar zal hij 
één fietser dodelijk treffen. Volgens het welzijnsprincipe van de wijsvinger is het beter 
om naar links te draaien: vijf doden is erger dan één dode.  
2) In een ziekenhuis hebben vijf patiënten nieuwe organen nodig. Er is een 
orgaantekort, maar de chirurg kan een onbekende bezoeker opofferen en diens organen 
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gebruiken om de vijf patiënten te redden. Net zoals in het vrachtwagendilemma zou het 
wijsvingerprincipe oordelen dat gedwongen orgaantransplantatie mag. Maar onze 
morele intuïtie zegt van niet. Om tegemoet te komen aan deze morele intuïtie, moeten 
we een ander ethisch principe introduceren: de morele middelvinger. 
Volgens het middelvingerprincipe heeft de onbekende bezoeker in het ziekenhuis 
een basisrecht om niet gebruikt te worden als louter middel voor de doelen van iemand 
anders. De lengte van een middelvinger is iets langer dan die van een wijsvinger, en de 
vingerlengte staat symbool voor het morele gewicht van een principe. Dus  
dit middel(vinger)principe weegt zwaarder door dan het wijsvinger-welzijnsprincipe. 
Bv. in het bovenstaande dilemma weegt het basisrecht minstens vijf keer zwaarder dan 
het recht op leven en welzijn van de vijf patiënten. De middelvinger is echter niet 
oneindig lang, dus het basisrecht is niet absoluut allesdominerend. Er is een 
zekere behoefte aan efficiëntie: gigantisch veel welzijn opofferen weegt zwaarder door 
dan iemand een klein beetje gebruiken als louter middel. 
Het middelprincipe is gebaseerd op respect voor de waardigheid van een persoon. 
Maar wanneer wordt nu precies iemand gebruikt als 'louter middel'? Er dient aan twee 
voorwaarden voldaan te zijn (die verwijzen naar de twee woorden 'louter' en 'middel').  
1) De aanwezigheid van het lichaam van het slachtoffer is noodzakelijk om het doel te 
bereiken. Als het slachtoffer niet aanwezig was en het plan om een doel te bereiken zou 
nog steeds werken, dan wordt het slachtoffer niet gebruikt als middel. Zo kan de 
vrachtwagen nog steeds naar links draaien als de fietser er niet is, maar kan de chirurg 
niet de bezoeker opofferen als er geen bezoeker is. De bezoeker (diens lichaam) wordt 
gebruikt als middel (als organen), de fietser niet. Het lichaam van het slachtoffer speelt 
een centrale rol, want het lichaam is het enige waar men volledig eigendomsrecht over 
heeft.9 Het lichaam speelt in het gebruik als middel een centrale rol indien de 
lichamelijke integriteit wordt geschonden (bv. vleesconsumptie, experimenten, 
orgaantransplantatie, lichamelijke manipulatie), indien er een seksuele handeling is met 
het lichaam (bv. verkrachting), indien het lichaam een activiteit moet uitvoeren (bv. 
slavernij), indien het lichaam ergens moet zijn (bv. opsluiten in een kooi), indien het 
lichaam wordt gefotografeerd of bekeken (bv. naaktfoto, schendingen van lichamelijke 
privacy), indien er een prijs staat op het lichaam (bv. handel)…  
 
                                                     
9
 We hebben de plicht om zwakkeren te helpen, maar niet als ons lichaam daarbij een centrale rol speelt. Men 
mag ons niet dwingen om een beetje bloed of een nier af te geven, want dat bloed en die nier zijn volledig van 
ons. Bloed- en nierdonaties zijn moreel goed maar niet verplicht. Men mag wel belastingen heffen (zelfs al 
geeft de belastingbetaler geen toestemming), want geld behoort niet tot het lichaam en is niet volledig van 
een persoon: het zou kunnen dat een persoon te veel geld verdiende, en als bv. een boer zijn oogst verkoopt, is 
de handenarbeid wel van de boer, maar de grond is (moreel gezien) niet van de boer. Iemand dwingen om 
arbeid te verrichten kan dan weer niet, want dan staat het lichaam wel centraal (cfr. slavernij).  
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2) De dader dwingt het slachtoffer bij de behandeling als middel iets te doen of 
ondergaan tegen de wil van het slachtoffer in. Als het slachtoffer niet graag zo 
behandeld wordt, wordt hij niet enkel gebruikt als middel, maar als louter middel. 
Hierbij is ook de aanwezigheid van de dader noodzakelijk. Als het slachtoffer nog steeds 
slachtoffer zou zijn (benadeeld zou zijn) indien er geen dader was, dan wordt het 
slachtoffer niet gebruikt voor het doel van de dader. Neem bv. een arme persoon die 
besluit brood te bakken om financieel rond te komen. Hij staat tegen zijn zin in 's 
ochtends vroeg op, en als ik brood ga kopen bij die bakker, gebruik ik hem wel als 
middel (zijn aanwezigheid is noodzakelijk), maar ik ben niet verantwoordelijk voor zijn 
slechte toestand. Dus ik gebruik hem niet als louter middel. Dat zou wel het geval zijn 
als ik hem bv. bedreig en dwing om brood te bakken; dan wordt het slavernij, want dan 
draag ik bij tot diens slechte toestand. 
Deze twee voorwaarden genereren het middelprincipe, dat coherent is met een 
behoorlijk aantal morele intuïties in diverse situaties: iemand gebruiken in onvrijwillige 
experimenten of als menselijk schild, terreuraanslagen plegen (onschuldige burgers 
doden met als doel de vijand te demoraliseren), een onschuldige persoon martelen (als 
die persoon de locatie van een bom weet maar terroristen hem chanteren om die locatie 
niet te onthullen), iemand doden bij chantage (als een terrorist tegen je zegt dat jij 
iemand moet doden, anders gaat hij vijf anderen doden), iemand gebruiken als losgeld 
of lokaas (bv. bij gijzelneming), een vrouw verkrachten (en de video van de verkrachting 
verkopen aan duizenden pornoconsumenten), mensen verhandelen, gladiatorgevechten 
organiseren (ter amusement van duizenden bezoekers), exotische mensen opsluiten om 
ze zoals in dierentuinen tentoon te stellen (etnografische zoos), mensen doden en 
opeten (kannibalisme), of mensen gebruiken als slaaf. Dergelijke praktijken mogen niet, 
zelfs al zou het welzijn in de wereld stijgen, want telkens wordt er iemand gebruikt als 
louter middel.  
De vraag is nu: wie krijgt dat basisrecht? Kijken we even naar de twee voorwaarden 
(lichamelijke aanwezigheid en onvrijwilligheid), dan moet het wezen alvast een lichaam 
en een wil hebben. Die wil kunnen we eng interpreteren, als de mogelijkheid om een 
geïnformeerde ongedwongen toestemming te kunnen geven. In dat geval krijgen enkel 
rationele wezens het basisrecht. Maar dan krijgen bv. mentaal gehandicapten dat recht 
niet.10 Een bredere invulling is de mogelijkheid om iets te kunnen willen. En alle 
voelende wezens die een welzijn hebben, hebben die capaciteit, want positieve en 
negatieve gevoelens zorgen ervoor dat een wezen iets wil (bv. pijn dat gepaard gaat met 
 
                                                     
10
 Die gehandicapten hebben wel een levend lichaam, maar als we dan zouden zeggen dat alle levende wezens 
het basisrecht krijgen, bekomen we volgens het antidiscriminatieprincipe het probleem dat we bv. geen 
planten meer mogen eten. Daarom is het beter het criterium voelen te nemen. 
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een verlies aan welzijn, zorgt ervoor dat ik lichamelijke schade wil vermijden). Zo 
hebben we een extra, derde argument waarom gevoelens en welzijn moreel belangrijk 
zijn.  
Een vierde argument zegt dat er een niet-vergezochte koppeling is tussen rechten en 
gevoelens: rechten beschermen belangen, en gevoelens detecteren belangen (bv. pijn 
zegt dat het belang van lichamelijke integriteit geschonden is, angst wijst op het belang 
van veiligheid). De koppeling tussen rechten en biologische soorten is daarentegen wel 
vergezocht. 
Het middelvingerprincipe genereert een tweede materieel principe van 
gelijkwaardigheid: alle voelende wezens hebben een gelijke claim op het basisrecht om 
niet als louter middel gebruikt te worden voor de doelen van anderen.11 In de 
dierenrechtenethiek zijn Regan (1983) en Francione (1996, 2000) voortrekkers van deze 
‘deontologische’ benadering. Zo stelt Francione dat alle voelende wezens het basisrecht 
hebben om niet gebruikt te worden als louter bezit. 
4. De ringvinger: het biodiversiteitsprincipe en het 
predatiedilemma 
4.1. Het predatieprobleem 
Een leeuw doodt in zijn leven wel honderden zebra’s en andere voelende wezens. Bij 
predatie wordt de prooi gebruikt als louter middel, en het zou best kunnen dat predatie 
het welzijn sterk reduceert. Hebben we volgens het wijs- en middelvingerprincipe dan 
de plicht om – in de mate van het mogelijke – prooien te beschermen en predatoren uit 
te roeien? Zelfs vele dierenactivisten zijn daar geen voorstander van. Het 
predatieprobleem (Fink, 2005; Simmons, 2009) is waarschijnlijk het meest ernstige en 
onderschatte probleem voor zowel een consequentialistische dierenwelzijnsethiek 
(Singer, 1975) als een deontologische dierenrechtenethiek (Regan, 1983). Want als een 
leeuw nog vlees mag eten, waarom mogen wij dat dan niet? 
Dierenrechtenfilosofen zoals Regan (1983) geven een onbevredigend antwoord op het 
predatieprobleem. Leeuwen zouden nog op zebra’s mogen jagen, omdat leeuwen geen 
moreel besef hebben. Leeuwen zijn amoreel, niet immoreel. Maar ten eerste zouden wij 
 
                                                     
11
 Eventueel kunnen we aanvullen dat rationele wezens een sterkere claim op dat basisrecht hebben. Dat is 
niet noodzakelijk discriminatie van niet-rationele voelende wezens. 
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als moreel bewuste wezens nog wel een verantwoordelijkheid hebben om prooien te 
beschermen, net zoals we een plicht hebben om voelende wezens te beschermen tegen 
bv. (amorele) vallende rotsblokken. En ten tweede: wat als morgen plots leeuwen 
rationeel kunnen denken en ze kennis hebben van ethiek? Mogen ze dan plots niet meer 
jagen?12 Of wat als op een eiland ver weg een mensenstam leeft die voor hun overleven 
afhankelijk is geworden van vlees en zou uitsterven als ze niet meer kan jagen? Je zou 
als carnivoor maar de pech hebben om een bepaalde intelligentie te hebben. Laten we 
daarom op zoek gaan naar een nieuw principe om predatie te rechtvaardigen. We 
kunnen ons hierbij laten inspireren door het carnisme, de ideologische tegenpool van 
veganisme. 
4.2. Het 3-N-principe 
Volgens sociaal psychologe Joy (2002, 2009) trachten carnisten hun vleesconsumptie te 
rechtvaardigen met drie argumenten: vlees is natuurlijk, normaal en noodzakelijk. Deze 
drie N-argumenten zal ik omvormen en verwerken tot een extra principe (de 
ringvinger) dat bepaalde vormen van predatie kan goedkeuren.  
De noodzakelijkheidsvoorwaarde is de eenvoudigste: het gaat om een vitale behoefte 
voor bestaande individuen (bv. eten, medicijnen,…) of voor potentiële wezens en 
populaties (bv. voortplanting). Normaal is hier voor de eenvoud: alles wat vaak gebeurt. 
Het criterium natuurlijk definieer ik als alles wat van nature – door evolutie – ontstaan 
is. Evolutie is hier het gekende ‘blinde’ proces van genetische mutatie en natuurlijke 
selectie. Doelbewuste uitvindingen van intelligente wezens zijn dus niet natuurlijk, 
hoewel die intelligentie wel natuurlijk is (want door evolutie ontstaan). Natuurlijk 
gedrag is gedrag dat mogelijk gemaakt werd door iets (bv. een lichaamsdeel) dat via 
evolutie ontstond.  
Het 3-N-principe (de morele ringvinger) kunnen we dan samenvatten als volgt: 
Als er een (a) voldoende aantal voelende wezens door een (b) evolutionair proces 
afhankelijk zijn geworden van een bepaald type gedrag (c) om te overleven, dan mogen 
die voelende wezens dat gedrag vertonen, zelfs al schenden ze het welzijns- en 
middelprincipe. Dit 3-N ringvingerprincipe zegt dus dat rechtenschendingen enkel 
mogen als een gedrag zowel (a) normaal, (b) natuurlijk als (c) noodzakelijk is. Des te 
normaler, natuurlijker en noodzakelijker een proces is, des te meer basisrechten mogen 
geschonden worden. Als slechts aan één of twee N-criteria voldaan is, dan mag het 
basisrecht niet geschonden worden. 
 
                                                     
12
 Mogelijks hebben dolfijnen reeds een protomoraliteit, en ze jagen op voelende vissen (Schermer, 2004, p.16). 
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Dit principe is coherent met een aantal morele intuïties in verschillende situaties. 1) 
Stel dat insecten voelende wezens zouden zijn, die we per ongeluk schaden 
(vertrappelen) als we bewegen. Het welzijnsprincipe dreigt geschaad te worden; mogen 
grote wezens zoals wij dan niet meer bewegen? Jawel, want beweging is normaal, 
natuurlijk en noodzakelijk voor ons. Dieren doodrijden met de auto mag dan weer niet, 
want autorijden is niet natuurlijk:dat is een bewuste uitvinding en niet ontstaan door 
blinde evolutie. 2) Dieren van sommige soorten hebben een lage levensverwachting, een 
lage emotionele rijkdom, of hun minimale behoefte aan schaarse hulpbronnen om te 
overleven is erg hoog, waardoor ze competitie met andere wezens verhogen. Met 
andere woorden: deze wezens dragen niet goed bij tot het welzijnsprincipe. Maar ze 
mogen zich nog wel voortplanten, want voortplanting is als gedrag natuurlijk, 
noodzakelijk en normaal. 3) Men zou kunnen stellen dat verkrachting natuurlijk is 
(mannen hebben door evolutie een lichaamsdeel ontwikkeld waarmee ze vrouwen 
kunnen verkrachten, voor mannen kan verkrachting een instinct zijn) en normaal is 
(het gebeurt vaak in de dierenwereld, onze voorouders deden het duizenden jaren, en 
het is niet uitgesloten dat wij ons bestaan te danken hebben aan het feit dat een verre 
voorvader eens een vrouw verkrachtte). Maar het is niet noodzakelijk voor ons 
overleven, en het is een schending van rechten, dus mag het niet. Hetzelfde geldt voor 
allerlei vormen van geweld en oorlog. 4) Gedwongen orgaantransplantatie is misschien 
wel noodzakelijk voor de patiënten bij een orgaantekort, maar orgaantransplantatie is 
niet normaal (het gebeurt niet vaak) en vooral: het is niet natuurlijk (het is niet ontstaan 
door een natuurlijk, evolutionair proces, het is geen instinct). Dus dergelijke 
orgaantransplantatie die het basisrecht schendt, mag niet volgens het 3-N-principe. 5) 
Hetzelfde geldt voor onvrijwillige medische experimenten: dergelijk gedrag is – in 
tegenstelling tot predatie – niet door blinde evolutie ontstaan en bijgevolg niet 
natuurlijk. 
Coherentie is opnieuw aanwezig, ook in dit ringvingerprincipe. Maar we kunnen met 
het ringvingerprincipe nog een stap verder gaan dan louter coherentie met intuïties.  
4.3. De waarde van biodiversiteit 
We hebben in verschillende situaties de intuïties dat anderen helpen goed is en anderen 
schaden verkeerd is. Er is niet enkel een coherentie tussen die intuïties in verschillende 
situaties, maar er bestaat ook een natuurlijke eigenschap die deze intuïties omkadert: 
welzijn, gedefinieerd als alle positieve gevoelens die een gevolg zijn van het goed 
geïnformeerd vervullen van behoeften. Kunnen we een gelijkaardige natuurlijke 
eigenschap vinden achter de intuïties van het 3-N-principe? Ja: biodiversiteit, 
gedefinieerd als alle variatie in processen (predatie,…) en entiteiten (genen, soorten,…) 
die een direct gevolg zijn van spontane evolutie. Zoals welzijn een complex 
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samenraapsel is van verschillende dingen, zo is biodiversiteit een complex 
samenraapsel. Zoals voelende wezens een neiging hebben om hun welzijn te verhogen 
door behoeftebevrediging (ondanks schaarste, trade-offs en andere beperkingen), zo 
hebben ecosystemen een spontane neiging om biodiversiteit te verhogen door 
genetische mutaties (ondanks natuurlijke selectie). Zoals voelende wezens welzijn als 
intrinsiek waardevolle natuurlijke eigenschap hebben, zo hebben ecosystemen 
biodiversiteit als waardevolle natuurlijke eigenschap.  
De link tussen het 3-N-principe en biodiversiteit is als volgt in te zien. Als een proces 
(gedrag, eigenschap,…) natuurlijk is, draagt het per definitie bij aan de biodiversiteit. Als 
een proces natuurlijk en normaal is, draagt het veel bij aan de biodiversiteit. En als een 
proces natuurlijk, normaal en noodzakelijk is, zou de biodiversiteit drastisch dalen als 
dat proces er niet meer was. Als biodiversiteit intrinsieke waarde heeft13, is een 
drastisch verlies van de biodiversiteit moreel gezien heel ernstig. De waarde van een 
grote hoeveelheid biodiversiteit overtroeft dan het basisrecht en welzijn van 
individuen.14 Vandaar het belang van de 3-N-voorwaarden. Het verschil tussen predatie 
en gedwongen orgaantransplantatie is dus dat het eerste type van gedrag wel en het 
tweede niet bijdraagt aan de biodiversiteit. Bij orgaantransplantatie is een zieke patiënt 
niet door een blind evolutionair proces afhankelijk geworden van chirurgen en organen. 
De koppeling tussen het 3-N-principe en de waarde van biodiversiteit werkt enkel als 
we ‘de duim tegen de ringvinger plaatsen’: gesteld dat we de plicht zouden hebben om 
deze zebra te beschermen tegen die leeuw, dan moeten we volgens de duim kunnen 
willen dat die plicht een universele regel wordt, dat predatie nergens en nooit mag. En 
dan zouden alle predatoren uitsterven (zolang ze geen voedingsalternatief hebben) en 
zou er een drastisch verlies aan biodiversiteit zijn. Daarom dat we in dit ene geval niet 
de plicht hebben om deze zebra te beschermen, zelfs al zou het beschermen van enkel 
deze zebra geen gevaar vormen voor de biodiversiteit. Dit is een mooi voorbeeld van de 
 
                                                     
13
 Biodiversiteit kan alvast instrumentele waarde hebben voor voelende wezens: het kan ecosysteemdiensten 
leveren en bijdragen aan ecosysteemstabiliteit. Maar het is allesbehalve duidelijk of dergelijke instrumentele 
waarde voor het welzijn van voelende wezens voldoende is om de rechtenschendingen van predatie te 
rechtvaardigen. Vandaar dat de waarde van biodiversiteit misschien toch intrinsiek moet zijn en niet louter 
instrumenteel, om sterk genoeg te staan in het rechtvaardigen van predatie. 
14
 Men kan stellen dat als mensen geen vlees meer zouden eten, de veedieren dan niet meer gekweekt zouden 
worden, waardoor die rassen zouden uitsterven en de biodiversiteit zou dalen (Scruton, 1998). Maar 1) het 
bewust kweken van bepaalde veerassen draagt niet bij aan de biodiversiteit, want dat kweken is geen 
spontaan evolutionair proces. 2) Wilde rassen (wilde runderen,…) kunnen zich nog wel voortplanten. 3) De 
veeteelt zelf vormt een grote bedreiging voor de biodiversiteit (FAO, 2006). 4) Het is niet verantwoord om 
doelbewust ernstig lichamelijk gehandicapte wezens te kweken (de meeste veedieren hebben ernstige 
handicaps). En 5) dergelijk argument zouden we ook nooit inroepen ter rechtvaardiging van het kweken van 
mensenrassen voor slavernij. 
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samenwerking van de verschillende vingers om een moreel probleem zoals predatie aan 
te pakken. 
Het probleem van het biodiversiteitsprincipe is dat veel ethici (in het bijzonder 
utilitaristen) zich de vraag zullen stellen waarom een niet-voelende entiteit (een 
ecosysteem) een intrinsieke waarde (biodiversiteit) heeft, en wat die intrinsieke waarde 
voor iets is. Het lijkt of we moeten kiezen tussen aan de ene kant het respecteren van 
bepaalde morele intuïties (bv. bij predatie en voortplanting) en aan de andere kant het 
vermijden van noties zoals intrinsieke waarde van niet-voelende entiteiten. 
4.4. Twee andere oplossingen voor het predatieprobleem 
Er zijn nog twee andere mogelijke oplossingen voor het predatieprobleem, die niet 
verwijzen naar een vermeende (intrinsieke) waarde van biodiversiteit.  
1) Gedragsrechtvaardigheid. Een type gedrag dat rechten schendt, is toegelaten, als 
het gedrag noodzakelijk is, als het slachtoffer zelf schuldig is aan hetzelfde type gedrag 
en datzelfde type gedrag mag doen. En het type gedrag mag niet verwijzen naar een 
naamwoord. Als een zebra nog mag eten om te overleven, dan mag een leeuw dat ook. 
En dat het voedsel nu gras is of zebra’s, maakt in de regel niet uit.  
Dit geheel nieuwe rechtvaardigheidsprincipe is coherent met intuïties in andere 
situaties naast predatie. Bv.: ik offer niemand zonder toestemming op voor organen of 
medische experimenten, dus jij mag mij niet opofferen voor orgaantransplantatie of 
experimenten. Een dier van een soort die sterk bijdraagt aan het globale welzijn, mag 
zich nog voortplanten, dus mogen andere diersoorten zich ook voortplanten. Een insect 
mag nog bewegen, dus mag ik dat ook (zelfs al vertrappel ik per ongeluk een insect en 
zelfs al is dat insect een voelend wezen).  
Een eerste probleem met dit principe is: wat als planten voelende wezens zouden 
zijn? De meeste planten schaden niemand bij het bewegen en eten niemand anders op, 
dus mogen wij geen planten meer eten. Een tweede probleem is de ‘gevaarlijke 
wetenschapper’ die tegen een biotechnoloog zegt: “Als jij experimenten mag doen, op 
planten, dan mag ik dat ook doen, op jou.” Dit probleem kan opgelost worden door te 
stellen dat het argument niet mag gebruikt worden tegen rationele, morele wezens 
zoals biotechnologen.  
2) Het bestaansprincipe. Een dader mag nog een type gedrag stellen dat rechten 
schendt, als dat gedrag noodzakelijk is15 en als de dader niet had bestaan indien het 
gedrag er nooit was geweest. Als er nooit predatie was geweest, had de leeuw nog niet 
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 Deze voorwaarde is belangrijk: misschien bestaan wij slechts als gevolg van een verkrachting van een verre 
voorouder. We willen uitsluiten dat verkrachting zo gerechtvaardigd wordt. 
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eens bestaan. Als er geen orgaantransplantatie bestond, kan een patiënt die een orgaan 
nodig heeft nog wel bestaan.  
Ook dit principe roept vragen op. Van waar komt die morele relevantie? Het lijkt 
vreemd dat het bestaan van het wezen zo’n belangrijke voorwaarde is. En zouden in 
sommige gevallen (onvrijwillige) experimenten wel toegelaten zijn? Indien mijn 
grootvader in leven kon blijven dankzij het resultaat van experimenten, heb ik mijn 
bestaan te danken aan dergelijk gedrag, en mag ik zelf (onvrijwillige) experimenten 
doen? Dit lijkt me een ernstig bezwaar te zijn voor het bestaansprincipe. 
Bovenstaande drie oplossingen van het predatieprobleem hebben enkele problemen.  
Het 3-N-biodiversiteitsprincipe lijkt misschien toch de sterkste kandidaat voor de 
ringvinger te zijn. Maar we kunnen ook het 3-N-principe en het 
gedragsrechtvaardigheidsprincipe combineren tot een derde materieel 
gelijkwaardigheidsprincipe: alle wezens hebben een gelijk recht op gedrag dat 
natuurlijk, normaal en noodzakelijk is (gedrag dat sterk bijdraagt aan de biodiversiteit).  
5. De pink: het partijdigheidsprincipe en getolereerde 
keuzegelijkwaardigheid 
Een onpartijdige ethiek zoals we die zagen in de vorige drie morele vingers, is soms erg 
veeleisend. Daarom introduceer ik een vijfde basisprincipe, dat een zekere vorm van 
partijdigheid toelaat. Metaforisch gesproken: de pink kan een klein beetje afwijken van 
de andere vingers, maar de pink is de kleinste vinger, dus te veel partijdigheid mag niet. 
Hoeveel partijdigheid we dan wel mogen hebben, kunnen we afleiden door de duim 
tegen de pink te plaatsen: we mogen partijdig zijn tot op zeker niveau, op voorwaarde 
dat we gelijkaardige niveaus van partijdigheid tolereren bij iedereen in alle gelijkaardige 
situaties.  
Laten we, om in de sfeer van predatie te blijven, dit principe toepassen op het 
volgende dilemma: een groep hongerige leeuwen komt aangerend; je hebt de tijd om 
ofwel je eigen kind ofwel twee onbekende Afrikaanse kinderen te redden. Het 
wijsvingerprincipe wijst naar het redden van de twee onbekende kinderen, maar toch 
zouden we tolereren dat je je eigen kind redt. Dergelijke partijdigheid willen we 
toelaten. En er is meer: als jij jouw kind redt in plaats van de andere kinderen, mag ik je 
daarvoor niet veroordelen, want dan beschouw ik je als louter middel. Je aanwezigheid 
is immers noodzakelijk om de twee andere kinderen te redden, en je zou dan iets doen 
tegen je wil. Dus het middelvingerprincipe zorgt ervoor dat ik je keuze moet tolereren, 
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waardoor de pink een beetje ruimte krijgt om af te wijken van het wijsvingerprincipe. Er 
is dus een zekere samenhang tussen de morele vingers.  
Dit pink-partijdigheidsprincipe kan ingeroepen worden om een aspect van het 
predatieprobleem op te lossen: zowat alle mensen zouden wel een kind en niet een 
zebra redden van de leeuwen16. Maar dat hoeft geen speciesisme te zijn. Als blanke je 
eigen kind redden, en niet een Afrikaans, getuigt ook niet noodzakelijk van racisme. Je 
zou wel racist zijn als je mijn keuze om het Afrikaanse kind te redden niet zou tolereren 
(als je bv. zou zeggen dat jouw kind blank is en het daarom meer rechten heeft om 
geholpen te worden). Hieruit besluiten dat je een ander kind mag opofferen om met 
diens hart het jouwe van een hartkwaal te genezen, is echter een stap te ver. Besluiten 
dat we dieren mogen eten, omdat we geneigd zijn in noodsituaties eerst mensen te 
redden, is net zo onterecht. 
Het partijdigheidsprincipe beantwoordt de vraag geformuleerd in de titel van een 
boek van Gary Francione: “Your child or the dog?” (Francione, 2000) Dit verwijst naar 
een brandend-huis-dilemma dat vegetariërs vaak te horen krijgen. Stel dat een huis in 
brand staat, en je hebt slechts tijd om ofwel je eigen kind, ofwel de hond, te redden. 
Wanneer men dit dilemma stelt, is de achterliggende idee vaak dat een dierenactivist 
consequent onpartijdig moet zijn. Hij zou een muntstuk kunnen opgooien om te bepalen 
wie hij zal redden: één kans op twee dat het de hond wordt, ten koste van het eigen 
kind. De dierenactivist die verkiest zijn eigen kind te redden – wat erg waarschijnlijk is – 
wordt beschuldigd van inconsequent gedrag. Het pink-partijdigheidsprincipe verwerpt 
deze beschuldiging.  
Net als bij het dilemma waarbij je moet kiezen tussen jou kind en een onbekend kind, 
is er in dit brandend-huis-dilemma een gevoelsmatige ongelijkwaardigheid als je de 
voorkeur geeft aan je eigen kind. Maar het partijdigheidsprincipe genereert wel een 
subtiele vijfde vorm van gelijkwaardigheid (naast de vier vormen besproken bij de 
vorige vingerprincipes): getolereerde keuzegelijkwaardigheid. Dit is gebaseerd op het 
tolereren van de keuze van andere hulpverleners. Stel dat jij in het brandend huis jouw 
kind redt en niet het mijne. Als wij elkaar als gelijkwaardig beschouwen, dan ‘erven’ 
onze kinderen een vorm van gelijkwaardigheid. Ik beweer namelijk niet dat je mijn kind 
moet redden omdat mijn kind meer morele waarde en rechten heeft. Gevoelsmatig heeft 
mijn kind wel meer waarde voor mij, maar ik zou jouw keuze om jouw kind te redden 
respecteren. Een gevoelsmatige ongelijkwaardigheid kan dus nog wel gepaard gaan met 
een getolereerde keuzegelijkwaardigheid.  
De regel van getolereerde keuzegelijkwaardigheid zegt dus dat men bij het helpen 
van anderen wel een zekere prioriteit mag geven aan de wezens met wie men een 
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 Uit persoonlijke contacten met talrijke dierenactivisten bleek dat zelfs antispeciesisten hiertoe neigen. 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 333 
sterkere emotionele betrokkenheid voelt, op voorwaarde dat men de keuze van andere 
hulpverleners respecteert die prioriteit geven aan hun dierbaren. Getolereerde 
keuzegelijkwaardigheid komt tegemoet aan de kritiek van zorgethici op de kille 
onpartijdigheid van het welzijnsprincipe. Net zoals een antiracist tolerant moet zijn 
tegenover de keuze voor het redden van het Afrikaanse kind, moet een antispeciesist de 
keuze tolereren om een hond en niet een mens te redden. Zoiets gebeurt misschien wel 
vaker dan we denken: iemand die een hond als huisdier heeft, zorgt meer voor die hond 
dan voor de kinderen van iemand anders. Men geeft bv. meer geld uit aan eten voor de 
eigen hond dan aan medicijnen voor een kind in Afrika.  
Belangrijk bij getolereerde keuzegelijkwaardigheid is dat de zorgverlening of 
hulpactie gemotiveerd wordt door een gevoel van empathie en betrokkenheid en niet 
door een vooroordeel.  
Conclusie: veganisme als morele plicht? 
Toegepast op onze consumptie van dierlijke producten, vertelt de morele hand een 
interessant verhaal. 
De wijsvinger wijst in de huidige veeteelt en visvangst een ernstige schending van 
het welzijn aan. Achter de sluier der onwetendheid zou je nooit kiezen voor een 
dergelijk systeem als je weet dat je geboren kan worden als veedier. En het dierenleed 
botst ook met onze waarden van mededogen en empathie.  
Volgens de middelvinger is zowat elke vorm van veeteelt en visvangst 
onverantwoord (niet enkel de intensieve, maar ook de meer ‘romantische’ vormen), 
omdat we zowat altijd het lichaam van voelende wezens gebruiken op een manier 
waarbij ze dat niet willen. Als men – met enige fantasie – mensen zoals mentaal 
gehandicapten zou kweken en gebruiken zoals we dieren gebruiken in de meest 
diervriendelijke veeteelt, zouden we het nog steeds verafschuwen.  
Het ringvinger-biodiversiteitsprincipe inroepen om de rechtenschendingen en het 
verlies aan welzijn te rechtvaardigen, zal niet lukken, want de consumptie van dierlijke 
producten is niet noodzakelijk voor ons. Vlees eten mag dan wel, net zoals verkrachting, 
in zekere zin normaal en natuurlijk zijn, maar we hebben geen dierlijke producten, en 
ook geen verkrachting, nodig om gezond te leven. De grootste 
voedingsdeskundigenorganisatie in de wereld, de Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, 
stelt letterlijk dat een goed gepland plantaardig voedingspatroon gezond is voor alle 
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mensen, inclusief zwangere vrouwen, jonge kinderen, topsporters17,… (ADA, 2009). De 
biodiversiteit gaat niet dalen als we veganist worden. Integendeel, de veeteelt vormt 
zelfs een ernstige bedreiging van de biodiversiteit (FAO, 2006).  
En volgens het pinkprincipe zouden we nooit de vorm van partijdigheid die nodig is 
om veeteelt te kunnen verantwoorden, tolereren. Getolereerde partijdigheid inroepen 
lukt dus ook niet.  
Veganisme is dus ethisch consistent. Tot slot implicert het duimprincipe dat we het 
goede voorbeeld moeten geven: zelfs al haalt het niets uit als enkel jij en ik besluiten om 
veganistisch te leven (de markt gaat daar niets van merken), dan nog blijft het onze 
morele plicht en moeten we doen wat iedereen zou moeten doen.  
Als afsluiter wil ik een andere optische illusie voorleggen: de onmogelijke driebalk, 
symbool voor het interne conflict in onze ethiek. De drie hoekpunten stellen ethische 
principes en waarden voor die gebaseerd zijn op morele intuïties. Het eerste principe 
zegt dat alle voelende mensen rechten hebben, zoals het basisrecht van de 
middelvinger. Het tweede hoekpunt zegt dat we nooit mogen discrimineren, en het 
derde zegt dat we dieren mogen gebruiken om op te eten (voor de smaak, want voor de 
gezondheid is het niet nodig).  
 
Figuur 16: de onmogelijke driebalk van de vleeseter 
 
We zijn ons niet bewust van de inconsistentie, omdat we telkens gefocust zijn op één 
of twee hoekpunten, terwijl we niet uitzoomen om te kijken of het globale plaatje klopt. 
Als we het geheel overschouwen, stellen we vast dat die drie principes onderling niet 
verzoenbaar zijn: als je niet mag discrimineren (tussen bv. mens-dier) en als je wel vlees 
mag eten, dan is bv. kannibalisme toegelaten. Eén van de principes moet sneuvelen. 
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 Zie bv. veganistische kampioenen zoals Carl Lewis, Patrik Baboumian, Scott Jurek en Mac Danzig. 
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Ofwel mogen we mensen zonder hun vrijwillige toestemming gebruiken als louter 
middel (bv. gedwongen mensproeven, kannibalisme, mensenhandel, verkrachting, 
slavernij), ofwel mogen we discrimineren (is ook racisme tolereerbaar), ofwel mogen we 
geen vlees en andere dierlijke producten meer eten. Als we kijken naar de geschiedenis 
en de horror van slavernij en racisme, is het zeer waarschijnlijk dat we de eerste twee 
principes absoluut niet willen afschaffen. Het derde principe, het tolereren van 
vleesconsumptie, staat het zwakst, en zal omgedraaid moeten worden: we mogen geen 
vleesconsumptie tolereren. Het derde hoekpunt in de figuur moeten we dan ook 
omkeren. 
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Appendix: a review and systematization of the 
trolley problem 
Abstract1 
The trolley problem, first described by Thomson (1976) and Foot (1978), is one of the 
most famous and influential thought experiments in deontological ethics. The general 
story is that a runaway trolley is threatening the lives of five people. Doing nothing will 
result in the death of those persons, but acting in order to save those persons would 
unavoidably result in the death of another, sixth person. It appears that, depending on 
the situation, we have different moral judgments about the permissibility of action. We 
will review and systematize all the proposals in the literature of the past 35 years that 
have attempted to grasp our moral intuitions in a simple deontological principle. In 
particular, seventeen proposals will be classified: six algorithmic, seven psychological, 
and four other invalid accounts. This review and classification sheds light on some 
subtle differences and clarify a few issues. 
Introduction 
The trolley problem consists of a series of moral dilemmas involving a runaway trolley 
threatening the lives of a certain number of people.2 The basic structure of all the 
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 This appendix is based on Bruers & Braeckman (2013). 
2
 For a highly readable overview and historic background of ‘trolleyology’, see Edmonds (2013). 
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dilemmas is the same: if you do not act, five people will die; if you act, one other person 
will be killed and the five will be saved. Research into the way people deal ethically with 
the trolley dilemmas has shown that most people’s intuitions do not correspond either 
with pure (extreme) deontology or with utilitarianism (Greene et al., 2001; Waldmann & 
Dieterich, 2007; Hauser et al., 2008). By ‘pure’ deontology we mean here, for simplicity’s 
sake, that people should comply with the following rule: never act if the act results in 
harming people who were not threatened if you had not acted. By ‘pure’ utilitarianism 
we mean that people should comply with the rule: always choose the action that 
maximizes the number of lives saved (i.e., least total harm).  
Different trolley dilemmas have the same consequential structure but yet, confronted 
with those dilemmas, people hardly ever say that one should never act, or that one 
should always act. When presented with different dilemmas, most people say that we 
must act in one trolley situation, but in another dilemma we are not allowed to act; it is 
as if people make inconsistent choices. Only pure utilitarian consequentialism states 
that we should always act in all the trolley dilemmas. So most people’s moral intuitions 
deviate from these consequentialist ethics, and therefore the trolley problem is an 
interesting thought experiment for studying deontological ethics. The basic question is 
the following: What is the morally relevant difference between Dilemma A and Dilemma 
B, such that it is morally allowable to act in A, but not to act in B? Also, in this article we 
state that a consistent moral solution of the trolley problem should contain a clear 
description of a rule or principle that best fits, justifies, and explains the diversity of 
people’s moral intuitions in the diverse cases. In other words, the best solution to the 
trolley problem is a clear algorithm to decide whether one should act or not, and the 
answers that this algorithm generates should be in line with intuitions. 
Many people have tried to solve the abovementioned basic question. In this article, 
we present an overview of the many proposals that ethicists have come up with during 
the last 35 years, and we discuss their differences, mutual relations, strengths, and 
weaknesses. In addition to covering the most relevant versions of trolley dilemmas and 
the solutions proposed in the literature, we also present some new hypothetical 
solutions. But probably the most important contribution of this article to the existing 
literature is a systematic classification of all those solutions. And looking at new trolley 
dilemmas, we clarify the differences between the proposed solutions (principles). 
There are several reasons why this new classification is important. First, it certainly 
helps to avoid confusion between different solutions (we will mention some confusions 
in the literature). Second, the classification of the different principles gives us insights 
into which of those principles and underlying moral intuitions could be something like 
‘moral illusions’ (e.g., Unger, 1996). Third, people adhering to deontological ethics might 
be able to see which proposed principle they would most prefer; that is, which of the 
proposals is most compatible with their own moral intuitions.  Fourth, our findings will 
have implications for further empirical studies in moral psychology (e.g., Greene, 2002; 
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Cushman et al. 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Greene, 2008). This systematization opens up some 
new questions. Do people prefer one of the proposed solutions? How many people 
would agree with which solution? Would they change their judgments in some 
dilemmas in order to make them fit with their preferred solution? And if there are 
different proposed solutions related to different (psychological or algorithmic) 
mechanisms, does that mean that there would be more ‘moral modules’ in our brains 
(e.g., the brain research on trolley dilemmas done by Greene et al., 2001)? 
We start this review with a number of trolley dilemmas that cover all the important 
issues and elements that are discussed in the literature. Then, we select six possible 
solutions to the trolley problem that are described in the literature (the sixth is in fact a 
new solution), from which we will suggest that these can be grouped in pairs, so that 
there are in fact only three groups of principles with more or less strong support in the 
literature. These accounts have an algorithmic character, with a clearer and more 
objective decision procedure than the other, psychological accounts.  
Of course, other hypothetical principles are possible, but they have few or no 
supporters or they remain dubious and are still debated. So after describing the three 
groups of ‘algorithmic’ accounts, we give an overview of seven other proposals that do 
not distinguish permissibility from non-permissibility so clearly. Some of these other 
proposals might be relevant, as they are more ‘psychological’ in nature and psychology 
strongly influences our moral judgments. However, these psychological explanations 
are not always clear or do not always make a distinction between the different ‘agent-
neutral’ trolley dilemmas: they make distinctions within one dilemma. An agent-neutral 
trolley dilemma is a description of a situation that excludes agent-related information.3 
The inclusion of agent-related information such as a person’s position (e.g., distance 
from the victim) or mental state (e.g., knowledge, risk attitude, intention to harm) give 
rise to further distinctions within the same agent-neutral trolley dilemma.  
After the six algorithmic and seven psychological accounts, we finally briefly 
highlight four other proposals encountered in the literature that do not solve the trolley 
problem, because they result in pure deontology. In summary, seventeen proposals in 
the literature are classified as follows: six solutions that make objective (algorithmic) 
distinctions between different dilemmas; seven solutions that make distinctions within 
one and the same dilemma, depending on some psychological state; and four invalid 
proposals that always result in pure deontology in all dilemmas. 
So let’s start the trolley’s engine. 
 
                                                     
3
 The only (trivial) agent related information in all situations is that if the agent acts, it is supposed that s/he 
acts with the intention or plan to save the people on the main track. I.e. malicious intentions (e.g. to kill a 
hated person) are excluded.  
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The trolley dilemmas 
In this section we will briefly present and systematize the most commonly discussed 
versions of the trolley dilemma (for further details, see Thomson, 1985; Kamm, 1989, 
1998; Otsuka, 2008; Fischer & Ravizza, 1992b). 
Dilemma 1: The switch. A trolley is moving towards five people on the main track. 
You are standing at a switch. If you turn the switch, the trolley will be diverted to a side 
track, but there is one person on this side track. Turning the switch will result in that 
person’s death, and the five people on the main track will be saved. Should you turn the 
switch? Most people (roughly 90% according to Hauser et al., 2008) say you are allowed 
to do so. 
Dilemma 2: The bridge. A fat man is standing on a bridge above the track. You can 
save the five people on the track below by pushing the fat man from the bridge in front 
of the trolley, so that the trolley will be stopped by his heavy weight. The fat man will 
die, and the five people will be saved. Only a few people (roughly 10% according to 
Hauser et al., 2008) say that we are allowed to push the fat man. Most people either 
refuse to push the fat man or condemn pushing the fat man. According to Waldmann 
and Dieterich (2007), people are more tolerant of pushing someone onto the tracks, but 
in their study, the dilemmas did not involve close up and personal contact with the 
victim who is pushed. Their dilemmas looked more like Dilemma 5 below, where the 
victim is in a truck, so you do not have to touch the victim personally. 
Dilemma 3: The loop. As in the first dilemma, you are standing at a switch. But this 
time the side track turns back onto the main track. If there is no one on the side track, 
the trolley will still move onto the main track and will kill the five people. But on the 
side track is a fat man. So if you turn the switch, the fat man will block the trolley. The 
fat man dies, the five people will be saved. In a recent survey, Hauser et al. (2008) found 
that roughly half of the respondents said that turning the switch is permitted. However, 
according to Waldmann and Dieterich (2007), people are more tolerant towards turning 
the switch. But they constructed the dilemma in a different way, where the person – the 
fat man – on the side track is sitting on a bus. So on the side track the bus will block the 
trolley, not the fat man. The fat man in the bus will die in the accident. 
Dilemmas 1 to 3 share a rather similar basic structure, as can be seen in Figure 17 
below. In the first picture, the people on the main track are standing between two forks 
and the trolley is situated before the first fork. This is equivalent to Dilemma 1 (the 
switch). In the second picture, the five people are behind the second fork, and you have 
hesitated so long that the trolley already passed the first fork. You could still save the 
people on the main track, because the side track is at a height, so you could easily push 
the fat man from the side track onto the main track. In the third picture, the people on 
the main track are behind the second fork, as in Dilemma 3 (Loop), and you still have 
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time to turn the switch. The difference is in the positions of the trolley and the people 
on the main track. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Basic structures of Dilemma 1 (Switch); Dilemma 2 (Bridge); and Dilemma 3 
(Loop). 
 
Dilemma  4: The loop with a stone. The situation resembles the one in Dilemma 3. But 
this time a heavy stone is located behind the man on the side track. The man on the side 
track is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. The stone will block the trolley if you turn 
the switch. But the man in front of the stone will die. In a survey performed by Hauser 
et al. (2008), it was found that nearly three quarters of the respondents say that turning 
the switch is allowed, and this is a statistically significant difference from Dilemma 3.   
Dilemma 5: The truck. You can block the trolley by pushing a heavy truck onto the 
rails. In this truck there is one passenger, who will get killed (this dilemma was studied 
by Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007). 
Dilemma 6: The rockslide. You can turn a switch, redirecting the trolley onto a side 
track. On this side track there is a big rock. When the trolley hits the rock, the rock 
slides towards a bystander and kills him. 
Dilemma 7: The platform. Five people are on a moving platform on the rails. If you do 
nothing, the trolley will crush the platform and kill the five. But you can move the 
platform away from the rails in order to save the five. But this move will push another 
person (who is standing next to the platform) on to an electric cable. This person will 
consequently die by electrocution. This dilemma is similar to the ‘Lazy Susan’ case in 
Kamm (1989). 
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The next dilemmas is new in the literature, and will be used to point out differences 
between some accounts.  
Dilemma 8: The loop with an avalanche. This dilemma is similar to the loop dilemma, 
but the person on the side track is controlling a safety barrier against avalanches. The 
person on the side track is not heavy enough to stop the trolley, so one needs to create 
an avalanche. But only after the person dies is it possible to initiate an avalanche that is 
not blocked by the barrier; so only after the victim dies and is no longer controlling the 
barrier, can the trolley be blocked and the five saved.4  
Six algorithmic accounts 
Ethicists have looked for morally relevant differences between the above dilemmas. 
They want to find a moral rule that generates answers that are consistent with the 
answers (intuitive moral judgments) of the majority of people. As we have seen, the 
majority of people are very clear about the first two dilemmas, the switch and the 
bridge. Therefore, we think that a good solution should consist of a most precise 
formulation as possible of a moral criterion to distinguish the dilemmas, such that 
action is at least permissible in the switch dilemma but not in the bridge dilemma. 
Concerning the other dilemmas, there is less consensus about people’s moral intuitions, 
so the solutions might differ in these cases. We prefer a moral rule that works like a kind 
of algorithm; that is, a clear procedure applicable to all dilemmas, which provides an 
unambiguous answer as to whether action is allowed or not, and without reference to 
fuzzy or ambiguous concepts.  
There are five algorithmic accounts proposed in the literature. We will introduce a 
sixth. They can be grouped together in pairs; hence, we have structured them into three 
groups of accounts. The first proposal in each group is a rather vague account, 
vulnerable to misinterpretations or borderline cases. The second account in each group 
is more precise, leaving less room for interpretation. In other words, the second 
accounts correspond to more accurate interpretations of the first ones in each group. 
We will apply these algorithmic accounts to the above dilemmas and show that these 
three explanations are different from each other.   
 
 
                                                     
4
 We note that Lippert-Rasmussen (1996) gave another dilemma that has a resemblance to Dilemma 8, 
according to the accounts mentioned in the next section. 
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Group A: the ‘mere means’ accounts 
A1: Use as merely a means to an end. The Kantian inspired right not to be treated solely 
as a means is based on the unalienable dignity of persons. This right trumps the right to 
life of other persons: it is never allowable to kill and use a person as merely a means – 
even if this means that by this act the lives of others could be spared. It is considered 
disrespectful to treat someone merely as means. This mere means account is mentioned 
in Thomson (1985), and as we will see in a later section, it is related to an interpretation 
of the doctrine of double effect (Quinn, 1989b).  
Looking at the dilemmas, we can say that the fat men on the bridge (Dilemma 2) and 
on the loop track (dilemma Loop) are used as ‘trolley blockers’ or ‘human shields.’ So 
only in these dilemmas is action not allowed (they violate the dignity of the victim). In 
the other dilemmas action is permitted.  
This account can sometimes be a bit vague, as it is not always easy to understand 
what use as merely a means really is. Sometimes one might have to use an element of 
fantasy to refer to an analogous means or instrument. We believe the following account 
is equivalent to this mere means account, but it provides a more algorithmic way (a 
clear test) to decide whether the Kantian right is violated or not. 
 
A2: The counterfactual account about the required presence of the victim (mentioned 
in Thomson, 1985; Parfit, 2011). If the presence of the potential victim is (causally) 
required in order to save the five people on the main track (i.e., if it would be impossible 
to save the five people without the victim’s body), then you should not act. Here we can 
easily decide whether the Kantian right is violated, by asking ourselves what would 
happen if the one person in the trolley dilemmas was not present. If nobody is on the 
bridge, it is impossible to push someone in front of the trolley to stop it. But in 
considering Dilemma 1 (Switch), saving the five would still be possible if the one person 
on the side track had not been present. In Dilemma 4 (Loop and stone) one can still turn 
the switch and let the trolley be stopped by the stone. In Dilemma 5 (Truck) one can still 
move the truck, even if there is nobody in it. The platform (Dilemma 7) can still be 
shifted when there is no one standing next to it. In Dilemma 8 (Loop with avalanche) 
one could still start an avalanche when the victim on the side track is not present.  
According to Waldmann and Dieterich (2007), using a person as a means is not a 
criterion that people use, because a lot of people say that we are allowed to turn the 
switch in Dilemma 3 (Loop). However, in their study, the person on the side track was 
sitting in a bus, and people might think it was the bus that is blocking the trolley. So the 
bus is used as the means, not the person’s body. If the person was not sitting on the bus, 
saving the five by turning the switch still works. Furthermore, Hauser et al. (2008) noted 
a slight difference in people’s responses between Dilemmas 3 (Loop) and 4 (Loop and 
stone). This difference can only be explained by the mere means accounts.  
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The mere means account also has another property: if the victim’s body needs to be 
present (if there is no other heavy object that could replace the person as a trolley 
blocker), it also implies that there is logically no possibility of saving the one person 
after the five people on the main track are saved. After turning the switch in Dilemma 4 
(Loop with stone), you could still try to save the person on the side track. But in 
Dilemma 3 (Loop), saving this person is impossible: even if you manage to run to the 
person and pull him away from the tracks, you cannot do this without endangering the 
five people again. This property might point at an evolutionary explanation of the moral 
intuition: in rescuing members from your group, it is advantageous to choose the option 
that allows you to try to save all of them. Saving everyone is not logically impossible in 
Dilemma 1 (Switch) and Dilemma 4 (Loop with stone). You first save the five people and 
then run to the side track. If you do not run fast enough, you still have saved the five, 
and if you can run fast enough, you can save everyone. The latter is logically impossible 
in Dilemmas 2 and 3 (Bridge and Loop). 
Compared with the next four accounts, the mere means accounts are the most 
reliable: they are more accurate, have less boundary cases and generate less judgments 
that are strongly counter-intuitive in some dilemmas (the only counter-intuitive 
judgment occurs in the loop dilemma).   
Group B: the ‘same threat’ accounts  
The two same threat accounts that we are about to discuss have something in common; 
they both claim that it is only permissible to act if two conditions are satisfied: (1) no 
new threat is introduced, but a pre-existing threat is redirected or redistributed from 
the larger to the smaller group (this is also referred to as the Permissible Diversion 
Hypothesis in Postow, 1989); and (2) another condition is satisfied – about this latter 
condition, we will discuss two candidates (related to rights or interventions), but we 
expect that they are equivalent. 
The first condition is not satisfied in Dilemma 6 (Rockslide) and Dilemma 7 
(Platform), because electrocution and rockslides are new threats. So in these dilemmas, 
action is already not permitted. However, a problem of this condition is its lack of 
clarity: it is not always clear when a new threat is introduced. There are some 
borderline cases of redirected threats that more resemble new threats (e.g., situations 
where trolleys change after being sent to a side track). These borderline cases might 
undermine the objective, algorithmic nature of the same threat account. Leaving this 
issue aside, let’s look at the second condition. There are two versions of the second 
condition, leading to two accounts. 
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B1: Violation of rights. Thomson (1976, 1985) had the idea that action in the case of 
Dilemma 2 (Bridge) is not allowable, because pushing the fat man is an infringement of 
an important right. On the other hand, in Dilemma 1 (Switch) turning the switch does 
not violate a similar right of the person on the side track because you do not do 
anything to him. In particular, you do not push him, so his right not to be pushed is not 
violated. In other words in Dilemma 2 (Bridge), you do something to a person (which is a 
violation of rights), whereas in the switch you act on the threat (which is not a rights 
violation). Also in all the loop dilemmas (3, 4, 8) nobody is pushed, so no right not to be 
pushed is violated. Turning the switch is itself morally neutral and not a violation of 
rights. Therefore, Thomson claimed that it is permitted to turn the switch in the loop 
dilemmas.   
Thomson’s idea has been criticized as being too vague and for contradicting moral 
intuitions (Kamm, 1989; Postow, 1989). What rights are we talking about – the right not 
to be killed by trolleys or the right not to be pushed? The following describes another 
candidate condition, which in fact might be equivalent to what Thomson had in mind, 
but stated a bit more clearly.  
 
B2: Sending a victim to the trolley. Some ethicists claim that there is a morally 
relevant difference between throwing a bomb at a person and throwing a person at a 
bomb; or in trolley language, sending a trolley to a person versus sending a person to a 
trolley. This is referred to as intervention myopia (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) and 
focuses at the locus of intervention: do you in the first instance intervene in the path of 
the aggressor (the trolley, the bomb) or the path of the victim? This criterion has some 
supporters (Boorse, 1994; Harris, 2000; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) and some critics 
(Fischer, 1992; Fischer & Ravizza, 1994). Montmarquet (1982) also offered a same threat 
principle, but this approach was criticized by Kamm (1989).  
Only in the bridge and truck dilemmas does one sends the victim (the fat man or the 
passenger) to the trolley. In these cases, action is not allowed, even if the threat is the 
same. We also note that in Dilemma 7 (Platform), the victim is sent to a new threat 
(electrocution), so both conditions of the same threat account are not satisfied. Yet, we 
expect that most people’s intuitions would allow action in this dilemma. This gives a 
strong counter example to the same threat account.  
Furthermore, there are some boundary cases between sending victims and threats to 
each other. As an example, consider a loop dilemma whereby turning the switch also 
shifts a platform, positioning the victim exactly on the side track to block the trolley. 
Also, according to Unger (1996, p. 101), the difference between sending the victim to the 
trolley versus sending the trolley to the victim is an illusion, based on what he called 
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‘protophysics.’5 In his book, Unger (1996) also gives other similar irrelevant 
protophysical differences that influence our moral judgments. For example: in some 
dilemmas it is worse to save some people and harm someone else by increasing the 
speed of a trolley than by decreasing it.     
Group C: the ‘causal chain’ accounts 
The next two principles look at the causal chain that is the result of action or inaction. 
We note that these principles should be taken with a grain of salt, because a clear and 
consistent interpretation of them might just be impossible if we think about them more 
critically. Nevertheless, we present them here.  
C1: Principle of (Im)Permissible Harm (PI/PH). We cite Kamm (1989, in Darwall, 2003, 
p. 167), who introduced this hypothesis: “It is permissible to cause harm to some in the 
course of achieving the greater good of saving a greater number of others from 
comparable harm, if events which produce the greater good are not more intimately 
causally related to the production of harm than they are to the production of the 
greater good.” This is a complicated formulation that needs more explication, so let us 
look at the dilemmas to see what is meant by “intimately causally related.”  
Looking at the switch dilemma, the action is turning the switch, and this action has 
two consequences that appear at the same instant in the causal chain: the five are saved, 
and the one is threatened by the trolley. The production of the harm (the threat to the 
one on the side track) is causally related to the action of turning the switch, and also the 
saving of the five is causally related to the turning of the switch. Both are in this 
dilemma equally intimately causally related to the turning of the switch, because both 
are the direct consequences of turning the switch. The condition of the PI/PH is 
satisfied, so it is allowable to turn the switch. 
In the bridge dilemma, however, the action is pushing the fat man. As a first 
consequence, the fat man is threatened; a second consequence is that the fat man blocks 
the trolley and saves the five. But looking at the causal chain, we see that the ‘causal 
distance’ between the action (the pushing) and the harm (or the threat) to the fat man is 
smaller than the causal distance between the action and the saving of the five. The 
 
                                                     
5
 The loop dilemma is often used by some philosophers (e.g., Singer, 2005; Scanlon, 2008) to demonstrate the 
invalidity of the deontological mere means account, the abovementioned mere means principle, by claiming 
that a lot of people have the intuition that it is permissible to act in the loop dilemma, even when the victim is 
used as a trolley blocker. However, if this protophysical explanation is correct, the judgment in the loop 
dilemma (the permissibility to act), might be a moral illusion. We will demonstrate in more detail in another 
study. 
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saving of the five happens further up in the causal chain. Therefore, PI/PH says that 
action is not permitted.  
As it is not always clear how to calculate intimate causal relatedness, there are some 
borderline cases.  In Dilemmas 3 (Loop), the situation is similar to Dilemma 1 (Switch), 
according to Kamm (1989).6 However, we might disagree with this, as can be seen in 
Situations 2 and 3 (Figure 17). In both the bridge and the loop dilemmas, the fat man is 
simply placed in the path of the trolley, either by changing the path of the trolley 
(Situation 3, Loop) or changing the position of the fat man (Situation 2, Bridge). Causally 
speaking, both are equivalent. So we should be a bit skeptical about this account.  
The sixth possible explanation is not mentioned in the literature (as far as we are 
aware), and perhaps it is identical to an interpretation of Kamm’s PI/PH hypothesis 
above. It is also vulnerable to borderline cases, such as the loop dilemma. 
 
C2: The increased threat account. This rule says: you are allowed to act if the victim 
of your action dies (is harmed) after the others are saved. In the causal chain, we can 
represent it as follows. Each person has a value: 1 equals alive and saved, 0 means dead 
(or harmed), X means actually threatened (but still alive), and Y means potentially 
threatened (meaning it is possible to turn a threat towards that person). The six persons 
in the dilemmas all have a value at each step; so we can represent the starting situation 
as X,X,X,X,X,Y, that is, five persons are actually threatened and one person is potentially 
threatened (we are able to act so that his position would become a threatened one). 
Turning the switch in Dilemma 1 changes the situation to Y,Y,Y,Y,Y,X, which means that 
one person is really threatened and the five people are potentially threatened: we can 
turn the switch back to change the situation back to the initial situation. So the five 
people are not yet absolutely sure about their survival. At a particular point, when the 
trolley passes the bifurcation in the track, the five people are actually saved and the 
situation turns into 1,1,1,1,1,X. And after a few moments, the person on the side track 
dies, resulting in 1,1,1,1,1,0. So the causal chain in the switch dilemma looks like: 
  X,X,X,X,X,Y→Y,Y,Y,Y,Y,X→1,1,1,1,1,X→1,1,1,1,1,0. 
Action is allowable if the causal chain looks like that above. However, in Dilemma 2 
(Bridge), matters are more complicated: it all depends on whether the fat man is heavy 
enough to block the trolley (i.e. whether the five are definitely saved once you pushed 
the fat man). It might be the case that the trolley is too fast and is able to kill all six 
people, because all six people are placed in the trajectory of the trolley. In other words, 
 
                                                     
6
 In her later work, Kamm (2007) introduced new refinements (e.g. causal versus non-causel flip sides, directly 
versus indirectly causing a lesser evil, producing versus sustaining a greater good and substituting versus 
subordinating persons). But this was criticized by Norcross (2008) as being heavily ad hoc and unclear. 
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it is not clear that the five people are absolutely saved already at the moment when one 
pushes the fat man. The causal chain now can look like:  
  X,X,X,X,X,Y→ X,X,X,X,X,X→1,1,1,1,1,0.  
The possibility of the X,X,X,X,X,X situation (everyone is in danger), distinguishes the 
bridge from the switch dilemma. The number of threatened people is increased. In 
Dilemma 8 (Loop with avalanche) we clearly see a moment where everyone is in danger: 
when turning the switch and the trolley passes the bifurcation, the one person on the 
side track is threatened, but the five other people are also still threatened, because the 
one person is not heavy enough to block the trolley. Only after the one person is killed 
does it become possible to relieve the threat to the five, by initiating an avalanche that 
blocks the trolley. The causal chain in Dilemma 8 looks like:  
  X,X,X,X,X,Y→X,X,X,X,X,X→X,X,X,X,X,0→1,1,1,1,1,0 
The causal chain account is only able to distinguish Dilemma 1 (Switch) from 
Dilemma 2 (Bridge) if the causal chain can have a point where everyone is in danger, for 
example if we suppose that the train might kill all six people in Bridge. The existence of 
this increased threat situation in the causal chain disallows action. But then we have to 
suppose a similar possibility in Dilemma 3 (Loop), which disallows action. However, 
Dilemma 4 (Loop and stone) becomes creates a boundary case: if the stone was a real 
mountain, the possibility of situation X,X,X,X,X,X is as unlikely as it is in Dilemma 1 
(Switch). So the permissibility depends on whether the stone is really heavy enough to 
block the trolley. But the same can be said about the fat man, who might be heavy 
enough to block the trolley. If we know the fat man is heavy enough, there is no 
distinction between Switch and Bridge: after pushing the fat man, the path of the trolley 
changes (it stops), just as the path of the trolley changes in the switch dilemma. Pushing 
the fat man and turning the switch automatically guarantee the immediate safety of the 
five people. We can introduce a distinction by claiming that the agent cannot be sure 
whether the fat man is heavy enough, but this turns the algorithmic account into a 
psychological account (see the section in risk aversion below).  
The increased threat account reveals a kind of ‘causal myopia’ (similar to the term 
‘intervention myopia’ related to the same threat account; Waldmann and Dieterich, 
2007). If in the series of consequences of your action you do not threaten someone 
before or at the moment when others are really saved, then you are allowed to act. It is 
as if you were blind to the further consequences in the causal chain. 
Table 1 presents the results of the trolley dilemmas according to the above three 
principles: the mere means, same threat, and causal chain accounts. A plus means that 
the action is allowed, a minus means that it is not. As discussed, the causal chain 
accounts have some question marks. 
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Dilemma Mere means 
account 
Same threat 
account 
Causal chain 
account 
1. Switch + + + 
2. Bridge − − −(?) 
3. Loop − + −(?) 
4. Loop and stone + + −(?) 
5. Truck + − −(?) 
6. Rockslide + − + 
7. Platform + − + 
8. Loop and avalanche + + − 
Table 1: answers to the trolley dilemmas, according to the three accounts. 
 
Note that the switch and bridge cases get all plus and minus signs respectively, so for 
these all three accounts can be considered as a solution to the trolley problem. But the 
answers differ when looking at other dilemmas.   
Seven psychological accounts 
The accounts that we presented above are all objective, in the sense that they did not 
refer to mental states, but to events, counterfactual requirements, number of threats, 
points of intervention, directions or causal consequences. In this section, we give an 
overview of some other proposals discussed in the literature. These proposals often 
involve some psychological influences, such as intentions, risk aversion, personal versus 
non-personal conflict, and so on. These psychological accounts have some flaws: 
sometimes they are not able to derive a clear judgment in a certain dilemma (especially 
the loop dilemma generates problems of interpretation), or they do not always make a 
clear distinction between dilemmas such as the switch and the bridge. They make 
distinctions even within one dilemma. So depending on the situation (related to the 
psychological states) it might be possible that it is not permitted to act in the switch 
dilemma, or that it is permitted to act in the bridge dilemma.  
 
1. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). This doctrine is mentioned in quite a few 
discussions about the trolley problem (Boyle, 1980; Davis, 1984; Fischer & Ravizza, 1992a; 
Reibetanz, 1998; McIntyre, 2001; Shaw, 2006; Edmonds, 2013). The doctrine says that 
there is a moral difference between the intentional harm as a means and the foreseen 
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harm as a side-effect (Quinn, 1989b). It has been criticized by, for example, McIntyre 
(2001). 
The DDE is an agent-centered, psychological account, as it makes a difference 
between what the agent intends or foresees.7 We could try to interpret the DDE in a 
more agent-neutral way; that is, without too much reference to the mental states of 
agents. Reinterpreting the DDE as an agent-neutral principle moves it close to the mere 
means account discussed above, because the DDE refers to ‘harm as a means.’ However, 
we have to be careful not to confuse the use of a person’s body as a means versus the use 
of, for instance, a switch as a means or a plan as a means. 
The difference between the DDE and the mere means accounts can be most clearly 
seen in Dilemma 8 (Loop and avalanche). The person on the side track is not used as a 
means, because the presence of his body is not necessary to save the five (on the 
contrary, his presence has prevented the initiation of the necessary avalanche). But the 
agent intends the killing (removal) of the person on the side track, because this removal 
is necessary in order to initiate the avalanche. The DDE says that action is not allowed, 
because it involves an intentional harm. 
Hence, the DDE is not simply equivalent to the mere means account, a fact that might 
result in misinterpretations in the literature. For example Costa (1986), in his 
application of the DDE to the trolley dilemma, combined (or confused?) the mere means 
account with a version of the causal chain account. And to make it even more 
extraordinary (or confusing), in a later article Costa (1987) also included a version of 
Thomson’s ‘same threat’ principle in the description of the DDE, as if the DDE is a 
confusing mixture of all three groups of accounts discussed in the previous section. 
The major problem with the DDE is the loop dilemma: is the death of the person on 
the side track intended or merely foreseen? When Kamm (2000) tried to apply the DDE 
to the loop trolley dilemma, she promoted a new doctrine of triple effect (DTE). 
 
2. The Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE). Following Kamm’s doctrine, turning the switch 
in the loop case is permissible according to triple effect. That is because apart from 
intentional harm (doing something in order to bring about an evil) and merely 
foreseeing a side effect (doing something in spite of bringing about an evil), Kamm 
claims that there is a third option, in which one does something because it brings about 
an evil (which should be distinguished from ‘in order to bring about an evil’). This DTE 
approach was further defended by Shaw (2006) but criticized by Harris (2000) and more 
 
                                                     
7
 Of course, the objective accounts also include a trivial mental state of the agent: if the agent acts, s/he is 
supposed to have an intention or plan to save the people on the main track. However, the DDE refers to a non-
trivial mental state: the intention to harm (distinguished from foreseeing the harm).  
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recently by Otsuka (2008) and Liao (2009) using the loop dilemma: triple effect does not 
solve the loop case either. Liao argued that the because of/in order to distinction does 
not apply to the loop case, and furthermore questions whether this distinction has a 
normative significance. 
Otsuka (2008) gives an example of a trolley dilemma where this triple effect becomes 
clearer: suppose you are at a switch, and on the side track there is one person in front of 
six other people. If you turn the switch, the five on the main track are saved, the first 
person on the side track will block the trolley, and the six people behind him are saved. 
Here, we can say that we would turn the switch, not in order to kill the one on the side 
track, but rather because he will be killed and stop the trolley. Nothing new is added 
however, we think, because action in this dilemma is also allowed according to our 
abovementioned three accounts.8  
 
3. Feelings of the victim. Thomson (1993) invited us to focus on what the potential 
victim would feel about what the agent does. If you were thrown from a bridge you 
might feel differently about the agent, than if a trolley were directed towards you. And 
it is this difference that plays a role. However, this claim also involves some complex 
knowledge of psychology, this time not of the agent, but of the victim. It does not yet 
solve the trolley problem, because one can imagine switch and bridge situations where 
the victim feels the same.  
 
4. Projective grouping. Peter Unger speculated about another psychological 
mechanism behind our moral judgments: projective grouping and projective separating 
(Unger, 1996, p. 97). “[When certain people are in a situation that is taken to be their 
problem], we tend to think it is badly wrong to spare them the serious losses that might 
stem from their problem by imposing serious loss on other people, who don’t have that 
problem.” In the first trolley dilemma (Switch), all six people on the tracks are 
considered to be in a similar position in that they have something in common: they are 
all on a track and could be run over by a trolley. So the five on the main track and the 
one on the side track are grouped together as having the same problem, and the one on 
the side track can therefore be considered as ‘fair game’ to be sacrificed. However, in the 
bridge dilemma, the fat man is in a different position: he is not on a track, but on a 
bridge. So the fat man is psychologically separated from the five people on the track, 
which makes us decide not to sacrifice the fat man. A lot of people, when responding to 
 
                                                     
8
 For some further subtlety, however, we can say that the one person on the side track is a means to save the 
six behind him, but he is not used as means to save the five. If the person was not present, the plan to turn the 
switch and save the five would still work (but six other people would be threatened).  
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the trolley dilemmas, give spontaneous answers that reflect this projective separation 
(people say something like, “But the fat man had nothing to do with it, he was just 
passing by”). Also Hanna (1992) proposed a Principle of Moral Inertia, which is basically 
the same as the projective separating. A distinction is made between participants (such 
as the person on the side track in the switch dilemma) who are part of an ongoing causal 
process, and bystanders (such as the fat man on the bridge) who are not part of the 
ongoing process. But this explanation is not fully satisfactory, however, because as 
Unger himself argued, it can be twisted. And it is at the least very vague: there are no 
clear criteria to separate people into groups. There is no consensus about what the 
relevant differences should be. Knowing whether someone is a participant or a 
bystander is not straightforward. And what about Situation 2 in Figure 17, where the fat 
man was on a side track on a bridge? 
 
5. Epistemic accounts: risk aversion. Risk aversion is a psychological attitude that 
might give an interesting explanation for the moral intuitions in the trolley problems. 
Can we know whether our plan to save the five would really work? If the fat man is not 
heavy enough and the trolley were to keep on moving, then all six will die, which is an 
even worse outcome. There is the risk of a worse outcome. If the trolley could have 
stopped in time, even without the fat man blocking it, then the fat man would have died 
unnecessarily. In the switch dilemma, however, we can be pretty sure that the five are 
saved and nobody dies in vain.  
According to this epistemic account, action would be impermissible if there is a 
possibility that the rescue plan will fail and all six people will die. In particular, action 
might not be allowed in Dilemmas 2, 3, and 5 (Bridge, Loop and Truck).  
The problem with this hypothesis is that certainty is a matter of degree. Take 
Dilemma 4 (Loop and stone): What if the stone was really heavy so that you could be 
sure that it would stop the train? Surely a mountain of stones would be convincing. And 
even in the switch dilemma, suppose that the side track bends behind a hill. You cannot 
be sure that there are no people on the side track behind the hill. Perhaps there are ten 
people on the side track, but you cannot see them. 
So the epistemic account in fact makes distinctions even within one dilemma, instead 
of between dilemmas. Nevertheless, there might be some interesting truth in this 
approach. It is related to the amount of risk aversion that the agent has. Suppose in the 
bridge dilemma there is a 10% probability that the plan of pushing the fat man fails and 
all six people die instead of one, an 80% probability that the plan will work and one 
person will die instead of five, and a 10% probability that the trolley could have stopped 
anyway without the fat man, so that one person dies instead of nobody. A person with a 
high level of risk aversion would choose not to act. A person with maximum risk 
aversion would never act, even if the probability of failure were 0.0001%. In this context, 
we note that most people have a high but not maximum level of risk aversion.  
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Going back to the switch dilemma, risk aversion would imply not turning the switch 
if there is a possibility that there are ten more people down the side track. But be aware 
that the same could apply to the main track: it might equally be possible that there are 
ten people behind the five, and you did not see them. Not turning the switch would 
result in fifteen deaths. Notice the word ‘equally’. There is a kind of symmetry in the 
switch dilemma; whereas in most bridge dilemma situations that we imagine we do not 
see such a symmetry, and risk aversion has a stronger influence in those dilemmas. 
  
6. Epistemic accounts: uncertainty aversion. Next to risk aversion there is 
uncertainty (or ambiguity) aversion, whereby the probabilities of success are not even 
known. The probability that the plan involving pushing the fat man will work is not 
10%: it is usually not known. So we have to choose between two games of chance. 
Suppose that you are one of the six people in the bridge trolley dilemma, but you do not 
know which one. If the fat man is not pushed, you know that the trolley will continue 
moving and kill five people. So you have a survival probability of one sixth, because you 
have a one sixth probability of being the fat man who survives. This is the first game of 
chance. In the second game, the fat man is pushed, and there is still a possibility that the 
trolley continues on and kills one or more of the five people on the track. Perhaps all 
might die. Which game of chance would you prefer to play? The situation is very similar 
to Ellsberg’s paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). Suppose we have an urn and you know three 
things: it contains six balls, has six (or fewer) different colors, and there is one green 
ball. The choice is between two games of chance. In the first, you win when you draw 
the green ball. Your probability of winning is one sixth. In the second, you win when 
you draw a blue ball. Your probability of winning is now unknown (somewhere between 
zero and five sixths), because you do not know how many blue balls there are. Some (or 
most) people prefer the first game, because they have uncertainty aversion. The 
similarity with the trolley game is obvious.  
 
7.Personal versus impersonal dilemmas. Greene (2008), finally, points – using 
psychological and brain research – to an important aspect in the trolley dilemmas: the 
distinction between personal versus impersonal dilemmas, related to the relative 
position of the agent towards the victim. Pushing the fat man is an action, which is close 
up and personal, whereas turning the switch is a more detached action. This is certainly 
something that influences people’s choices, but it is not sufficient to solve the trolley 
problem, because it is easy to invent scenarios such as the bridge dilemma to make the 
action more detached (e.g., you are standing far away from the bridge and the fat man, 
but you can push a button, overturning the bridge). So this criterion would also make a 
distinction within the bridge dilemma. When most people imagine the bridge dilemma 
as a close up and personal situation, some emotion reaction in their brains will be 
triggered and tell them not to push the fat man.  
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Interestingly, in their research, Greene et al. (2001) classified personal dilemmas 
using some criteria, one of them reads: “where this harm is not the result of deflecting 
an existing threat onto a different party” (Greene, 2002, p168). This refers to the same 
threat account. 
Four invalid accounts 
In this section, we summarize some proposals that in fact would all result in ‘pure’ 
deontology, so they do not solve the trolley problem. 
 
1. The Doctrine of Doing versus Allowing (DDA). This principle of DDA is that there is 
a moral difference between killing and letting die. Quinn (1989a) for example, referred 
to the DDA to distinguish between trolley dilemmas. But as Fischer and Ravizza (1992a) 
argued, matters get very complicated in applying the DDA to trolley dilemmas, because 
one needs to include unsatisfactory references to concepts such as ‘transfer of 
intentions,’ ‘causal isolation,’ and so on.  
In line with the DDA, Foot (1978) made a distinction between positive duties (aid) 
versus negative duties (non-interference), and applied this to the trolley dilemmas. But 
this approach was criticized by Thomson (2008), who showed that Foot’s idea basically 
results in pure deontology, whereby no action is permitted in all the trolley dilemmas.  
Interestingly, Thomson (2008) also ends up with pure deontology. However, we think 
that she is mistaken at some point. Thomson (2008, p.365) used a wrong argument 
(wrong analogy) to demonstrate that action is never allowed. Let us digress on this a 
little, because it is a recent discussion. Thomson starts with the ‘three options’ dilemma: 
you are at a switch – if you do nothing the trolley will kill five people on the main track. 
You can also turn the switch to the right hand track, where one person will be killed, or 
turn it to the left hand track, where you will be killed. The argument goes that nobody is 
willing to sacrifice himself/herself (apart from real altruists or depressed people), and it 
is really unfair, Thomson claims, to turn the switch to the one victim on the right hand 
track. To show that this is unfair, Thomson uses another example:  You are asked to give 
money to a charity, in order to save people. You are able to send your own money, but 
you instead feel like stealing the money of someone else and sending that money to the 
charity. We claim that the analogy does not apply, because in the charity dilemma, you 
are using something of someone else. It is comparable to the ‘transplant dilemma’ 
(Thomson, 1985), whereby a surgeon can save five patients by sacrificing an innocent 
person and use that person’s organs for transplantation. The transplant dilemma is 
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similar to the bridge trolley dilemma, whereby you also use something of the victim, 
namely his body, without his consent. So Thomson’s analogy can be used to argue that 
pushing the fat man in the bridge dilemma is not allowed. But from the charity dilemma 
analogy, it does not yet follow that turning the switch is not allowed. FitzPatrick (2009) 
and Shaver (2011) also commented on Thomson’s new turn towards pure deontology 
(Thomson, 2008). 
 
2. Illigitimate plans. Russell (1979) referred to ‘illegitimate plans’ to argue against the 
permission of, for example, pushing the fat man from the bridge. But this idea was 
criticized by Kamm (1989), and is in fact equal to pure deontology, as all the actions are 
shown to be illegitimate plans. 
 
3. Threatened persons. Montmarquet (1982) stated that only when a person was not 
threatened is action impermissible. But he claimed that the person on the side track is 
already threatened. This claim, however, is false, as was argued by Gorr (1990). 
Montmarquet’s approach would result in pure deontology, just like the DDA (Gorr 
himself, by the way, refers to a ‘same threat’ account). 
 
4. Rare situations. Gert (1993) claimed that – in contrast with impermissible actions – 
the permissible actions occur in very rare situations. Sitting in a truck next to a railway 
(Dilemma 5) or standing on a bridge above a railway (Dilemma 2) are more typical 
situations than standing on the railway with no escape possible, standing next to a 
moving platform, or standing in the pathway of a rock, and so on. The problem with this 
approach is that it is difficult to quantify the rarity of a situation and derive from this 
the permissibility of actions. 
Conclusion and further research 
The basic question we now have to ask is whether our pattern of answers (following our 
moral intuitions) is given by one or more of the three accounts presented above: the 
mere means, same threat, or causal chain accounts. If not, there must be other 
principles, or we must have moral illusions (comparable to optical illusions and 
cognitive biases). We know that there are some very peculiar examples of irrationalities 
in people’s answers to the trolley dilemmas. Unger (1996) demonstrated that people’s 
responses to the trolley dilemmas are often more (inconsistent) psychology than ethics, 
by pointing out that judgments about the permissibility of an option (e.g. the choice to 
push the fat man) depend on the availability of other options that people consider as 
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being irrelevant (see also Norcross, 2008). There is the well known effect of wording and 
framing (Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Lanteri et al., 2008; Ray & 
Holyoak, 2010). Especially the order in which different trolley dilemmas are presented, 
has some influence (Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Liao et al. 2011; Schwitzgebel & 
Cushman, 2012; Di Nucci, 2012). And also induced feelings of disgust (Schnall et al., 2008) 
and happiness (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) can influence moral intuitions in the trolley 
dilemmas. The turn that the trolley problem has made towards empirical studies in 
moral psychology (Greene, 2008; Cushman et al. 2006; Mikhail, 2007) is very fruitful, 
especially in discovering moral illusions. Still, the abovementioned studies in 
experimental philosophy do not indicate that the gap between the two paradigmatic 
cases Switch and Bridge can be closed. 
Given the classification of different accounts above, we can now ask the following 
(empirical) questions: How many people can agree with one or more of the three 
principles? Which account will have the most followers? What happens if respondents 
learn about these accounts? Do people feel satisfied with these accounts, and would they 
pick a preferred one? Will this influence their judgments in some dilemmas, and how? 
If, for example, a person is permissive towards the action in the loop dilemma, but 
learned that the mere means account is perfectly compatible with all of his/her 
intuitions in all dilemmas, except for the loop dilemma, would that change the 
judgment in the loop dilemma? Can such reflections easily override intuitions? Would 
that eventually influence the intuition in that dilemma? Can those accounts be used in 
the method of reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1971)? These can be questions for future 
research. 
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